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Abstract 
This study examines spatial dimensions of state violence against the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia in the 1930s, and the creation of a place of 
surveillance, the famous House of Writers (Budynok Slovo), an apartment 
building that was conceived by an association of writers “Slovo” in Kharkiv. 
This building fashioned an important identity for Ukrainian intellectuals, 
which was altered under state pressure and the fear of being exterminated. 
Their creative art was gradually transformed into the art of living and 
surviving under the terror, a feature of a regimented society. The study 
explores the writers’ behavior during arrests and interrogation, and examines 
the Soviet secret police’s tactics employed in interrogation rooms.  
 
The narrative considers the space of politics that brought the 
perpetrators of terror and their victims closer to each other, eventually forcing 
them to share the same place. Within this space and place they became 
interchangeable and interchanged, and ultimately were physically eliminated. 
Importantly, the research illuminates the multiethnic composition of the 
building’s residents: among them were cultural figures of Ukrainian, Russian 
and Jewish origins. Their individual histories and contributions to Ukrainian 
culture demonstrate the vector of Stalin’s terror which targeted not Ukrainian 
ethnicity as such but instead was directed against the development of 
Ukrainian national identity and Ukrainian statehood that were perceived as a 
challenge to the center’s control and as harbingers of separatism.  
 
The study also reveals that the state launched the course of counter-
Ukrainization in 1926 and disintegrated the Ukrainian intellectual community 
through mass repressive operations which the secret police began to apply 
from 1929. The study also demonstrates that, together with people, the state 
purposefully exterminated national cultural artifacts—journals, books, art and 
sculpture, burying human ideas which have never been and will never be 
consummated. The purpose was to explain how the elimination of most 
prominent Ukrainian intellectuals was organized, rationalized and politicized. 
During the period of one decade, the terror tore a hole in the fabric of 
Ukrainian culture that may never be mended.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
  
v 
 
Acknowledgments 
I am indebted to my supervisor Dr. Nick Baron for his professional 
guidance and patience throughout this project. Our different views on several 
issues crucial to Soviet history invigorated robust debates which encouraged 
greater introspection about the subject of my research. Because of his 
thoughtful comments, several separate research projects were launched that 
helped me address questions that were not included in the thesis. Moreover, I 
have to thank Dr. Baron for sharing common interests in cultural studies (what 
could we expect other than this from the children of writers?), interests that, I 
hope, might generate a common research project in the future. Beyond 
intellectual encouragement for this study, I am grateful for his unfailing 
support for all my projects that ran parallel to the dissertation over three years. 
 
I am also grateful to Professor Elizabeth Harvey for her thoughtful and 
detailed comments on various chapters of the dissertation, and for her support 
of my endless array of research projects. The final draft especially benefited 
from her suggestions about structure and the conceptual framework of the 
thesis. Inspiring conversations with Dr. Liudmyla Sharipova about Ukrainian 
realities reinforced a necessary bridge between the past and the present in 
Ukrainian history, which found its reflection on the pages of the dissertation. 
 
The assistance of faculty and staff at the University of Nottingham 
(History Department) Professors Maiken Umbach and John Young, Dr. Rob 
Lutton, Dr. Mathilde Von Bulow, Dr. Sarah Badcock, Amanda Samuels and 
Jessica Chan helped me in many different ways approach the final stage of the 
Ph.D. program, for which I am very grateful to all of them. Dr. Margaret Siriol 
Colley, the British journalist Gareth Jones’ niece, was extraordinarily kind to 
me during my residence in Nottingham, and I am grateful to her for sharing 
her thoughts and knowledge about the famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine.   
 
I also wish to thank Dr. Myroslav Shkandrij (another scholar and a 
child of a writer) for his generous support of this project—for the time he 
invested reading the thesis and his thoughtful comments and knowledge on the 
subject he shared with me. I am indebted to him for providing me with 
alternative translations of names, titles and excerpts from prose and poetry 
from Ukrainian into English. His suggestions made my translations and the 
narrative clearer and more precise. 
 
I owe special thanks to my undergraduate professor Dr. Michael 
Hickey whose intelligence, knowledge, thoroughness and precision have 
always set an example for me. His constant involvement and contribution to 
my scholarly growth are greatly appreciated, as well as his practical advice 
about surviving in the academic world. 
 
I would also like to thank Dr. Matthew Schwonek for reading parts of 
the thesis and for his extensive comments, as well as for additional secondary 
sources he recommended. They were extraordinarily helpful for my 
understanding of several issues raised in the dissertation. I am grateful to Dr. 
Roman Serbyn, Dr. Roman Senkus, Dr. Marko Pavlyshyn and Dr. Halyna 
vi 
 
Hryn for their general support of the study and patient readings of parts of the 
dissertation. Special thanks to the Ukrainian journal editors Liudmyla 
Shalaeva and Dr. Aliona Varets’ka who provided me with their thought-
provoking comments about several chapters of the dissertation and also with 
their friendly support while in Kyiv, Ukraine. I greatly appreciate my 
friendship with the Ukrainian scholar Serhii Krasnokuts’kyi who helped me 
conceptualize the narrative about Mykhailo Bykovets’. His and his wife Dr. 
Viktoriia Kas’ianova’s incessant optimism and rare sense of humor have been 
a “transmitted” phenomenon, and helped me during moments of despair and 
disappointment.  
 
I appreciate the thoughtful suggestions of Dr. William Chase about the 
issues of subjectivity and terminological clarity of several notions related to 
repression. I am grateful for his trust in me as a scholar and his support of my 
views. Dr. Yaroslav Bilinsky read a part of my thesis and provided several 
useful insights that strengthened the argument, and Dr. Taras Hunczak 
confirmed the legitimate use of the term “slov’iany” after consulting with his 
colleagues—scholars in Ukraine. I am grateful to David Brandenberger for his 
comments about the theme of Galicians, and for his thought provoking 
questions about the subjectivities of Soviet secret agents.         
 
I am grateful to Dr. Vadym Zolotar’ov, an expert on the history of the 
Soviet secret police, for his support of the study and his willingness to make 
his unique private archive available to me. The study greatly benefited from 
his knowledge and subtle understanding of the methods and practices of the 
secret police in the 1930s.  
 
The Ukrainian historian Ihor Shuis’kyi allowed me to use the catalogue 
of the state project “Rehabilitated by History” which helped me locate several 
criminal files of the slov’iany. Our communication resulted in a mutual 
scholarly project that is in its final stage. 
 
The Les’ Kurbas Center in Kyiv helped a great deal at the early stage 
of my research, and provided me with an opportunity to use a unique 
collection of sources about Ukrainian culture and theatre gathered by Les’ 
Taniuk. Special thanks to Dr. Tetiana Boiko for her knowledge and assistance 
with the sources. I also owe a large debt of gratitude to L.I. Mukha, Head of 
the Scientific and Informational Department in the Institute of Ukrainian 
History of the National Academy of Science (Kyiv, Ukraine), who provided 
access to a great wealth of materials about Soviet repression of Galicians 
during the 1920s-1930s and the famine of 1932-33 in Soviet Ukraine.   
 
I am indebted to the staff of the Ukrainian archives for their 
assistance—Serhii Bohunov, Volodymyr Viatrovych, Volodymyr Hovorun, 
Heorhii Smirnov, Marat Balyshev, Olena Balysheva, Leonid Skrypka, 
Volodymyr Lozyts’kyi, Liudmyla Momot, Valentyna Plisak, Iuliia Kozhedub, 
Iuliia Hun’ko,  Olena Rachkivs’ka,  Ul’iana Herasimova, Oksana Sumtsova, 
Iryna Hryhorenko, Svitlana Dubrovs’ka, Tetiana Pylypchuk, Ol’ha 
Riznychenko, Volodymyr Chaplia, and for their permission to make 
photocopies of archival documents. Special thanks to the Head of the Security 
vii 
 
Service of Ukraine in Kharkiv oblast’ Volodymyr Vyshnevs’kyi and to the 
Head of the SBU archive in Kyiv Svitlana Liaskovs’ka. 
 
Research and writing were supported by several institutions. I am 
grateful to the University of Nottingham and its History Department (U.K.), 
the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (Canada), the Shevchenko 
Scientific Society (U.S.A.), and the British Royal Historical Society (U.K.) for 
their financial support of the study. This support made my extensively long 
research trips to Ukrainian archives possible. 
 
I wish to thank the Union of Writers and the community of Kharkiv 
writers who in many ways participated in this project. I am grateful to the 
Ukrainian poet Tetiana Shamrai for our 3 December 1988 conversation that 
occurred several days before her tragic death at the age of 24. I frequently 
return to this conversation about Khvyl’ovyi, mortality and senseless 
existence, and her poetry in my memory, and this memory accompanied me 
and helped me conceptualize the chapter about Khvyl’ovyi. I am also grateful 
to the literary critic Volodymyr Bruggen whose work, thoughts and friendship 
were of great importance and support for me throughout this project. Special 
thanks to the poets Anatolii Pererva and Viacheslav Romanovs’kyi for their 
valuable assistance during my research in Kharkiv. The project also benefited 
from my communication with the theatre director and actor of the Pushkin 
Russian Drama Theatre Oleksandr Vasyl’iev, the theatre director of the 
Shevchenko Ukrainian Drama Theatre in Kharkiv Anatolii Starodub, and the 
Ukrainian artist Natalia Verhun. 
 
I would like to thank Valentyna Sichkar, the director of the Holobs’ka 
Village Library (Kovel’ Region,Volyn’ oblast’, Ukraine), for allowing me to 
use documents related to the slov’ianka Halyna Orlivna (from the Iakov 
Voznyi  Family Archive). I am also very grateful to the director of the 
Korolenko State Scientific Library (Kharkiv, Ukraine) Valentyna 
Rakytians’ka and her assistant Nadiia Firsova for their permission to use rare 
book collections and for making photocopies of documents and photographs 
that have been used in the dissertation.  
 
I consider myself fortunate in having Dale A. Bertelsen as my 
husband, friend and scholarly advisor. His expertise in Soviet political and 
cultural history was of great help to me, and I am pleased to express my 
gratitude for his comments and suggestions about earlier drafts of the 
dissertation. With all my love and appreciation of his help, I have to admit that 
I am still confused about the proper use of English articles “a” and “the,” 
which I use interchangeably and often improperly. Nevertheless, of necessity, 
we discovered his unique culinary talents which proved useful in keeping our 
family alive during the writing of this thesis. We both are thankful to our 
daughter Kate whose intellectual and professional maturity allowed us to 
pursue our separate scholarly projects. Her physical presence and her interest 
in the topic helped me mobilize my intellectual resources during public 
presentations. 
 
viii 
 
Finally, I would like to thank my parents, the former residents of the 
House of Writers (Budynok Slovo)—my late father and Ukrainian poet Robert 
Tretyakov, and my mother, editor and journalist, Lidiia Tretyakova, without 
whom this project would not have come into being. They brought me into this 
world, and, most importantly, into this place, which became emblematic of 
Ukrainian cultural traditions. I am grateful to my predecessors, Jewish, 
Ukrainian and Russian intellectuals, who resided in apartment 44 in the House 
of Writers in Kharkiv where I was born, Dovid Fel’dman, Oleksandr 
Dovzhenko, Mykola Bazhan, Iurii Ianovs’kyi, Ivan Kaliannyk and Ivan 
Vyrhan, whose individual histories and creative art invigorated my interest in 
this study, and inspire me to continue.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
Contents 
Abstract                 iii 
 
Acknowledgments               v 
 
Introduction         1 
 
The Subject of the Study and Historiography     1 
Conceptual Framework       15 
Sources and Methods       27 
 
Chapter One        39 
From Culture to Politics: The House of Writers— 
Conceived, Lived, Perceived 
 
Kharkiv of the 1920s—“the Capital of Arts”    39 
Conceiving Byt: Collective Search for Solitude and Isolation 45 
Building Budynok Slovo: Organizational Difficulties  55 
Slov’iany and the Communal 1930     67 
  
Chapter Two                77 
Material Culture and Surveillance of Budynok Slovo 
 
Budynok Slovo as an Architectural Innovation   77 
Fashion in Budynok Slovo      92 
Elegance as a Business Style: Writers’ Tools   97 
Furniture: Luxury, Convenience, and its Absence   99 
Changing Self-Identities of the Slov’iany            102 
Surveillance of Budynok Slovo: Vanishing Public Space          106 
The Role of Janitors and Administrators            111  
Deterioration of the Community and Art            114 
 
Chapter Three               121 
Police Spatial Practices and the Galician Trace 
 
Historical Context                123 
The Early Thirties: Vanquished Slov’iany            132 
The Kharkiv GPU Prison and Staff: Practices and Traditions   140 
The First Slov’iany Arrested              148 
Galicians (Halychany): Proponents of Ukrainian Culture          153 
x 
 
Independentist Pavlo Khrystiuk              156 
Words, Deeds, Fear and Confusion             161 
Chapter Four               165 
Ialovyi’s Case: The Power of Interrogation Rooms  
 
Combating Ukrainian Nationalism             165 
The Uniqueness of Mykhailo Ialovyi’s Criminal File          170  
Obliterating Human Bonds and Friendships            183 
Love and Fear: Lidiia Vovchyk-Blakytna            189  
The Ukrainian Scenario of Conversion            194 
Chapter Five               207 
Mykola Khvyl’ovyi: Suicide or Murder? 
 
Khvyl’ovyi in Scholarly Discourse             210 
Khvyl’ovyi’s Views and the Literary Landscape of the 1920s     218 
The State’s Attitudes toward Khvyl’ovyi            224 
The Noose Tightened: The Late 1920s             228 
Potential Reasons for Khvyl’ovyi’s Suicide            231 
The Controversy over Khvyl’ovyi’s Suicide            239 
Free in the Space of Art               244 
 
Chapter Six               251  
The UVO Case and the Repressions of 1933 
 
A Scapegoat: Andrii Richyts’kyi             254 
Serhii Pylypenko                263 
The “Decemberists” of 1933                                        267 
Oles’ Dosvitnii                275 
Ostap Vyshnia and Les’ Kurbas             282 
Chapter Seven               295  
Unnecessary Bloodstained Confessions: The 
Repressions of 1934 
 
The Spatiality of the Terror              295 
Oleksa Slisarenko: Temporary Surrender            299 
The Krushel’nytskyi Family: The Fatal Misstep                          304                         
Valerian Polishchuk: “An Artist with Nerves Stretched like 
Strings”                                                                         313 
Hryhorii Epik: A Return to Roots             326   
xi 
 
Displacement, “Prisonization,” and Social Exclusion          337 
 
Chapter Eight               341 
Repressions of 1935-1936: “Wrong” Places for 
Tea Ceremonies 
 
 Counter-Ukrainization in Progress             341 
The Russian Tolmachiov as a Ukrainian Nationalist          349 
The Head of the Cooperative “Slovo” Petro Lisovyi          360 
The Boichukists Vasyl’ Sedliar and Ivan Padalka           370  
Ethnically Diverse Ukrainian Nationalists            380 
 
Chapter Nine               399  
The Great Terror: Reshaping Social and Cultural 
Space 
 
No Victors                 399 
Mykhail’ Semenko and Ivan Kulyk: Semantics Stripped 
of Meaning                 402 
“It Is Better to Hit Harder:” The NKVD’s 1937 Crop of the 
Privileged                 422 
1938: The Remaining Slov’iany Were Swept Away           453 
 
Conclusion                       475 
 
Selected Bibliography             500 
 
Archival Sources                500 
Soviet and Ukrainian Periodicals             502 
Published Scholarly Works              503 
Reference Works                522 
Published Collections of Documents             523 
Literary Works                524 
Memoirs, Diaries, Biographies and Correspondence                 525 
 
  
xii 
 
 
1 
 
 Introduction 
The Subject of the Study and Historiography 
The Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia’s experience in the 1920s and 
1930s is tragically unique, because most of them perished in Stalin’s camps or 
were executed in the cellars of the GPU.
1
 Long suppressed by Tsarist Russia, 
Ukrainian culture experienced a renaissance in the 1920s known as the 
Cultural Renaissance or Red Renaissance. But this resurgence was short-
lived—this cultural revival was increasingly characterized by the center as 
nationalist rather than national. In the late 1920s, when Stalin consolidated his 
power, mass arrests of the Ukrainian intelligentsia began, and the rebirth of 
Ukrainian culture soon became known as the Executed Renaissance.
2
  
The number of Ukrainians incarcerated in the Gulag increased steadily 
from the late 1920s. By late September 1929, the number of prisoners in the 
                                                          
1
 On the number of Ukrainian writers who were victims of Stalin’s regime, see Tanya 
Richardson, Kaleidoscopic Odessa: History and Place in Contemporary Ukraine (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2008), 27; Semen Pidhainyi, Ukrains’ka inteligentsiia na 
Solovkakh: nedostriliani (Kyiv: Vudavnychyi dim “Kyievo-Mogylians’ka akademiia, 2008); 
Mykola Zhulyns’kyi et al., eds., Nashi vtraty: Materialy do biohrafichnoho slovnyka 
represovanykh u 1930-ykh rokakh diiachiv v URSR, zibrani Iuriiem Lavrinenkom (Kyiv/New 
York: Ukrains’ka Vil’na Akademiia Nauk u SShA,“Tvim Inter,” 2005); Natalia Yakovenko, 
“On Historical Memory and the Traditions of the Ukrainian People,” Independent Cultural 
Magazine ‘Ii’ 22 (2001): 19; George S.N. Luckyj, Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 
1917-1934 (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990), 257-58. On the ethnic 
composition of prisoners in the GULAG system, see Anne Applebaum, GULAG: A History 
(New York: Doubleday, 2003), 495. On the 1937-38 NKVD arrest quotas of the Ukrainians, 
see Oleg V. Khlevniuk, The History of the Gulag: From Collectivization to the Great Terror, 
trans. V. Stalko (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2004), 162 and Paul R. 
Gregory, Terror by Quota: State Security from Lenin to Stalin (An Archival Study) (New 
Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009), 72, 192, 233, 236, 265-6. GPU refers to 
Soviet secret police—the State Political Administration (Gosudarstvennoie politicheskoie 
upravleniie). On 15 October 1923, the GPU was transformed into the OGPU, the United State 
Political Administration, which was changed to the NKVD—the People’s Commissariat for 
Internal Affairs (Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del SSSR) in 1934. Because the Russian 
acronyms GPU and NKVD are more recognizable for scholars, they are used throughout the 
narrative instead of their analogies in Ukrainian—DPU and NKVS.    
2
 The term “Executed Renaissance” was offered by Jerzy Giedroyc, the Polish journalist, 
activist and the editor of the journal Kultura (Paris) who suggested this term as a title for the  
Diaspora literary critic Jurij Lawrynenko’s anthology of 1917-33 works by Ukrainian writers 
that was published in Paris in 1959 (Instytut Literacki). The fifth edition of this collection was 
published in Kyiv in 2007 by the Smoloskyp Publishing House. 
2 
 
Solovets’ki Islands (Solovky) grew dramatically: the majority of contingents 
were Ukrainian peasants, priests and the intelligentsia, primarily teachers.
3
 By 
1931, the Ukrainian prisoners constituted the “lion’s share of the Northern 
exiles.”
4
 In his pioneering study, Jurij Lawrynenko revealed that throughout 
1931-34, besides Ukrainian scholars in the humanities from VUAN (the 
Ukrainian Academy of Science), representatives of the technical intelligentsia 
were swept up in the arrests, as well as people from various cultural 
institutions such as theatre, museums, archives, and libraries, and 
professionals from the military, industry, agriculture, education, and medicine. 
The Soviet terror also took the lives of 259 Ukrainian writers; only 36 
survived Stalin’s purges.
5
 Between January 1933 and January 1934, the 
Communist party of Ukraine was purged. Most of those who were dismissed 
were arrested: the Ukrainian Communist party lost about 100,000 people, 
many of whom were representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. 
Individuals “with a measure of independent thought” were removed and sent 
to labor camps not as Ukrainians but as “nationalist deviationists,” as Stalin’s 
protégé in Ukraine Pavel Postyshev emphasized.
6
  Considering the Great 
                                                          
3
 Pidhainyi, 17-9; Dmytro Vedeneev and Serhii Shevchenko, Ukrains’ki Solovky (Kyiv: 
“EksOb,” 2001), 79. The political prisoner of Solovky Ivan Tuz wrote in October 1937 that in 
Solovky, the majority of inmates were Ukrainians.  
4
 Lynne Viola, The Unknown Gulag: The Lost World of Stalin’s Special Settlements (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 71, 195-97.   
5
 Larysa Lawrynenko, “Slovo do chytacha” in Zhulyns’kyi, 5. I. Lawrynenko’s research 
studied the fates of all those writers who published their works before 1930. See also David R. 
Marples, Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine (New 
York: Central European University Press, 2007), 58. Marples noted that in 1932-33, 1,649 
Ukrainian scholars were purged. See also Pavel Monakov’s memoirs about the Solovky, 
available at http://www.solovki.ca/camp_20/kurbas_solovki.php (accessed 26 January 2012). 
Monakov who shared his prison cell with Les’ Kurbas and 5 other inmates noted that the 
Solovky were almost exclusively Ukrainian.    
6
 Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century 
Ukraine (Edmonton, Canada: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies; University of Toronto 
Press, 1985), 146. See also George O. Liber, Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and 
Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 
3 
 
Terror, Hiroaki Kuromiya has noted that despite the relative inaccuracy of 
statistical data and the imprecision of data concerning ethnic identity in 
localities, the numbers for 1937-38 provide us with at least some approximate 
ethnic dimensions of Stalin’s terror in Ukraine: “ethnic Ukrainians accounted 
for the majority of those arrested (and almost certainly executed as well): 53.2 
percent. Russians were the second largest ethnic group among those arrested: 
7.7 percent.”
7
 On the basis of the French scholars France Meslé’s and Jacques 
Vallin’s calculations, “in total, the 1939 Ukrainian population deficit due to 
forced migration departures from Ukraine can thus be established at 400,000 
who were forcibly exiled and 530,000 deported to the gulag, i.e. 930,000, of 
whom 563,000 were males and 367,000 females.”
 8
 
Colonial Russification policies and the Soviet treatment of Ukraine as 
a borderland region constrained the development of Ukrainian culture, and as 
Tanya Richardson has noted, although it did develop, it was “positioned in 
quasi-colonial ways in relation to Russian culture in the Russian Empire and 
Soviet Union.”
9
 The complexity of Ukraine as a geographical and, most 
importantly, a borderland region, has been emphasized in studies by Catherine 
Wanner, Andrew Wilson, Kate Brown, Tanya Richardson and Timothy 
Snyder, and is typical for places with a “legacy of statelessness” and “shifting 
                                                                                                                                                        
169. Liber noted that among party-members and candidate-members purged in 1932-3 most 
were Ukrainians.       
7
 Hiroaki Kuromiya, The Voices of the Dead: Stalin’s Great Terror in the 1930s (New Haven 
& London: Yale University Press, 2007), 218-19. Kuromiya provides the ethnicity distribution 
in the Ukrainian population as 78.2 % Ukrainian and 11.3% Russian. See also Timothy 
Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 85-
87, 89, 329, and Norman M. Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2010). Snyder posited that in Soviet Ukraine, besides class enemies, the 
Soviet Union “was also killing ethnic enemies:” a third of the arrests were part of national 
operations.   
8
 See France Meslé’s and Jacques Vallin’s detailed explanations in Mortality and Causes of 
Death in 20
th
-Century Ukraine, in the series of the Max Planck Institute for Demographic 
Research, trans. Karen George (Paris, France: Springer, 2012), 27. 
9
 Richardson, 175.  
4 
 
state regimes.”
 10
 It suggests that the struggle of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in 
the 1920-30s might be profitably explained through a spatial lens. 
In essence, Ukraine in the 1920s and1930s constituted a broad 
battleground, geographically and intellectually, where the fate of the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia and Ukrainian identity were ultimately forged for 
years to come. There were, however, places where the struggle might be 
closely and carefully observed. One of these places was Budynok Slovo (the 
House of Writers), an apartment building that was conceived by the 
cooperative “Slovo” (Word), a professional association of writers in Kharkiv, 
the Ukrainian capital until 1934. This building as a geographical place and 
intellectual space reveals the patterns of human behavior that emerged during 
the cultural struggle of the 1920s and1930s, and through the analysis of this 
contested place and space, a clearer view of this period in Ukrainian history 
emerges. 
This research marks the first attempt in Western scholarship to write 
the history of Budynok Slovo and contributes to our understanding of its role in 
the development of Ukrainian culture and the fate of the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia. This building has a special meaning in any discussion about ties 
between a writer’s national identity, art, emotions and the landscape that 
shapes this identity,
11
 and social and political behavior. Space and place are 
concepts that reveal the interplay of the Ukrainian writers’ borderland 
                                                          
10
 Catherine Wanner, Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine 
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), xviii; Andrew Wilson, 
The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Kate 
Brown, A Biography of no Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2004); Richardson, Kaleidoscopic Odessa, 212; Snyder, 
Bloodlands. 
11
 On relations between human emotions, the geographical landscape (a place) and identity, 
see Yi Fu Tuan, Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes and Values (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1974).  
5 
 
experience, their creative manner of expression and the state’s perspective and 
vision of their role in socialist construction. 
Budynok Slovo as a place is also significant in the history of 
individuals who lived there in the 1930s. Despite the fact that most residents 
of the building (writers, theatre directors, artists and state officials) were 
ethnic Ukrainians, the composition of the building remained multiethnic. 
Among the residents of Budynok Slovo, known as slov’iany, were writers of 
Jewish and Russian origins, whose everyday experiences, as well as their 
contributions to the dynamics of events in the building and to Ukrainian 
culture, were valuable and have been examined in this study.
12
 The importance 
of utilizing ethnically diverse human experiences in historical narratives about 
Ukraine has been emphasized by Mark von Hagen, Andreas Kappeler, Serhii 
Plokhy and other historians, and such an approach is conditioned by the rich 
multiethnic history of Ukraine, its geographical positioning and cross-cultural 
borderland experience.
 13
 
One key agency is also of great importance to this study, an agency 
that contributed significantly to the history of Budynok Slovo and changed the 
                                                          
12
 The cooperative members called themselves slov’iany, a term that illuminated an interplay 
between these two words, “slovo” (word), the name of a writers’ cooperative, and slov’iany 
(Slavic people). 
13
 See Mark von Hagen, “Empires, Borderlands, and Diasporas: Eurasia as Anti-Paradigm for 
the Post-Soviet Era,” American Historical Review 109, no. 2 (2004): 445–68; Andreas 
Kappeler, “From an Ethnonational to a Multiethnic to a Transnational Ukrainian History,” 
Ukraine as a Laboratory of Transnational History, eds. Georgiy Kasianov and Philipp Ther 
(Budapest: CEU P), 2009. 51–80; Andreas Kappeler, “‘Great Russians’ and ‘Little Russians’: 
Russian–Ukrainian Relations and Perceptions in Historical Perspective,” The Donald W. 
Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, no. 39 (Seattle: 
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cultural and political landscape in Ukraine—the Soviet secret police. Many 
scholarly studies clarified the origins, goals, functions, methods and practices 
of this powerful agency. These valuable works introduced several aspects of 
power struggles among leading figures, the relationship of the agency with the 
center, and the basic principles and methods of the agency’s work during 
Stalin’s era.
14
 In addition, works by the Ukrainian historians Iurii Shapoval, 
Vadym Zolotar’ov, Volodymyr Prystaiko, Volodomyr Okipniuk and 
Oleksandr Rubl’ov enriched the analysis of practices employed by the secret 
organs and added important depth to the social portraits of chekists who 
worked with the slov’iany.
15
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Although the issue of subjectivity is not the main focus of this study, 
the slov’iany’s feelings, emotions and self-perceptions have been discussed in 
several contexts on the basis of their own testimonies and behavior. 
Subjectivity was a point of departure for existentialists, and to some degree, an 
analysis of the writers’ behavior, feelings and perceptions benefited from 
Sartre’s perspective. He believed that people’s subjectivity could be analyzed 
in the context of choices they made and the behavior they exhibited.
16
 Some of 
his explanations are problematic, but Sartre accurately grasped one aspect—
people discover their subjectivity and inner “I” only through their contacts 
with other people and through the cultural space that surrounds them, a 
phenomenon that he calls “inter-subjectivity.”
17
 Within a social vacuum, 
humans are often unable to understand either themselves or the realities 
around them.
18
 The selection of this premise of Sartre combined with the 
spatial perspective as a framework for examining the lives of the slov’iany is 
not accidental. An analysis of people’s behavior and the choices they made in 
different settings help us better understand both—them as human beings and 
the space in which they functioned. Isolated from the external world, the 
writers could not make sense of the realities which drove many insane. The 
notions of space and place invite us to consider their specificity. In this case 
study, the specificity of power politics in Ukraine evoked certain popular 
feelings, emotions and attitudes, which in turn dictated specific human 
adaptations and behavior.  
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In contrast to several recent studies on subjectivities, this study argues 
precisely against the idea that the dominant trend during Stalinism was the 
internalization and inner acceptance of Stalinist values.
 19
 The evidence shows 
that in the Ukrainian context this was not the case. The subject of this 
research, the Ukrainian intelligentsia, although having faith in Communism in 
the early twenties, ceased being happy Stalinists by the early thirties. Because 
of their fear of physical extermination, feelings of despair and doom 
overwhelmed them. Hopes for building a new Ukrainian culture were 
abandoned; they were marginalized as “nationalists,” and were quietly 
arrested. They became disillusioned, and even their quest for privacy and 
comfort was denied.  
George O. Liber aptly noted that “unlike Russian writers, who were 
committed to Bolshevik state-building in the 1920s, Ukrainian writers were 
involved in nation-building.”
20
 The lives of Ukrainian intellectuals are 
considered therefore in the context of historical realities and politics in 
Ukraine, which allows a nuanced view of national/regional human experiences 
under Stalinism. For most Ukrainian literati, the meaning of their lives was 
derived not from the state as a vehicle of the revolutionary project, but from 
the regional/national cultural landscape which conditioned their feelings and 
behavior. They were more nationally oriented than revolutionary, although 
they all emerged from the Revolution. However, understandings of the 
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Revolution were very different in Russia and Ukraine. The “revolutionary 
project” for them was to de-russify Ukraine, and in this sense, they derived the 
meaning of their lives from the state at the moment it supported Ukrainization. 
When they realized that Ukrainization was simply a “chess move” and a 
temporary concession to a nationally conscious Communist party elite in 
Ukraine, most of them were disenchanted; some committed suicide.
21
 
The present study of Budynok Slovo is focused on repression, terror 
and human deaths in one place, and, more specifically, on the manner and 
methods of killing. The purpose of such a focus is to illuminate its vector and, 
most significantly, its reasons, and to examine the state’s involvement in mass 
killings and its legitimization of deaths. This study not only locates the place 
of violent deaths geographically, but it also views historical events and human 
experiences through personal biographies that have been placed in a larger 
political context. It is written in the belief that behind theoretical 
generalizations, human beings should always be seen—whether for a better 
understanding of their integrity, or for their irrationality, confusion, and moral 
deterioration. Isaiah Berlin believed that “what we are seeking to understand is 
men—human beings endowed, as we are, with minds and purposes and inner 
lives.”
22
 The examination of human experiences in one place provides us with 
this opportunity, and an analysis of the social fabric of this place reveals 
patterns of human behavior, their motivations and the relationships among 
people that are interdependent with and contingent upon external forces. 
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This examination became possible due to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the gradual opening of the archives over the following two decades, 
the events that dramatically changed Soviet studies, yielding new approaches 
to Soviet history. In the post-Soviet period, hostile attitudes toward the USSR 
and historical interpretations of the most critical events of Stalin’s era were 
replaced by newer ones that preferred to avoid ideology or large overviews, 
and instead focused on the experience of the ordinary citizen, on micro-
histories or the study of daily life. Sometimes these approaches were 
influenced by discussions of postmodernism and sometimes by a desire to 
overturn the ideologization that was a legacy of “Cold War thinking.” These 
studies often avoided the most appalling aspects of the Soviet experience, and 
by doing so frequently flirted with various forms of apologism. They were 
manifested in concepts such as vacillation, infighting, confusion, 
indecisiveness and ad-hoc measures of central power.
23
 As Stanislav 
Kul’chyts’kyi has noted, the goal was “to free the history of the USSR from 
the critical assessments characteristic of the Cold War era.”
24
 Some contended 
that the repression and violence was a response to insistent pressure from 
regional authorities.
25
 However, these approaches, now well-represented in 
Western scholarship, have not generated a consensus among historians. They 
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have, in turn, been challenged by scholars who have reaffirmed the 
significance of mass terror, the gulag, the famine of 1932-33, and the role of 
the secret police as crucial, defining moments.
26
  
The discovery of a wealth of archival information dealing with Stalin 
and the interwar period, and the participation of East European scholars in 
wider historical discussions have forced a reappraisal of the twenties and the 
thirties, and a construction of a more nuanced narrative about state violence.
27
 
In Ukraine, hundreds of operational files and thousands of individual and 
collective criminal files fabricated by the secret police became available to 
scholars. These documents have fundamentally challenged the historical 
narrative about Soviet nationality policies in Ukraine presented by many 
Russian and Western historians. Paul V. Gregory has stated that “as a vast 
borderland subject to forces of nationalism, it would seem that Stalin would 
especially have singled out the Ukraine for repression.”
28
 The archival 
evidence discovered in Ukraine supports this claim, yet the on-going 
discussion of the questions “why terror?” and “why Ukraine?” have produced 
heated scholarly debates. In particular, the issues of the intentionality of state 
violence (including ethnic cleansing operations and the extermination of 
millions of people during the famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine) and its specific 
national vector remains largely unsettled.  
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Western scholars explored the multi-faceted dimensions of national 
cleansing operations in the 1930s. Terry Martin formulated the idea of an 
“affirmative action empire,” Yuri Slezkine spoke of “ethnophilia,” and Ronald 
Grigor Suny of a “state of nations.”
29
 The present study challenges their 
supposition that Ukrainization and other nationality campaigns were aimed at 
the promotion of national identity and self-consciousness of non-Russian 
populations of the Soviet Union, and at the development of their own political 
and cultural institutions, a supposition which is inconsistent with new archival 
evidence. The evidence presented in this study illuminates the state’s fear of 
losing control over Ukraine because of potential cooperation between the 
intelligentsia and the peasantry, a fear that had been instigated by a 
widespread hatred of the Soviets and rebellions in the Ukrainian countryside.
30
  
Moreover, in contrast to the ideas that the shift in Soviet nationalities 
policies occurred in 1932-33, this study shows that the perceptions of where 
Ukrainization would lead (according to the center—to Ukrainian separatism) 
arose earlier. The evidence suggests that the center’s decision to keep 
Ukrainization activists under surveillance was adopted in the mid-twenties. 
The study demonstrates that the anti-Ukrainian course was designed in detail 
by the center and the secret police in 1926. Its purpose was to limit and then to 
reverse Ukrainization. This course was in progress until 1929 when it was 
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fully applied though mass repressions of tens of thousands of people. The 
study also examines the rhetoric by which the top party leadership operated to 
curtail Ukrainization, and the real power politics that operated beneath the 
surface. 
Although several authors have provided readers with their reflections 
on the atmosphere of the House of Writers, its residents and traditions, 
information about the legendary building is scattered and has never been 
properly organized or investigated by historians. Among those who have 
written about Budynok Slovo were several of its residents who survived 
Stalin’s purges.
31
 Their main emphasis has been the cruel and horrifying 
history of the building during Stalin’s repressions. 
Budynok Slovo became decisive and significant for both the state and 
its residents. Many different agencies and figures expressed some interest in 
working and living there. The site became a place of conflicts and painful 
negotiations. For its residents, Budynok Slovo was fundamental not only for 
their everyday activities but also for their personal identities, collective dreams 
and political aspirations. The building became a cultural marker of their 
existence. The place reinforced their optimistic expectations about Ukraine’s 
future and the inspiration and passionate dedication (oderzhymist’) to the 
development of Ukrainian culture, trends that were very pronounced in the 
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1920s.
32
 For the state, the building became a place of surveillance and terror 
that conveniently gathered the writers under one roof.    
Yet, the politics of place in the 1930s made the writers realize that their 
“nation, patriotism, native tongue, motherland all fell into the category of 
fiction,” as Valentyn Moroz noted.
33
 Their humanity, enthusiasm and 
inspiration were replaced with fear and depression—in some cases, with moral 
decline. Gone were their resilience and the inspiration that, as Moroz posited, 
was something more than a gift of artists but “a component which is 
indispensable, along with others, for a fully-rounded spiritual life.”
34
 Moroz 
wrote: 
We had Pavlo Tychyna [slov’ianyn—a resident of Budynok Slovo] with his poems of 
genius, but with these treasures he did not possess the power to make Ukrainians of 
even those closest to him, to raise them to speak the Ukrainian language. What was 
lacking? There was not one spark of inspiration left of those which had fallen in 
golden cascades and set aflame the conflagration of the Ukrainian renaissance of the 
twenties. Although at liberty, he no longer possessed the spark of inspiration because 
freedom had been buried by Siberian snows.
35
 
  
The memory of Budynok Slovo also has been buried by Siberian snows, and 
those bits and pieces that miraculously survived have been investigated in this 
study. 
In this historical analysis, Budynok Slovo emerges as a laboratory, an 
experimental space where nascent Stalinism encountered, marginalized and, 
ultimately, overpowered Ukrainian nationalism. This unique vantage point 
provides a detailed exploration of the Soviet secret police’s role in the cultural 
disruption and intellectual paralysis of the residents that to this day haunts the 
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Ukrainian intellectual elite, their creative art, political activism and human 
behavior.    
 
Conceptual Framework 
A recent body of scholarship has emerged that emphasizes the 
influence of physical or geographical space on human behavior and culture, 
reintroducing concepts of space and place to many disciplines in the 
humanities. As David J. Bodenhamer, John Corrigan and Trevor M. Harris 
have noted, the notion of space has been transformed from a “dormant 
interest” to an actively applied theoretical category.
36
 The most appealing 
results of such application came out of scholarship on the states of the former 
Soviet bloc, including the former Soviet Union.
37
 Human experience under 
authoritarian rule is dramatic, traumatic and tragic, and geography as well as 
the history of a place, play an enormous role in subsequent cultural 
development and in the formation of distinct post-traumatic behavioral trends. 
Although the events of the 1920s and 1930s are considered here in 
spatial terms, the theoretical discussion and analysis relate and refer to people. 
Theorizing makes little sense without this focal point. The notion of space and 
place is associatively and naturally connected with the history of people and 
society, and provokes unexpected allusions and interesting hypotheses. The 
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investigation of human behavior in various physical places and social settings 
is an exciting and often rewarding endeavor when events and behavioral 
patterns are structured and clarified through the text (a historical narrative), 
which gradually reveals the significance of the spatial realm. Thinking about 
people and society, and their relationships with the state within a spatial 
framework, enriches our understanding of the cultural roots of the event which 
are inevitably embedded in a given geographic place and social space.  
In other words, when narrating history of people and their deeds, we 
depict space and time, operating with terms which are spatial and temporal by 
nature. The German historian Reinhart Koselleck has emphasized that “all 
historical categories, including progress, which is the first specifically modern 
category of historical time, are spatial expressions by origin …[and] ‘history’ 
[itself] originally also contained a spatial meaning…”
38
 The history of a social 
space, a place or a building is a relatively new concept for historians, but 
spatial history has been readily accepted by the historical community as a 
promising branch of conceptual history. Why? Because the history of a place 
is a history of people’s ideas, deeds and their consequences, and precisely this 
notion makes spatial history so exciting.
39
  
There is also another reason for advocating history expressed in spatial 
terms. The material culture of place helps us better understand the social and 
cultural landscape in which this place existed. Therefore, analyzing space and 
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place, it is important to present a description of their material culture, the 
physical evidence of the past—one that might be confirmed and verified 
through a reader’s personal knowledge and experience, as it relates to these 
objects or space. For instance, a linguistic description of a building may 
trigger the historical imagination about its creators, their desires, convictions 
and even their emotions. In order to verify the truthfulness of a written text, 
visual images of places are of great importance.
40
   
For this study, the politics of space and place that involves the 
relationships between society and state seems to be most relevant. Pressure, 
coercion and violence and the corresponding conformism, obedience and 
submission are examined through a spatial lens that allows us to observe 
transformations of human behavior in different settings. However, the main 
focus is the House of Writers, and although this research is related to one 
building, it is a place that embodies countless generalizable precedents which 
will inevitably enhance our understanding of human experience under 
Stalinism.  
The politics of place, as experienced by Ukrainian writers, influenced 
their feelings and shaped their perceptions and judgments, but at the same time 
space and place were also subject to changes humans imposed on them. Space 
changes in tune with human actions which in turn are influenced by societal 
factors. Buildings are conceived and erected under complex social 
circumstances, and equally complex political, economic and cultural 
conditions in society. The utility and function of architectural structures, as 
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well as their symbolic significance and artistic meaning, shed some light on 
the internal composition of society, or at least, on some social stratum of the 
society, and most importantly, on the boundaries of the permissible at the state 
level, including state and popular visions, aspirations and dreams.  
In other words, space and place are fascinating cognitive categories in 
an anthropological sense, categories that help study and analyze human 
experiences and behavior in society. Through space and physical objects, we 
are able to perceive human emotions, hopes, sufferings and doubts. Through 
their symbolic meanings for a given society, places make it possible to realize 
the scope of human intellectual and moral progress or regression. A mythical 
representation of space or place might perpetuate good or evil, and knowledge 
about the historical context of this representation might change the 
conceptions of space and place, and its representation, sometimes generating 
completely opposite perceptions.
41
 
Furthermore, the discourse about spatial concepts abounds with ideas 
about the essential difference between space and place. For instance, 
American philosopher Edward Casey ascribed some finite qualities to place 
(the material); space for him is associated with the infinite.
42
 This research 
about intellectuals’ lives under Stalinism does not consider differences 
between these two notions, although they are significant in the philosophical, 
historical, and metaphorical sense. Instead, the focus is on a dialectic and 
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temporal relationship between them, the fluid transformation of the material 
(which indeed is finite) to the metaphysical, the space of human memories, 
customs, traditions and practices that were conditioned by a place that has 
survived to the present day or once existed in the past. In this sense, place is 
infinite historically (in time) because it continues to exist in people’s 
imaginations, being recreated in different forms in their literature and art. 
Moreover, those who reproduce a place through their creative activity 
are themselves to a certain degree a product of this place, and its embodiment, 
continuance and extension. This study reveals that the place itself, as well as 
state pressure, led to the cultivation among writers of new skills, dispositions 
and habits—in other words, a new habitus, using Pierre Bourdieu’s term—to a 
degree that it became their second nature. Understanding Ukrainian writers’ 
perceptions and visions about Budynok Slovo, its meaning to them in the past 
and the present, and their habitus will advance our knowledge about the 
thirties and Stalin’s terror in Ukraine.
43
   
Importantly, the geographical, social and political landscape in which 
buildings exist is not static. Everything changes. The historical fluidity and the 
functional adaptability of buildings which reveal the imprint of society and 
state are remarkably instructive for historians, and encourage deeper 
understandings of the sources of societal aggravation with the state, or of 
public enthusiasm about measures undertaken by the state in the sphere of 
human affairs. This particular feature of historical fluidity and flexibility of a 
place (not only as a philosophical concept but even more so as a practical 
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perceptible object) allows us to recreate a moment in history or patterns of 
human behavior. In other words, an analysis of a physical place that constantly 
changes over time under the influence of external forces helps us recreate its 
history and the history of its inhabitants. Stones talk, the ancients taught us, 
but it would be fair to add that buildings talk even more after surviving the 
cataclysms of war and nature. They constitute and embody human spirit and 
meanings people attribute to them throughout history. 
Importantly, the spatial analysis of writers’ lives also guides us to the 
concept of regionalism.
44
 This research marks an attempt to examine the 
worldviews of those representatives of the intelligentsia who were born and 
grew up in Ukraine, a region with unstable borders and boundaries, 
changeable capitals and frontiers, centers and peripheries. Instability is not 
only geographical but political, and, what is more important for the main 
characters of this narrative, cultural. The changeability of space made them 
naively seek a more stable and secure place, and thus, a more stable and 
protected existence, and they created such a place for themselves—Budynok 
Slovo, the meaning of which began to change as soon as its construction was 
completed.  
In a dictatorial society such as the Soviet Union, apartment buildings 
were the spaces which served as the last retreat for many Soviet citizens who 
craved privacy, and gravitated toward individual rather than collective values. 
“Given up, but not completely abandoned” (broshennyi, no ne vpolne 
otpushchennyi), the old style of life and old values, or at least their 
unconscious shadow and memories, inspired people to erect buildings with 
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private apartments which would adhere to Soviet ideas about communal life 
while simultaneously providing for them some semblance of a private 
existence as individuals.
45
 Paradoxically, despite sincerely supporting Soviet 
ideology in rejecting private property and privacy, the Ukrainian writers, the 
subject of this research, still desired property and privacy for themselves, and 
overcame tremendous organizational and financial difficulties to build an 
exemplary apartment compound, innovative and progressive for the 1930s.
46
 
In contrast to many Kharkivites, the intelligentsia perceived urban space not as 
communal but as private space, subsequently discovering how misplaced this 
perception was. 
In the 1920s, the Soviet state itself was involved in constructing 
comfortable apartment buildings. Soviet citizens, especially party officials and 
cultural figures, often received a private apartment as a reward for their loyalty 
to the new socialist state, or as an inducement to solicit that loyalty. Beyond 
improved living conditions, such an exchange provided an additional perk for 
individuals, namely new status and prestige that were associated with their 
apartment. In return, they were expected to exhibit political loyalty and 
stability. However, as Lewis H. Siegelbaum suggested, it would be superficial 
to “treat relations between the state and the intelligentsia in simple bipolar 
terms. The boundaries between the two were too fluid and divisions within 
each too severe to sustain such a framework.” 
47
 Moreover, there were other 
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factors and indicators that must be included in the analysis of these relations, 
temporal and spatial. In Ukraine in the 1930s, cultural space was a site where 
the struggle for control was waged. The politics of space played out in 
Budynok Slovo, where aesthetic creativity and intellectual freedom clashed 
with the hegemony of the Soviet state, transforming the inner essence of both 
the intellectuals and the state. 
48
 This study examines how they were affected 
by one another and to what end. 
The writers produced literature and shaped culture but the place and 
the environment had a symbiotic influence on them, imposing certain modes 
of social and political behavior and structuring their minds. The themes of 
their conformism, ambivalence, and naiveté of their everyday behavior are 
particularly strong in this narrative and might be explained by the atmosphere 
of violence and brutality produced by the new regime, and also by the national 
and ideological divisions among the newly born intelligentsia in a provincial 
and backward Ukraine.
49
 The responses of the more adamant and stoic writers 
to state pressure in turn exacerbated repressive state policies. Moreover, 
through their everyday experiences in Budynok Slovo which had been reflected 
in their art, the writers reveal to us mysteries, coincidences and motivations for 
their actions, and certainly help us understand the logic of subsequent 
historical changes. The House of Writers, as a contested place in the past and 
as a material object and a geographical place that exists today, serves as a 
methodological (and at the same time a metaphorical) tool to narrow the area 
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of this investigation. Viewed on a smaller field, players are positioned closer 
to each other, and thus their interactions are magnified for analysis. 
As this study will demonstrate, the Ukrainian intelligentsia of the 
1920s lived in a very uncomfortable space (Budynok Slovo) in a political 
sense. Although many of them were apolitical and impractical, the political 
climate of the 1920s and early 1930s politicized their interactions with each 
other. Because they did their most significant thinking through the various 
modes of art and literature, they cherished art as their private space, one which 
was radically violated by the party establishment. The aggressive penetration 
of the political into their space of art, into the process of their thinking and 
writing, made them carefully measure whether their art adhered to the party 
line, thus provoking their moral and intellectual suffering. What is worse, they 
had to cultivate the ability of predicting “new currents among the party 
leadership, to sense which way the wind [was] blowing.”
50
 The moment of 
insight usually became the moment of their internal crisis. As Czeslaw Milosz 
noted, once artists had succumbed to political pressures, they questioned 
themselves about the “lasting value” of their art.
51
  
In the middle of the twenties, many Ukrainian writers began to 
recognize their dependency on party directives and their lack of artistic 
freedom. The idea of socialist realism emanating from the top was already in 
the air, and they embraced it. However, as Robert Conquest noted, with those 
who conformed, there was only one problem—“they couldn’t write.”
52
 They 
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tortuously searched for an answer to whether their own art had lasting value, 
and would be remembered by future generations. Some writers “rejected the 
idea of a controlled literature, of a superiority of the Party over the 
unprogrammable individual sources of creativity.”
53
 Their oppression by the 
state and vicious attacks on them by official “courtier” writers, as well as their 
subsequent rebellion, played a tragic role in their lives. Through the analysis 
of personal changes in slov’iany, the research exposes the scale of violence 
with which the Bolshevik regime created a new society and illuminates human 
limitations under authoritarian rule. 
The study demonstrates the gradual disappearance of their inspiration 
(oderzhymist’) to build a new Ukrainian culture, and the consequences of their 
political and ideological maneuverability. The study also reveals the 
transformation of the meaning of the building for the writers—from a joyful 
place that was at the root of the formation of their individual and group 
identity, and which symbolized their dream and hope for freedom, to a site of 
cultural struggle and danger: in the 1930s, slov’iany began to spend nights at 
hotels and at friends’ places because of the fear of being arrested.
54
 The 
transformation and destruction of their hopes was followed by a similar 
change or loss of people’s sense of personal, cultural, and national identity.
 55
 
Changing themselves, they changed the place where they lived. They 
developed claustrophobia in a place that was previously desirable and 
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comfortable for them. The uniformity of political space and the loss of home 
further transformed them to the point where suicides and betrayals became 
commonplace.
56
  
The task here was to differentiate between patterns and events, and 
being aware of this, ultimately to search for changes in human behavior 
provoked by spatial factors (i.e., home, travel abroad, prison). Describing 
these patterns that had been changing through time promised some fusion of 
place and time, what Russian literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin called the 
“chronotope” in the narrative that should provide readers with a clear sense of 
the spatial and temporal auras of the 1930s.
57
 The contingency of various 
social domains (private, public, political) and their description and analysis 
help this fusion to occur. Such an analysis of patterns of human behavior in 
different social settings in the past facilitates the discovery of emerging 
nuances and the deep interconnectedness of power and social responses, of the 
close bonds between ideology and personal and group identity. American 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz offered a method of “thick description” of 
culture which might be useful in attaining Bakhtin’s magic chronotope in a 
historical narrative.
58
 This is no easy task. Nevertheless, through a thorough 
analysis of details from the past (the time before the arrest of these individuals 
and after), of the material (place and texts) and of the metaphysical 
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(perceptions, emotions and feelings), patterns of human behavior should 
become more pronounced and concrete.
59
  
Significantly, the study invites readers to revisit the consequences of 
Stalin’s repressions of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the resilience of 
imperial imagination and practices that shaped the thinking of subsequent 
generations of Ukrainian writers even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Tanya Richardson noted that “empires and states do not simply cease to exist 
when formally declared defunct, but rather persist in changed, often diffuse, 
forms and have various contradictory effects in the present.”
60
 This concerns 
not only institutions and political practices within the state that “persist in 
peculiar forms in Post-Soviet and postcolonial contexts,”
 61
 but also the psyche 
of the modern Ukrainian intelligentsia, traumatized by the memory of the 
writers purged one by one, and millions of Ukrainian peasants who perished in 
labor camps, a psyche formed by the deprivation of a natural cultural 
continuity. Scholars characterized the period of the 1930s as a “chain of 
demoralizing atrocities and a propagation of ignorance and prejudice that in 
the cultural respect had turned Soviet society back by decades,” and a time of 
“complete subjugation of Soviet Ukraine” by the Kremlin.
62
 The intellectual 
and political gap in the leadership of Ukraine as a state, created because of 
Stalin’s terror in the 1930s, cannot be bridged, a fact that is being observed by 
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specialists in history and political science who analyze the political and 
cultural climate in Ukraine today.
63
 
 
Sources and Methods 
For this study, a variety of sources were consulted, including: memoirs 
and diaries written by those who lived in this building or those who were a 
part of the literary and artistic discourse in the 1920-30s; major works by poets 
and writers of the Red renaissance; personal archives of the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia from the State Archives of Literature and Art and the Kharkiv 
Literary Museum; operational documents, and individual and group criminal 
files of the Soviet secret police located in SBU archives in Kyiv and Kharkiv; 
stenographic reports of the Kharkiv Writers’ Association “Slovo” from the 
State Archives of Kharkiv Oblast’; party documents and documents of the 
Union of Writers from the former party archive; Ukrainian periodicals and 
private archives. 
Memoirs appear problematic because they often overlook experiences 
that are painful or shameful for the narrator, and are usually constrained by 
official discourse or the fear of punishment for the truth as the narrator sees it, 
which is common in socialist societies.
64
 To mitigate these negative aspects of 
memoirs as sources, they are analyzed here in combination with an appraisal 
of the conditions and circumstances under which they were produced.
65
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Although nostalgia is present in some memoirs, a distinct feature of the 
memoirs about Budynok Slovo is a feeling of shame, fear and horror which 
depicts Budynok Slovo as a place of suffering.  
Diaries are often influenced by political and ideological discourses at 
the time of their creation, but they have to be considered and analyzed, with 
caution and at the same time with great appreciation of their authors’ views. 
Tragically, the residents of the building burned their diaries, anticipating 
arrest, and this study benefited only from Arkadii Liubchenko’s diary that 
miraculously survived the German occupation. This text is extraordinarily 
valuable because it provides us with understandings of the political and social 
atmosphere in Kharkiv before the war, as well as the writers’ relationships 
with the state and each other. 
GPU-NKVD criminal files on Ukrainian intellectuals are compromised 
by forgery and fabrication. Despite concerns about the reliability of these 
documents, they do reveal a timeframe of events and the Soviet agenda on 
Ukrainization policies. Police records, including operational and rehabilitation 
materials, constitute a rich source of supplementary material for studying the 
mechanism of repressions of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the ideological 
motivations of their tormentors and their collaborators in implementing them. 
Methodologically, beyond a comparative analysis of the information found in 
GPU-NKVD documents and the extant data from other sources (e.g. first-
person testimonies, émigré accounts) about Soviet repressions of Ukrainian 
intellectuals, careful scrutiny of the logistics of events, critical attention to the 
language of GPU-NKVD officials, and a constant alertness for underlying 
motives are necessary to appreciate the documents of the Soviet secret police. 
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A critical stance is important when working with these kinds of 
sources. For instance, meticulous readings of criminal files may disclose half-
truths that at first glance were taken as the truth, revealing the state’s skill of 
deception to impose “part-truths.” Robert Conquest stressed this point in his 
introduction to Vitaly Shentalinsky’s book The KGB’s Literary Archive. When 
many writers were  
rehabilitated on the criminal charges for which they had died, false death dates were 
given. These emerged because when rehabilitation started, it was impossible to 
reconcile the true execution dates with the fact that relatives had been informed that 
the sentence was to “10 years without the right of correspondence:” so random dates 
of death at supposed “places of imprisonment” were given on the rehabilitation 
certificates. That is, even when the truths began to come out, they were for years only 
part-truths.
66
 
 
However, any sources or documents of the past are valuable if approached 
critically. According to American historian David J. Bodenhamer,  
a deep map of heritage and culture, centered on memory and place, ideally would 
[operate as a series of layers]. Each artifact—a letter, memoir, photograph, painting, 
oral account, video…would constitute a separate record anchored in time and space, 
thus allowing us to keep them in relationship, and each layer would contain the 
unique view over time—the dynamic memory—of an individual or a social unit.
67
 
  
The accessibility of new archival sources in Ukraine without doubt have 
facilitated understanding of the Bolsheviks’ treatment of the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia, adding depth to it and creating layers of unique views in our 
imagination. Recent historians’ analyses of memoirs and diaries have proved 
to be innovative and fruitful.
68
 Russian writer and poet, and editor of Novyi 
Mir, Aleksandr Tvardovskii once told Iurii Trifonov: “The memoirs of 
eyewitnesses are extremely important, even in manuscripts and drafts, even 
when written without any hope to publish them: this is the truth of the past 
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which must not disappear.”
69
 What has helped in the present research in 
filtering “half-truths,” “part-truths” and lies is what might be called “cross-
reading.” The same factual detail was checked in a range of sources, and texts 
composed by the GPU were analyzed and compared in hundreds of criminal 
cases. Despite efforts to maintain academic distance and a degree of 
objectivity, the research will nevertheless echo personal perceptions, based on 
knowledge, experience and moral dispositions. The narrative still remains only 
a point of view and an interpretation. 
Chapter One discusses the social and political atmosphere of the 
1920s, in which Ukrainian writers lived, worked and conceived an apartment 
building for the members of the cooperative “Slovo” in Kharkiv. Soviet 
cultural construction is examined in the context of Ukrainization policies and 
illustrated through the creation of professional unions, literary groups and 
associations in Ukraine in the 1920s.
70
 The narrative also contains a detailed 
description of the building project of Budynok Slovo at the various stages of its 
conception and development, as well as the material and social status of the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia before 1930. An analysis of the first “communal” year 
in the building lays the foundation for our understanding of Stalin’s 
subsequent repression of the residents.      
Chapter Two considers the material culture of the building, and the 
ways it shaped the residents’ lifestyles and self-identities. This chapter also 
demonstrates how the surveillance of the building by the secret police 
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intimidated the community of Budynok Slovo, facilitated the deterioration of 
its public space, and contributed to the development of artistic conformism 
among the writers. 
Chapter Three provides the historical context of the twenties and the 
early thirties, discusses the role of the center in arrests of Ukrainian 
intellectuals, and analyzes the changing atmosphere in the building where fear 
and despair dominated. It also examines the traditions and methods practiced 
by the Soviet secret police in the Kharkiv prison, and the move by the state 
and the GPU to eliminate the Galician Ukrainian intelligentsia in Ukraine. 
Chapter Four analyzes the methods of fabrication of criminal cases 
against Ukrainian “nationalists,” using Mykhailo Ialovyi’s case as an example 
of forgery. It also provides an insight into human behavior under torture, and 
illustrates the purposes and the methods of obliterating human bonds and 
friendships among people by the secret police. The narrative provides 
evidence of the state’s intentions to erase Ukrainian national consciousness 
and to physically exterminate its proponents.  
Chapter Five, through Mykola Khvyl’ovyi’s individual history, 
illustrates the enthusiasm and oderzhymist’ of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in 
building a new national culture, and reflects on the problems of the Literary 
Discussion launched in 1925. The chapter provides an explanation of why 
Khvyl’ovyi attracted the state’s attention to the cultural and political life of 
Ukraine, and investigates the controversy about the circumstances of his 
alleged suicide. The party and the GPU reserved a special place for 
Khvyl’ovyi: for Stalin, he stood apart as the most dangerous element among 
the Ukrainian intelligentsia who propagated separatist ideas and perpetuated 
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nationalistic tendencies. The chapter examines the detrimental effect of the 
suffocating political atmosphere in Ukraine in the early thirties on 
Khvyl’ovyi’s spirit, and reveals Stalin’s militant position toward him and his 
friends, similar-minded writers and poets. 
Chapter Six investigates the secret police’s fabrication of criminal 
cases against the most prominent cultural figures in Ukraine within the 1933 
mass repressive operation code-named “the UVO”— the anti-Soviet 
nationalist Ukrainian Military Organization. It also considers the Soviet 
regime’s vision of culture, its ideology, objectives, goals and priorities in 
Ukraine. The discussion addresses the moral transformation of writers under 
the pressure of the secret police, and reveals that their art, social connections, 
family ties and professional affiliation became crucial factors in fabricating 
criminal cases against them.  
Chapter Seven discusses the 1934 repression in Budynok Slovo, and 
analyzes behaviors of the writers not only during interrogation, but also in 
labor camps. It also reveals the state’s aggressive and violent tactics that had 
been employed to criminalize the community of Ukrainian writers. The 
chapter provides evidence of the state’s preconceived plans to marginalize and 
isolate the nationally conscious elite. 
Chapter Eight offers an analysis of the ethnic composition of the 
arrested in 1935-36, and reveals multiple identities of Ukrainian writers, the 
residents of Budynok Slovo, who were ethnic Ukrainians, Russians and Jews. 
The discussion illuminates the full force of counter-Ukrainization and 
investigates the individual histories of faithful Communists whose use of 
Ukrainian as an everyday language became a problem for the state.  
33 
 
Chapter Nine discusses the writers’ literary conformism and their 
psychological condition under state pressure. It closely examines the patterns 
of arrests during the Great Terror, and the secret police’s priorities, objectives 
and the array of interrogation methods and fabrication tactics used against 
Ukrainian “nationalists.” It accentuates specific procedural features of 
criminal files in 1937-38, and offers an overview of repression within the 
secret organs. It reflects on the general deterioration of the community in 
Budynok Slovo and the personal survival strategies of intellectuals under 
Stalin’s regime.  
To summarize, the proposition of this study is rather simple. Instead of 
examining the subjectivities and thoughts of the “masters” of death and of 
their victims, it offers an analysis of their deeds, actions and behavior. A 
single act and its motivations may be interpreted in dozens of possible ways. 
Repeated acts and persistence in exterminating people observed in one place 
within a decade allow us to see patterns. The repetition of events in Budynok 
Slovo suggests a political agenda rather than ad hoc repressive measures, and 
this particular factor offers us an interpretive aid and demonstrates the 
continuity of actions and motivations exhibited by the state. 
In other words, this study suggests considering the intentionality of the 
state’s actions toward the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the context of “spatial 
orientation and causal involvement,” using J.E. Malpas’s terminology. Malpas 
proposed understanding human actions as an engagement in activities that are 
dictated not only by certain understandings and perceptions of those people 
toward whom these actions are directed, but also by the objects and places in 
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which these people are situated.
71
 Precisely the persistence of spatial 
orientation and causal involvement exhibited by the state and the secret police 
reveals the intentionality of their actions. Accordingly, Ukrainian intellectuals 
had their distinct beliefs, desires and attitudes, which resulted in their spatial 
orientation and causal involvement in their surroundings, including cultural 
and political space. Moreover, they were an integral part of Budynok Slovo, a 
place that triggered certain associations among secret agents, and an 
environment that facilitated the process of mythmaking about it residents. The 
state attributed a separatist collective mentality to the slov’iany who were 
allegedly engaged in a nationalist conspiracy aimed at dethroning Soviet 
power in Ukraine. The identification of Budynok Slovo (a “nest of 
nationalists”) created by the secret police ultimately made all Ukrainian 
intelligentsia vulnerable. Their real or imaginary links to the place shaped the 
patterns of repressive policies and attitudes toward the intelligentsia. 
Interestingly, the state constructed an illusion of unity in a place of disunity 
and fragmentation, envisioned a plan that allegedly had been hatched in a 
space of irrationality and complete disorganization, and imagined strength in a 
space of collective weakness and confusion provoked by state violence.  
Importantly, this study does not subscribe events in Ukraine to a 
monolithic state system but instead illuminates a number of key factors that 
played a central role in the tragedy of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the 1930s. 
Spatial factors prevail in an analysis of Soviet nationality policies and the 
center’s attitudes toward Ukrainian intellectuals that were closely linked to 
Ukraine, a place of “nationalism,” perceived as “the elevation of the interests 
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of the unity and self-determination of the nation to the status of the supreme 
value,” up to the point of political separatism.
72
  
Significantly, the study provides no grounds for considering the fate of 
the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the context of the continuing discourse about 
“monolithic Stalinism.”
73
 “Monolithicism” presumes homogeneity which is an 
unimaginable physical, social or political phenomenon. It is virtually 
impossible to encounter it in nature or in social settings. Juan J. Linz noted 
that “an image of an all-powerful leader [with monolithic powers] making all 
the decisions is impirically false,” although Stalin’s regime was a centralized 
system, in which decisions were made in a monocentric fashion.
74
 From a 
philosophical perspective, the term “monolithicism” is also doubtful because 
an empirical analysis will not yield a single example, in which this definition 
would sufficiently describe or reflect the essence of tangible or non-tangible 
objects. Clearly, one can only talk about the relative homogeneity of a material 
or non-material object. Why is this notion still a centrepiece of any discussion 
on Stalinism?   
The term “monolithic power or state” (which is relatively close to the 
term “binary opposition of the state and ordinary people") seems to be an 
artificial creation that emerged in the process of debates between scholars of 
the totalitarian school and those of the revisionist school. To problematize the 
“perspective from above” that allegedly suggests the homogeneity of one 
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group—the state (or the homogeneity of power and its complete consolidation 
in one institution), social historians often employ these notions as semantic 
tools for argumentation, tools that neither clarify, nor strengthen their position. 
Importantly, both sides, rejecting the arguments of their opponents, employ 
similar tools that tend to obscure notions such as state violence, human 
behaviour and state actions. Graeme Gill aptly noted that “totalitarian” 
historians, rejecting the “perspective from below,” “are being unreasonable,” 
and “revisionist” historians, underestimating the rigid centralization of the 
Soviet state, “are being unrealistic.”
75
         
In the context of this study, the cooperation and collaboration of the 
populace with the regime, in this case—of Ukrainian intellectuals who to some 
extent helped perpetuate the status quo, reveals the limitations and 
inappropriateness of the notion of “monolithic power.” However, it should be 
emphasized that the leading figures who fought for power and who were 
chosen by Stalin and tolerated by him acted in a manner expected and required 
of them, and their behavioral unison led to mass killings for which they, 
together with their leader Stalin, bear full responsibility.
76
 
To be sure, a general discussion about these constructs—“binary 
opposition of the populace and the state in Soviet Ukraine,” and a “monolithic 
state”— should not obscure the overall historical picture and the aftermath of a 
concerted and massive attack on Ukrainian nationalism and Ukrainian cultural 
activists. The disintegration of the Ukrainian intellectual community in the 
thirties because of Stalin’s repression is not something that can be denied or 
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diminished, nor can the cultural disruption in contemporary Ukraine, a 
ramification of Stalin’s terror in the UkrSSR in the 1930s. 
One of the purposes of this study is to explain how this happened, and 
how the elimination of the most prominent Ukrainian intellectuals was 
organized, rationalized and politicized. No matter how one characterizes 
Stalin’s power—“monolithic,” “chaotic,” or based on ad hoc measures—these 
definitions do not change the violent essence of Stalinism, do not reduce the 
number of its victims and do not mend the social and cultural fabric of 
contemporary Ukrainian society that suffers from what has been described as a 
post-genocidal syndrome.  
Furthermore, as far as spatial histories are concerned, events are 
intertwined and interdependent with places, and certain events have their 
special locations that intrinsically represent the specificity of these events.
77
 
Similar to places that represent a larger geographical landscape, events are 
imbedded in a larger political, social and cultural historical context, and 
precisely from this “positional” (spatial) perspective, the interdependence and 
specificity of events and places have been analyzed in this narrative. The 
notions of time (events), space and place are akin to nested dolls that can be 
deconstructed and reconstructed, and their features, special characters and 
colors can be closely examined as elements of the whole.
78
 The cultural space 
of Budynok Slovo and the mélange of individuals who were linked to this 
space and place became those elements necessary for a reconstruction of 
events that allows a close analysis of the history of repression of the 
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intelligentsia in Ukraine in the 1930s.
79
 A decade of terror wiped out fifty-nine 
residents of the House of Writers. Seven individuals miraculously survived the 
gulag. 
Special attention is paid to the GPU/NKVD strategies in persecuting 
slov’iany, to an analysis of several agents’ personalities who worked with the 
residents of Budynok Slovo, and to the role of the slov’iany’s families in 
rehabilitation processes in the 1950s, late 1980s and early 1990s. The history 
of Budynok Slovo reveals the gradual appropriation of the building by the 
punitive organs, and the aesthetic change of its environment.  
The narrative is organized both thematically and chronologically. All 
terms and names are provided in Ukrainian in its English transliteration 
(according to the Library of Congress system), except the names of Russian 
geographic places and the last names of party and secret police officials, 
commonly used in scholarly literature. It is important to remember that “God 
is in the details,” as Flaubert (or Goethe) reportedly proclaimed, so let us pay 
attention to the details.
80
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Chapter  One 
From Culture to Politics: The House of Writers—
Conceived, Lived, Perceived
1
 
 
Little imagination is needed to see space-time as 
potential tools of regimentation and discipline: 
The “right place” and “right time” function 
ideologically to keep order within society. 
 
Raymie E. McKerrow
2
 
 
Kharkiv of the 1920s—“The Capital of Arts” 
  
As Moscow and Petrograd became artistic and literary meccas in 
Russia, Kharkiv became “the capital of arts” in Ukraine in the early 1920s.
3
 
Hryhorii Kostiuk characterized the emergence of a vibrant Ukrainian 
intellectual community in Kharkiv as sudden and “unexpected.”
4
 The 
Ukrainization campaign generated an emotional and creative upheaval among 
the intelligentsia. The most active were Ellan Blakytnyi who became the editor 
of the government newspaper Visti VUTsVK (The News of VUTsVK), and 
Serhii Pylypenko, the editor of Selians’ka hazeta (The Peasant News), two 
faithful Bolsheviks.
5
 Many intellectuals, from Ukraine and from abroad, 
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enthusiastically supported Ukrainization, and moved to Kharkiv with new 
expectations and hopes. The future resident of the House of Writers Leonid 
Chernov wrote in 1925: “It became fashionable to speak Ukrainian in Kharkiv. 
And those who do not master the language look like white crows in our 
streets.”
6
  
Cultural life in Kharkiv experienced a rapid awakening: dozens of 
Ukrainian literary associations and journals emerged and became popular 
among literary figures and ordinary Ukrainians. Sliakhy mystetstva (The Paths 
of Art), Zhovten’ (October), Chervonyi shliakh (The Red Path), Pluh (Plough), 
Hart (Tempering) and others invited poets, writers, literary critics and 
historians to publish their works, and provided jobs for hundreds of people 
exhausted by hunger, and the hardships of civil war. In contrast to tsarist 
times, in the Kharkiv Pedagogical Institute of Professional Education 
(KhPIPO), formerly Kharkiv University—the first university in Ukraine, 
students could attend courses of lectures on Ukrainian history and the history 
of Ukrainian literature. Archival research in Kharkiv was rejuvenated and 
allowed scholars to recover forgotten names and the works of Ukrainian poets 
and prose writers who lived in the first half of the nineteenth century. Many in 
the Kyiv intelligentsia moved to Kharkiv, where they joined various literary 
organizations and found jobs in various literary journals and government 
newspapers.
7
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The state expected a significant contribution from intellectuals to the 
new society, one which was to transform an uneducated and illiterate 
population into a disciplined, educated and industrious society. A mass 
organization of proletarian literati would exemplify the idea of a new socialist 
collective, purified from individualistic, bourgeois, and therefore harmful 
influences, and thus would help administer and consolidate the social basis of 
the Soviet dictatorship. Proletcult became an attempt to create a mass Soviet 
literary movement employing the state scheme.
8
  
In Kharkiv many literary and artistic associations emerged in the early 
1920s. The most popular were the Soviet Ukrainian Peasant Writers’ 
association “Pluh” (Plow) and “VAPLITE” (Vil’na Academia Proletars’koi 
Literatury/the Free Academy of Proletarian Literature).  
The tireless organizer of “Pluh” was Serhii Pylypenko who created a 
mass literary organization of peasant writers, an alternative to the dying 
Proletcult. Pylypenko was later accused by Mykola Khvyl’ovyi and other 
writers of lowering literary standards, allowing anyone “who showed the 
slightest interest in literature to join the organization.”
9
 However, in hindsight, 
considering the number of truly talented writers who sharpened their literary 
skills in “Pluh,” encouraged by the warm and welcoming atmosphere 
Pylypenko created, one can see the fruitfulness of the seed planted by his 
“cultural mission.”  
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“Pluh” in 1923. Serhii Pylypenko—seated second from the right.
10
  
 
The goal of VAPLITE was to create a new Ukrainian literature, 
embracing the best achievements of Western European culture. Mykola 
Khvyl’ovyi became a driving force and an inspiration for this association.
11
 
However, identities and personal literary affinities were not fixed. People 
changed their memberships, searching for new ideals in art and literature, 
experimenting with new literary forms and genres. They wrote and painted, 
contributing to the Red Renaissance of Ukrainian culture, as contemporary 
literary critics described the phenomenon that occurred in Ukraine in the 
1920s.
12
  
A number of major Ukrainian cultural institutions were founded in 
Kharkiv in 1926, a period associated with the peak of the Soviet Ukrainization 
campaign. The Taras Shevchenko Scientific Research Institute of Literature 
                                                          
10
 The photograph was published in Pluzhanyn, no. 8 (1927): 11. 
11
 For details, see Luckyj, Literary Politics; Halyna Hryn “Executed Renaissance Paradigm 
Revisited,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 27, no. 1-4 (2004-2005), 67-96; L.I. Kavun 
“Literaturne ob’iednannia VAPLITE i khudozhnio-estetychne shukannia v ukrains’kii prozi 
20-kh rokiv XX stolittia (Kyiv: 2007). 
12
 A.M. Lejtes and M.F Jasek, Desiat’ Rokiv Ukrajins’koji Literatury (1917-1927), Bio-
Bibliohraficnyj Charkiv. 1928 (Munchen: Verlag Otto Sagner, 1986), 1:432. See also Luckyj, 
Literary Politics, 43.    
43 
 
was established in Kharkiv under the leadership of the Ukrainian historian 
Dmytro Bagalii.
13
 The Ellan-Blakytnyi House of Literature became a cultural 
center and a place for social gatherings for the intelligentsia, and major literary 
figures such as Vladimir Maiakovskii, Henri Barbusse, Maxim Gorky, Ianka 
Kupala visited this Ukrainian literary “Parnassus” to lecture.
14
  The State 
Ukrainian Drama Theatre “Berezil,” established in 1922 in Kyiv and led by 
the progressive Ukrainian director Les’ Kurbas, began its work in Kharkiv.
15
 
The State Publishing House of Ukraine (DVU) published works by Ukrainian 
classic writers of the nineteenth century, contemporary Ukrainian writers, as 
well as translations of world classic prose and poetry into Ukrainian, including 
works by British, German, American, Polish, Russian and other authors.  
Numerous Ukrainian literary associations attracted a constellation of 
talented Ukrainian youth who created their own journals, in which they 
expressed their beliefs concerning the path of Ukrainian culture. These beliefs 
varied, and often were diametrically opposed. Although the primary focus of 
Ukrainian literary organizations was literature and art, their activities were 
politicized through the party’s efforts. The focal point of the rivalry between, 
for instance, “Pluh” and “Hart” shifted toward ideological and political 
questions, concerning Soviet literary and cultural politics. Their debates and 
polemical clashes identified very different political views uttered by their most 
prominent members.
16
 “Pluh” followed Moscow’s prescriptions about the 
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creation of all-Union proletarian art, and “Hart” advocated a path independent 
from Moscow for the development of Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian 
National-Communism.
17
 “Hart” rejected any cooperation with organizations 
that exhibited russophile tendencies, such as the All-Ukrainian Association of 
Proletarian Writers (VUAPP).
18
 “Pluh” was more agreeable and remained 
loyal to the VUAPP, emphasizing its democratic and all-inclusive nature. Its 
members had not limited their membership and affiliation to one organization, 
and cooperation with pro-Soviet organizations was encouraged. While “Hart” 
was establishing connections in the West (Canada, the United States, Europe 
and Western Ukraine), “Pluh” asserted its role as a trade union for Ukrainian 
writers.
19
 
It has been argued by many scholars that the overall cultural 
atmosphere in Kharkiv in the 1920s was optimistic and promising despite the 
party’s attempts to condemn “nationalist” groups and despite rigorous debates 
among writers and bitter personal clashes over cultural and political issues. 
However, some authors caution against such a view of the turbulent twenties. 
During the 1920s, many writers in Ukraine had already buried their 
enthusiasm and hopes for the free development of Ukrainian culture. Although 
the first unified literary organization under full party control was founded only 
in the late 1920s, party censorship control was established through the 
formation of Holovlit in the early 1920s, the chief party censorship 
institution.
20
 Preliminary repression of the creative intelligentsia in Ukraine 
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had been implemented by the Bolsheviks after the Civil War when they 
extirpated politically suspicious bourgeois associations that were composed of 
literati, philosophers, artists and spiritual leaders. The fear of repression forced 
Ukrainian writers to self-censor their views. Increasing state pressure on 
intellectuals created the “foundation for [their] pessimism, alienation, [and] 
the deterioration of personality.”
21
 The disillusioned artists craved spatial 
isolation, trying to avoid the sensational cacophony of artistic and political 
debates.  
 
Conceiving Byt: Collective Search for Solitude and Isolation 
In the 1920s, the Soviet state rhetoric of collective socialist values and 
the importance of belonging to a collective club or professional association 
became quite popular. Various organizations, clubs and unions mushroomed 
in the Soviet Union, including Soviet Ukraine, although their emergence and 
registration were carefully monitored and supervised by the Soviets through 
the MEKOSO and the GPU.
22
 The GPU made sure that the ideological make-
up of newly created associations coincided with Bolshevik ideals and 
understandings of what popular socialist culture should be.  
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The creation of communes and clubs promoted by the state was 
designed to stimulate popular enthusiasm and the joyfulness so desperately 
needed during the first years of socialist construction, and was broadly 
propagandized and institutionalized by the state within each Soviet republic. 
In the Bolsheviks’ view, individual identity was to be erased, and a new 
collective socialist identity should emerge, one associated with the progressive 
deep inner transformation of the individual who belonged to the club. Czeslaw 
Milosz emphasized the significance of professional clubs for the Soviets that 
existed in every Soviet enterprise, every factory and every school in the 1920s. 
Milosz’s explanation of communal “joy” and individual transformation has 
transparently negative connotations: 
People who attend a ‘club’ submit to a collective rhythm, and so come to feel that it 
is absurd to think differently from the collective. The collective is composed of units 
that doubt; but as these individuals pronounce the ritual phrases and sing the ritual 
songs, they created a collective aura to which they in turn surrender. Despite its 
apparent appeal to reason, the “club’s” activity comes under the heading of collective 
magic. The rationalism of the doctrine is fused with sorcery, and the two strengthen 
each other. Free discussion is, of course, eliminated.
23
 
  
People moved by the collective values of the new socialist state, often 
initiated the creation of professional organizations themselves. If a popular 
civic organization was successful and recruited many followers, the members 
tried to find funds to build an elaborate infrastructure to support its 
functioning. Although many literary clubs focused on the material needs of 
writers and artists, and nourished the idea of building their own living quarters 
for intellectuals, the Kharkiv literary organization “Pluh” with its leaders 
Pylypenko, Vyshnia and others managed to realize this dream first. In 1930, 
they built a one-of-a-kind, exclusive home for Ukrainian intellectuals—the 
                                                          
23
 For the notion of “club” in a Communist society, see Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind, 
trans. Jane Zielonko (New York: Vintage Books, 1953), 197-99.  
47 
 
first apartment compound for writers and journalists in the Soviet Union 
(Budynok Slovo).  
Because of collectivization and industrialization, the competition for 
working and living space in Kharkiv became fierce during the postwar era. By 
1924, the housing fund in Kharkiv showed a decrease of 28 percent as 
compared with the prerevolutionary period.
24
 During the postwar years, the 
population in Kharkiv increased from 155,000 tɨ 409,000 people in 1927. 
According to Kharkiv statisticians’ calculations, the average living space was 
5.7 square meters per person which constituted approximately two-thirds of 
the sanitary norm.
25
 Most people shared communal flats which were 
overpopulated beyond belief. Sheds, summer houses, cellars and attics were 
inhabited by several families.
26
  
Many of the writers and artists shared tiny rooms with their friends or 
strangers, suffering greatly during the first years of the revolution and in the 
early 1920s.
27
 For instance, Iurii Smolych recalled that in the early 1920s, 
before he became a professional writer, he was an actor in the Ivan Franko 
Drama Theatre in Kharkiv and lived in a dormitory. His room which held his 
bed, a little table and a chair was three meters long and two meters wide. 
There were no windows that faced the yard, and above his door was a narrow 
transom open to the common corridor. In the past, this room served as a 
storage room for a cafeteria. Here Smolych wrote at night after rehearsals or 
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performances in the theatre.
28
 Similarly, Mykhailo Bykovets’ and Vasyl’ Sokil 
lived in extremely poor conditions, sharing a tiny guard room in a secondary 
school.
29
 Already famous by 1923, the Ukrainian poet Pavlo Tychyna resided 
in a little room in the editorial headquarters of the newspaper Visti. The room 
was near the public toilet and previously served as a shower room. There was 
space only for a table and a chair. Tychyna slept atop a pile of old issues of 
Visti which he covered with a blanket. To prevent the resident rats and mice 
from devouring his manuscripts that were piled on the table, the inventive 
Tychyna placed the table’s legs in condensed milk cans filled with water. 
These mini-moats guarded his work as the rodents regularly drowned trying in 
vain to climb to their supper. Before he received a large three-room apartment 
in Budynok Slovo, Tychyna had moved to a bigger room which was in fact a 
kitchen. The stove served as his table and the oven as his book case. For his 
manuscripts, he found a safer place: he stored them in a large metal pot for 
bleaching linen that was embedded in the wall over the stove.
30
 In the middle 
of the 1920s, the Ukrainian writer Teren’ Masenko and his wife shared an 
apartment with its owners. The Masenkos rented a room through which the 
owners of the apartment regularly marched. Before the Masenkos received 
apartment 59 in Budynok Slovo, they shared a four room apartment with three 
other writers, Pavlo Tychyna, Leib Kvitko and Ezra Fininberg, but in contrast 
to the previous shelter, they enjoyed a separate room and shared only a 
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communal kitchen and bathroom.
31
 Oles’ Dosvitnii lived with his family (four 
people, including two little children) and a goat in one room.
32
 The House of 
Writers as conceived by the writers was clearly an improvement of their living 
conditions.  
Interestingly, in the mid-twenties, the communal lifestyle, so favored 
by the state in the early 1920s, was now criticized for fostering potential anti-
Soviet conspiracies, “petit-bourgeois self-absorption, anti-social-mindedness, 
vulgar egalitarianism, egotism and Trotskyism,” and, therefore, lost its 
attractiveness to the populace.
33
 Housing co-operatives and private apartments 
were seen as a progressive step forward in Soviet state schemes for arranging 
people’s byt.
34
 Self-sufficient private apartments and domestic services within 
an apartment building, such as a laundry, a cafeteria and childcare, contributed 
to the popularity of the housing cooperative movement which, according to 
Victor Buchli, survived longer than other state approaches to organizing byt.
35
 
Despite the fact that housing cooperatives existed in various forms before and 
after the revolution, an official resolution “On Housing Cooperatives” was 
issued by the VTsIK only on 19 August 1924. This resolution launched the 
popular cooperative movement which reduced the socialist value of communal 
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life.
36
 A December 1924 VTsIK decree reiterated the advantages of a new 
housing politics, and proclaimed the expediency and even the necessity of 
private investments to increase the Soviet housing fund.
37
 The expediency of 
housing cooperatives for the state was quite obvious: instead of financing a 
cooperative initiative with the state’s or the party’s funds, the construction of 
an apartment building and its maintenance were fully supported by the 
cooperative.
38
 By 1 October 1925, there were 15 housing co-operatives in 
Kharkiv, and people began to move from communal apartments to their own 
apartments. In 1926, 45 apartment buildings were built, and 441 people 
received new apartments in the city. By 1 April 1927, 114 housing co-
operatives were created, and Kharkiv turned into a massive construction site.
39
  
Leasing or buying properties or pre-existing office or apartment 
buildings from a city council was a common practice for a housing 
cooperative. Its members usually invested their own funds at the initial stage 
of the project (leasing, buying or constructing properties), and later had to pay 
monthly fees to sustain the everyday life of the co-operative. The routine 
responsibilities for the maintenance of the apartment building were distributed 
among the cooperative’s members. Specialists were also hired (plumbers, 
carpenters) when professional knowledge was in demand. 
40
 These services 
were funded by members’ monthly fees.  
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Recent studies on the Soviet housing cooperative movement showed 
that the state never provided the freedom promised to Soviet citizens who 
were members of housing cooperatives.
41
 Just the opposite, the absence of 
freedom was stipulated by multiple regulations that constrained people’s 
slightest collective or individual initiatives. The members had to report to the 
All-Union Organization Bureau on Housing Cooperation about their 
administrative and financial decisions and obtain official “blessings” for 
construction repairs that were paid from the members’ monthly shares, and for 
any residential movements and exchanges that were additionally supervised by 
the chief of the building (usually a GPU associate).
42
 The cooperative was 
required to join the Central Union of Housing Cooperatives and to pay state 
fees.
43
 The class approach was decisive. State decisions and approvals were 
based on the ideological evaluation of petitioners, and often depended on their 
party membership and connections. In addition, according to state injunctions, 
co-operatives were to hire only state construction companies, and to limit their 
business with private ones.
44
 
Beginning in the early twenties, literary associations made attempts to 
organize byt for the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Kharkiv. The association 
“Pluh” took the first steps, and reserved about twenty apartments in an area 
called Kholodna Hora (Cold Hill), on 118 Sverdlov Street for the creative 
intelligentsia who wished to reside and work in Kharkiv cultural institutions.
45
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Usually these apartments were shared by two or more young writers, and this 
commune represented an institution conceived and designed by the state to 
wholly socialize the byt of like-minded individuals.
46
 Among those who lived 
in these apartments and shared them with their friends and homeless writers, 
were Andrii Holovko, Ivan Mykytenko, Volodymyr Sosiura, Iurii Ianovs’kyi, 
Natalia Zabila, Sava Bozhko and Hryhorii Kostiuk.
47
 Pylypenko, the head of 
“Pluh,” had a hand in helping the Ukrainian intelligentsia survive 
professionally and physically in Kharkiv. 
At the peak of the mass cooperative movement, in February 1927, a 
group of Kharkiv writers created a cooperative association, “Slovo,” with the 
purpose of building a five-story apartment compound for the writers—
Budynok Slovo.
48
 In the meantime, they continued to seek alternative solutions 
to their deplorable living conditions. 
In 1928, many state and party organizations were moved to the 
thirteen-story Derzhprom,
49
 the first Kharkiv “skyscraper” erected in the 
constructivist style, thus freeing a huge state reserve of office buildings. The 
Central Committee (TsK) of the Ukrainian Communist party (KP(b)U) 
decided to allocate the space in 82 K. Libknekht Street that previously 
belonged to the Narkozem, to the Ukrainian Writers club. The club 
immediately occupied it with the intention of expanding its living residences 
for writers. However, the decision was reversed after complaints were made 
by the rector of the Kharkiv Agricultural Institute about the unbearable living 
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conditions of the institute’s faculty.
50
 Following Pavel Postyshev’s (member 
of the Bureau of the Kharkiv Okruha Party Committee) order to provide all 
Communists with apartments first, the building was taken away from the 
writers. Those who were non-party members had limited opportunities to 
receive a room in Kharkiv.
51
  
The construction of the House of Writers “Slovo” (“Word”), conceived 
by the housing cooperative “Slovo” as a home for the most prominent 
Ukrainian intellectuals, became a precursor to a new fashionable approach to 
solving byt problems for Soviet citizens. Importantly, the 21 November 1927 
Law that provided more favorable terms to cooperatives and private builders 
stated that “for ten years from the date of completion, new structures were 
exempt from assessment and taxation.”
52
 Greater benefits to private builders 
granted by the state encouraged the writers to pursue their dream to build an 
apartment compound. They were attracted by the idea of unlimited housing 
space per person that was allowed to cooperatives by the state. The writers 
enthusiastically endorsed the building project that was to be built out of their 
personal savings.
53
 Four years later, the 16 May 1930 directive of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party “On Work in Reorganizing Daily Life” 
rejected the communal byt scheme. Ideas concerning individual consumer 
choice and pluralism began to dominate the state discourse about byt in 
1931.
54
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According to memoirs and personal correspondence, the idea of 
building a home for writers germinated among a group of writers in Kharkiv 
in late 1926, but the “prime mover” of the project was Pylypenko.
55
 At this 
point in time, it is uncertain whether the idea to build a home exclusively for 
writers was initiated purposefully by some GPU official in a friendly 
conversation with his party colleague Pylypenko, or whether Pylypenko 
received an official blessing from the local authorities to launch the building 
project after he proposed a plan to the TsK KP(b)U to improve living 
conditions of the Ukrainian cultural elite.
56
 Whatever the case may be, the 
beginning of the construction of the apartment building “Slovo” (Budynok 
Slovo) in 1927 coincided with the peak of the Ukrainization campaign, when 
the development of national culture was seemingly encouraged and promoted. 
“Slovo” became the first cooperative building not only in the republic but in 
the entire Soviet Union, a building belonging to a civic organization and 
specifically erected as a home for Ukrainian intellectuals.
57
 A similar building 
was later reproduced in Kyiv, the famous “Rolit,” the residential apartment 
building for the Kyiv intelligentsia, although it was built using state funds. 
Conceived by the Ukrainian writers, Budynok Slovo was designed to 
accommodate their bodies and improve their spirits, which had been distressed 
by the struggle with each other and the state. Conceptually and practically, the 
intelligentsia was to provide an example of the new daily life of Soviet people. 
The state very soon realized that private apartments, like communal flats, 
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might cultivate individual and group conspiracies and transgressions, and, 
thus, these sites required full supervision and surveillance. State interest in 
writers’ bodies and their comfort was minimal in contrast to state interest in 
writers’ minds and souls.
58
 The desire of Ukrainian writers to create a new 
national culture strengthened the party’s distrust of them. In the state’s view, 
the national ferment among them proved to be so powerful that it could not be 
simply exorcized or banished by invoking the sacred ideals of the revolution 
or mitigated by concessions and incentives granted in the form of privacy and 
expanded personal space. From the state perspective, their souls were corrupt 
because they had been exposed for a decade to harmful nationalist deviationist 
thinking (perehyby; perekruchennia) that were produced by Ukrainization. 
This perception conditioned the Soviet police’s fixation on Budynok Slovo 
which will be examined in later chapters. 
  
Building Budynok Slovo: Organizational Difficulties 
In late 1926, the cooperative “Slovo” raised funds from its members’ 
personal savings
59
 and ordered the design and drawings of their future home 
from the Kharkiv architect Mytrofan Dashkevych. Dashkevych was selected 
because of his innovative reputation. He was fond of mixing modern styles 
and neo-baroque motifs.
60
 The original drawings of Budynok Slovo 
conceptually combined the two architectural styles of modernism and 
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constructivism.
61
 Dashkevych’s architectural project was simple, progressive 
and bold because the building was designed according to the highest 
contemporary standards of comfort, and had amenities that were rare for the 
late twenties: facilities for leisure, a cafeteria, baths, a solarium, a kindergarten 
and other service rooms that were non-existent in other communal living 
quarters. Dashkevych considered the writers’ wishes and even went beyond 
their expectations. 
Originally, the cooperative “Slovo” asked Dashkevych to design a fifty 
apartment compound. Each apartment was supposed to have three or four 
rooms. The estimated cost of this project was approximately 570,000 
karbovantsi.
62
 However, more than fifty writers applied to be residents in the 
future compound, and it became clear that the cooperative faced a dilemma: 
the administration of the cooperative would need to exclude some members 
from the list of potential shareholders or seek additional funds to finance a 
larger project in order to satisfy the needs of all those who applied.
63
 
The cooperative decided to reconsider the original plan. The new 
architectural project had 66 private apartments, excluding space for communal 
services. In June-July 1927, the literary magazine Hart noted that in order to 
complete the project, the cooperative “Slovo” needed nearly 800,000 
karbovantsi. Through the assistance of the Kharkiv Orgvykonkom, the 
                                                          
61
 I.M. Shkodovskii et al., eds., Khar’kov: vchera, segodnia, zavtra (Khar’kov: Folio, 2002), 
130. 
62
 Karbovanets’ (singular) or karbovantsi (plural) was the basic unit of Soviet Ukrainian 
currency established after the 1924 Soviet currency reform. This currency was in use in 
Ukraine until 1996.  
63
 Chervonyi Shliakh, no. 2 (1927): 247; Pluzhanyn, no. 2 (1927): 31.  
57 
 
cooperative received 150,000 karbovantsi from Ukrzhytlospilka and 
Tsekombank.
64
 The Okruha Aid Committee also provided 50,000 karbovantsi 
  
  
Dashkevych’s drawings of Budynok Slovo.
65
 
 
but the project required regular, not sporadic investments, and the 
Okrvykonkom had to ask the Central Committee for help.
66
 Because of the 
financial strain for each writer, and because it would take several years to 
complete the project, the administration of the cooperative may have used 
their party connections and asked the local party branch and the Okrvykonkom 
for individual support for the writers. Ultimately, the Okrvykonkom made a 
decision to support the Ukrainian writers with individual grants of 3,000 
karbovantsi in total, and the Komunhosp administration agreed to allocate 45 
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apartments in newly built compounds for those writers who were not members 
of the cooperative “Slovo” which alleviated the writers’ hardships.
67
                            
The logistics of the writers’ financial odyssey are not completely clear 
but the budget of 840,000 karbovantsi was approved by the All-Union 
Organization Bureau on Housing Cooperation and the Komunhosp, and on 8 
August 1927 the state construction firm “Ukrpaistroi” began to create a 
working plan for Budynok Slovo.
68
 On 10 September 1927, the cooperative 
“Slovo” signed an agreement with the Komunhosp, according to which the 
Komunhosp became a sub-contractor and was responsible for the legal and 
technical organization of the construction process.
69
 This document described 
the building as a five-and-a-half story building, explaining that in its right 
wing, there would be two additional apartments below ground level.
70
 It also 
specified that the conditions and the technical specifications for the building 
provided by the cooperative “Slovo” would be observed. According to this 
document, the cooperative remained in full control of the project and was to 
supervise any activities at the construction site, as well as to perform regular 
inspections of the quantity and quality of materials and services delivered by 
the Komunhosp.
71
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Yet surprisingly, paragraph no. 12 of the document mentioned above 
denied the cooperative “Slovo” the right to be the sole supervisor and advisor 
of the project that was discussed in earlier paragraphs. It specified that the 
Komunhosp was ultimately subservient only to central and local authorities 
that might intercede in the project, and was to report on the quality of the 
service first of all to the Main District Engineer.
72
 As Timothy Sosnovy 
demonstrated in his pioneering study about the housing problem in the Soviet 
Union, the existence of the cooperative movement was inconceivable outside 
of state control.
73
  
Moreover, it is intriguing that the construction was handled by the All-
Ukrainian Shareholding Construction Association “Ukrpaistroi” which was 
created and functioned under the NKVD umbrella. In the 1920s, there were a 
great number of construction companies in Kharkiv, state and private, but for 
some reason the “Ukrpaistroi” was assigned to build the apartment compound. 
Whether it was decided by the cooperative “Slovo,” the city authorities, the 
bank administration that loaned the initial funds for the project, or the 
Komunhosp remains unknown. Rumors about the GPU embedding special 
surveillance equipment (including special wiretapping and telephone circuits) 
within the walls of the building have been circulating for decades among 
writers. An expert evaluation of the building codes, of the materials that had 
been used during construction, and of the somewhat unusual architectural 
features has never been performed. Nevertheless, the fact that “Ukrpaistroi” 
was nursed at the bosom of the secret police raises doubts about the 
randomness and the accidental nature of such a choice. 
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News about the beginning of the construction in the newspaper Visti  
VUTsVK, 29 September 1927.  
 
 
At the construction site, human labor was employed extensively. 
Mechanized labor was almost non-existent. The foundation pit for the building 
which was 3 meters deep, 5 meters in some parts such as the area of the boiler 
room, was dug by hand. Heavy beams were carried to the required location 
and set in place by several people.
74
  
The technical description of construction work reveals that the 
characteristics of the building differed from those of a typical building: 
engineering specifications promised high quality materials and work which 
was ordered by the cooperative. The external walls had to be two to three 
bricks wide, and masons were advised to use a reliable “complex cement 
mixture 1:2:3” for the brick work and “1:4:6 for the concrete floors,” in which 
the proportion of cement should have been higher than that of sand.
75
 The 
writers insisted that for the foundation only high quality bricks produced 
locally were to be used. Each delivery of bricks was to be examined by the 
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cooperative, and only after inspection were the bricks ready for use.
76
 The best 
quality cement was also requested—the writers called it “Portland cement.”
77
 
The final touch of the façade walls was a thick layer of plaster, decorated by a 
“crumbs” technique.
78
  The floors in all entrances (pid’izdy) throughout the 
building were tiled: the tile, as well as the installation, was expensive which 
consumed a great deal of human and financial resources. The stairs on the first 
floor of all five entrances were embellished with a decorative mosaic tile 
which created a grandiose look and astonished visitors.
79
 The writers were 
even concerned with things such as alabaster, glue, paint and the like.
80
 
The interior was no less extravagant than the exterior and public spaces 
in the building. The apartment floors had oak parquet, and carpentry work was 
of excellent quality. Kitchen cabinets, external, internal and pantry doors, and 
window frames and windowsills were made of fine quality pine.
81
 Only dry 
wood was employed; defective and deformed wooden details were not 
accepted in the construction.
82
 In the kitchens, pig-iron fireplaces were 
installed which could burn coal. They functioned as heaters and also as 
cooking stoves.
83
 The kitchen and the bathroom were provided with both cold 
and hot water which was a rare feature in the 1920s.
84
 A bathtub and shower 
that were installed in each bathroom by the contractor were considered a 
luxury.
85
 The bathroom walls and floors were decorated with the best quality 
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tile available at the time.
86
 The apartment walls were painted in pastel colors 
with decorative neutral images (al’freina robota) which created a cozy 
comfortable environment within the apartments.
87
 The door handles were 
made of stainless steel with a polished finish, and the locks were of high 
quality.
88
        
Many accounts state that the writers themselves, and the administration 
of the writers’ cooperative “Slovo” in particular, were in charge of this 
construction and totally responsible for its outcome. They carefully planned 
organizational and financial matters, and involved various organizations in the 
republic and outside Ukraine as well to complete the construction of the 
apartment building. Writers Ostap Vyshnia was appointed head of the 
cooperative “Slovo,” Serhii Pylypenko--Vyshnia’s chief assistant, and 
Anatolii Richyts’kyi and Arkadii Liubchenko became the most active 
members of the cooperative administration.
89
 The responsibilities regarding 
the project were equally distributed among its members. They had to deal with 
issues about the equipment for the construction site, including construction 
materials which were ordered not only from Kharkiv factories but also from 
outside the Ukrainian republic. This certainly required additional investments 
and individual commitment to the project.  
In a letter to his brother, Ukrainian writer Arkadii Liubchenko wrote 
that in early October 1929 after he returned to Kharkiv from his vacation in 
the Crimea, he urgently had to go to the Gomel’ mechanical factory (today in 
Belarus), where he had an assignment as a member of the “Slovo” cooperative 
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administration to expedite the construction of the furnace (kotiol) for Budynok 
Slovo. Winter was coming, and the slov’iany looked forward to moving to 
their new apartments. The furnace had to be installed as soon as possible 
before the first frost, and Liubchenko lamented that going to Gomel’ was both 
a great responsibility and troublesome.
 90
 
Originally, the members of the cooperative “Slovo” expected to move 
to their new apartments on 15 November 1928. The Komunhosp and the 
“Ukrpaistroi” believed that it would take about a year to complete the 
construction of Budynok Slovo. However, it proved to be a longer process. 
There were several reasons for this.  
First, communication between the cooperative “Slovo” and the 
contractor was difficult. For instance, in early November 1927 a disagreement 
about the structural strength of the future building emerged among the 
cooperative, the Komunhosp and the “Ukrpaistroi.” 
91
 Richyts’kyi and 
Liubchenko protested the decision of the Komunhosp which clearly violated 
the detailed preliminary agreement about materials and terms of the 
construction.
92
  
Second, constant difficulties in raising funds for the project prevented 
the cooperative from making regular payments to the Komunhosp and the 
“Ukrpaistroi” to sustain uninterrupted work at the construction site. In late 
November 1928, the “Slovo” informed the “Ukrpaistroi” that the cooperative 
had only 106,000 karbovantsi remaining: to finish the project, the “Slovo” had 
to raise an additional 300,000 karbovantsi.  
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By January 1929, the cooperative faced unpleasant news: the writers’ 
funds proved to be insufficient to complete the project. The cooperative also 
failed to receive state and bank relief aid. The process became costly and time-
consuming, and a burden for every member of the cooperative. Their dreams 
of having their own spacious and technologically innovative apartments were 
crushed after 1.5 years of hope and hard work. 
Financial problems persisted, and the construction of the building was 
halted. In late January 1929, a Ukrainian delegation, consisting of the most 
prominent Ukrainian writers, went to Moscow for “The Week of Ukrainian 
Literature.”
93
 During this week at a meeting in the Agitprom of the Central 
Committee of the VKP(b), party leaders, Ukrainian and Russian writers 
discussed ways to strengthen ties between Ukrainian and Russian literature. 
According to Vyshnia who attended this meeting, suddenly in the middle of it, 
Stalin entered through the side doors and sat down at the table. He was silent, 
and from time to time walked behind the table smoking his pipe. Vyshnia 
recalled that a thought crossed his mind: where else should I ask for money for 
the completion of Budynok Slovo if not from the government? 
94
 
He wrote and passed a note to Stalin and watched him reading it. When 
Stalin finished reading the note, he affirmatively moved his hand with the 
pipe. After the meeting, Vyshnia returned to the hotel “Astoriia” to rest. An 
abrupt knock at the door interrupted Vyshnia’s relaxation. Opening the door, 
Vyshnia found a man with a large valise carrying a revolver in his belt who 
said: “Are you Ostap Vyshnia?” “Yes,” Vyshnia replied. “I was ordered to 
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convey the money to you,” said the stranger. “What money?” asked Vyshnia. 
“What you were asking for,” said the stranger, shaking the contents of the bag 
onto the table. In a moment, there were stacks of bills in front of him.
95
  
Later, Vyshnia remembered that the most striking fact was that the 
courier never asked him to count the money or to sign any receipts. It was a 
challenge to bring this cash to Kharkiv from Moscow safely, but the sheer 
number of Ukrainian writers who occupied almost the entire car on the train to 
Kharkiv secured the safe delivery of the cash to the treasury of the cooperative 
“Slovo.” These funds were sufficient to complete the construction of the 
Writers’ Home, and Vyshnia alone bore full responsibility for courageously 
approaching Stalin at the conference with a request for additional sums to 
finance the project.
96
 
Nevertheless, we cannot totally exclude the possibility of some initial 
state financial or ideological support for the project. Neither should we 
abandon the thought that the original idea for the creation of living quarters for 
the Ukrainian intelligentsia might have been born in the Soviet secret organs 
and was transmitted to the top leaders of literary circles in Kharkiv. This 
circumstance would fundamentally and philosophically alter our perception 
about the intentions of the state to deal with Ukrainian intellectuals whose 
behavior could be easily observed in one place, intentions that might have 
been at the root of transforming Budynok Slovo into one of the most agonizing 
sites in Kharkiv in the early 1930s. 
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On 25 December 1929, the newspaper Visti VUTSVK announced 
the completion of Budynok Slovo. 
  
  
It took the cooperative nearly two-and-one-half years to complete the 
project. In late December 1929, the first writers moved to the building to 
celebrate the New Year of 1930.
97
 The idea of privacy and potential personal 
property that could be inherited by their children overwhelmed the writers 
with joy and pride. According to Tatiana Kardinalowska, it was planned that 
“each shareholder was to make annual payments for his apartment for some 
fifteen years, after which it would become his private property,” a 
presumption that appears today most unlikely if not impossible in an 
atmosphere of the total negation of private property as a manifestation of 
bourgeois decadence.
98
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Slov’iany and the Communal 1930 
The euphoria of 1930 that accompanied the move by residents into 
their new home was followed by new hopes for a better life which would be 
marked by new literary achievements, and the improvement of their financial 
status. The epoch of minimalism and modesty in private life began to fade 
away, and proletarian writers and artists felt entitled to some financial comfort 
for all their suffering during the First World War, the revolution, the Civil War 
and the first Soviet years of material deprivation and hunger.
99
  
The distribution of elite apartments had little to do with the socialist 
principles of equality. When the construction of the apartment building was 
completed, only those who conceived the project and took an active part in its 
completion had the right to choose their own apartment. Among them were 
Pylypenko and several active members of the cooperative’s administration. 
Other members had to participate in a lottery, and to change their apartment 
later was problematic.
100
 The first choice for the members of the 
administration, most of whom were members of the Communist party, 
followed the hierarchical party principle that was formed by the end of the 
1920s and practiced among the highest echelons of party leaders. 
Another confirmation of a rather commercial and anti-socialist 
approach in arranging the financing of living quarters for Ukrainian writers 
came from the memoirs of Natalka Dukyna and Vasyl’ Sokil. The cooperative 
established rather high fees for the apartments, and monthly payments became 
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unaffordable for most writers’ families. Although high honorariums for the 
work of writers provoked the envy of many ordinary workers, they were 
insufficient to support a family and to pay the cooperative’s fees. Dukyn noted 
that before they received spacious three-room apartment no. 57 in Budynok 
Slovo, her father worked in the cooperative, the Publishing Association 
“Pluzhanyn” and the journal Pluh, and that he with his wife and their small 
Natalka had to share apartment no. 14 in Budynok Slovo with Mykhailo 
Bykovets’, Vasyl’ Sokil and Esphir’ Cherniak. To afford the fees for private 
apartment no.57, Dukyn had to give up his own creative work, and began to 
translate different authors into Ukrainian, an activity that brought a quick 
income into their family. Natalka’s mother was a school teacher, and to help 
her husband pay fees, she worked two shifts at school which consumed all her 
time.
101
 In his memoirs, Sokil also confirmed that he and Bykovets’ had to 
share apartment no. 14 to manage the burden of the communal fees 
together.
102
 
By 1930 many of those who moved to Budynok Slovo occupied two or 
three, and in Pylypenko’s case, even four or five positions at once, working as 
editors of literary journals or newspapers, directors of Ukrainian publishing 
houses, directors of cultural institutions, and heads and managers of literary 
organizations and associations. For instance, Serhii Pylypenko had multiple 
commitments and responsibilities. He was the founder and manager of “Pluh,” 
the chief editor of the newspaper Selians’ka Pravda (Peasant Truth), the 
executive director of the Taras Shevchenko Scientific Research Institute, the 
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chief editor of the State Publishing House of Ukraine, the secretary of the 
Federation of Soviet Writers of Ukraine, chairman of the editorial board of the 
scholarly journal Literaturnyi Arkhiv (Literary Archive), and this was not the 
full list of his responsibilities.
103
 Ostap Vyshnia worked as a secretary for the 
newspaper Selians’ka Pravda, and had a job as a journalist for the newspaper 
Visti (News).
104
 Andrii Paniv was an executive secretary of the journal 
Sil’s’ko-Hospodars’kyi Proletar (Agricultural Proletarian) and a secretary for 
the Central Committee in “Pluh.”
105
  However, to cover the cooperative fees 
was a challenge for many families.  
 
         
         
The original list of Budynok Slovo’s residents.
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Because Budynok Slovo was a product of the cooperative movement, 
the cooperative could not benefit from state subsidies of any kind. 
Understanding writers’ financial difficulties, the cooperative’s administration 
did not mind the communal scheme under which several families shared 
apartments in the building, as long as the residents paid their cooperative fees. 
At the same time, the administration neglected their responsibilities to report 
to the administrator of the building (kerbud) about the composition of the 
residents of the apartments, which frequently changed. Similarly, the residents 
never officially reported to the administration about their rental activities 
because most of their renters were not members of the cooperative. The secret 
police soon became aware of the cooperative’s degree of autonomy, a factor 
that played an ominous role in its members’ lives. 
In 1930, although living in the apparent privacy of their apartments, 
many residents nevertheless lived in a big dormitory, and were involved in 
common activities connected with their profession and everyday life. This 
prevented their isolation or estrangement, or at least made it difficult to 
maintain. Greeting and talking to their neighbors several times a day, the 
slov’iany knew everyone’s daily schedule, and generally were aware of local 
rumors, family scandals and the slightest changes in the private lives of all 
residents. Mark B. Smith posited that “demands of economy and cultural 
norms alike made domestic privacy a problematic concept and an uncertain 
reality: even the separate home was a relatively open space, with rooms 
having multiple functions, usually occupied by more than one family member, 
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and with substantial interaction between neighbors within the block.”
107
 The 
slov’iany still represented a community of writers rather than separate 
individuals.  
The cult of community promoted by the new socialist state in the 
1920s pushed people toward each other, abolishing the notion of private space 
as a bourgeois vestige of the past. Life in a community that shared mutual 
professional interests helped the Ukrainian intelligentsia to cope with the 
arrhythmia and chaos of socialist construction, and uncertainties in human 
lives. However, as Czeslaw Milosz argued, “this cult of the community 
produce[d] something which poison[ed] the community itself.”
108
 Exhausted 
by literary debates and personal clashes, and craving privacy, the Ukrainian 
writers continued to exist in a “literary ghetto,” and, as we will see in later 
chapters, their collective home became nothing more than a Panopticon for the 
state that was carefully scrutinized.
109
 
However, one should not get the impression that the residents of the 
building were martyrs, especially in the beginning of their communal life. The 
members of the cooperative had hobbies and shared common interests beyond 
literature. Some of them were fashion mavens, and many of them were hunters 
and experts in guns, hunting ammunition and dogs. Some slov’iany developed 
                                                          
107
 Smith, Property of Communists, 45. 
108
 See Milosz, 76. This idea was reiterated many times, including Mikhail Bulgakov’s famous 
framing through Woland, a character in Master and Margarita: “the housing shortage 
[zhylishchnyi vopros] has soured them [the people]…” See Mikhail Bulgakov, The Master and 
Margarita, trans. Michael Glenny (London: Everyman’s Library, 1992), 147. 
109
 For the notion of “literary ghetto,” see Milosz, 109. Jeremy Bentham’s concept of the 
Panopticon was rediscovered and illuminated by Michel Foucault, and echoed in James C. 
Scott’s discussion about the transparency of a society the state strives for to facilitate its 
regimentation. See the conversation between Michel Foucault, Jean-Pierre Barou and Michelle 
Perrot, “The Eye of Power,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 
1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).  For a discussion about the 
relationship between the state and society, and the legibility of society for the state, see James 
C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998).  
72 
 
pernicious habits—smoking and drinking beyond moderation, and parties in 
Budynok Slovo often disturbed writers’ wives.
110
 
Importantly, the majority of male and female cultural figures who 
received apartments in Budynok Slovo were mature individuals, and 
accomplished actors and prolific authors. They were born in the last two 
decades of the 19
th
 century, and by 1930, were in their late thirties and forties. 
They had survived the cataclysms of the first twenty years of a new century. 
Many were married, and their life experiences facilitated and assisted the 
blossoming of their talents. Despite the intense politicization and partyzation 
of Ukrainian cultural circles in the 1920s, many writers and artists lived on the 
edge of the permissible, consciously balancing between being loyal 
Communists and romantic adventurers. They succumbed to the new 
Communist aesthetics neither at once, nor unanimously.   
Regarding their educational background, the slov’iany did not 
constitute a homogenous community. They came from families whose social 
status varied, and received different educations. Most of them came from 
families of workers or peasants, some—from the intelligentsia. Some did not 
complete their higher education because of the civil war and the political 
turbulence of the first years of Soviet power in Ukraine. Others had received 
their higher education in institutions such as the Institute of People’s 
Education in various Ukrainian cities, Kyiv Commercial Institute, Kharkiv 
Ukrainian Institute of Marxism, Kharkiv Agricultural Institute, Kharkiv 
Polytechnical Institute, Pedagogical Institutes in Kharkiv and Poltava, the 
Historical and Philological Institute in Nizhyn and elsewhere.  
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Some writers held medical and natural science degrees. For instance, 
Ivan Mykytenko graduated from Kharkiv Medical Institute and the futurist 
Mykhailo Semenko studied in Leningrad’s psycho-neurological institute.
111
 
Pavlo Hubenko (whose literary pseudonym was Ostap Vyshnia) received his 
nursing degree in the Kyiv military school.
112
 Mykhailo Dolengo graduated 
from the botanical department of Kharkiv University, although he continued 
his education there as a graduate student first at the botanical department in 
1922-26, and later at the philological department in 1926-30.
113
 For these 
“engineers of human souls” this scientific experience became beneficial in 
their mature writings.
114
 Some were self-educated, including Mykola Kulish, 
Mykola Khvyl’ovyi, and Iurii Smolych. The majority made their living as 
teachers, and during the 1920s, they obtained various positions in Kharkiv 
journals and magazines. 
However, the writer Antin Dykyi was ignorant and uneducated, 
according to several accounts. He received no higher education, and did not 
seem to be interested in one. He learned grammar in a village church school, 
and had trouble expressing his thoughts on paper.
115
 Paradoxically, he was a 
marvelous story-teller, had a sharp sense of humor, and was entertaining in 
any company.
116
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Most residents of Budynok Slovo embraced Ukrainian culture, and 
spoke Ukrainian. Yet several slov’iany spoke Russian. Among them were the 
Russian and Jewish writers Volodymyr Iurezans’kyi, Raisa Troianker, Leib 
Kvitko, and Dovid Fel’dman, who used the Russian language in their every-
day lives.
117
 The slov’ianyn Smolych has testified that many Jewish writers in 
Kharkiv in the 1920s spoke Ukrainian.
118
 It might be fair to assume that their 
linguistic preferences depended on the situation and their conversational 
partners at the moment because, considering their literary legacy, some of 
them mastered three languages, Yiddish, Russian and Ukrainian.  
For many slov’iany, perceptions of reality shifted dramatically between 
their immediate past and their Budynok Slovo present. The building gathered 
under its roof talented people of various social, cultural and ethnic 
backgrounds. Passing through its threshold, they became members of the 
middle-class elite who were involved in intellectual labor, and many led a 
privileged lifestyle. Many writers were office holders, and entitled to special 
food rations (paiky). The jobs of the slov’iany became an anchor that held 
them in one place, as did Budynok Slovo, which was itself an incentive and 
privilege permitted by the state. These conditions made the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia “immovable.”
119
 They were tied to their desks and salaries,
120
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and after 1930, they became hostages of a bigger burden, a luxurious 
apartment. 
These assets transformed and tarnished many of them as artists. They 
lost the freedom they had enjoyed as impoverished artists, when they led an 
unsettled and pitiable existence. Edward W. Said maintained that the lonely 
condition of intellectuals, unburdened by material possessions and awards 
from the state, was always better for their mind, soul and art, than the 
conformism they developed in the process of turning into literary 
dignitaries.
121
 Their belonging to Budynok Slovo and the professional club 
“Slovo” codified their behavior and influenced many of their habits and tastes.  
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Chapter Two 
Material Culture and Surveillance of Budynok Slovo 
 
Buildings are appropriated in a twofold 
manner: by use and by perception. 
 
Walter Benjamin
1
 
 
…the behavioral and material cultures 
of an organized group are partly 
integrated with its ideological culture, 
partly unintegrated, and partly 
contradictory.  
 
Pitirim A. Sorokin
2
 
 
Budynok Slovo as an Architectural Innovation 
 
Although Budynok Slovo is interesting in purely geographical or 
historical terms, it was also significant as a social and cultural habitat that was 
systematically traumatized by state power, human irrationality and emotions. 
An examination of this habitat provides a better understanding of the irrational 
factors and emotions that shaped the intellectual elite’s behavior, factors 
which continue to play a significant role in history.
3
 Their behavior was 
deeply imbedded in national culture, politics and the language they spoke, but 
also—in the place in which they lived, and its material culture. To some 
extent, the slov’iany’s material world influenced their behavior, values, habits 
and moral norms which in turn formed the state’s perceptions about them. The 
exploration of these interrelations illuminates the subsequent transformations 
of the slov’iany as writers, and their behavioral changes in prison. The absence 
of ritualized practices and a habitual material world, combined with the 
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violence applied to them, confused people and destabilized them emotionally. 
An analysis of the writers’ social and material world will extend our 
understandings about the struggle between the intellectual and the state 
beyond the binary scheme “oppressors versus oppressed,” and will 
demonstrate the residents’ social adjustments to the changing political and 
cultural landscape, adjustments  that shaped the slov’iany’s future in so many 
ways, mostly tragic and even catastrophic. In other words, material, spatial, 
and subjectivity factors form the center of this discussion. 
In the early 1930s, because of the state crusade against Ukrainian 
nationalism, conformism became an overarching phenomenon among the 
literary bohemia. Ivan Maistrenko observed that Communist idealism of the 
early twenties was replaced by non-ideology, careerism and welfare concerns 
in the late twenties and early thirties.
4
 Budynok Slovo reflected the writers’ 
tastes, practices and habits that became embedded in its material culture.
5
 To 
be sure, usually just by looking at buildings, sites of dwelling, we can tell who 
belongs where and why, who did what and how. Material culture can answer 
questions about the relationship between space and human behavior, tastes, 
priorities and functions.
6
 As we have learned, the writers assertively 
contributed to the final look of their home. Let us take a close look at Budynok 
Slovo as a material object and place in an attempt to understand the 
community of Ukrainian writers.  
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The aerial view of the building presented a square variant of the 
Russian letter “ɋ” symbolizing the special designation of the home for the 
cooperative “Slovo,” a collective of the most progressive and popular 
Ukrainian writers and poets.
7
 Today Budynok Slovo is located on 9 Kul’tury 
Street in the very heart of Kharkiv. Despite some memoirs’ claims that the 
building had a short life,
8
 Budynok Slovo survived the Second World War and 
the German occupation, and has preserved its original name even today.
9
     
     
Budynok  Slovo today. (Kharkiv, Ukraine). July 2004, March 2005. 
 
In a sense, Budynok Slovo became a gated community. Later, the 
Soviet authorities became extremely sophisticated in creating gated 
communities for “higher dignitaries.”
10
 Institutional 
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(vidomchi/vedomstvennye) apartment buildings
 11
 were created in the majority 
of the largest urban centers, including the cities of the Baltic states, 
incorporated into the Soviet Union before the Second World War, and after 
the war in the countries of the socialist camp. A simple mortal could not 
penetrate the bastilles, and telephone numbers of the chosen who resided in 
such compounds were not available in the directory. Agents of the secret 
police usually guarded the entrances, and one could not pass unnoticed by 
their vigilant eyes unless they had special oral (telephone) or written 
permission from the owner to visit.
12
 The order in Budynok Slovo was more 
democratic. However, the gates were erected not by the writers but by the 
secret police that monitored any movement in and about the building. In the 
thirties, the Soviet secret police gained an opportunity to watch the 
intelligentsia as a community in one place, in action. 
Geographically, one could not desire a better location for a home. 
Local authorities allocated a space for the building at quiet Barachna Street 
which was not far from the center of the city. The historical name of the street 
can be traced to the 1870s, when nine barracks were built in this area located 
near the University Garden. These barracks were used for wounded soldiers 
who were rehabilitated there after the battles of the Russian-Turkish War in 
1877-78. Gradually, the territory around the barracks was improved, and 
during the 1930s several cooperative buildings were erected along Barachna 
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Street, including Budynok Slovo.
13
 The buildings adjacent to Budynok Slovo 
that had been erected at approximately the same time were also institutional, 
living quarters for the South Railway and Aviation administration staff, but the 
House of Writers remains unique architecturally and structurally.
14
 Changed in 
1930 from Barachna to Chervonykh Pys’mennykiv Street (Street of Red 
Writers), the name provokes dark associations of the profound disintegration 
of the writers’ community in Kharkiv during Stalin’s repressions.  
Everything inside and outside the building promised comfort and 
luxury. Structurally, the Writers’ home was conceived as a five-storey 
building that would go beyond the accepted construction norms and standards, 
despite party suggestions to economize on materials and construct no more 
than four-storey buildings.
15
 The rooms were three-and-one-half meters in 
height. To make the walls sound-proof, a thick layer of wool fabric was 
installed between the two constituent parts of the wall. The staircase was wide 
and not steep, and its handrails were made of oak which survives even today.
16
 
Sufficient room was left to install the elevator, an idea that never materialized 
because of a lack of funds.
17
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The balconies were an innovation in contrast to the plain barrack-like 
buildings in the neighborhood. Balconies were multifunctional, and played a 
specific role in the lives of residents, depending on time of the day or season.
18
  
 
            
Original blueprints of the staircase in Budynok Slovo.
19
  
 
 
 
 
The staircase is preserved today. August 2009. 
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During warm months, they served as a storage place and a point from 
which mothers could observe their children playing outside. The balconies that 
faced the internal yard often turned into stadium seats when the internal yard 
was claimed for sports contests that were very popular among children and 
adults. The fame of these sports events reached other literary associations and 
theatres that performed in Kharkiv, and the scale of football competitions 
often reached the republic and even the state level. The collectives of artists or 
writers who came to Kharkiv for professional purposes usually attended sports 
tournaments conducted in Budynok Slovo. Writers’ children were vigorous 
initiators and founders of sport traditions and activities in “Slovo,” and 
gradually involved a good portion of the adults in sporting events and 
competitions, conducted in the internal yard of the building. 
20
 
 
 
The profile of the building with balconies on both sides--the façade and the 
internal yard.
21
 
 
 
During winter time, the balconies served as refrigerators which 
attracted homeless hungry children (besprizorniki), “a legacy of war, 
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revolution, and civil war,” who systematically stole the food stored there.
22
 
For them, the upper floors were not a challenge, and their marvelous acrobatic 
skills, the flexibility of their young bodies and the sturdy rain downspouts 
helped them in obtaining desirable foodstuffs.
 23
 Importantly, balconies were a 
social meeting place, and a source of information for many residents. The 
slov’iany rested, wrote and read on the balconies. 
During the nights when arrests were made, balconies were initially 
observation towers for the residents but very soon ceased to serve as such, 
because the residents developed a habit of hiding behind the thick walls of the 
building when their neighbors were taken by the GPU.  
 
 
  
A little decorative stone fence in Dashkevych’s original blueprints.
24
 
  
 
The building’s façade was embellished by a little decorative stone 
fence that remains untouched to the present day. It was framed by flowerbeds, 
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and a beautiful garden was planted near the building. The technical description 
of this fence leaves readers amazed at the quality of materials and the 
architectural fundamentality of this little detail.
25
 It is a wonder that the fence 
survived frequent bombing attacks by the Germans and the Nazi occupation, 
and required only minor repairs over the years. 
 
 
The façade of Budynok Slovo (with the little fence) in the 1930s.
26
 
 
 
Five entrances pierced the building, and from the street one could get 
to the internal yard and vice versa, although according to some accounts, the 
façade entrances were often locked, and the residents used only back entrances 
to enter their section.
27
 The back entrances were accessed through the 
courtyard, and the façade entrances faced the street. The façade doors were 
massive and presentable, and made of oak.
28
 Imitating the European tradition, 
an elegant board was installed downstairs near the façade doors with the 
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numbers of apartments and the doorbells, including the list of residents and the 
number of their apartment.
29
  
 
 
The façade of Budynok Slovo. Summer 2008. 
 
 
Dashkevych’s blueprints of Budynok Slovo are extremely 
detailed. One of many drawings of the doors.
30
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The two wings of the building created a cozy and safe internal yard 
which played a significant role in residents’ lives. Wooden tables and benches 
were installed which were often the sites of chess competitions among the 
residents. They also served as social space for writers’ relatives where the 
latest news and rumors were discussed. The tables and benches were hidden in 
the shadow of the trees that were planted in the internal yard, as well as along 
the façade of the building. A part of the internal yard was allocated to 
volleyball games. In winter time, a skating rink for the writers’ children was 
set up within the internal yard.
31
 For some writers, the skating rink became a 
place for nocturnal wanderings which diverted the insomniacs from the 
activities at their desks. Many found the nights very productive because the 
building’s quiet was not violated by noisy children outside or family 
adventures within their apartments. During their night writings, they took a 
break and went outside to smoke, to run and to slide on the ice.
32
  
 
 
The internal yard of Budynok Slovo. Summer 2008. 
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There were 68 apartments, and they were bright because of the big 
windows in each room that faced both the street and the internal yard. The 
rooms were spacious, and the ceilings in the apartments were rather high (3. 5 
meters), which contributed to a grandiose look from outside.
33
 There were five 
separate entrances in the building (pid’izd). The first and the fifth entrances 
had three apartments on each floor (they formed the wings of the letter C), and 
the second, third and fourth entrances in the middle had two flats across from 
each other on each floor. Each apartment contained a living room, a study, one 
or two bedrooms, a kitchen, a pantry, a separate bathroom and a long hallway.  
 
 
Original drawings of the 1
st
 floor plan, and the 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
 and 5
th
 floor plan.
34
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The heating system was centralized for the whole building, and ran on 
coal that was piled up in the basement for the entire winter. The cooperative 
decided that gas might be dangerous and stayed with the old method of 
heating, safe and inexpensive. Stoves in the kitchen also worked on coal, and 
because there was no elevator in the building the residents of the upper floors 
were at a disadvantage having to carry buckets of coal for cooking. Coal ashes 
were piled in the courtyard until taken for disposal by a communal truck.
35
  
The most luxurious and rare objects were the telephones in each 
apartment, and a solarium shared by all inhabitants of the building. 
Telephones in private apartments in 1930 were an unheard-of phenomenon.
36
 
This device played a crucial role in the subsequent repression of the slov’iany. 
The solarium with 10 showers and a locker room for 10-15 people on the top 
floor was extraordinarily popular mostly among children who suntanned and 
played with the water on the roof during summers. For them, the solarium was 
a special subject in conversations with their peers who could not believe that 
such a miracle existed in Kharkiv.
37
  
In addition, there were other remarkable amenities in Budynok Slovo. 
A kindergarten that was organized in the building enrolled many children of 
resident families. The kindergarten was situated in the fifth entrance in the 
basement (apartment no. 51), and its staff took excellent care of the writers’ 
children.
38
 They were regularly fed, and provided with a daily dosage of 
vitamin D (fish oil), a substance hated by all pupils collectively without 
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exception.
39
 The kindergarten was a form of life inconceivable for many 
Soviet children, especially in the historical context of 1930-31 when the 
Ukrainian countryside began to starve, and more and more hungry, begging 
peasants and children appeared in the streets of Kharkiv. Regular meals and 
proper hygiene were strongly promoted and maintained in the kindergarten. 
The every-day schedule was vigorously enforced, and after lunch, the children 
were buttoned in sleeping bags for an afternoon nap. This space cultivated in 
them a feeling of home, one that they owed to the privileged position of their 
parents.
40
 
Near the kindergarten, in apartment no. 50, the cooperative established 
and subsidized a cafeteria for the residents. According to the first resident of 
Budynok Slovo Vasyl’ Sokil’s memoirs, Raia Kotliar, wife of the Jewish poet 
Iosif Kotliar, was in charge of the cafeteria, and the meals it provided for the 
slov’iany were of excellent quality. Residents simultaneously enjoyed the 
atmosphere of the cafeteria and its affordable prices. Like the internal yard, the 
cafeteria was their favorite place because of its social and culinary attractions. 
The cafeteria reinforced the feeling of belonging to a club of intellectuals 
where people could casually chat without paying attention to the literary ranks 
or honored achievements of their colleagues.
41
 
Other common facilities in Budynok Slovo included a beauty salon and 
a laundry room that shared apartment no. 38 in the basement. Few details are 
available about the specific features and patterns of work of these facilities but 
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41
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 91 
 
the services that the residents received were subsidized by the cooperative and 
their location saved a great deal of time for the residents.
42
  
There was another public place in the basement of Budynok Slovo—the 
bomb shelter. Designers of Soviet architectural standards for apartment 
buildings of the late 1920s and early 1930s took into consideration political 
warnings of the Soviet government about a potential invasion by capitalist 
countries. Spacious bomb shelters were constructed in the basements of all 
newly erected buildings that would serve not only as emergency shelters but 
also as study rooms for high school and university students where they learned 
practical skills necessary in case of military air attacks. Budynok Slovo was not 
an exception, and its bomb shelter was a large space equal to two four-room 
apartments, sharing a common wall with the apartment of Iakym Petymko, a 
janitor of Budynok Slovo, who resided in apartment no. 2 in the basement.
43
     
Despite the building’s innovative architectural features that were 
unusual for the Communist reality, it would be fair to identify the house as 
only semi-luxurious.
44
 In other words, Budynok Slovo placed its residents in 
the middle of a social continuum, where the top was occupied by high-ranking 
party, state and military officials who lived in completely isolated,  
exceptionally private, and well-guarded compounds,
45
 and the bottom 
belonged to laborers who lived in communal flats and barracks. 
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Fashion in Budynok Slovo  
The spirit of revolutionary innovations in art infiltrated the private 
sphere, and the personal manner of dress played a part in artistic expression 
and individual identity. Costumes became an ideological statement for 
residents, although it is fair to say that for some individuals clothes were 
merely a matter of necessity and practical everyday activities. Nevertheless, 
fashion became a passion for the female inhabitants of the Writers’ Home as 
well as a subject of conversation and competition for male writers. 
The Ukrainian writer Mykola Khvyl’ovyi was one who was not driven 
by the desire to be presentable and fashionable. In fact, he was very 
undemanding, reserved and modest in his material needs.
46
 Most of the time, 
he could be seen in his typical hunting outfit (his passion for hunting went 
beyond a mere hobby; his knowledge of guns and their history was 
encyclopedic, to say nothing about his research interest in hunting dogs, their 
breeds and proper training). There was nothing more constant in Budynok 
Slovo than Khvyl’ovyi’s hunting outfit: an old rough hunting coat, pants of 
indistinguishable color, a pair of boots and a hunting hat.
47
 According to 
Kostiuk, only during literary gatherings would the “severe polemicist” wear 
something more formal. Nevertheless, he routinely surprised his colleagues by 
his unassuming choice of shirts and pants, and the shabby summer shoes that 
he wore without socks.
48
 His style was consistent with what Soviet 
professional clothing designers in the 1920s would call industrial or working 
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clothes style (prozodezhda).
49
 However, most of the residents of the building 
enthusiastically adopted the standards and dress codes that were dictated by 
the atmosphere and the culture of the building— elegant and business-like. 
The most extravagant and “foreign-looking” in their fashion were 
Valerian Polishchuk and Maik Iohansen. Polishchuk’s romantic and artistic 
nature and his long-lasting vacillation between two loves who happened to be 
sisters contributed to his visual image which at times was innovative and 
provocative.
50
 His hat, made of two colors, white and black, surprised 
pedestrians by its purple “tongue,” hanging from the front, which, as 
Polishchuk confessed, he made and sewed himself. Like many intellectuals, he 
was influenced by futurism, and by the manner of dress of David Burliuk and 
Vladimir Maiakovskii which sometimes employed two or three contrasting 
colors in an outfit.
51
 This fashion style followed the futurists’ rejection of 
habitual harmony and their elevation of the ideas of cacophony and chaos “to 
the status of a poetic principle.”
52
   
In contrast to Polishchuk, Iohansen was more conservative, and 
employed a strange amalgam of sport style and classic British style which 
together with his elegant physique brought him fame as a “dandy” (pizhon). 
Iohansen looked like a “foreign tourist” to Hryhorii Kostiuk, who arrived in 
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Kharkiv from Kyiv and first saw Iohansen at a meeting in the State Publishing 
House of Ukraine in 1929.
53
 According to Stepan Kryzhanivs’kyi, in contrast 
to the routinely disorganized and messy look of his desk at Budynok Slovo, 
Iohansen looked like a gentleman from some European country, from top to 
bottom, and his elegant “picnic” style alternated with an official look marked 
by a hat and a bow-tie.
54
  
Some slov’iany preferred a classically elegant look. According to 
Teren’ Masenko, Oleksa Vlyz’ko was often seen in fine and fashionable 
clothes, and his sophisticated elegant manner of carrying himself corresponded 
with his appearance.
55
 Iurii Ianovs’kyi was also a fan of high-quality clothes. 
His beautiful shoes became a part of his image and the subject of many 
recollections about him.
56
         
Budynok Slovo and its residents’ fashions were clearly influenced by 
the new Soviet culture emerging from ideological discourses, and from the 
social and economic realities of the 1920s and 1930s. This period was 
amazingly productive for painters, sculptors, architects and craftsmen who 
found employment in factories that specialized in the mass production of 
textiles. Perceptions of textile and clothing design were elevated from the level 
of crafts to that of original and creative proletarian arts. Textile “bourgeous” 
patterns were replaced by modern geometric patterns, a la Picasso, and 
contained asymmetrical and symmetrical images of tractors, screws, hammers 
and sickles.
57
 Constructivist fashion of the 1920s was associated with 
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democratic motifs which rejected the idea of fashion for the elites and mass 
eclectic trends which dominated the post-revolutionary era.
58
  
However, the Constructivist influence
59
 was rather brief, and an 
aesthetic change in clothing design toward a more elaborate fashion style 
reflected public taste that was cultivated by the cultural shift in Soviet 
propaganda, one that promoted welfare and new material opportunities which 
emerged in the Soviet Union in the early 1930s.
60
    
The slov’iany became consumers of both styles of clothing, industrial 
and haute couture. The latter were quite expensive and difficult to find. The 
sources of unique textile pieces that were worn by residents came from their 
trips abroad (Vienna, Berlin, Paris and other European cities) during the 1920s 
and early 1930s.
61
 Liubochka, Khvyl’ovyi’s step-daughter, invited attacks of 
jealousy from her peers in the conservatory where she advanced herself as a 
pianist: Khvyl’ovyi brought her a hand-knitted blouse from one of his 
international trips, a garment that would have cost an astronomical sum in the 
black market in the early 1930s. Ievhen Kas’ianenko, editor of the Kharkiv 
party newspaper Visti, spent more time abroad than in Budynok Slovo, and 
provided a lifestyle for his family that was well beyond that which ordinary 
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slov’iany could afford.
 
A collection of goods that Kas’ianenko brought for his 
wife and his daughter, including clothes, astonished his neighbors.
62
  
The products of Moscow and Leningrad textile factories were also in 
favor in Budynok Slovo. Oleksa Slisarenko provoked a great deal of 
excitement among the residents when he brought from Leningrad a short 
winter jacket with a fur collar.
63
 In a week, the entire building possessed 
similar coats. The source of their purchase remained unknown. Perhaps the 
slov’iany made special trips to Leningrad or obtained similar coats on the 
black market. Slisarenko also became the initiator of another fashion craze 
over a pair of white valianky, winter sheepwool boots made of felt, a craze that 
lasted for a long time. Mykola Kulish enjoyed wearing them, like many other 
slov’iany.
64
 As a matter of fact, white valianky remained a luxury item 
throughout the Second World War. Valianky were provided for superior 
military commanders, and were considered an elegant accessory to an 
industrial look that signaled the important bureaucratic standing of the owners 
or their influential connections in the party. 
65
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Borys Groys posits that during the Stalin era the party struggled 
against fashion.
66
 Its aesthetics prescribed “strict enforcement of a clothes 
ordinance,”
67
 and any deviations from prescribed norms were likely to be 
characterized as dissent.Obviously, valianky and Leningrad jackets were more 
than clothes for slov’iany. They were symbols of security and belonging to a 
common culture or a “club,” an elite group that celebrated life and power. On 
the other hand, for the state, the fashions of slov’iany and, more than anything, 
their ability to follow fashion innovations and be dressed according to the 
latest trends signaled freedom and, therefore, dangers of independence.
68
  
 
Elegance as a Business Style: Writers’ Tools 
 The slov’iany also developed a taste for high-quality writing 
accessories. Stationery products including personalized paper for private and 
official correspondence, as well as the basic tools—pens and pencils—began 
to play a significant role in the writers’ everyday lives. Although having 
proper writing accessories did not become a form of material object fetishism, 
most residents of Budynok Slovo considered personalized items for public 
writing an inseparable and prestigious part of their professional image. 
Through the DVU, Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo Ukrainy (the State Publisher of 
Ukraine), slov’iany could order special letterhead for correspondence, which 
included their first and last names or a literary pseudonym, their home address 
and home telephone number. This information usually was provided in the 
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Ukrainian and English languages which were widely believed to inspire 
recipients’ respect for the importance of the paper’s owner.
69
 
 
   
Valerian Polishchuk’s letter written on personalized letterhead.
70
   
 
 
Some writers grew fussy about the paper, and could write only on a 
certain type of white sheet. Iurii Ianovs’kyi was exceptionally selective about 
the paper and pens he used in his creative writing. He would wander from 
store to store, looking for the best quality paper. His handwriting was 
calligraphic, and his desk was always in perfect order. A perfectionist in 
everything, he strove for the best tools the socialist state could provide for a 
writer.
71
  
Pens brought from abroad were especially cherished by the writers 
because their innovative features were unknown to Soviet consumers. Arkadii 
Liubchenko brought his father an automatic pen of foreign production that was 
called among slov’iany “vichne” (eternal). Khvyl’ovyi brought an automatic 
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pencil from abroad as a gift (whose happy recipient remains unknown). The 
pencil had automatically interchangeable parts that could write in four 
different colors.
72
  
Furthermore, typewriters that were brought from Germany served 
writers as a primary tool for their intellectual labor, and also often saved the 
lives of their wives and children after the GPU evicted them from Budynok 
Slovo as families of enemies of the people. Because of this precious 
possession, the wives of writers found jobs as typists and survived. The 
slov’iany truly appreciated the aesthetic beauty of foreign consumer goods, 
and this factor, including their easy access to European technology, 
contributed to their image as “bourgeois elements” which was ascribed to 
them after their arrests. 
 
Furniture: Luxury, Convenience and its Absence  
Generally, the material possessions of an average resident of Budynok 
Slovo were modest and were often limited to extensive personal libraries.
73
 
The furniture question was solved by the residents according to their financial 
abilities and practical skills. Many writers had no beds or desks, and floors and 
stoves served as their substitutes.
74
   
In contrast to its conceptual twin, Dom na Naberezhnoi, a home built 
specifically for governmental and political leaders in Moscow, Budynok Slovo 
was not decorated with state (kazionnaia) furniture which was typically added 
to an inventory list of state possessions that had to be signed for by residents 
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on arrival.
75
 Instead, residents had to furnish their own homes. Furniture was 
an expensive commodity and few families could allow themselves brand new 
suites.
76
 Usually only those who had professional ties or family connections 
with the party could afford new furniture. Among them were the Mykytenko, 
Bazhan and Panch families. Ivan Mykytenko, in addition to a comfortable 
home with luxurious furniture and other incentives provided by the party, was 
the only one who had his own secretary. Mykola Bazhan was famous for his 
four-room apartment in Budynok Slovo, fully decorated with expensive pieces 
of furniture made of some rare sort of red wood.
77
 Although an average writer, 
“Panch knew how to sell himself,” a skill which apparently brought a certain 
prosperity to his family.
 
Panch’s apartment was elaborately decorated with 
beautiful new furniture.
78
  
Ordinary slov’iany customarily purchased used and inexpensive pieces 
of furniture in the market. Some writers made book shelves and beds by 
themselves. For instance, Mykhailo Bykovets’, who had composed an 
extensive bibliographical and biographical catalogue of prominent Ukrainian 
political and cultural figures, invested days of intense labor to install built-in 
bookshelves in his apartment to store his unique catalogue. Vasyl’ Sokil 
remembered the moment when he finally saw the final product: the 
bookshelves held thousands of cards that Bykovets made throughout his life. 
From the floor to the ceiling, these shelves were the spellbinding creation of a 
poet, not a carpenter, and their content was a treasure for those who were 
interested in the history of Ukraine as well as a desirable object for the GPU. 
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Bykovets’ catalogue might have served GPU agents as a guideline for their 
activity, and may have saved the GPU many hours of investigative operational 
work on individuals who were repressed and shot in the 1930s.
79
  
Analyzing the material culture of Budynok Slovo, one might note that 
in general the mental needs of writers outweighed the needs of their bodies. 
Indeed, prosperous apartments like Mykytenko’s, Bazhan’s or the Panch’s 
were aberrations. The other side of the spectrum also merits attention: 
Volodymyr Sosiura’s poverty. His family experienced permanent material 
hardships. This factor contributed to regular scandals between Sosiura and his 
wife, which were often observed by the community of Budynok Slovo. A 
subtle lyric poet, Sosiura had virtually no furniture. He, his wife and several 
other relatives slept on the floor for years.
80
 Neither his personal eccentricity, 
nor poverty should be completely blamed for this state of affairs. By 1930, he 
had become a well-known and accomplished poet, and his literary 
honorariums were generous and regular, the highest among slov’iany. What 
destabilized and undermined his comfortable everyday existence and family 
relationships were his lack of interest in material possessions in general and 
his passion for alcohol.
81
  
However, most residents tried to find a reasonable balance between 
their intellectual and the bodily needs that would resuscitate their poetic souls, 
which had been disturbed by the hardships of the wars. In these quests, the 
culture and practices of the building prescribed the material norms that 
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became desirable for its residents, although the residents themselves created 
these norms. The necessity and pressure to acquiesce to these norms made 
slov’iany internalize them and conform to them. The place, more imagined 
than perceived realistically, influenced their lives. For some writers, the 
“myth” and prestige of the building, and therefore of their social status, 
became more important than its “reality.” Sleepless and exhausted, the 
slov’iany worked at night, creating, writing and translating in order to pay for 
their lifestyles, which were barely affordable for many.
82
 In maintaining their 
special social status, they were covertly compromised by the culture of the 
building, unconsciously mimicked their neighbors’ habits and adopted their 
colleagues’ literary approaches and findings. 
 
Changing Self-Identities of the Slov’iany  
Paradoxically, in a socialist society where material considerations 
should have been secondary, the self-identities of residents were also shaped 
through the ownership of goods that constituted the material culture of 
Budynok Slovo. Their lifestyles were defined by fashionable clothes and 
expensive habits that many slov’iany could afford. They developed a taste for 
them, although most slov’iany were “ascetically modest,” according to the 
writer Teren’ Masenko. For the majority, the desire for intellectual freedom 
and creativity was more powerful and unwavering than the need for material 
wealth. They believed that the right to individual freedom and prosperity was 
                                                          
82
 Kulish, A Word, 19; Iurii Smolych, Rozpovid’ pro nespokii tryvaie: deshcho z dvadtsiatykh, 
trydtsiatykh rokiv i doteper v ukrains’komu literaturnomu pobuti (Kyiv: Radians’kyi 
pys’mennyk, 1969), 2: 86. On self-identity and home, space and social order, see Murray 
Edelman, From Art to Politics: How Artistic Creations Shape Political Conceptions (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 79. 
 103 
 
granted to them by the revolution.
83
 Yet, the bohemian lifestyle and the ability 
to afford it shaped their habits and attitudes. The writers borrowed money 
from each other unconditionally, without any expectations to collect or to 
return debts in the future. Masenko characterized the writers’ existence as “the 
happiness of joyful lightness.”
84
 
“The happiness” however often alternated with sorrow—material life 
often became a pretext for criticism of literary opponents and the party. 
Depending on the situation, funding, honorariums, luxury items or trips abroad 
could be characteristic of both a hard-working successful proletarian writer 
and a bourgeois, counterrevolutionary, and even nationalist one.
85
 Petit-
bourgeois consciousness and the material life associated with it were 
condemned by the party, but for most slov’iany, the objects of material culture 
were manifestations of their individual freedom, and of the trust that was 
generously bestowed upon them by the government. They believed that their 
inner essence as true Bolsheviks defined them in the eyes of the state, not their 
material life. Yet Stalin’s state attributed a specific meaning and logic to their 
lifestyles, which were associated with their reputations which the writers 
earned during the Literary Discussion in the 1920s.
86
   
The joy and happiness of the first year in Budynok Slovo was soon 
replaced by gloom and despair, as repression increased (see next chapter). The 
GPU’s total surveillance produced a quite dismal atmosphere in the building. 
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The artists unmistakably sensed the changing political climate in Ukraine, and 
their rebellious and creative spirit now asserted itself only in byt and social 
space, distancing itself from art. The state campaign against nationalist 
“deviationists” (see Chapter Three) forced the slov’iany to compartmentalize 
art and everyday space. Many lost their aesthetic orientation; most changed 
their literary style.
87
 This bifurcated personality was characteristic of the 
majority of the slov’iany which manifested itself on the pages of interrogation 
protocols and their letters of appeal to the highest GPU/NKVD authorities. 
Moreover, the discrepancy between their assumed privileged status and the 
humiliation they experienced in prison confused them and facilitated their 
eventual surrender to the state.  
The slov’iany’s financial freedom and ideological incarceration shaped 
their art. Its aesthetics mirrored unbalanced quests for consolidation of the 
realities—their comfortable “club” existence, dubious politics and routine 
arrests of their colleagues. The writers constructed an artistic world in which 
the “I” was still alive but competed with the revolutionary “we,” conceptually 
foreign for many of them but generally accepted by most of them.
88
 Ivan 
Dziuba characterized the literature of the 1930s even more severely: the 
writers produced a “poetics of un-freedom,” whose centerpiece was 
“fanaticism of self-denial.”
89
 The Soviet punitive organs focused more on the 
individualism of the Ukrainian intelligentsia evident in their every-day lives in 
Budynok Slovo while overlooking the collective spirit that permeated, more 
than ever, the prose and poetry of the slov’iany. Writers consciously or 
unconsciously surrendered the manifold dimensions and complexities of their 
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art, but the sacrifice in the name of their families’ safety was in vain. It was 
not their art but they, as physical objects, the residents of Budynok Slovo, and 
the “kings and slaves of their own artifice,” that was of greatest interest to the 
GPU.
90
  
The slov’iany’s suffering was exacerbated by an increasing social 
chasm between them and the rest of society. Mykola Khvyl’ovyi became 
aware of social and material differences between writers and ordinary people 
before he moved to Budynok Slovo. In his novel Val’dshnepy (The 
Woodsnipes), the dialogue between Vovchyk and Karamazov reveals his, 
Khvyl’ovyi’s, understanding about financial opportunities of the writers that 
set them apart from the rest of society.
91
 Khvyl’ovyi’s life in the elite building 
became psychologically difficult for him: beyond the freedom that was buried 
in the 1920s, egalitarian ideals, the ultimate goal of Soviet society, had been 
vulgarized and forgotten. Forcible collectivization and mobs of hungry 
peasants, including children in the streets, accentuated the drastic contrast 
between the lives of writers and the Ukrainian peasantry.
92
 Scholars claim that 
some of the reasons for Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide were his suffering and 
compassion toward the dying Ukrainian countryside in 1933, his realization of 
social and political impotence, and his recognition of the impossibility of 
questioning the authorities effectively.
93
 Although material hardships of 
ordinary people provoked sympathy among slov’iany, they themselves were 
nevertheless on a distant orbit from them. Through inertia, they celebrated life 
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in their new apartment building, arranged tea ceremonies and parties, read 
poems—lived their lives. 
 
Surveillance of Budynok Slovo: Vanishing Public Space  
Although the complex organism of Budynok Slovo was not as 
homogenous as the slov’iany wanted, its fragmentation into groups and 
subgroups became even more pronounced within a year after the writers 
inhabited the building. Some were united by their closeness to the party elite; 
others by their distance from it. For instance, Ivan Mykytenko, the leader of 
the pro-Soviet literary organization VUSPP, Ivan Kyrylenko, Ivan Kulyk and 
Ivan Le represented the group of official writers and party functionaries. 
Among slov’iany, they were called the “four Ivans,” emphasizing their 
ideological unity and equally distributed mediocrity. Mykola Kulish, Mykola 
Khvyl’ovyi, Arkadii Liubchenko, Oles’ Dosvitnii, Iurii Ianovs’kyi and others 
belonged to a group of writers who saw the development of Ukrainian culture 
along other than the prescribed party line.
94
 A hierarchical society was 
emerging in front of residents’ eyes, and they were active participants in the 
construction of this society. Cerebral and talented, they were losing their role 
as outsiders and independent thinkers. In Marshall Sahlins’s terms, chained by 
material possessions and by a place that they could not abandon, they no 
longer could be free “hunters and gatherers,” for whom movement meant 
life.
95
 They became settlers, and Budynok Slovo became for them a space from 
which they could not escape.  
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Social links in the building continued to deteriorate. The presence of 
literary hangers-on in the building, who began to obtain apartments through 
connections that were not totally clear and transparent for slov’iany, 
exacerbated their feelings of insecurity and fear. Typically, a great number of 
guests visited Budynok Slovo every day. Among them were book dealers, 
publishers, friends and relatives. In the early 1930s, the secret agency fully 
established its reputation as the party’s watchdog over the intelligentsia, and 
many attributed the wanderings of strangers through the internal yard of 
Budynok Slovo and its entrances to the GPU’s clandestine work.
96
  
By 1931, before the Central Committee’s decision of 1932 on the 
restructuring of literary-artistic organizations which suggested a rigid 
centralization and administering of culture in the Soviet Union, the state had 
destroyed almost all free literary associations in Ukraine.
97
 The slov’iany 
began to realize the danger of stubborn artistic and political principles and the 
benefits of ideological elasticity. Their professional integrity and personal 
dignity were undermined by fears of being eliminated as formalists and 
counterrevolutionaries. Repentant public letters published in the Soviet press 
and self-criticism in various literary forms became a common practice among 
writers. Observing a solitary individual standing and smoking under their 
balconies for days, some slov’iany decided to act before it was too late. 
Hryhorii Epik wrote his Petro Romen glorifying the new proletarian man. 
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Maik Iohansen created a poem about Lenin, contributing significantly to 
literary Leniniana. Khvyl’ovyi publicly denounced his colleagues in 
newspaper essays as “bourgeois sponges,” and in 1932, in the foreword to his 
book he lamented that his perestroika occurred too late.
98
  
After May 1933, and the suicides of Khvyl’ovyi and Skrypnyk,
99
 GPU 
activity ceased being clandestine. The militia closed the façade entrances of 
the building. The authorities announced that the façade doors would be locked 
“for safety reasons and in the interests of the residents—respected writers of 
Ukraine” to prevent robberies.
100
 The residents could now enter the building 
only from the internal yard. On both sides of the building there were always at 
least two young individuals whose faces after some time became familiar to 
the residents.
101
 These additions to the building’s population occupied their 
places twenty-four hours a day.  
Their behavior became rather assertive, and, according to the opinions 
of many slov’iany, increasingly aggressive. Two or three residents, while 
walking along the building or in the internal yard and conversing, were often 
joined by a follower behind them, who without any concealment tried to catch 
the content of the talk. The tactics of GPU agents began to irritate the 
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residents, the most courageous of whom often stopped abruptly and asked 
whether the follower wanted a cigarette.
102
   
“Berezil” theater actor Iosyp Hirniak who survived Stalin’s purges and 
observed how the slov’iany were taken by the GPU one by one also testified 
that before the arrest the agents followed the victim for a week or two, with 
intentional conspicuousness, and in this way terrified the chosen victim before 
he or she was taken to a prison cell in Radnarkomivs’ka Street, the Kharkiv 
GPU headquarters.
103
 
Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide and GPU surveillance devastated the residents of 
Budynok Slovo, and the building became silent and seemingly uninhabited. 
The writers developed distrust toward their neighbors: almost all oral contacts 
and social activities were cut off. People stopped inviting their neighbors and 
colleagues for a cup of tea or for a game of chess. The volleyball and football 
competitions receded into the past, and people no longer sat at the tables in the 
garden playing chess. The janitor Iakym stopped preparing the skating rink for 
the children. People rushed into their apartments, avoiding conversations. The 
internal yard was abandoned by the slov’iany, and appropriated by GPU 
agents on duty. 
104
 
Ostap Vyshnia stopped going out, and only publishing affairs forced 
him to leave the building. His wife Varvara always kept him company.
105
 
Mykola Bazhan, expecting visitors from the GPU every night, slept in his 
pants for a year, and his little suitcase was packed with things of first necessity 
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in case of an emergency. He rejected the idea of standing naked in front of 
GPU agents.
106
  
In the morning, leaving for work, many slov’iany put in their bags a 
piece of soap, a towel and clean underwear. The daughter of the writer Mykola 
Dukyn, Natalka Dukyna, recalled that this was a common practice in Budynok 
Slovo after Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide. The residents began to burn personal 
correspondence, manuscripts and books that could compromise them.
107
 They 
could not and would not write. Mykola Kulish’s wife Antonina Kulish 
confirmed that after Khvyl’ovyi’s death, Kulish was so depressed that he 
wrote nothing for a year, and only in 1934 produced a play Vichnyi Bunt 
(Eternal Uprising) and the script for the cinema Parizhkom (The Paris 
Commune).
108
  
Budynok Slovo was transformed into a prison for its residents, and the 
slov’iany referred to it as “the building of preliminary imprisonment,” BPU 
(budynok poperednioho uv’iaznennia).
109
 An escape from there was virtually 
impossible. No one, with a suitcase or without, could leave the building 
unnoticed. Besides, an escape would only confirm their alleged guilt, and the 
desire to avoid punishment. The writers’ family members were potential 
hostages for the GPU and also were under constant surveillance, which 
reminded the slov’iany about the temporary nature of their lives. In Walter 
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Benjamin’s terms, they began to expect a “very definite death…at a very 
definite place.” 
110
  
It was much easier for the Ukrainian intelligentsia to disappear from 
Kharkiv if they lived elsewhere, not in Budynok Slovo. Some escaped to Asia, 
Russia, Siberia, the Caucasus and Crimea. For instance, historian and writer 
Mykola Horban’ left Kharkiv just before the beginning of mass repressions in 
1933, and fled to Tomsk, Russia. He found employment there as a university 
professor.
111
 In contrast, the slov’iany were trapped in the building, and all 
their moves were carefully monitored. With the assistance of informers 
(seksoty) and GPU agents, the secret police manufactured files (spravy-
formuliary) on all members of the cooperative “Slovo,” in which the residents’ 
regular contacts, habits and daily working schedules were described.
112
 
 
The Role of Janitors and Administrators  
  Originally, Budynok Slovo was conceived as a 66 apartment building. 
However, according to a GPU injunction, two more apartments were added 
during the planning stage—one for a janitor, and another—for the 
administrator of the building. The secret police performed a search and 
appointed two reliable individuals for these two positions. The cooperative 
“Slovo” had nothing to do with the selection process but had to provide GPU 
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agents with two apartments free of charge. The janitor Iakym Petymko became 
a key figure in interactions between the secret service and the intelligentsia.
113
  
Svetlana Boym noted that janitors, having moved to the cities, received 
resident privilege “in exchange for performing a number of services—least of 
which was any actual yard cleaning. They informed, supervised, drank with 
the members of the Housing Committees, and occasionally swept the 
staircases.”
114
 Petymko lived in the basement of the first entrance (apartment 
no. 2). He was married and had a daughter Alla who did not get along with 
other children in Budynok Slovo.
115
 Petymko’s wife was also a janitor in the 
building, and the sanitary conditions (as well as the ideological purity of the 
community, as we learn later) totally depended on this family.  
Iakym appeared to be gloomy and taciturn, and his interest in the 
celebrity status of his neighbors, to say nothing about his interest in their 
literary work, was limited. However, he was not deprived of compassion or 
some other manifestations of humanity. For instance, writers who were 
penniless or destitute could borrow some insignificant sums from Iakym to 
survive until the next literary honorarium. Among residents frequently saved 
by Iakym was Volodymyr Sosiura who after routine scandals at home with his 
multiple relatives ran to Iakym to borrow money. On one occasion, Iakym, 
taking pity on Sosiura and his black eye, lent him some money, not expecting 
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the debt to be repaid. Sosiura’s payment was a copy of his book with a 
memorable inscription that he provided on the spot. After Sosiura, encouraged 
by Iakym’s generosity, disappeared around the corner, Iakym openly burned 
the gift in front of many witnesses.
116
  
Iakym’s responsibility was constant and invariable. He had to inform 
the GPU about visitors to residents, the time of their arrival and departure, the 
frequency of the visits, and about the everyday activities of the residents.
117
 
When mass arrests began in Budynok Slovo in 1933-34, Iakym’s service to the 
secret police and his responsibilities were extended.  Accompanied by a group 
of GPU agents, he rang the bell of a writer’s apartment, and witnessed the 
necessary search and a preliminary interrogation. Petymko’s neighbor was 
Anatolii Boldiner who lived in apartment no. 1, and who often served as 
Petymko’s replacement during the arrests. Beyond his role as a witness and 
informer for the GPU, Boldiner represented the building’s administration and 
was called kerbud or housing administrator.
118
 The names and signatures of 
Petymko and Boldiner appear in many GPU arrest protocols in the criminal 
files of the Ukrainian intelligentsia who once resided in Budynok Slovo.
119
  
The fates of Petymko and Boldiner remain unknown but their names 
are engraved in the history of Stalin’s repressions in Kharkiv during the 1930s. 
In a very practical sense, Petymko and Boldiner, as well as other janitors, 
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couriers and housing administrators, appointed by the GPU, actively 
facilitated the establishment of a new ideology and pure socialist society. The 
Petymkos were janitors and sanitizers of the society, and their contributions to 
the repression of professional communities should not be overlooked.
120
 
Reciprocal relations and fruitful exchanges existed between the lower chain of 
command (dopomizhnyi sklad of the GPU), in other words the populace, and 
professionals in the Soviet secret service, which was not necessarily expressed 
through material support of the former.
121
 Personal favors, including a major 
incentive from the GPU—the right to live—were factors governing the 
effective productivity of these relations. 
 
Deterioration of the Community and Art 
The slov’iany anticipated and expedited the emergence of what 
Vladimir Paperny has termed Culture Two, which “wanted to tie people to 
their spaces, to settle them down.”
122
 They conceived the place long before 
1932, and to a certain degree, shaped new individualistic values of the future 
Stalinist era. Communists and enthusiastic builders of a new Communist era, 
slov’iany became confused by the assertive and forceful tactics of the GPU. 
They avoided spending nights at home. The Soviet secret police placed the 
whole building under surveillance so suddenly that slov’iany’s new 
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perceptions and feelings about the changing climate in the building had little 
time to mature. This shocking experience and the first arrests in the building 
alienated them from one another and from the external world. The writers 
were horrified by the new emerging culture of denunciation in the building 
and their membership in it. Budynok Slovo was now a reservoir of dangerous 
energy, and the slov’iany perceived themselves as an unneeded commodity 
that had been used and disposed by the state.   
They came to the realization that their status and privileges were 
provisional and meaningless before the threat of being arrested, deported, or 
shot. Sleepless productive nights and the pleasant experience of personal 
creativity were replaced by a torturous waiting for arrests. The habitual 
certainties and the comfort generated by their special status as celebrities and 
by the exclusivity of the place where they lived were undermined by a force 
they had no control over—the state. The meaning of Budynok Slovo was 
reformulated in their minds, and the associative links between the building, 
prestige and comfort were broken. The life of the mind was reduced to the 
elementary existence of physical bodies in a physical place, simple survival. 
Some had nervous breakdowns; many could not write. For instance, in 
1933, Sosiura was put in a mental institution in Kharkiv, and was later 
transferred to Moscow. In all, he spent about a year in mental clinics receiving 
professional help.
123
 The cultural production and literary in-fighting with 
literary opponents no longer occupied the minds of slov’iany, or, rather, these 
pastimes became secondary considerations in their survival strategies. Despite 
a widespread culture of diary writing that was encouraged and inspired by the 
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Soviet regime,
124
 the realities of Budynok Slovo prevented Ukrainian 
intellectuals from keeping records. Arkadii Liubchenko was the only one to 
write a diary which he began only in 1941 under the German occupation of 
Kharkiv.
125
 Observing regular thorough searches of the apartments during the 
arrests of their neighbors, they learned that they could not leave any evidence 
of private thoughts on paper, which could be interpreted in any possible way 
by creative GPU associates.
126
  
After 1932, most slov’iany fell silent, or published one or two 
politically correct novels that glorified the successes of collectivization and 
industrialization. The tragedy of the writers who stopped writing becomes 
evident when one compares it to the productivity of the 1920s. Vasyl’ Sokil 
has provided an impressive list of works by slov’iany that were written and 
published in the 1920s.
127
 Socially and professionally active in the 1920s, 
Khvyl’ovyi wrote “nothing significant” after he moved to Budynok Slovo.
128
 
The free spirit of creativity of most writers melted in the grip of fears for their 
relatives and their physical survival.  
The writers realized that for the state and the secret police, Budynok 
Slovo was nothing more than a “counterrevolutionary nest” and a place of 
“anti-Soviet conspiracy.” Certainly, the non-standard living spaces that 
belonged to the slov’iany shaped the secret police’s attitudes toward the 
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residents as a privileged community, but most importantly, the GPU perceived 
them as untrustworthy and politically unreliable.  
In 1930 when writers moved into Budynok Slovo, they were involved 
in the production of a unique space for themselves and distinctive social 
practices. The distinctiveness of their social and material conditions 
encouraged the state to perceive the building as a place not for subordinates 
but for free co-producers of new socialist society. For the Soviet government 
the place became an extension of the free Ukrainian national spirit that 
blossomed among Ukrainian writers in the 1920s, and manifested itself in their 
creative art. The Literary Discussion among the literati had identified (for the 
authorities) the politically unreliable, and most of these were to be found in 
one place, conveniently for the state but fatally for the writers. The state’s trust 
in writers was low; the danger of their ideas for the center was considered 
high.  
By 1932, the GPU became the de-facto owner of the place. After the 
arrests of the Ukrainian intellectuals had been made, they ordered the wives 
and children to surrender their apartments, in which the GPU installed new 
residents.
129
 Officially, it was only in 1937, when the Soviet government 
issued the 17 October 1937 Law “On the Preservation of the Housing Fund 
and the Improvement of Housing in Cities,” that the house-building 
cooperative societies were dissolved.
130
 Because of this law, the huge 
cooperative housing fund passed into the possession of the state in all Soviet 
republics.
131
 Budynok Slovo factually became state property in the early 1930s 
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when displacements and apartment transactions were implemented at will by 
the GPU after massive arrests of the building’s residents.   
The new place and space legitimated the power of the regime, and the 
new composition of the building’s inhabitants illuminated the vulnerability 
and helplessness of the slov’iany to resist state power.
132
 The administration of 
the cooperative “Slovo” was absolutely powerless to defend the property they 
had conceived and built for the writers. By late 1933, the place produced by 
the writers was illegally appropriated by the GPU.
133
 Many newcomers simply 
seized the apartments. After the physical extermination and displacement of 
residents, the original meaning of the building’s designation as the home of 
writers was erased. New residents created a new culture that resembled the 
culture of a military detachment rather than a space of art and intellectual 
life.
134
  
Moreover, artistic clashes and personal disagreements exacerbated the 
feeling of an “unnatural community” that strangled freedom of expression 
among writers, and eliminated vestiges of what was initially conceived as a 
civic professional association.
135
 This was of great assistance to the secret 
organs, which were bent on demolishing the unique atmosphere of the 
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building along with physically removing its residents. Paraphrasing Lefebvre’s 
terms, the culture of Budynok Slovo was murdered by the anti-culture of the 
GPU and new residents, some of whom now worked for the Soviet secret 
agency.
136
   
Interestingly enough, an association of writers that assumed common 
communal and professional interests initiated and produced a place that was 
supposed to physically separate its members, providing them with privacy and 
seclusion. The material logic of the intellectuals’ existence and their needs for 
solitude and comfort (in order to be able to create) outweighed the writers’ 
ideological upbringing and their faith in collective values. Within two to three 
years, the state completed their separation to the point of isolation. 
The loss of their habitual material world and ritualized existence, 
amplified by their confused feelings about themselves and their sense of 
belonging, resulted in a loss of moral orientation and agonies of morbid 
conscience. Through torture and in the face of violent death, they 
compromised with interrogators, hoping to return to their families, to their 
happy bohemian lives and the opportunity for self-expression.  
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Chapter Three 
Police Spatial Practices and the Galician Trace  
 
The coldness and fixity of their gaze betrayed the nature 
of their occupation. Was it a reflection of their corrupt 
souls or a mark of the revolting work to which they 
devoted themselves day and night? 
 
Michael Voslensky 
1
 
The habitual nocturnal existence of the writers matched the nocturnal 
schedule of GPU agents who established surveillance of Budynok Slovo 
immediately after the writers moved there in late December of 1929. The 
slov’iany were placed at the top of the surveillance list which grew rapidly. 
The secret police’s presence permeated their daily life, and their cultural and 
professional practices. The GPU carefully monitored, and often manipulated 
and guided the writers’ activities in the direction prescribed by the state.  
The writers’ vulnerability became clear to them long before the first 
arrests in the building occurred. Their feelings of uncertainty and fear, which 
emanated from the secret aura of the GPU and from the writers’ lack of 
awareness of the scale of GPU repressive activities, generated a degree of 
popular conformity and compliance among the slov’iany. The first searches 
and arrests confirmed their high visibility for the state, and defined the 
boundaries of their behavior in the privileged space of Budynok Slovo, 
behavior which was later transplanted to interrogation rooms.  
The literary and private lives of the residents were influenced by so 
many various social and cultural environments that a full rendition of the 
stories of more than sixty individuals seems a rather daunting task. However, 
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the common space they shared produced areas of overlapping experiences that 
provides some insight into the place of surveillance and regimentation, and 
into people’s reactions to this place. From this description of the place and 
analysis of its inhabitants’ behavior the cultural atmosphere of those days will 
emerge, and the demise of the Ukrainian intellectual community and the 
implications of its demise may be more fully understood. Readers might be 
able to see (in the words of the Ukrainian scholar Mykhailo Naienko) “not 
only the trees in the forest but the forest itself,” a place of literary 
experimentation and nation-building that was regimented by the state.
2
  
This generation of writers exhibited absolute faith and confidence in 
their own talent and energy that would enable them to transform Ukrainian 
literature and art from its provincial and backward status into a modern 
European art form. Their aspirations and freedom competed with the state’s 
dictatorship which by definition did not embrace competition. Unbeknownst to 
them, the price to be paid for this competition was supreme—their lives. 
Freedom has been traditionally associated with boundless space. 
Paradoxically, in Soviet Ukraine the writers erected walls to feel free, 
boundaries that separated them from the external world, and ultimately from 
the state. Using Hellberg-Hirn’s terminology, they separated themselves from 
external chaos in the hope of building internal order.
3
 This was an ideological 
declaration in itself for the state, despite the fact that for the authorities the 
cooperative movement at least partially solved the housing question in 
Ukraine on its own, without additional state investments. But most 
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importantly, the internal dynamics of this place were too free and too vigorous 
which clashed with the idea of a centralized authority nurtured by the center.  
This chapter investigates the early period of the repression of the 
slov’iany during 1930-1931, when the regime began to imprison and deport 
“nationalists,” especially those who had links with Galicia. The chapter 
demonstrates the anti-national and geopolitical vector of the repression, and 
analyzes the reasons for such spatial tactics employed by the GPU. 
    
Historical Context 
As archival documents recently declassified in Ukraine and scholarly 
works by the historians Norman Naimark, Iurii Shapoval, Vasyl’ Marochko, 
Serhii Bilokin’ and others demonstrated, repressions during the 1920s-50s had 
a pronounced anti-national vector in Ukraine.
4
 The Bolsheviks considered 
Ukrainians a potentially dangerous force: from the moment they took power in 
Ukraine in 1919, the Cheka/GPU/NKVD began to routinely collect data about 
the moods and “nationalist” tendencies among the Ukrainian population in the 
countryside and in the cities. In the early 1920s, the party through the secret 
police took complete control over publishing production in Ukraine and 
established a sophisticated multifaceted system of censorship. In 1924, the 
GPU fabricated a group criminal case under the code name Kyivs’kyi oblastnyi 
tsentr dii (the “Kyiv Regional Center of Actions”), and Mykola Vasylenko, 
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Ukrainian historian and president of the Ukrainian Academy of science in 
1921-22, was sentenced to 10 years in prison together with other scholars and 
teachers.
5
  
To strengthen their grip on Ukraine, on 26 March 1925 the Central 
Committee of the RKP(b) sent Lazar Kaganovich, Stalin’s faithful adherent 
and follower, to Ukraine as the general secretary of the  KP(b)U.
6
 Kaganovich 
owed Stalin a favor for his rapid promotion from VTsRPS (Vsesoiuzna 
Tsentral’na Rada Profesiinykh Spilok/All-Union Central Council of 
Professional Associations) instructor in 1921 to secretary of the Central 
Committee of the RKP(b). He, therefore, was someone who would and could 
restrain ambitious Ukrainian party members’ national zeal, and who could 
mobilize the republic to implement its significant social and economic 
transformation into a modern Soviet entity.
7
  
Kaganovich replaced E.I. Kviring who was forced to resign, and the 
configuration of Soviet policies in Ukraine began to enforce Stalin’s views, a 
factor that played a significant role in the lives of many prominent, and 
ordinary political and cultural figures in Ukraine. Ukrainian party leaders’ 
attempts to criticize Kaganovich for his authoritarian management or, worse, 
their requests to replace Kaganovich as the general secretary in the republic 
addressed to Stalin resulted in the methodical elimination of Ukrainian 
communists. By the late 1930s, literally within little more than a decade, there 
was no one left in the highest echelons of power who had been involved with 
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the early implementation of Ukrainization, industrialization and 
collectivization policies in the 1920s and 1930s. They had been accused of 
“nationalist deviations” and were eliminated by the state.
8
 
On 26 April 1926 Stalin wrote a secret letter to Kaganovich and other 
members of the Politburo and the Central Committee of the KP(b)U, in which 
he condemned Shums’kyi’s and Khvyl’ovyi’s ideas as manifestations of 
national separatism:  
…in the Ukraine, where the Communist cadres are weak, such a movement 
[Ukrainization], led everywhere by the non-Communist intelligentsia, may assume in 
places the character of a struggle for the alienation of Ukrainian culture from All-
Soviet culture, a struggle against “Moscow,” against the Russians, against the 
Russian culture and its greatest achievement, Leninism, altogether. I need not point 
out that such a danger grows more and more real in the Ukraine. I should only like to 
mention that even some Ukrainian Communists are not free from such defects. I have 
in mind that well known article by the noted Communist Khvyl’ovyi, in the 
Ukrainian press. Khvyl’ovyi demands that the proletariat in the Ukraine be 
immediately de-Russified…his ridiculous and non-Marxist attempt to divorce culture 
from politics—all this and much more in the mouth of this Ukrainian Communist 
sounds…more than strange…[he] has nothing to say in favor of Moscow except to 
call on Ukrainian leaders to run away from Moscow as fast as possible…the extreme 
views of Khvyl’ovyi within the Communist ranks must be combated; comrade 
Shums’kyi does not understand that only by combating such extremisms is it possible 
to transform the rising Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian social life into a Soviet 
culture and Soviet social life.
9
 
 
The secret police reacted quickly, and at the peak of Ukrainization, on 4 
September 1926, the GPU distributed a circular “On Ukrainian Separatism” 
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among a narrow circle of GPU agents.
10
 The secret agency explained in detail 
four main goals in combating Ukrainian nationalism. First, the GPU was to 
identify the networks among right-wing organizations and the broader strata of 
Ukrainian society. Second, this was to be implemented through total 
surveillance of the most prominent Ukrainian intellectuals. Third, the secret 
agency was to reveal the connections between the Ukrainian intelligentsia and 
the peasants. Fourth, an analysis of the moods and attitudes of the Ukrainians 
toward “our internal and international political life” was considered one of the 
most important tasks of the secret police.
 11
 The actions followed. Those 
Ukrainian party members who actively promoted Soviet national policies were 
reprimanded. Many were excluded from the party for nationalist deviations. 
This message signaled to the Ukrainian intelligentsia that 
Ukrainization was a temporary measure. The instant re-orientation of some 
Ukrainian communists in tune with new political impulses emanating from 
Moscow manifested itself in their harassment of Shums’kyi, a defender of 
Ukrainization. Shums’kyi’s eventual resignation in February 1927 indicated 
that the Kremlin could withdraw their concessions to Ukrainian Communists 
at any moment, as James Mace and Mai Panchuk have suggested.
12
  
Historians Marochko and Hillig argued that Ukrainization offered by 
the Bolsheviks had features of a distinctive national cleansing operation 
against proponents of Ukrainian culture, rather than an “ethnophilic” 
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enhancement policy.
13
 Counter-Ukrainization was accelerated according to the 
scenario written in the Kremlin in the middle of the 1920s. Although de-
russification of Ukrainian urban centers, an increased number of Ukrainian 
schools, books published in Ukrainian, and the development of national 
culture did take place, there was also a dark side that was characterized by the 
purposeful destruction of religious and socio-cultural traditions, which 
constituted the very fabric of Ukrainian culture.  
Seduced by the opportunity to preserve and enhance Ukrainian 
national identity, many Ukrainians re-emigrated to Soviet Ukraine to 
participate in the Bolshevik project. The first president of Ukraine, Mykhailo 
Hrushevs’kyi, returned to Soviet Ukraine in 1924, unaware that his books 
were quietly purged from the libraries during Ukrainization.
14
  
The Bolsheviks’ attempt to establish obligatory courses in the 
Ukrainian language for party and state officials who were mobilized from 
Russian provinces en masse to build a new socialist society in Soviet Ukraine 
“looked like a farce.”
15
 Ethnic Russian bureaucrats refused to learn Ukrainian, 
and those who did learn spoke surzhyk, an uneducated mixture of Russian and 
Ukrainian. Behind the inspiring statistical data reflecting the successes of 
Ukrainization, one could observe an ideological nurturing of a new Soviet 
citizen that had little to do with cherishing Ukrainian national culture or 
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encouraging national pride among the Ukrainian population, to say nothing 
about popular intellectual involvement in learning culture.
16
 
Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Head of the Directory (the government of 
the Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1918), a writer and artist, was one of the 
few in 1926 who immediately recognized the transformation of the Bolshevik 
regime into a brutal authoritarian force. As a Marxist and a socialist, 
Vynnychenko criticized Lenin and his regime for Machiavellian tactics and 
dishonesty, suggesting that “from a red Bolshevik egg fascism is being 
hatched.”
17
 
Consequently, the emergence of the 28 August 1928 resolution of the 
Kharkiv okruha committee of the KP(b)U “About Work among the 
Intelligentsia” is not surprising: this document, as well as the GPU/NKVD 
circular “About Ukrainian Separatism,” precipitated the subsequent course of 
repression of Ukrainian intellectuals in cultural institutions and their primary 
party cells. The 1928 Kharkiv party resolution was grounded in definitions of 
the Ukrainian intelligentsia provided by the XV Congress of the VKP(b) that 
emphasized its internal disintegration (vnutrenneie rassloienie), pernicious 
influences of the faculty on young students in universities and hostile attitudes 
of the Ukrainian intelligentsia toward socialist construction. The Kharkiv party 
committee suggested that these attitudes grew into open wrecking activities, 
although thusfar it involved narrow circles of the intelligentsia.
18
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Interestingly, Kharkiv party officials hastily mentioned Russian 
imperial chauvinism, antisemitism and Jewish Zionist chauvinism as equally 
widespread phenomena among the Ukrainian intelligentsia to divert public 
attention from its overwhelming fixation on Ukrainian nationalism, a trend 
that “disintegrated” the community of intelligentsia in Ukraine. The party also 
scolded the intelligentsia about their insincere bureaucratic approach to 
Ukrainization. Ironically, the document is written in Russian, and the 
representatives of the Ukrainian party apparatus (that had to be Ukrainized by 
1928, or be at an advanced stage of de-russification) admonished the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia in Russian about their failures to properly implement 
Ukrainization policies in Ukraine.
19
 
This document is also interesting in the context of subsequent 
repressions because it is one among a few found in the Ukrainian archives that 
rebukes the Ukrainian intelligentsia for their material corruption. Despite 
advocating common and individual socialist welfare, the state nevertheless 
accused Ukrainian intellectuals of moral deterioration and coalescence with 
the petty bourgeoisie (meshchanstvo, obyvatel’shchina, pogonia za 
material’nymi blagami) and nepmany.                
By the late 1920s and the early 1930s, the Ukrainization campaign, and 
everything that had been associated with it, free speech, creativity, 
independent thinking and national self-consciousness, had exceeded the limits 
of what the state could tolerate.
20
 During this period, in the bowels of the 
Kharkiv Cheka, a group criminal case was fabricated against the pro-
monarchical Natsional’nyi tsentr (the “National Center”) and prominent 
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representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, such as professors Mykola 
Sumstsov, Fedir Shmit and others, were repressed.
21
  
In 1929 the Soviet government embarked on a massive campaign 
against “bourgeois and nationalist elements,” and set out to liquidate the 
kurkuls (kulaks in Russian) as a class within the framework of mass 
collectivization in Ukraine. The resistance of the peasantry to Soviet 
collectivization policies had been registered since 1927. In 1927 a League of 
the Peasants of Ukraine sent a letter of protest to the newspaper Visti to inform 
the party that the Ukrainian peasantry proclaimed war against Soviet policies 
because the peasants could no longer tolerate the dictatorship of the 
Communists, with its ensuing hardships and hunger.
22
 During 1928-1930 the 
Ukrainian GPU weekly informed the OGPU in Moscow about dangerous 
tendencies observed in the countryside. In the GPU’s operational materials, it 
has been noted that anti-Russian and anti-Jewish sentiment had been growing 
among the Ukrainian peasantry. According to the head of the GPU Balyts’kyi, 
in January 1930 alone 37 incidents of mass unrest in the countryside occurred, 
in which 12,000 peasants participated: by early February 1930 the GPU 
arrested 11,865 people for resistance to collectivization policies and terrorist 
activity.
23
 The October 1929 Plenum of the TsK VKP(b) mobilized 6,435 
workers from Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkiv and other cities of the USSR to be 
sent to the Ukrainian countryside to establish order. Through the efforts of the 
center and the GPU, on 5-6 October 1930 one of the biggest rebellions in 
Pavlohrad (Pavlohrads’ke povstannia) was suppressed in the countryside. The 
GPU launched an operation under the code name “Orhanizatory:” 79 peasants 
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were arrested, 21 of the most dangerous individuals were executed.
24
 Shortly 
after the rebellion several hundred more people were arrested by the GPU.
25
 
These developments strengthened the view of the center that Ukrainian 
nationalism presented a real threat to the Union. 
Anticipating resistance among the intelligentsia against forcible 
agricultural policies, the GPU/NKVD implemented a preemptive blow against 
those who might have opposed force and violence in the countryside. The 
SVU trial was part of a thoroughly conceived and effectively implemented 
strategic state operation against “nationalist deviationists” in Ukraine, and the 
trial itself was preceded by meticulous work that had been conducted by the 
GPU since 1926. Over three years, the secret police collected kompromat 
(compromising materials) on thousands of Ukrainian intellectuals.
26
 
The crusade against Ukrainian nationalism was characterized by a 
cascade of subsequent group criminal cases that obtained code names from 
groups allegedly formed in Ukraine that struggled for political and cultural 
independence from Russia: SVU (Spilka vyzvolennia Ukrainy—The Union of 
the Liberation of Ukraine, launched in 1929), UNTs (Ukrains’kyi 
natsional’nyi tsentr—The Ukrainian National Center, fabricated in 1930-31), 
UVO (Ukrains’ka viis’kova orhanizatsiia—The Ukrainian Military 
Organization, fabricated in 1932-33), OUT (Ob’iednannia ukrains’kykh 
natsionalistiv—The Union of Ukrainian Nationalists, fabricated in 1935), and 
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others.
27
 The authorities broadcast only the SVU case, publishing daily reports 
about the trial, cultivating popular belief in internal enemies and counter-
revolutionaries. Subsequently, the GPU eliminated “nationalists” in a quiet 
clandestine manner.  
It appears that Moscow paid special attention to those who understood 
the central power and its intentions, and could articulate and convey their 
thoughts to others. The danger emanated from those who had an indisputable 
reputation as talented writers, scientists and scholars. Those who established 
themselves as independent original thinkers, and who had knowledge of three 
and more languages (English, French, Italian, Polish) were especially 
vulnerable.
28
 Mass terror launched in 1929 by the SVU case that put thousands 
of intellectuals in prison was destroying “the social base” for Ukrainian 
separatism that might have put at risk the entire enterprise called the Soviet 
Union in economic and geo-political senses.
29
 
 
The Early Thirties: Vanquished Slov’iany 
 An analysis of archival documents reveals the virtual absence of 
resistance of Ukrainian intellectuals to state violence. In fact, many shouldered 
it and perpetuated violent practices. The slov’ianyn and American scholar 
Hryhorii Kostiuk has always been careful in assessing the contribution of 
Ukrainian writers to the brutal repression of the Ukrainian intelligentsia during 
Stalin’s terror. He confessed that this is one of the most difficult and under-
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investigated topics in scholarly discourse. It is linked to questions of morality 
and social responsibility, questions that receive more attention in philosophical 
and psychological inquiries than in historical or sociological studies. The 
intelligentsia’s fear of being repressed and beliefs in Communist ideas 
combined with political blindness seem to explain their behavior.     
On demand of the center, the TsK KP(b)U and the Ukrainian GPU 
regularly compiled lists of Ukrainian, Jewish and Russian writers who resided 
and worked in Ukraine, lists that had to be delivered to Moscow. They 
contained brief biographical data, party membership, major publications, 
employment history, literary association affiliations and political views.
30
 
Most of these kharakterystyky (evaluations) of the writers were negative, 
revealing their “political physiognomy,” “national deviations” and literary 
errors.  
Many slov’iany were aware of these reports. The majority was plunged 
into deep personal crises and depression.
31
 Repressions sobered them and 
forced them to keep a low profile. Most of them were put on a black list, and 
state and private publishing houses stopped accepting their works for 
publication which further demoralized them.
32
  
The imposition of these constraints affected them financially. They 
could not support their families even through translation work because 
publishers, intimidated by the GPU, rejected any work by writers with the 
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reputation of nationalists.
33
 Sudden poverty and hunger encouraged 
chameleon-like practices among them. In order to survive, Khvyl’ovyi’s circle 
of writers had to disguise themselves as active supporters of the party line, 
even though they understood the baseness of methods the party employed.  
After years of debates about the future of Ukrainian culture, gathering 
together in literary groups, they seemed to surrender their principles and their 
collective will to build a new Ukrainian culture. Their enthusiasm, exaltation, 
public actions, and the quest for like-minded conversationalists were dissolved 
in the shared fear of being repressed. Moreover, factory workers who were 
regularly invited to public discussions of a new novel or play written by the 
slov’iany served as state inquisitors who criticized the shortcomings and 
ideological shortsightedness of their work.
34
 These party techniques brought 
about social “dissociation” and estrangement of workers and the intelligentsia 
from each other. In essence, the social unity was disintegrated, and the 
“national-popular collective will” necessary for historical change was 
suppressed.
35
   
Similarly, there was no unity between the slov’iany and the peasants, 
although many writers came from peasant backgrounds. In fact, the 
intelligentsia exhibited a lack of support for the Ukrainian peasants during the 
most tragic years of 1932-33 when the latter died by the millions in the 
countryside. The ambivalent attitude of the slov’iany to the collectivization 
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campaign and to the famine in 1932-33 contrasted with the focus on the 
peasantry that could be observed in late 19
th
 century Ukrainian political 
thought and among Ukrainian intellectuals.
36
 Although many slov’iany were 
former members of the Borot’bist party that supported the peasants and was 
popular among them, they publicly approved the party line of collectivization 
that terrorized the peasantry by procurement quotas, a fact that contributed to 
the disunity of Ukrainian society.  
At the peak of the famine, writers were challenging each other in a 
socialist competition to identify whose novel on collectivization reflected 
more fully and realistically the marvelous achievements of Soviet power in the 
countryside. Such a competition was launched between Epik and Khvyl’ovyi 
as part of their self-rehabilitation. The official press unsurprisingly awarded 
victory to Epik’s novel Petro Romen. Epik also promised to complete another 
novel about class struggle in the countryside by September 1933. Isolated and 
ostracized, Khvyl’ovyi was extremely quiet, and a newspaper reporter 
lamented that the author had provided no information on the progress of a new 
novel.
37
  
The slov’ianyn Oles’ Dosvitnii openly hated the peasants, and never 
failed to express his attitude to his friends. In his novel Who? Dosvitnii wrote: 
“It is a useless attempt to engage the peasants in socialism.”
38
 Often 
Khvyl’ovyi supported him, emphasizing the low cultural level and 
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backwardness of the Ukrainian peasantry.
39
 Khvyl’ovyi, Dosvitnii and 
Iohansen believed that the peasants simply sabotaged bread procurement 
plans, and that in reality there were plenty of grain and other foodstuffs in the 
Ukrainian countryside.
40
  
Moreover, the writers made regular trips to the Ukrainian villages to 
agitate for increased grain production and the rapid fulfillment of state 
procurements plans. They wrote reports and articles on the front pages of 
newspapers, uncovering sabotage by kurkuls in collective farms and calling 
for their complete bolshevization.
41
 In the press, the Union of Ukrainian 
Writers assured the party, Postyshev and Stalin, that the writers, traveling to 
the countryside, would not be simply tourists but active propagandists of party 
collectivization policies. Similarly, representatives of the Ukrainian theatre 
promised Ukrainian collective farms to deliver true Bolshevik theatrical 
performances and art which would inspire energy and enthusiasm in 
conducting Soviet polices in the countryside.
42
 Meanwhile, the Ukrainian 
villages were dying, and Molotov and Stalin demanded the application of 
measures of “extraordinary severity for failure to meet grain procurements in 
Ukraine.”
43
  
In the Ukrainian case, the Gramscian notion of a mass movement and 
resistance to state violence and repression, based on the alliance of a given 
class with other classes and their collective will, could not materialize. The 
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absence of potential unity and lack of coordinated effort between the two 
essential social groups in Ukraine that might have brought about social and 
political change facilitated the repressive tactics of the secret police. 
Importantly, many slov’iany although they shared cultural traditions and a 
common origin with the peasantry, had become urbanized and modernized in 
Kharkiv, and had distanced themselves from the peasants. They passed 
through various stages searching for their identity: purely artistic, vulgarly 
politicized and individualistic. The individualistic stage amounted to little 
more than a scramble for mere physical survival. Myroslav Shkandrij noted 
that “as the general atmosphere degenerated, the charge of ‘nationalism’ was 
thrown around indiscriminately,” and Ukrainian intellectuals were left 
standing alone against the repressive state machine, without support, 
publically and secretly denouncing each other and discovering perhaps for the 
first time the extent of their isolation.
44
         
Importantly, for those who belonged to the literary bohemia, it was 
extremely difficult to reconcile their habits and lifestyle with their individual 
isolation, and to endure change in their status instigated by the political 
climate in Ukraine. The bohemian lifestyle formed in the twenties was very 
important to the slov’iany. According to Iurii Smolych, flamboyant parties and 
gatherings played a significant role in the writers’ intellectual development.
45
 
Their “domestic incarceration” in the early thirties because of the party’s 
                                                          
44
 Myroslav Shkandrij, Modernists, Marxists and the Nation: The Ukrainian Literary 
Discussion of the 1920s (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, University 
of Alberta, 1992), 168. 
45
 See Smolych’s four volumes of memoirs; Ivan Senchenko, “Notatky pro literaturne zhyttia 
20—40 rokiv,” in Ivan Senchenko, Opovidannia. Povisti. Spohady (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 
1990), 557-60. 
 138 
 
routine harrasment was as suspicious for the state as the writers’ gatherings. 
Some writers realized this earlier than others. 
A number escaped from Budynok Slovo, increasingly perceived by the 
center as a nationalist nest, to northern Russian provinces. Others found safe 
anchor in Moscow and Leningrad. For instance, Raisa Troianker sensed 
danger prior to the beginning of mass arrests in Budynok Slovo and in 1931 
left for Leningrad.
46
 The belief was that Moscow, Leningrad, or any other big 
city in Russia, were safe places for the Ukrainians because they would be less 
visible for the state, and therefore, had an opportunity to avoid persecution. 
Moreover, the very fact that a former Ukrainian resident moved to Moscow 
was a certain statement that the writer had nothing to hide or conceal and was 
not particularly wedded to a Ukrainian or local identity. Many of those who 
did not escape at the height of the repression were repressed, and having 
survived the camps returned not to Ukraine but to Moscow for the same 
reason.
47
 The false belief that an expatriate sanctuary existed proved to be 
wrong during the Great Terror and during the massive wave of the late 1940s 
repressions that absorbed people indiscriminately in all Soviet republics and 
other foreign cities as well. 
By the early 1930s, Moscow had total control over cultural, and 
ultimately, political matters in Ukraine. On 5 April 1931, the Secret Political 
Department was created that began to fabricate criminal cases against 
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Ukrainian intellectuals and those who resisted collectivization in the 
countryside.
48
 As we have seen, on the cultural front the idea that literature 
and the arts should primarily serve as tools of socialist construction had 
already become a dominant theme of party resolutions in 1926-27, and was 
developed by literary critics and local party officials in the press willingly and 
often eloquently, depending on the literary talent of the commentators.
49
 
Ukrainian writers were advised to support the party line not only by party 
officials but also by their fellow writers. The pressure on artists was totalizing, 
and emanated from above and below, creating a space of obligatory unison as 
demanded by the state. As Boris Groys posited, “all of society represent[ed] a 
single vast, unified, homogenous field of operation.”
50
 Some writers 
contributed to the Leniniana and Staliniana, and published poems dedicated to 
the secret police, trying to prove their loyalty to the regime.
51
  
 Verbally challenging the party’s view about the dominant literary 
method that was to serve as an example for creative writing, was fraught with 
reprimands, purges and imprisonment, and by 1930 the slov’iany were fully 
aware of the potential ramifications of oppositional thinking. The early thirties 
and Budynok Slovo became the time and place where the devaluation of 
individual critical thinking occurred and sovetskist’ of Ukrainian literature 
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developed. 
52
 The secret police divided society into “these” and “those,” and 
independent thinkers were identified and marginalized.
53
  
 
The Kharkiv GPU Prison and Staff: Practices and Traditions 
By 1930, the Kharkiv GPU had compiled detailed individual dossiers 
on all residents of Bydynok Slovo, the result of meticulous work by GPU 
agents who had been collecting operational data already for several years 
before the writers moved to their new apartments. The data contained 
surveillance materials and denunciation reports delivered by GPU seksoty. 
During the preceding decade, the secret police had gained valuable experience 
in dealing with all kinds of enemies of the Soviet regime—kurkuli, religious 
zealots, Zionists, wreckers and nationalists. Everyday practices were 
established: interrogators worked efficiently and quickly. Confessions were 
effectively beaten out of prisoners in the cellars of the GPU, and as Merle 
Fainsod stated, “the extraction of real confession to imaginary crimes became 
a major industry.”
54
  
In 1930, the GPU began to arrest the slov’iany, and their confessions 
facilitated the elimination of the intellectual base of Ukrainian society that 
was, in the NKVD view, fertile soil for the growth of any resistance 
movement. The slov’iany’s psychological breaking began during the night of 
the arrest. The procedure of search and arrest was designed to discredit and to 
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humiliate the suspect in front of his neighbors and family members. In many 
cases during slov’iany’s arrests, all written or printed materials, money and 
personal possessions were confiscated, and in most cases no certificate or 
receipt was provided for the relatives of the arrested.
55
 
A common feature of behavior under arrest was complete surrender to 
interrogators and full confession of anti-Soviet activities. In her book Police 
Aesthetics, Cristina Vatulesku has examined the reasons for mass confessions 
in Soviet prisons in the 1930s. They were partially determined by the suspects’ 
feelings of spatial disorientation in prison, when they lost their familiar cues 
and connections to their everyday environments. The suspects’ confusion and 
inner disarray were skillfully created and manipulated by GPU interrogators. 
The absence of familiar routine practices, a network of people and personal 
material possessions induced their inner tension and even panic in prison 
cells.
56
 
The barbarity of the Kharkiv interrogators was boundless.
57
 To break 
the suspect’s will, the interrogators completely eliminated any interactions 
between the arrested and the outside world, and physically and mentally 
abused the arrested. The Kharkiv GPU prison had its own favorite practice—
the GPU personnel expropriated people’s underwear to dehumanize and to 
humiliate them.
58
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Following Andrei Vyshinskii’s order that proclaimed that confessions 
should determine the sentence of the arrested, GPU associates designed 
special techniques for extorting confessions.
59
 Several months of detention, 
isolation and humiliation exhausted the physical and moral inner resources of 
the strongest individual. Daily screaming and shouting by the interrogators 
often plunged the suspects into a hysterical state, and they were willing to sign 
their self-indictments which had been prepared beforehand.
 
Physical torture 
became an indispensable dimension of preliminary investigation for the most 
obstinate prisoners in the Kharkiv GPU prison.
60
 If prisoners resisted the 
torture and proved recalcitrant, intimidating tactics, such as verbal threats to 
retaliate against family members, were employed. Mock murders of relatives 
in front of the suspect or the raping of relatives in their presence, as in 
Kosior’s case, became favorite methods to extract confessions.
61
 The suspect 
was forced to watch the physical torture of relatives and subjected to multiple 
personal confrontations (ochnyie stavki) with his former friends and co-
workers who betrayed him in his presence for the same reasons—fear and 
exhaustion from physical and mental tortures. These methods provoked a 
certain “twilight” state in the suspect’s mind—indifferent to everything and 
everyone.  
 A written admission of guilt by the arrested was usually preceded by 
several days, weeks or months of “persuasion” and tortures. The disruption of 
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the suspect’s perception of reality through “conveyer” interrogations (sleep 
deprivation), physical and chemical irritants, such as high or low room 
temperature, bright light or complete darkness, loud cries or noises, or 
excessively salty or sweet drinking water, inevitably led to psychiatric 
symptoms when mental control and moral judgments became problematic.
62
 
As many memoirs revealed, the prolonged exposure to bright light or darkness 
caused pathological psychiatric symptoms such as hallucination, aggressive 
behavior and irritability, delusions, paranoia, memory lapses, the desire to be 
alone and so on. “Nothing could be more depressing than that cold sepulchral 
darkness; the cell seemed like the grave,” remembered Tatiana Tchernavin, a 
victim of Stalin’s terror.
63
 
Violent beatings were an everyday routine in the Kharkiv GPU. 
According to Fiodor Fiodorov-Berkov, former assistant head of the fourth 
UNKVD department in the Kharkiv region, the main GPU/NKVD 
headquarters in Kharkiv were a blood bath in the 1930s where screams, 
moaning, beating noises, shouting, and puddles of blood and urine in 
interrogation rooms were a routine everyday experience.
64
 
The evidence collected in Fiodorov-Berkov’s criminal case confirmed 
many witness accounts about the GPU treatment and work with prisoners. 
This case demonstrated that the Kharkiv GPU/NKVD systematically 
employed physical tortures, intimidation of prisoners and falsification of 
investigative materials. Among those who practiced these methods were 
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Berkov, Lev Reikhman and Abram Simkhovich. Berkov routinely arranged 
“avraly,” using his own terminology, when he gave 24 hours for special troika 
to try 50-100 cases.
 65
  
The responsibilities of GPU associates were precisely identified and 
carefully planned. The brigade of Drushliak, Kamenev and Gorokhovskii was 
responsible for providing physical “assistance” to prisoners who denied 
accusations. Investigator Gold’shtein was put in charge of the process of the 
falsification of interrogation protocols. NKVD associate Epel’baum fabricated 
more than 100 criminal cases against intelligentsia and religious figures. 
Through violent and exhausting beatings, compromising information even 
about Vyshyns’kyi and Ul’rikh was obtained from prosecutors’ assistants A.I. 
Moroz and M.I. Bron.
66
 Hundreds of prisoners who were sitting in the cellars 
of Radnarkomivs’ka Street in Kharkiv were subjected to similar treatment. 
Former NKVD associate and witness in this criminal case V.I. Lenskii 
confirmed that all members of all NKVD sectors and departments participated 
in beatings. There were no exceptions.
67
  
Former assistant head of the fourth NKVD department, Boris Frei was 
especially inventive in extracting false confessions from prisoners. Former 
regional prosecutor Bron testified that during the investigation Frei 
systematically beat him and employed a “dog house” method. There was a 
little space in interrogation room no. 111 between the wall and a heavy cash 
register. Frei called Bron “a fascist dog,” and forced him to crawl into this 
little space and bark, or simply to stand there for days. “On the fifth or sixth 
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day of standing there, blood went through my throat and I fell unconscious,” 
Bron testified.
68
  
Similarly, in his appeal to the Prosecutor of the UkrSSR, former 
prisoner Timokhin wrote that Frei together with two other associates tied him 
to the chair, burnt his nose and ears, forced him to eat paper, dance and imitate 
a rooster. Three of them systematically beat and kicked him with their boots. 
His cell mate P. P. Kipenko confirmed the allegations.
69
 Testifying in court 
against Frei, Lenskii noted that “during this period, the situation in the 
GPU/UNKVD was such that the entire building was shaking from screams 
and moans…”
70
  
Usually, when a confession was obtained, another stage followed: the 
prisoner had to disclose all the names of his accomplices with whom he 
planned to assassinate the leaders of the Ukrainian government and the party, 
and with whom he would organize a military uprising against Soviet power in 
Ukraine.
71
 Intimidation and threats to root out the entire family of the arrested 
facilitated the deposition of the arrested about the imaginary members of the 
imaginary counterrevolutionary organization. They had no choice but to 
provide a list of the “members,” denouncing those who were still free. 
The methods and esthetics of the Kharkiv chekists were shaped under 
the influence of the central secret organs, and the tactical and structural 
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changes that were dictated by the Lubianka.
72
 However, human qualities and 
features, in other words, personalities, of those who worked for the Kharkiv 
GPU/NKVD in the 1930s should not be overlooked. In the 1930s, the secret 
police was multifunctional, and implemented not only investigative and 
punitive functions but also supervised educational, economic and agricultural 
activities in the republics through various People’s Commissariats.
73
 Although 
under strict central party control, certain departments that executed repressive 
and punitive policies of the Soviet government were credited with special 
plenary powers. Among them were the Main Administration of State Security 
(GUDB), the Administration of State Security (UDB), and other departments 
that occupied a special position within the structure of the Soviet secret 
police.
74
 The Central Committee in Moscow and the Lubianka supervised all 
structural changes, functions and everyday activities of the regional secret 
organs through written correspondence, phone calls, and regular combined 
meetings of central and regional authorities of the secret police.
75
 Through the 
various stages of structural reorganization of the secret organs until 1941, the 
prominence of the GUDB, and of so-called “operational-chekist” sub-
departments continued to grow, as political power was increasingly centralized 
in Moscow.
76
 
 A description of the Kharkiv GPU prison has been provided by several 
Ukrainian writers who survived arrests and labor camps—Ivan Bahrianyi, 
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Hryhorii Kostiuk, Ivan Maistrenko and others. In the early 1930s, a newly 
built prison in the internal yard of the Kharkiv headquarters was hidden from 
the public eye. The administrative building reliably surrounded the entire 
perimeter of the prison. Large cells had parquet floors and big windows, 
features that seemed absolutely inappropriate to the inspection commission 
from Moscow.  
 
The Kharkiv SBU headquarters and the internal yard where in the 1930s  
the GPU prison was located. June, 2012. 
 
 
The commission characterized the prison as a resort. The 
administration immediately found a solution. The most “dangerous” 
individuals were kept in Radnarkomivs’ka Street, and the rest who were under 
preliminary investigation were placed in a prison in the Kholodna Hora (Cold 
Mountain) district, an older prison and, thus, less modern and comfortable. 
Every day a truck delivered the prisoners to Radnarkomivs’ka Street for 
interrogation. The Kholodna Hora prison’s conditions and moldy cells were 
more suited to the Moscow inspectors’ conception of a proper prison 
environment. However, the commission was dissatisfied with the beautiful 
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view from the cells’ windows. Its members ordered all trees in the internal 
yard of the prison to be cut, and the cells’ windows to be covered by special 
hoods to obscure the view. In their view, the beauty of nature did not 
contribute to the interrogators’ hard work of obtaining confessions. Green 
grass, trees and blue sky connected the arrested with the external world which 
was in clear violation with police norms, rules and aesthetics.
77
                 
 
The First Slov’iany Arrested 
 The GPU began to arrest slov’iany three weeks after they moved to 
their new apartments. During the night of 19-20 January 1930, the GPU came 
to apartment 27 to arrest Ukrainian actress, writer and teacher Halyna Orlivna 
(Mnevs’ka).  
Halyna Orlivna was born in the village of Kalandentsi in Poltava 
oblast’ in 1895 but in 1920 she moved abroad to Lviv. She published her first 
prose in Ukrainian journals in Vienna, Prague and Lviv, and before she 
returned to Soviet Ukraine in 1925, she had two collections of short stories 
published.
78
  
In 1920 in Poland, she married the young writer Klym Polishchuk. The 
Lviv period became very productive for both writers but in 1925, the 
Polishchuk family decided to move to Kharkiv, which as the capital of 
Ukrainian culture was perceived to be a perfect place for a young couple with 
literary talent. Together with their little daughter Lesia, they moved first to 
Lubny (where Orlivna had been born), and later to Kharkiv. Klym was 
hesitant and reluctant; he anticipated repressions. Halyna was optimistic and 
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enthusiastic. According to Klym’s letters from labor camps, Halyna was 
adamant in her decision to move to Kharkiv. In hindsight, Klym 
systematically rebuked Halyna for her thoughtlessness and shortsightedness. 
In his 14 December 1934 letter to Halyna, Klym wrote: 
I should have done what I thought was right…I would not have done this… if not for 
your desire to return as soon as possible there…I had to agree because I loved you 
and Lesia, and could not allow myself to stay there by myself…I could not allow this 
but I knew the consequences of this decision, I could predict them, and saw them in 
my dreams…
79
 
 
Their literary careers in Kharkiv followed different trajectories. Klym 
could not work, and what he wrote seemed to him insipid and colorless. The 
theme of the revolution, a feature of his earlier work, disappeared. His 
characters became hesitant and confused.
80
 On the other hand, Halyna 
advanced her talent and grew professionally. The year of 1929 was extremely 
productive for her, and marked a qualitative change in her literary skill. 
Halyna published her novel Emigrants edited by Pavlo Tychyna.
81
 In 1929, 
she joined the literary association “Pluh.” Following a popular subject among 
writers, Halyna conceived a novel about collectivization, and traveled to many 
collective farms in Poltava, Kharkiv and Myrhorod oblasts to study closely the 
problems and successes in the countryside. The result was unexpected. In the 
beginning of 1930, she published two works Nove pole (New Field) and 
Babs’kyi bunt (Women’s Uprising) which tragically changed her life.
82
 In her 
works, Orlivna depicted the peasants’ distrust of Soviet collectivization and 
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their resistance to the methods of forcible collectivization the Soviets 
employed. 
Despite the fact that their marriage deteriorated and they eventually 
separated, Halyna and Klym shared similar fates. Klym Polishchuk was 
arrested on 5 November 1929. Orlivna was “double-guilty.” She was 
identified as a relative of a counterrevolutionary, and because of her novels, 
she earned a reputation as a Ukrainian nationalist.
83
 She was arrested in 
Budynok Slovo after she moved there together with her lover, the Russian 
writer Volodymyr Iurezans’kyi. According to Ukrainian scholar Petro Rotach, 
Iurezans’kyi’s and Orlivna’s affair began in 1927 ending the relationship 
between Halyna and Klym.
84
 The GPU put her in Kholodna Hora prison, and 
in the same year she was exiled to Kazakhstan for 5 years.  
                                                  
Halyna Orlivna
85
              Klym Ploishchuk
86
  
 
She continued to write in Kazakhstan and even sent some of her work 
to Kharkiv but soon realized that her work would never be published. Her 
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mother brought Lesia to Kazakhstan, and shortly after this trip Halyna’s 
mother died. After her term, Orlivna taught in the Martunsk high school in 
Aktiubinsk oblast’: the GPU/NKVD prohibited her to return to Ukraine. She 
was able to visit Kyiv and Lubny only after the war in 1948. She died in Kyiv 
on 21 March 1955 and was buried in the village of Holoby in Kovel’ region 
(Volyn’ oblast’), the native village of her second husband Iakiv Voznyi.
87
   
Some commentators argued that Orlivna denounced her ex-husband 
Klym Polishchuk but Klym’s letters from labor camps gave no indication of 
Halyna’s betrayal, and generally are very friendly and warm.
88
 Polishchuk 
never lived in Budynok Slovo but his life is obliquely connected with this place 
and its residents. He was accused of counterrevolutionary activity, and on 29 
January 1930 he was sentenced to 10 years in labor camps by the OGPU 
Collegium.
89
 Polishchuk was shot on 3 November 1937 together with many 
other slov’iany and Ukrainian scholars and intellectuals, in Sandarmokh 
(Karelia).
90
 On the order of the UNKVD troika in Leningrad oblast’ no. 
103010 /37, in total, 265 people were shot on this day. This day should be 
considered one of the most tragic days for Ukrainian culture: 134 Ukrainian 
literary figures and artists were exterminated in Sandarmokh to “celebrate the 
20
th
 anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution,” as the NKVD 
called it. Among them were Omelian Volokh, Marko Voronyi, Mykola Zerov, 
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Antin Krushel’nyts’kyi, Mykola Kulish, Les’ Kurbas, Iurko Mazurenko, 
Mykola Pavlushkov, Valerian Pidmohyl’nyi, Pavlo Fylypovych, Volodymyr 
Chekhivs’kyi and many others.
91
  
 The Russian writer and slov’ianyn Volodymyr Iurezans’kyi was never 
repressed, and continued to live in Budynok Slovo with his adult son Borys in 
apartment 27 after Orlivna was arrested.
92
 However, in late 1933, when 
Budynok Slovo was shaken from night arrests, he left for Moscow.
93
 
Apparently, the GPU had reasons for granting him freedom, despite the fact 
that his life partner Orlivna was arrested and accused of being a Ukrainian 
nationalist. First, he was a Russian writer, one among few in Budynok Slovo, 
and in his daily life Iurezans’kyi never spoke Ukrainian. It would be 
problematic to accuse him of Ukrainian nationalism. Second, he wrote 
extensively about Dniprobud, glorifying Soviet industrialization, and became 
one of a few experts in the history of that construction site.
94
 The party needed 
him as a popularizer of Soviet successes in industrialization.
95
 Before the 
Great Terror, he moved to the Urals, although the exact date remains 
unknown. Iurezans’kyi worked in various newspapers, and later resided in 
Moscow. He died there on 9 February 1957. In his biographical statement, the 
Ukrainian period was totally erased, and one can only learn about his career in 
Ukraine by examining his published works.
96
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 Galicians (Halychany): Proponents of Ukrainian Culture  
The pattern of early arrests in Budynok Slovo followed the general 
pattern of arrests in Soviet Ukraine during the late 1920s and early 1930s. 
Those among the Ukrainian intelligentsia who had emigrated from Galicia or 
those Galicians who had re-emigrated to Soviet Ukraine from European states 
were arrested first.
97
 The Galicians enthusiastically supported Ukrainization, 
and after their arrival in Soviet Ukraine they occupied leading positions in 
various cultural institutions. Moscow perceived the Galician Ukrainian 
intelligentsia as the authentic carriers and promoters of Ukrainian culture, and 
ultimately as Ukrainian nationalists. They were cast as “nationalists,” 
“counterrevolutionaries” and “spies.” Under the OGPU’s supervision, the 
Ukrainian secret police launched a mass operation that Pavel Postyshev called 
a “crusade against Galicians.”
98
 The scholar Ivan Maistrenko who survived the 
terror in the 1930s noted that by the middle of the 1930s, if there were any 
Galician Ukrainians left in Kharkiv, they were either collaborating with the 
secret police or had some connections to the GPU.
99
 
 The scholar Larysa Krushel’nyts’ka (she was six when almost all 
members of her large family were repressed in Budynok Slovo) suggested that 
Galicians had never perceived themselves as the provincial intellectual elite, 
views that were in drastic dissonance with the center’s perceptions about 
Moscow as the capital of all peoples—all other regions were a province for 
party leaders, and they preferred to keep it this way. She noted that the idea of 
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freedom dominated the Galicians’ psyche, and the national idea elevated their 
spirit and awoke their national pride.
100
 Sixty thousand of Galicians 
immigrated to Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s-early 1930s, escaping persecutions 
by the Poles. The Soviets viewed the Galician intelligentsia not only as 
“nationalists” but also as “foreign spies” who were to be eliminated.
101
  
The GPU began to methodically arrest Western Ukrainians in July and 
August 1929.
102
 The Galician Matvii Iavors’kyi, political figure, academic of 
the Ukrainian Academy of Science and the major theoretician of Ukrainian 
Marxist historiography in the 1920s, was arrested in 1930, and in 1931 was 
exiled to Solovky.
103
 A new wave of repressions in Ukraine in 1931 absorbed 
approximately 70 prominent Ukrainian intellectuals. Among them were many 
Galicians and former members of the Ukrainian Central Rada and the UNR 
(Ukrainian People’s Republic).
104
 They were accused of membership in the 
underground “Ukrainian Nationalist Center” (UNTs) whose “leader” was 
Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi.
105
 Within 5 months, the GPU conducted mass arrests 
all over Ukraine, and 60,000 Ukrainians, those who served in the UNR Army, 
were exiled to Siberia.
106
 There were professors, teachers, engineers, 
academics, educators and cultural workers among those who were charged 
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with illegal activity within the UNTs, the UVO (the Ukrainian Military 
Organization) and the POV (the Polish Military Organization).
107
  
The repression of Galicians was a strategic mass operation, and its 
implementation was intense and vigorous. In 1933 at the November Party 
Plenum, the General Secretary of the TsK KP(b)U Stanislav Kosior 
summarized the attitudes of the Soviet government toward Galicians. He 
proclaimed: “The Ukrainian nationalists are preparing an intervention against 
the USSR. The majority of those counterrevolutionaries and nationalists that 
had been uncovered recently came to us from abroad—Prague, Galicia and 
other places…those Galician nationalists…were sent here to prepare the 
intervention from inside.”
108
  
The secret police included Orlivna and Polishchuk in the same 
dangerous circle of Galician nationalists and spies from Western Ukraine who 
had to be neutralized, as well as their “nationalist” art. Eastern Galicia was the 
main base of organized resistance and struggle for Ukrainian independence, 
and as the scholar Myroslav Prokop noted, “in the eyes of the Kremlin, every 
Ukrainian who belonged to any Ukrainian civic organization [before or after 
the revolution] was considered an enemy who had to be destroyed.”
109
 
Galicians who cherished their cultural roots and national heritage could be a 
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stimulus for Soviet Ukrainians to follow the Western national path, an 
influence that had to be prevented.
110
  
    
Independentist Pavlo Khrystiuk
111
 
Pavlo Khrystiuk, the slov’ianyn (resident of apartment 25), journalist 
and historian, was a former member of the Central Rada, Borot’bist, 
Vynnychenko’s adherent and the author of monographs about 
Vynnychenko.
112
 Khrystiuk’s biography served as a pretext for his arrest. He 
was arrested on 2 March 1931 on the same day as other former members of 
the Central Rada Vsevolod Holubovych, Vasyl’ Mazurenko and Mykola 
Chechil’.
113
  
In April 1917, Khrystiuk was one of the founders of the Ukrainian 
Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR). A member of the Ukrainian 
Central Rada, he became chief secretary of the General Secretariat. In January 
1918, when the independent Ukrainian People’s Republic was proclaimed, he 
was appointed minister of internal affairs. In late February 1918 Khrystiuk 
became the secretary of state. Soon after the collapse of Het ‘man Pavlo 
Skoropads’kyi’s regime, on 3 August 1919, Khrystiuk emigrated to Vienna, 
worked for the journal Boritesia—poborete, and wrote a four volume work 
Notes and Materials on the History of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1920 
which was published in 1922. Today Khrystiuk’s work is being extensively 
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quoted and represents one of the eyewitness accounts about the Ukrainian 
revolution.
114
  
In 1923, encouraged by the idea of Ukrainization, and having faith in 
the Bolshevik government, Khrystiuk, like many of his compatriots, returned 
to Soviet Ukraine.
115
 First he worked as an inspector in the Ukrainian bank. In 
1925, the People’s Commissar of Education Shums’kyi appointed Khrystiuk 
one of the administration members in the Ukrainian State Publishing House 
(the DVU). During this period, he befriended many slov’iany, members of 
VAPLITE.
116
 His close communication with this group of writers, such as 
Ostap Vyshnia, Ivan Dniprovs’kyi, Pavlo Tychyna, Mykola Kulish and of 
course Mykola Khvyl’ovyi encouraged him to continue to write. Their unique 
literary gifts and the feeling of community Khrystiuk experienced in their 
company attracted him to their circle, and he became a member of the 
cooperative “Slovo” with hopes of participating in the construction project of 
a new home for writers. 
The period of the Literary Discussion was productive for Khrystiuk. 
However, his style went through dramatic changes under state pressure. In 
contrast to his history of the Ukrainian revolution that had been written 
abroad, his texts were ideologically adjusted, and constrained. However, 
Khrystiuk made a serious tactical mistake which the party could not forgive. 
He published a series of positive critical essays about several writers’ literary 
works who were members of VAPLITE, including Khvyl’ovyi and Epik. 
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Khrystiuk’s favorable tone drastically contrasted with severe party criticism of 
these individuals. These publications exacerbated his unstable political 
position. His support of “Ukrainian nationalists” was viewed by the secret 
police as a relapse of a former independentist, a member of the Central 
Rada.
117
   
The members of VAPLITE (vaplitiany) considered Khrystiuk’s articles 
ill-timed and provocative. They believed that these articles escalated state 
pressure on VAPLITE. According to Khrystiuk, after the disintegration of this 
literary association, vaplitiany began to avoid meeting him. His work in the 
DVU became unbearable and he resigned. He found a position at the People’s 
Commissariat of Finances, and worked there from 1928 until 1931. Being 
employed helped Khrystiuk regularly pay his share during the construction 
process of Budynok Slovo. In early 1931 Khrystiuk accepted a position as a 
scientific worker at the Shevchenko Institute of Literature, but on 2 March 
1931 he was arrested.
118
  
Khrystiuk had always been a problematic and suspicious character in 
the eyes of the Soviet government. Several factors contributed to this. First, he 
was a former member of the Ukrainian Rada and the UPSR, entities that were 
“hostile” to the Bolshevik regime. Khrystiuk’s “Galician trace” made him 
suspect. Second, in 1919 Khrystiuk emigrated to Vienna, “running” from the 
Bolsheviks, and as far as the GPU was concerned, he remained an immigrant. 
Very simply, his contact with “bourgeois” Europe made him an offender. 
Third, Khrystiuk’s affinity for vaplitiany further compromised his reputation. 
In his diary, Serhii Iefremov noted that when VAPLITE was harassed by the 
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party establishment, the literary association was rebuked for placing 
Khvyl’ovyi’s and Khrystiuk’s nationalistic works on the pages of its 
journal.
119
 For the GPU there were ample reasons to neutralize Khrystiuk as a 
nationalist and counter-revolutionist. 
 
 
Pavlo Khrystiuk 
 
The elimination of great numbers of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was 
conducted under the pretext of multiple contrived accusations, the more 
serious the better, such as treason and conspiracy against the Soviet 
government, organizing of a military uprising to dethrone the Soviet regime, 
spying for Western intelligence services to undermine the Soviet state and the 
like. Khrystiuk and other former members of the Central Rada were accused 
of membership in the UNTs, which automatically made them guilty of all 
these points. Khrystiuk signed all protocols that identified him as a nationalist 
and conspirator in an anti-Soviet plot, and on 7 February 1932 he was 
sentenced to five years in prison by the OGPU Collegium of the USSR.
120
 
Like many other Ukrainian intellectuals, Khrystiuk ended up in 
Solovky. He was from there assigned to the 9
th
 Kems’kyi department of the 
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BBK and worked there for the 5
th
 kolkhoz in Veheraksha.
121
 But even in labor 
camps, GPU agents followed Khrystiuk’s every step. A denunciation written 
by a GPU agent suggested that Khrystiuk communicated with fellow prisoners 
Iavors’kyi, Fylypovych and Kossak. Their interaction in prison was based on 
common political views and a common nationalist past. GPU agents 
characterized Khrystiuk’s attitude to Soviet power as chronically hostile.
122
 
This denunciation played a significant role in Khrystiuk’s fate in the Solovky. 
On 21 January 1935, the NKVD Special Meeting of the USSR sentenced 
Khrystiuk to three more years in labor camps but even this additional term 
appeared to be insufficient for a nezalezhnyk. On 3 November 1936 the same 
NKVD body added another 8 years in prison which became fatal for 
Khrystiuk. According to recently declassified materials, Khrystiuk died in 
September 1941 in the labor camp “Sevvostlag” in Arkhangel’sk oblast’.
123
  
Through the efforts of Serhii Pustovoitov, Khrystiuk’s interrogator, 
Khrystiuk, as others arrested in this case, informed on his friends and 
colleagues who, together with Khrystiuk, were accused of having “conspired” 
against the Soviet regime.
124
 During his career in the GPU/NKVD, 
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Pustovoitov tortured hundreds of Ukrainian intellectuals. Khrystiuk was no 
exception. He signed a written confession that was filled with details of real 
events that were generously interwoven into the fictive narrative. Detailed 
narratives written in the first person were routinely invented by the GPU, an 
attempt at making the suspect’s deposition believable, which would create the 
impression of a carefully investigated criminal case. During the first wave of 
rehabilitation in the 1950s and 1960s that sprang from Khrushchev’s speech at 
the XX Party Congress, the truth about fabricated confessions emerged. Those 
who survived GPU tortures and interrogation in the thirties testified about the 
methods the secret police used to obtain self-incriminating statements from 
suspects.
125
   
 
Words, Deeds, Fear and Confusion 
The first arrests in Budynok Slovo plunged the slov’iany into 
depression. They distrusted and feared each other, which culminated in 
hysterical and inappropriate reactions.
126
 Ivan Senchenko remembered that 
during a friendly meeting at Khvyl’ovyi’s place in the winter of 1932, Oles’ 
Dosvitnii, who had known Senchenko for years, attacked him with the 
statement: “We don’t know at all what and who you are,” implying that 
Senchenko might have worked for the GPU.
127
 It was clear for everyone that 
the GPU had focused its attention on the building, and the writers grew 
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increasingly concerned about their future and that of their families. The 
slov’iany searched for commonalities and linkages between “proper” behavior 
and personal safety. However, they seemed to be unable to systematize the 
reality that surrounded them. They simply could not grasp the discrepancy 
between the words and deeds of the party establishment. Khvyl’ovyi wrote in 
his 13 May 1933 suicide note that he did not understand why the most faithful 
Bolsheviks had been eliminated.
128
  
The absence of inner logic of the space in which the slov’iany existed, 
and whispered rumors about what was happening in Sovnarkomivs’ka Street 
further confused the community of Budynok Slovo. Their understanding of the 
events was pieced together from bits of information about the arrests of their 
neighbors. This sketchy information generated suppositions which favored any 
number of interpretations—from certainties to doubts about the guilt of the 
arrested. Their new understanding of the place where they lived came to them 
gradually, through uncertainty and incoherence that are imbedded in any 
spatial entity.
129
 A lack of information about the reasons for arrests made some 
of them panic and search for their “perfect” outward representation. They 
stopped expressing strong opinions because this would expose them before the 
state. They became guarded in their public statements, and vagueness and 
ambiguity of expression were safety measures during this turbulent time. The 
slov’iany adapted to the time and place, incoherent, uncertain and fragile, 
hoping to become invisible to the state. Most of them did not succeed. 
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The arrests in Budynok Slovo were not conducted in a frenzy of 
aggression amid administrative chaos, or haphazard GPU leadership. They 
were a part of carefully planned mass operations which were designed to 
eliminate the nationally conscious elite. The slov’iany’s compromised past 
marked by their Galician links and prior membership in national parties 
defined their images as Ukrainian nationalists in the eyes of the state. Real 
individual histories were spiced with the “evidence” of a crime against the 
state, fabricated in the bowels of the GPU. As we shall see in Chapter Four, by 
May-July 1933, the GPU possessed hundreds of documents—fabricated 
evidence of the Ukrainian intelligentsia’s multiple crimes and ultimate guilt.
130
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Chapter Four 
Ialovyi’s Case: The Power of Interrogation Rooms  
 
Get dressed for execution… 
 
 Pavlo Tychyna
1
  
  
Combating Ukrainian Nationalism 
The mass terror against the intelligentsia was unleashed in Ukraine in 
1933. In an important republic such as Ukraine, which because of widespread 
hostility to government policies might have been lost to the Soviet cause, “the 
year 1937 began with the year 1933.”
2
 The December 1932 and January 1933 
Plenums of the TsK VKP(b) issued resolutions (14 December 1932 and 24 
January 1933) that sealed the fate of thousands of Ukrainians. The party 
severely criticized the KP(b)U for errors in collectivization and nationality 
policy. In 1933, Postyshev and 1,340 party apparatchiks were sent from 
Moscow to Kharkiv to “correct” these grave errors. Vsevolod Balyts’kyi was 
put in charge of the OGPU in Ukraine, and together with Pavel Postyshev, 
launched a mass terror attack against Ukrainian cultural institutions and the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia who were in favor of “Soviet Ukrainian, not all-
Soviet, sovereignty.” 
3
 
The center observed a disturbing tendency: after the battle of the 
Literary Discussion that dismissed Khvyl’ovyi’s theory of gravitating toward 
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“psychological Europe,” only 20 % of literature translated into Ukrainian and 
published in 1927 had been translated from the Russian language, while 
publications translated from various European languages doubled and 
constituted 80% of total publications.
4
 In Moscow’s view, Ukrainization 
exacerbated these tendencies which were considered unacceptable, and the 
policy was to be reconfigured and reformulated. Ukrainian “nationalism,” 
which, it was thought, had blossomed due to the efforts of Skrypnyk and other 
party leaders in Ukraine, was to be combated.
5
  
The first written order that overtly launched counter-Ukrainization 
with subsequent consequences for Ukrainians came from Moscow in 
December 1932. Stalin and Molotov sent a telegram to Ukrainian party 
officials of contested geographical regions (the Kuban’, Kurs’k and Voronezh 
provinces), as well as the Soviet Far East and Turkestan where great numbers 
of Ukrainians lived, in which they ordered local authorities to “stop 
Ukrainization [in these areas], transform all Ukrainian-language newspapers, 
books, and publications into Russian-language ones, and to change the 
language of instruction from Ukrainian to Russian in all schools by fall of 
1933.” 
6
  
A similarly blunt and direct demand about the reversal of 
Ukrainization in Kharkiv, the heart of Ukrainian culture, would have been 
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considered inappropriate and inconsistent in the context of the political course 
of Ukrainization proclaimed by the party in 1923. A different solution had 
been found, and the GPU became the chief executor of a new covert course of 
counter-Ukrainization in Ukraine. The proponents of Ukrainization policies 
were to be proclaimed Ukrainian deviationists and nationalists and imprisoned 
for anti-Soviet activity. This idea was reinforced by Postyshev at the 
November, 1933 KP(b)U Plenum. He affirmed that Ukrainian nationalism had 
become a “chief threat to the Soviet state.”
7
 The support of the center, and 
collegial criticism of nationalistic tendencies by literary professionals from 
below, emboldened the GPU in their struggle against “nationalist deviations” 
in the republic.  
By 1933 the nationalist deviations such as khvyliovism, shumskism and 
volobuievshchyna had been eliminated through party reprimands, public 
ostracism of their adherents and purges. The next task was to eliminate the 
“nest” of supporters of Ukrainian nationalists—the People’s Commissariat of 
Enlightenment (Narkomosvita). After the 7 July 1933 suicide of the People’s 
Commissar of Enlightenment Mykola Skrypnyk, who was harassed because of 
his supposed national deviations, the center ordered the massive purge of the 
entire Narkomos which lasted from 1933 to early 1934.
8
 All Skrypnyk’s 
assistants were arrested. In total, 200 people were repressed from the 
Commissariat (in 1928 there were 202 associates in the office) for their 
national errors and deviations.
9
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A massive purge of 1933-34 cleaned also the primary party cells of 
various cultural institutions, including Ukrainian publishing houses, 
newspapers and journals. The state purge commissions found party members 
guilty of turning a blind eye to nationalists and counterrevolutionaries in their 
cells. They accused partorgy
10
 of primary party cells of indifference toward 
wreckers and separatists who deliberately undermined the normal functioning 
of newspapers and the ideological purity of publications.
11
  
The capital city, highly saturated with intellectuals and progressive 
thinkers, attracted substantial GPU resources to investigate prominent figures 
as carriers of counterrevolutionary “heresy” and treason. Budynok Slovo was a 
place where “nationalists” could be conveniently observed in their daily 
activities. Domestic settings, sometimes even more than professional settings, 
revealed their habits and convictions. In addition to being writers, several 
slov’iany were editors of various Ukrainian journals and newspapers. By 1933, 
they functioned together with newly created staffs under constant GPU 
scrutiny. Most learned new rules of survival: purged and sanitized of 
“nationalist elements,” cultural institutions publicly and collectively had to 
condemn “deviationists,” and entire collectives unanimously had to report 
their faithfulness to the party.
12
 
Publishing activities received special attention from the state and the 
GPU. Fighting Ukrainian nationalism, the center combined purges and 
repressions with economic measures, constraining publishing activities 
through a considerable reduction of paper allocated to state and private 
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publishing houses in Ukraine. On 4 February 1933 Panas Liubchenko wrote 
Kaganovich that Ukrainian newspapers had not received 300 tons of paper that 
were specified in the documents of the Soiuzgosplan.
13
 On 4 March 1933 the 
secretary of the TsK KP(b)U Mykola Popov reiterated the problem to 
Kaganovich, stating that in 1932 the delivery of paper to Ukraine had 
constituted 85% of the norms that were originally planned by the 
Soiuzgosplan, while according to its statistics, the other Soviet republics 
received 95%.
14
 Popov complained that this situation resulted in the constant 
reduction of newspaper circulation, as well as in the reduction of the size of 
publications, changes in their format, and the frequency and regularity of 
issuing newspapers. Routinely, the writers began to receive rejection letters to 
their requests to publish their work.   
Two of the most important state publishing houses in Ukraine, the 
DVU (the State Publishing House of Ukraine) and the Knyhospilka (the Book 
Association), as well as private publishers, such as “Rukh,” “Slovo,” “Chas” 
and “Siaivo,” became targets of repression. In April 1932, the party liquidated 
all independent literary organizations and their journals, such as Pluzhanyn 
and Vaplite, and in 1934 created the Union of Writers. Those individuals who 
had earlier served “oppositional” publishing houses and established their 
“nationalist” reputations were on the GPU’s black list. The slov’ianyn 
Mykhailo Ialovyi, an editor of the DVU, became one of the hundreds of 
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Ukrainian intellectuals who were arrested as a member of the mythical 
nationalist organization, UVO.
15
 
 
The Uniqueness of Mykhailo Ialovyi’s Criminal File  
Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj noted that Ialovyi “occup[ied] a modest place in the 
literature of the 1920s.”
16
 However, he was a recognizable figure among the 
literary community in Kharkiv: in 1926, he was the first president of the 
literary group VAPLITE that gained fame as an oppositional group to state-
sponsored literary associations “Molodniak” (Youth)and VUSPP, and an 
editor of the journal Chervonyi Shliakh, and of publishing houses “LIM” 
(Literatura i mystetstvo/Literature and Art) and DVU.
17
 Together with 
censors, Ialovyi made final decisions about works that were published in 
Ukraine.
18
 But most importantly, he was a person who had close relationships 
with Khvyl’ovyi, and was associated with Khvyl’ovy’s seditious views on the 
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development of Ukrainian culture.
19
 Ialovyi became one of the first alleged 
uvisty who was arrested during the night of 12 May 1933 in apartment 30, the 
day before Mykola Khvyl’ovyi committed suicide.
20
  
Ialovyi’s past, his active membership in the Borot’bist party before 
1920, close relationships with Vasyl’ Ellan-Blakytnyi, Oleksandr Shums’kyi 
and Mykhailo Poloz, the People’s Commissar of Finance in the UkrSSR in the 
1920s, and two years of interactions with Ukrainian futurists, such as 
Mykhailo Semenko, Oleksa Slisarenko, Volodymyr Iarovenko and Vasyl’ 
Aleshko were factors that influenced the GPU decision to eliminate him.
21
 
When in 1926 Ialovyi published an article in which he criticized Russian 
chauvinism and “the nihilistic interpretation of Ukrainian culture by the 
editorial board of the Leningrad journal Zhyzn’ iskusstva,” he earned his 
reputation with the secret police as a nationalist deviationist once and 
forever.
22
 
 
Mykhailo Ialovyi  
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His participation in the project on the systemization of Ukrainian 
spelling that was commissioned by the state and led by the People’s 
Commissar of Education Oleksandr Shums’kyi also compromised his image. 
Among the members of the commission were the slov’iany and writers Maik 
Iohansen, Mykola Khvyl’ovyi and many prominent Ukrainian scholars who 
were not favored by the center. By 1933, the state considered the project 
harmful, and obstructed the commission’s work in all possible ways. The All-
Ukrainian Academy of Science received secret instructions from Moscow that 
the scholars had to “do everything they could to make the Ukrainian language 
as similar to Russian as possible.”
23
 Shortly thereafter, most commission 
members, including Ialovyi, were repressed.
24
 
The scenario of his arrest was written by the GPU long before 12 May 
1933. As a vaplitianyn, Ialovyi struggled “with anti-Ukrainian attitudes,” and 
in 1929, he published his novel Zoloti lyseniata (Golden Fox-cubs) about the 
Ukrainian revolutions and the Borot’bists.
25
 A vocal opponent of national 
oppression, Ialovyi was doomed to repression. During the night of 11-12 May, 
he was arrested in the presence of two witnesses, the commandant of Budynok 
Slovo Pavlo Litvinenko and his neighbor Vasyl’ Vrazhlyvyi (Shtan’ko).
26
 
Apparently, the GPU established an additional position within the 
cooperative’s administration, and although it proved to be problematic to learn 
more about Litvinenko’s identity, it is clear that he worked for the secret 
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police. As the “commandant” of the building, his name appears in several 
criminal cases, including the case fabricated against the slov’ianyn Vasyl’ 
Desniak-Vasylenko. Litvinenko’s title emphasizes a complete regimentation 
of the building, militarization of its culture, and its appropriation by the secret 
police.  
According to routine practice, before his arrest, Ialovyi was expelled 
from the party for his anti-Soviet activity. His arrest was secured by several 
depositions of the previously arrested who claimed that Ialovyi was a UVO 
member and took an active part in preparing a military uprising against Soviet 
power in Ukraine. One such denunciation was written by Ievhen Cherniak, the 
director of the Kharkiv Institute of the History of Ukrainian Culture who was 
arrested as a UVO member. He supposedly reported that he regularly attended 
UVO meetings at various residential places of the members of the 
counterrevolutionary organization. For instance, Cherniak was present at a 2 
May 1933 UVO meeting that took place at Ialovyi’s apartment 30 in Budynok 
Slovo. The occasion was the visit of Mykhailo Poloz, one of the supposed 
leaders of the UVO Moscow branch. According to Cherniak’s testimony, the 
members of the organization, Ialovyi, Poloz, Tymophii Repa, Serhii Vikul, 
Andrii Richyts’kyi (another slov’ianyn), Ivan Tur and Iosyp Bukshovanyi 
discussed the urgency of the military uprising in Ukraine that was to be 
organized quickly because of the massive arrests of the UVO members by the 
GPU.
27
 It is almost certain that Ialovyi was informed by his interrogator about 
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these depositions made by his former colleagues because on 8 June 1933, 
Ialovyi provided a detailed report about the goals of the organization, its 
composition, and its international support and connections. 
 Ialovyi’s file may conceal the particulars of his behavior during the 
preliminary investigation, yet it discloses valuable details about how the GPU 
operated, how the secret police understood evidence, guilt, the ethics of 
investigation and the significance of collected testimonies. Several supervisors 
accepted Ialovyi’s interrogation protocols, inconsistent and contradictory, as 
sufficient incriminating evidence of his guilt which discloses a crude 
debasement of law and its rudimentary instrumentalisation on the agency 
level, from top to bottom.   
 Many Soviet individual files are attempts to write a suspect’s 
biography.
28
 The biographies in the criminal files differ from conventional 
ones written by professional biographers in that they lack almost any 
description of childhood years. The Soviet police’s lack of interest in a 
suspect’s early years is understandable: in its view, childhoods were irrelevant 
because the transgressions committed as adults to which the arrested confessed 
were sufficient for closing the case. A victim’s early years were reduced to the 
“social origin” of their families. Yet the conscious life of the individual had to 
be reflected in detail and shaped in a certain way to emphasize his or her 
“belonging,” “membership,” “participation,” “ideological inclinations,” 
“political views,” and other ideological indicators, on which the whole case 
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was built, and which helped bring the suspect to the expected closure—a 
confession. Ialovyi’s case is no exception. In the 108 pages of the 
autobiography which at the same time served as his confession, there is very 
little about Ialovyi’s early years, although he, or possibly the interrogator, 
provided an extensive narrative about his criminal activities and nationalist 
views as a conscious adult. 
 Ialovyi was writing his confession volens-nolens, he was answering 
someone’s questions: the document has the features of a dialogue, not a 
monologue. His answers appear fully scripted and carefully structured; his 
narrative effusively reflects the needs of the secret police. A clear attempt to 
follow the prescribed plan of an imagined narrative is the most striking feature 
of Ialovyi’s self-indictment. Clear thinking and the organized manner of the 
narrative were hardly possible to achieve under circumstances that were so far 
from relaxing and tranquil. Perhaps Ialovyi was aware of what was expected 
of him in advance, and this knowledge helped him produce a book-length 
confession within three days.
29
 The writer very accurately conveyed a sense of 
his own doom, as if he was ready from the beginning to expiate his guilt. His 
narrative includes every imaginable self-incriminating detail. The “thickness” 
of this description is remarkable.
30
 Political expectations shaped the 
“formation” and “transformation” of Ialovyi’s identity on paper: it unraveled 
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rapidly and obsessively.
31
 As the future testimonies of those who survived the 
Kharkiv GPU prison and labor camps demonstrate, interrogators promised 
“the guilty” a “soft” punishment or even freedom in exchange for a detailed 
narrative about counterrevolutionary activity, and this promise contoured the 
depositions of many victims.
32
 
Importantly, the file reveals an interesting detail that might provide 
some clues for considering the authenticity of Ialovyi’s depositions. On the 
back of page 32 of Ialovyi’s confession, there is a plan, written apparently by 
Pustovoitov, Ialovyi’s interrogator, of what Ialovyi was supposed to illuminate 
in his narrative. There were three points that the GPU was interested in having 
on paper: first, “my [Ialovyi’s] practical counterrevolutionary work, 
separately;” second, “the activity of the organization in general;” and third, 
“the activity of the members of the organization known to me.” Below this 
list, there is Pustovoitov’s signature.
33
 Whatever the case might be, Ialovyi 
strictly followed the plan and provided the exact information the GPU agent 
listed.  
 In contrast to the filtration interrogation procedure imposed on 
returnees from Nazi Germany after WWII which demanded, as Nick Baron 
put it, “raw information,” such as dates, places, occupation and so on,
34
 
Ialovyi’s interrogator demanded psychological explanations of what brought 
the suspect to this point. The investigative flow was constructed along 
Freudian lines and schemes, revealing the underlying motivations of Ialovyi’s 
“regress.” It was clear that there was a pathological and morbid condition that 
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had to be “treated,” but the “doctor” needed full self-disclosure and self-
analysis in a written form that would expose weaknesses, vices and fallacies, 
together with pernicious influences that provoked the suspect to commit a 
crime. The interrogator demanded from the suspect a full and complete 
“disarmament” (rozzbroiennia/razoruzhenie), and Ialovyi provided it, as well 
as clarifications on his moral regression along his nationalist journey.  
 Moreover, in 1933 those arrested were given ample time to write as 
much as possible in their autobiographies and confessions. No one limited 
them in terms of the length of their compositions or in the time it took to 
create them. Writing such a lengthy confession must have seemed like a 
protracted torture and death for Ialovyi. This deposition became the last text 
that he created as a writer. Soon the responsibility of elaborating on the text 
was permanently shifted to his interrogator.    
 Interestingly, as the file progresses, the first-person narrative alternates 
with the third-person depositions which produces an effect of personal 
estrangement. For a reader, Ialovyi represents a person who has become 
judgmental and critical toward himself and his alleged criminal actions. 
However, another scenario is possible: the interrogator kept forgetting that 
Ialovyi was supposed to be the sole author of his own file, and the GPU agent 
was only a modest recorder of Ialovyi’s “recollections.” Such inadvertent 
digressions can be observed throughout many individual files but there is a 
common thread: the more believable the authorship of the suspect’s confession 
might be at the outset, the more striking becomes the stylistic dissonance 
between the first-person original narrative and the suspect’s sudden desire to 
refer to himself or herself in the third person. Such a stylistic transition 
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heightens a reader’s concerns about authorship, and other changes in a 
narrator’s style become more perceptible and more noticeable.       
In contrast to other individual criminal files of representatives of the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia who were arrested during the 1930s, Ialovyi’s criminal 
file has some unique features, and therefore it is worthwhile to examine it in 
detail. First, this file is amazingly long—414 pages of tiny handwriting, 
written on both sides of many pages (roughly 600-700 pages in all).
35
 By 
1937, after years of file fabrication and experience, GPU craftsmen downsized 
their files, reducing the time and effort that was invested in these fabrications. 
Only group files consisted of several volumes of documents. During the Great 
Terror (1937-38), the record was set at 57 pages per file.
36
 Only Ialovyi’s 
confession of anti-Soviet activity reached 108 pages in the criminal file. He 
apparently completed the first 32 pages within three days after his arrest. The 
remaining pages were likely written within the next two weeks before 
Ialovyi’s first interrogation. This confession is one of the lengthiest and 
detailed among criminal files of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and it left no 
avenue for Ialovyi to escape the death penalty.
37
 
Second, the number of testimonies within the file that revealed 
Ialovyi’s supposed anti-Soviet activity is overwhelming. All of them belong to 
famous political and literary figures who were arrested before Ialovyi: many 
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of them were from Western Ukraine, and from abroad (written by those who 
worked in Soviet embassies and polpredstva before their arrests).
38
 
Third, Ialovyi’s confession, as well as his interrogation protocols, was 
written by hand which ceased to be a common practice of the GPU/NKVD 
after 1934. Ialovyi did not sign each page of the written documents, as he 
should have, and even an untrained eye can easily detect graphological 
inconsistencies in Ialovyi’s handwritten testimonies during different periods of 
time. These inconsistencies might have occurred because as time progressed, 
Ialovyi’s handwriting changed as his physical condition deteriorated because 
of the torture, or some sections were written by someone else. Both scenarios 
are possible. 
Fourth, linguistic differences (Ukrainianisms employed by the author 
in Russian texts, his vocabulary and manner of expression) between the earlier 
testimonies and the later ones are rather drastic, a fact that encourages 
questions about the authenticity of Ialovyi’s later pages, but not about the 
early confession (the first 82 pages).
39
 From page 83 of the criminal file, the 
original voice of the writer faded away and was replaced by bureaucratic 
standard slang that was a trademark of GPU interrogators. In other words, the 
language of the first 82 pages of Ialovyi’s criminal file is very different from 
the language of the remaining pages of his protocols, and readers need not be 
linguists to notice this difference. Certainly, this discrepancy neither confirms 
nor denies the circumstances under which his confession was extracted. 
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However, precisely this discrepancy should forestall any moral judgments of 
Ialovyi’s behavior under arrest. 
Fifth, Ialovyi’s case was one of the first against Ukrainian intellectuals 
in which the GPU/NKVD broadly employed a “principle of escalation” when 
the suspect’s deposition was built on a steady progression of numbers of 
meetings mentioned, its participants, organizations and its members. A 
plethora of names, individual connections and group links emerges while 
proceeding through interrogation protocols. With each new protocol, the 
alleged counterrevolutionary organization increasingly expanded, and new 
representatives of various cultural institutions in Ukraine were, it was claimed, 
members of this organization. By the time a reader gets to the last 
interrogation protocol, almost all significant cultural figures and 
representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia have been mentioned on the 
pages of this criminal file as participants in anti-Soviet activities: from 
Narkompros, the Ukrainian Academy of Science, various institutes and 
universities, the theatre “Berezil’,” the literary association “Zakhidna Ukraina” 
(Western Ukraine), the publishing houses Sel’khozvydav, Radshkola and 
LIM, the Red Army, plants and factories, and republican cultural 
establishments and Soviet polpredstva abroad. The narrative of interrogation 
protocols identified a multifaceted conspiracy of Ukrainian nationalists against 
the Soviet state which ensured future purges of Ukrainian intellectuals on a 
massive scale. The escalation principle was extensively used in all subsequent 
criminal cases, and by the late 1930s there was no one left in Ukraine (among 
those who occupied noticeable positions in various cultural institutions) who 
would not be mentioned in criminal files as a counterrevolutionary. They were 
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swept away and replaced by new cadres, more obedient, and thus more 
reliable. Interestingly, even those who were never repressed were mentioned 
in individual and group files during different periods in the thirties.
40
             
             
 
05.28.1933 Ialovyi’s interrogation     05.28.1933 Ialovyi’s interrogation 
protocol.
41
        protocol.
42
 
          
       
        
          
07.30.1933 Ialovyi’s interrogation      07.30.1933 Ialovyi’s interrogation 
protocol.
43
            protocol.
44
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Finally, the visual appearance of the pages dealing with the minutes of 
the last interrogation suggests an attempt might have been made to forge 
Ialovyi’s handwriting. Even without expert evaluation, the writer’s lack of 
patience is evident in the final minutes. Is it possible that the apparent 
difference in handwriting between questions and answers might have been 
done to persuade readers that the questions were written by the interrogator, 
and the answers by Ialovyi? Surely yes. What then can be made of the last 
minutes which reveal a similarity between these two handwritings? Readers 
might notice the sloppy and hasty handwriting which diminishes some 
differences between them. Might it be possible that by page 133 of the 
criminal case, the GPU agent tired of being a careful imitator because the 
investigation was to be completed and the file had to be transferred to the 
prosecutor?  
As in Khrystiuk’s case, Ialovyi’s interrogator was the GPU operative 
Pustovoitov, whose name appears in many interrogation protocols of the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia, and who was famous for his vicious and sadistic 
nature.
45
 It is unknown whether Ialovyi endured physical torture but an 
analysis of his confession suggests he was subjected to possible mental abuse 
by Pustovoitov. The fates of interrogators became unexpectedly intertwined 
with the fates of the slov’iany which gave Budynok Slovo a tragic and, 
simultaneously, mystical aura. These two groups of people, although pitted 
against one another, had much in common: they spent time together and 
ultimately met similar fates and deaths in the same place. Indeed, some of 
them shared their final destination—the place of their last worldly days—
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Solovky. They met at the same time and in the same place, and they parted 
synchronically and forever in the same place, not accidentally but forcibly, 
against their wills. 
 
Obliterating Human Bonds and Friendships 
 For the secret police, the bonds of friendship and personal loyalty 
seemed suspicious, and were thoroughly scrutinized and even compromised 
for the sake of “smooth” evidence in a fabricated case. An analysis of criminal 
files reveals interrogators’ attempts to compromise the relatives and friends of 
the suspects. Such tactics further demoralized them. Ultimately, all 
participants of the conspiracy narrative written by the police became enemies 
and counterrevolutionaries by definition. Interrogators designed a self-
enclosing circle of untrustworthy individuals who, maintaining contacts with 
each other, committed and perpetuated a crime. Interactions, links, 
connections and affiliations, imaginary or real, were used for writing a 
conspiracy scenario. Everyone was guilty: some—of being a member of a 
nationalist organization, others—of their shortsightedness and maintaining 
connections with the enemy. The absence of logic confused the suspects: in 
interrogation rooms, they realized that any human bonds, friendships and 
social links were discouraged; the only passion the suspects should have was a 
passion for constructing socialism. To pass the interrogator’s test for loyalty, 
people had to collectively build socialism but only as separate individuals. 
Their circle, according to the interrogator, proved to be a group of nationalists. 
Many slov’iany accepted this ideological and psychological engineering 
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scheme, and as soon as they yielded to the fear of resisting it, they were no 
longer in control of their lives in prison. 
             Ialovyi was one of them. His friend Khvyl’ovyi avoided a similar fate 
by committing suicide. Before Khvyl’ovyi and Ialovyi moved to Budynok 
Slovo, there was an absolute bond between them. They regularly met in the 
Blakytnyi House, created new literary organizations and participated in 
vigorous literary discussions together, and under state pressure wrote letters of 
recantation together. However, Khvyl’ovyi’s name was always in the forefront 
of the polemical battles. He was a better polemicist than Ialovyi and a more 
productive and talented writer. Ialovyi was an organizer and, strictly speaking, 
a literary bureaucrat. He wrote less, and therefore, was less visible to the state 
than Khvyl’ovyi. These differences might have contributed to their mutual 
alienation in 1933. 
 But in crucial moments of his life, Khvyl’ovyi sought Ialovyi’s advice. 
When in the late 1920s Khvyl’ovyi was leaving for Vienna (the legitimate 
reason was treatment of his tuberculosis), he shared his intention with Ialovyi 
to continue fighting for Ukrainian culture from abroad, and not to return to 
Soviet Ukraine. Ialovyi argued that Khvyl’ovyi would never be able to live far 
away from Ukraine, and, as a writer and as a person, would cease to exist.
46
 
Ialovyi proved to be right: in his letter to Ialovyi from Vienna, Khvyl’ovyi 
informed him about his decision to return. The first person Khvyl’ovyi visited 
upon his return to Kharkiv was Ialovyi. Moreover, according to the 
testimonies of those who were in Khvyl’ovyi’s apartment at the moment of his 
suicide on 13 May 1933, Kvyl’ovyi feverishly searched for a solution to help 
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Ialovyi. After he learned from Ialovyi’s wife about his arrest, Khvyl’ovyi 
made phone calls to the highest officials in the Central Committee and the 
GPU/NKVD.
47
 
 Considering the tone of Ialovyi’s confession written on 15 May 1933, 
he knew nothing about Khvyl’ovyi’s death. In his testimony to the GPU, 
Ialovyi emphasized his literary and ideological difference from Khvyl’ovyi, 
estranging himself from this odious figure.
48
 He stated that he did not share 
Khvyl’ovyi’s ideas about the gravitation of Ukrainian culture toward 
European culture, and the pernicious influence of Russian cultural traditions 
on the development of Ukrainian literature. He called the program of 
VAPLITE “openly nationalistic and fascist,” and stated that it was approved 
and inspired by Khvyl’ovyi and Shums’kyi. According to Ialovyi’s deposition, 
the counterrevolutionary and national-chauvinistic ideas of VAPLITE were 
propagandized on the pages of Chervonyi Shliakh, Vaplite, Kul’tura i pobut 
and other journals.
49
 
Ialovyi persuasively described the 1920s meetings with both 
Khvyl’ovyi and Shums’kyi, during which they discussed the Kremlin’s 
crusade against Ukrainian culture. He stated that all of them believed that 
there was nothing left from the original idea of socialism, and the entire 
situation in Ukraine looked like the “renaissance of the Russian national 
state.” 
50
  
He also admitted that the December 1926 letter of self-criticism written 
together with Khvyl’ovyi and Dosvitnii was insincere and purely formal, and 
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this act only exacerbated his wrong-doing. Ialovyi condemned his own 
nationalist views and argued that nationalist manifestations in his behavior 
were nothing but the old shadow of his Borot’bist past that haunted him for 
years.
51
 He informed the GPU that Khvyl’ovyi was one of the central figures 
in the counter-revolutionary nationalist organization UVO that planned a 
military uprising and the assassination of the highest party leaders in Ukraine. 
According to Ialovyi, in 1932-33, the organization also planned to undermine 
the sowing and bread procurement campaigns, and to organize resistance to 
collectivization in the countryside.
52
  
Moreover, according to Ialovyi’s confession, in the early 1930s the 
apartments of Khvyl’ovyi, Ialovyi and Mykola Kulish in Budynok Slovo were 
regularly used as places for meetings of the organization. The meetings 
became especially frequent after the summer of 1932 when in July the 
leadership of the organization decided to activate its efforts to organize a 
military uprising against the Bolshevik dictatorship in Ukraine.
53
 The 
members, usually the nucleus of the organization and the former members of 
VAPLITE, discussed the reliability of rebel cadres in the periphery and in the 
countryside that were allegedly recruited into the UVO. Interestingly, Ialovyi 
named not only the members of the former VAPLITE among the participants 
in these meetings but also those slov’iany who in the past were members of 
state-sponsored literary organizations and party functionaries in publishing 
houses. In the minutes of each subsequent interrogation, the list of the 
members grew but Khvyl’ovyi was mentioned quite often as an active 
participant at all meetings of the organization. Whether these meetings were 
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real, or only a figment of Ialovyi’s tortured imagination, or a product of the 
interrogator’s morbid fantasy is hard to say. 
This narrative appears to be a fiction because in the early 1930s Ialovyi 
and Khvyl’ovyi seemed to drift apart. Few slov’iany failed to sense the danger 
of being around the rebel (Khvyl’ovyi) who provoked Stalin’s fury.
54
 
Moreover, most slov’iany knew about the arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals, 
and this certainly limited their contacts with each other.
55
 Social interractions 
became extremely dangerous for them. In addition, Ialovyi was involved in the 
organizational work in publishing houses, and Khvyl’ovyi fell silent, began to 
drink, became socially inactive and unproductive as a writer. Their trajectories 
rarely crossed.   
The interrogator Pustovoitov who can hardly be suspected of mercy or 
kindness toward prisoners managed to destroy Ialovyi’s and Khvyl’ovyi’s 
friendship, a friendship that did exist, according to many memoirs. Their 
friendship was born during the years of seeming freedom in the 1920s and 
blessed by their romantic views about the promising future of the new 
Ukrainian literature.
56
 Yet, beyond the friendship between these two 
individuals, Pustovoitov managed to destroy Ialovyi’s integrity and poise. It 
seems likely that he familiarized Ialovyi with his friends’ depositions 
denouncing Ialovyi as a member of the UVO.       
The tactics the GPU employed seemed to work effectively each time in 
destroying the inner core of the arrested before investigators even began to 
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work with them. Emptied, wounded and devastated by human disloyalty and 
treachery, the victims presented maleable human material for interrogators. 
The weakest, less resilient and more vulnerable were broken first. They 
betrayed those who were considered stronger than their predecessors who, in 
turn, were broken by their friends’ betrayals, or committed suicide. The circle 
repeated and perpetuated itself.  
The finale of this criminal investigation precisely followed the scenario 
that was designed by the GPU. The secret police forced Ialovyi to reveal his 
friendship with oppositionists, such as Khvyl’ovyi, Shums’kyi and many 
others, as well as their alleged co-attendance at meetings and active co-
participation in the conspiracy. The ultimate task of interrogators was to lead 
the suspect to a moral decline when he would betray his friends and loved 
ones, denouncing them on paper. This scenario usually prevented surprises at 
the final stages of the investigation. Destroyed morally, very few recanted 
their depositions during the trial. Indifferent to the future and hateful of their 
past, the suspects usually confirmed their preliminary statements in front of 
dvoikas, troikas and prosecutors. 
The destruction of human bonds and friendship was one of the tasks of 
the Soviet secret police. With all necessary means in hand, mainly guided by 
the party’s blessing, the GPU secured complete control over the slov’iany’s 
interpersonal relationships, including their flow of ideas and deeds. Broken 
and depressed, in prison and labor camps, people who were betrayed by their 
friends and loved ones (or were persuaded they had been) carried a burden that 
was beyond physical suffering: they carried a ruined faith in morality, love 
and friendship, a feeling that crippled them for life. Those who survived 
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repressions never recovered fully in a physical, psychological or psychiatric 
sense.
57
 Khvyl’ovyi committed suicide without learning the bitterness of his 
friend’s betrayal or weakness.  
Prison could change people in many unpredictable ways, as Ivan 
Bahrianyi demonstrated. In prison, Ialovyi asked Pustovoitov to spare his life 
because of his sincerity and openness with the secret police. These written 
lines invite the reader to remember what was at stake—human life. Not 
everyone was prepared to die instantly, without negotiations or a struggle with 
the system. 
 
Love and Fear: Lidiia Vovchyk-Blakytna  
Individual criminal files on each Ukrainian intellectual usually begin 
with a detailed characterization of the suspect (supplied by a questionnaire or 
anketa) which provides data on his or her relatives, including wives, husbands 
and children, as well as the suspect’s parents, and siblings. Sometimes, the 
circle of personal connections was even broader than this, and the list 
incorporated those individuals who lived at the same address with the suspect. 
Ultimately, in the eyes of the GPU, they were criminalized and constituted a 
future target for the punitive organs. They were guilty ab definitio as the 
relatives of a nationalist deviationist, a wrecker and a counterrevolutionary.
58
 
As Vatulesku noted, “each file became the potential originator of other files in 
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an arborescent model that first takes over the family tree and later 
threateningly spreads out to ‘any inimical and personal relationships.’”
59
 The 
closest connection to Ialovyi was Lidiia Vovchyk-Blakytna who also lived in 
Budynok Slovo together with Ialovyi.     
Although they were never officially married, she and Ialovyi moved 
together to Budynok Slovo in 1930. Lidiia was Vasyl’ Ellan-Blakytnyi’s wife 
and they had a daughter Maia. Before and after Blakytnyi’s death in 1925, 
Lidiia had a relationship with Ialovyi which was interrupted by different 
professional assignments for both. Ialovyi worked in Kyiv and Moscow; 
Lidiia was sent to work for the Ukrainian Embassy in Warsaw.
60
  
 
Maia Vovchyk-Blakytna with her mother Lidiia Vovchyk-Blakytna (1977).
61
 
 
 
 Upon their return to Kharkiv, during the most tragic periods of 
Lidiia’s life (the sicknesses of her daughter Maiia and Blakytnyi, and 
Blakytnyi’s subsequent death), Ialovyi took good care of Lidiia and Maia. In 
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her report to the GPU, Vovchyk suggested that she was very grateful to 
Ialovyi because he literally saved her daughter’s life.
62
 
However, when she was arrested, clearly because of her relationship 
with Ialovyi, her acquaintances with Ukrainian writers and her residence in 
Budynok Slovo, Vovchyk transparently described Ialovyi as a person who 
made political and ideological mistakes. She claimed that because of this their 
relationship remained incredibly tense. She informed the organs that she 
expressed her concerns to Ialovyi about his presidency in VAPLITE, 
suggesting that this literary association was bourgeois, as well as the title of 
his position in it…“president.” Moreover, in their conversations with Ialovyi 
she insisted that before he died, Blakytnyi, an influential literary and party 
figure, was adamantly against the very concept of this association which 
deeply offended Ialovyi on collective and personal levels.
63
 According to 
Lidiia, these disagreements estranged them from one another.    
However, for some time in 1930 they lived happily together. Ialovyi 
was entitled to a three-room apartment in a newly built Budynok Slovo. 
According to the decision of the Blakytnyi’s legacy committee, Vovchyk was 
also offered a three-room apartment. At the final stage, it turned out that there 
were not enough apartments for all writers who originally applied for 
membership, and Ialovyi and Vovchyk voluntarily gave up the right to an 
extra apartment. They moved to apartment 30 together with Maia.
64
  
According to Vovchyk’s deposition, their relationship with Ialovyi was 
terminated when she told him that she had met Vasyl’ Krasen’kov from 
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Moscow during her vacation at the Zheleznovodsk resort. The couple 
continued to live together although they were separated.
65
 She also reported 
that many slov’iany came to visit Ialovyi, but Khvyl’ovyi, Dosvitnii and 
Vyshnia were not among them. She was curious and asked Ialovyi about it. He 
replied that he was “sick of everybody,” and as for Dosvitnii, “[he] never had 
respect for him.”
66
 Vovchyk also reported to GPU interrogators that she did 
not appreciate the atmosphere in Budynok Slovo: the writers were constantly 
drinking, arranging scandals and generally led noisy bohemian lifestyles. In 
her view, among slov’iany, there were also two people, Bazhan and 
Ianovs’kyi, who differed from the rest of the writers.
67
 
Throughout the report, Vovchyk emphasized that although Ialovyi and 
she lived in one apartment, they were on absolutely different work schedules, 
and during 1932-33 they had not seen each other “for weeks,” sometimes “for 
months.”
68
 Yet she could not believe that Ialovyi was an “enemy,” because he 
was an “adherent to the general party line.” Vovchyk even suggested that 
someone might have denounced him.
69
 After Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide, she tried to 
share her concerns with the slov’ianyn Ivan Kulyk. His response was typical 
of this time: “No one is arrested without a reason…Apparently, I was 
mistaken about Ialovyi.” 
70
  
Importantly, in April 1934, Serhii’s Pylypenko’s wife Kardinalowska 
visited Vovchyk and asked her to sign the collective letter to Maxim Gorky 
from the wives of those slov’iany who were arrested. Vovchyk replied that she 
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found this absolutely inappropriate and refused to do so. In her deposition to 
the GPU, she stated that Kardinalowska was frightened by her response, told 
her that she would abandon the idea, and very soon left.
71
 
Like many others who were questioned by the secret police, Vovchyk 
exhibited the behavior of alienation from her friend who was in the GPU’s 
custody. Vovchyk lamented that she continued to bring food and warm clothes 
to Ialovyi while he was in prison in Kharkiv and in exile in the Solovky. Her 
human duty was to thank Ialovyi for everything that he did for her and her 
daughter. However, she wished she would have terminated any relationship 
with him much earlier, and her behavior was dictated by the norm of the 
intelligentsia.
72
  
After many years in prison and during her rehabilitation process, Lidiia 
asked the prosecutor about the reasons for her arrest in the 1930s. The 
prosecutor looked at her in surprise, and said: “But you yourself signed the 
confession and the verdict.” Lidiia requested the KGB to allow her to look 
through her criminal file and found two clean pages with her signature, pages 
that had never been completed. For Lidiia, this was a complete surprise, for a 
reader of her criminal file—a bitter irony and a rare phenomenon that confirms 
the methods of fabrication of criminal cases the secret police employed.
73
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The Ukrainian Scenario of Conversion 
 The year of 1933 marked the high point of repressions and state 
violence in Ukraine. The secret police moved on “nationalists,” reassured in 
its methods and practices that bore results desirable for the state. In late 1932, 
Stalin published a congratulatory letter to the secret police that celebrated its 
15
th
 anniversary, a sign of approval and encouragement of its work.
74
 By 1933, 
the number of labor camps increased dramatically, where Ukrainian 
“nationalists” were supposed to be reforged.
75
  
Yet, there was another effective method of conversion of Ukrainian 
nationalists and enemies of the state—their recruitment to work as 
informants.
76
 Their reeducation was implemented through blackmail, 
intimidation and fear for their relatives who were kept under various 
constraints within the country as hostages. Nevertheless, the names of the 
informants had never migrated from the lists of politically unreliable enemies 
to the lists of trustworthy and recanted individuals. They were used when 
needed, and eliminated whenever possible.  
As many observers pointed out, the final stage of the Soviet 
preliminary investigation should have been the suspect’s ideological 
conversion, recantation and reeducation.
77
 Reeducation began in the 
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interrogator’s room and continued in the labor camp. “Corrective labor” was 
considered a part of the re-educational program.
78
 The methods of the 
conversion into Soviet values varied, depending on the degree of humanity the 
supervisors of the “transformation” possessed. Persuasion and oral speeches 
played a minor role in such exercises. Physical and moral tortures, including 
humiliation and erasing feelings of personal pride and dignity, were deemed 
the most effective measures in re-creating a new Soviet man.
79
 
 In Ukraine, the ideological conversion of “nationalists” and 
“separatists” was largely considered impractical. Their recidivism and relapses 
seemed to the state chronic and untreatable. Such relapses were discussed with 
each suspect individually in interrogation rooms. The interrogators believed 
that the roots of routine transgressions could be traced back to the suspects’ 
active political involvement in the creation of an independent Ukrainian 
People’s Republic and their membership in the Borot’bist Party. Indeed, 
former membership in any national party that existed in the territory of 
Ukraine made people suspects, and was a pretext for the GPU to closely 
investigate their former and current activities.
80
 Those individuals who fought 
against the Soviet Army in the past or who were famous for their resistance to 
the Bolsheviks earned their reputations once and forever. Their past and origin 
were sufficient incriminating evidence against them which could not be 
undone, altered, changed, and most importantly, could not be ignored, 
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neglected or forgiven. Nationalistic relapses and reversions were expected, 
and had to be uprooted by eliminating individuals with compromised 
reputations, as well as their social networks. 
 Such practices were established immediately after the XII Congress of 
the RKP(b) in 1923 which proclaimed the struggle against Russian chauvinism 
a chief priority. Two months after the Congress, the recanting of the Tatar 
Communist Sultan-Galiev of his supposed nationalistic deviations became the 
agenda of the All-Union party meeting about the national question.
81
 Sultan-
Galiev’s case became the first attack against local nationalisms. He was 
accused of spying for foreign states (Persia, Turkey), and without any 
evidence arrested in 1923 by Stalin’s order. Because many members of the 
Politburo, including Trotsky, regretted their approval of Sultan-Galiev’s arrest 
and insisted on his release, this followed shortly thereafter. Yet Stalin and the 
GPU were persistent, and in 1929, again without any evidence, Sultan-Galiev 
was sentenced to 10 years in prison, and in 1940 he was shot.
 82
 Ivan 
Maistrenko noted that “the entire period of the struggle for the implementation 
of the XII Congress’s decrees about the national question does not contain a 
single prosecution case of a Russian chauvinist…while the struggle with local 
nationalisms and their proponents echoed in all national republics.”
83
  
 Given Ukraine’s striving for national liberation, the republic could not 
serve as an experimental field for developing Soviet citizens. In Stalin’s and 
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the GPU’s views, Ukraine was filled with Sultan-Galievs, and their national 
aspirations could only be curbed radically, by terror, which would produce a 
desirable effect—compliance in the republic. Experiments in reforming or 
appeasing nationalists on an explosively dangerous soil, or even in the Gulag, 
seemed to be an endeavor which the secret police had no interest in exploring.  
In light of the brutal treatment of humans in general, and national 
minorities in particular in the Gulag by the Soviet regime, the statements made 
by historian Stephen Barnes that “the Gulag was not a death chamber,” and 
that the Soviet authorities “chose not to create a truly genocidal institution,” 
such as the Gulag, seem problematic.
84
 Interestingly, Barnes ultimately 
admitted that Ukrainian nationalism, like other local nationalisms, was 
considered an especially dangerous state crime, and those who were accused 
of being a Ukrainian nationalist were exempted from release.
85
 Indeed, many 
Ukrainian intellectuals, writers and journalists did not even reach the Gulag—
they were shot in the cellars at Radnarkomivs’ka Street.
86
 In the early 1930s, 
every night a truck with the sign “Meat” left the GPU headquarters, taking the 
Belgorod road toward the Forest Zone (Lesopark) near Kharkiv. The interior 
of the truck was made of steel to prevent blood from dripping through the 
bottom of the truck. The victims were buried in mass graves in the 6
th
 kvartal 
(bloc) in Lesopark, together with the victims who died during the famine.
87
 
Most of those who survived preliminary investigation in the Kharkiv GPU 
prison and served their term in Solovky were shot there in November 1937. 
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Those who were released after the completion of their terms were 
subsequently arrested for new crimes, and later were also shot.
88
  
 The GPU cover-up operations of mass executions of the Kharkiv 
intelligentsia deserve special attention, and remain one of the least 
investigated topics in Ukrainian history. It seems appropriate to mention here a 
spatial aspect of the Soviet secret police’s activities, and their special affinity 
to one place. In 1937, with great irony, the NKVD built a modern gated 
community with luxurious apartments in the 6
th
 kvartal in the Kharkiv park 
zone (Lesopark), on the bones of their victims.
89
 The place still remains in 
possession of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), and apparently, the 
history of the landscape and human remains under the resort do not seem to 
disturb visitors who are associates of the current successor organization of the 
GPU/NKVD. Today, the place is nondescript: there are no open pits, piles of 
dead bodies covered with lime, or soil bumps or impressions. Everything has 
been leveled by human effort, nature and time. But a violent space still exists 
there, in human memories and physical artifacts that are carefully hidden from 
the human eye. The space and place of the 6
th
 kvartal, and spatial practices 
related to them, reveal how the GPU envisioned individual reforging in 
Ukraine. The spatial status quo also illuminates the stability and unshaken 
persistence of established Stalinist definitions of life, society and culture that 
were cynically extended and perpetuated by the secret agency.  
 W.G. Hoskin posited that “all studies of the past, in fact, draw their 
evidence from three primary terms—documents, archeology, and the 
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landscape.”
90
 Perhaps one day the 6
th
 kvartal will become a subject of 
archeological investigation, and testimonies and memoirs about this place will 
guide that investigation and lead to material confirmation of those guides. This 
place, for many of us abstract and imaginary, is nevertheless “concretely 
historical,” as any other landscape.
91
 It instructs us about the moral disposition 
of GPU/NKVD associates, as well as their inclinations to ameliorate 
Ukrainian nationalists. 
Was the reforging mission implemented in Soviet prison successful? 
Were those few slov’iany who survived the terror ever converted? Some 
commentators answered these questions negatively, suggesting that they were 
certainly broken, and physically and morally destroyed. Soviet-like 
amelioration (po-Sovetski) a contrario meant “broken,” a euphemism for 
Soviet conversion. In this sense, the survivors had been ameliorated: some of 
them spoke about it through the silence of their own voices after the prison 
term; some of them—through the lies and distortions of the past.
92
  
On 23 September 1933, after four months of interrogations, Ialovyi 
was sentenced to 10 years in labor camps by the GPU troika. In Solovky 
where he served his term, Ialovyi was denounced by his prison mate Ianov. 
Ialovyi’s appeal was ignored, and he was shot as a Ukrainian nationalist and a 
member of an anti-Soviet organization according to the decision of the NKVD 
troika in Leningrad oblast’ on 3 November 1937 in Sandarmokh (Karelia).
93
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On 25 February 2003, Ialovyi, as well as other UVO “members,” was 
rehabilitated because of the false accusations used to convict them.
94
  
 
    
Ialovy’s verdict, 23 September 1933.
95
   Ialovyi’s second verdict, 9 October  
                                                                 1937. 
96
    
 
Mykhailo Ialovyi was the first slov’ianyn whose arrest resonated in a 
series of tragic events in Ukraine. Ialovyi’s prominence as a political figure 
conditioned the final outlook of his criminal case: bulky and “full of evidence” 
of his anti-Soviet activities, the volume was fabricated in a methodical and 
thorough fashion. The glib and detailed confession contains denunciations of 
many representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia nationwide and even 
abroad. Ialovyi’s depositions are read as an attempt of the secret police to 
justify further mass arrests in Budynok Slovo.  
Interestingly, according to memoirs, Ialovyi had a special affinity for 
Budynok Slovo—he enjoyed the place and its surroundings. He liked to sit 
outside and quietly sing songs in the garden.
97
 Yet, his depositions portray a 
place in which he was constantly subjected to nationalist influences and which 
was hostile to his essence as a Communist. Evidently, his later perceptions of 
his home fully coincided and adhered to the image held by the secret police. 
Or rather it would be fair to say that he willingly or unwillingly delivered the 
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description of Budynok Slovo which was expected of him and imposed on him 
by his interrogator. 
Through deception and intimidation, the secret police eroded the civil 
cohesiveness and dissolved human bonds among the slov’iany, reforging the 
human psyche of those who were chosen to survive according to the tasks of 
class struggle, a psyche that was to be devoid of national consciousness and 
personality. The obligatory thinking on the “All-Union” level had to replace 
the “All-Ukrainian” one, and the creativity of individual thinking was 
dismissed as a bourgeois phenomenon. The achievements of social 
construction claimed to be a product of collective thinking and Communist 
upbringing.             
A question of great significance emerges here about the charges of 
Ukrainian nationalism that the secret police commonly applied to anyone in 
the 1930s who spoke Ukrainian or occupied leading positions in bringing 
Ukrainian language and culture to the people: were they true or false? More 
than twenty years ago, George S.N. Luckyj deconstructed the notion of a 
Ukrainian nationalist:  
If by nationalism is meant national pride and identity then the Ukrainians were guilty 
of the charge, but so were the Russians. As an emerging nationality, after the 
centuries of oppression, Ukrainians were certainly eager to assert themselves 
culturally, especially linguistically. On the other hand, nationalism such as this was 
far removed from any political “integral” nationalism, in which most Ukrainians did 
not participate. Probably most of the people, following a long tradition, did not object 
to a federation with Russia, as long as this meant full cultural and some political 
autonomy. The Soviet charges blurred this important distinction and in attacking 
everything Ukrainian helped to create an image of national genocide rather than 
indiscriminate mass terror. These perceptions in Ukraine were strengthened by the 
fact that the sweeping purges ordered by Moscow were carried out by special 
Russian emissaries like Postyshev and Khrushchev. Ukrainian communist leaders 
who had purged literary groups in the early 1930s were themselves purged a few 
years later, without a single exception.
98
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Certainly, the Ukrainian revolution shaped and mobilized certain popular 
perceptions and “feelings of collective belonging.” The British historian Eric 
Hobsbawm would call them “popular proto-identification or nationalism.”
99
 
However, these feelings were not extended and did not operate on the macro-
political scale and therefore, could not result in an enormous political change 
in the republic.  
Yet the Ukrainian intelligentsia’s aspirations to advance the Ukrainian 
language and culture and to share them with the broader population were a 
conscious political choice. Was the language a central element of these 
aspirations? Yes and no. Banned for centuries, the Ukrainian language was 
perceived as a significant marker of the Ukrainian nation that had to be 
rejuvenated and appreciated. But Russian oppression, the cause of the 
deplorable state of Ukrainian public education, was no less relevant or 
significant for Ukrainian intellectuals, a trend that continued to dominate 
throughout the twenties and to disrupt proto-national cohesion. They resisted it 
on a cultural or micro-political level. Their cohesion was more cultural than 
linguistic, and cultural bonds perhaps had a stronger potential for survival, 
which is evident in contemporary Ukraine. The Ukrainian elite came from 
various origins, and among them were Russians and Jews. What united them 
was a belief in Ukrainian culture and they fought to preserve it. Their response 
to oppression, or their proto-nationalism, was rooted in this belief and it was 
passionate, but spontaneous, immature, disorganized and chaotic.
100
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A well-policed state such as the Soviet Union perceived cultural bonds 
among the Ukrainian intelligentsia as politically sensitive, and as a factor that 
could be lethal to the Soviet project. These bonds spelled national loyalty that 
ran against state loyalty. The state made no distinction between demands for 
cultural and political freedoms and considered them essential and existential 
aspirations and ambitions of the Ukrainians. The center did not pursue a 
reconciliation scenario and believed that these aspirations, together with their 
proponents, had to be purged and destroyed. The state had no expectations of 
the development of all-union state patriotism from a nation that was annexed 
by force in 1919. Conversely, the language that reinforced national and 
cultural bonds was to be reduced to a minimal level of education and usage.  
In his 13 February 1933 operational report to the GPU organs, the head of the 
GPU in Ukraine Balyts’kyi reported that a thorough analysis of criminal cases 
revealed that an underground network of Ukrainian nationalist organizations 
functioned in Ukraine that planned a military uprising to demolish the Soviet 
regime in spring 1933 and to establish a capitalist state—“the Ukrainian 
independent republic.”
101
 According to the statistical data of the GPU and 
decrees by the court troiki of the GPU Collegium in the UkrSSR, throughout 
1933, 805 people were executed for anti-Soviet activity.
102
  
“A network” (in Balyts’kyi’s words) meant further repression. The 
elimination of the slov’iany was a part of mass operations conducted all over 
Ukraine, operations that received different code names at different times. 
Ialovyi’s case and his depositions prepared the grounds for arresting a number 
of prominent cultural figures in Budynok Slovo as UVO members. Throughout 
                                                          
101
 HDA SBU, f.9, spr.666, ark.56,58. 
102
 HDA SBU, f.42, spr.10, ark.48 (the 31 March 1934 report by the head of the OSV GPU 
UkrSSR Bukshpan to the head of the ASV OGPU Genkin in Moscow).  
 204 
 
Ukraine during 1933-1934, approximately 150 Ukrainian intellectuals who 
originated in or had connections with Galicia were accused of membership in 
the UVO. All “members” of this imaginary organization were rehabilitated in 
the 1950s, 1980s and 1990s.
103
     
An analysis of operational materials, and their criminal cases 
fabricated by the GPU in 1933 reveals the absurdity of accusations and 
outrageous illegality and misconduct by the secret police that was suitable for 
the center’s purposes and, thus, possible in the 1930s. Brandishing weapons in 
interrogation rooms and beating the arrested until they were unconscious, the 
interrogators openly boasted about their power over their victims’ lives. The 
British historian Andrew Wilson noted that the repressions of the 1930s were 
“brutally effective,”
104
 and precisely the brutality and the non-human 
treatment of the arrested and mass executions made them so effective, 
cultivating fear and compliance among the slov’iany.     
It is noteworthy that although the human losses during 1929-30 and 
during the Great Terror of 1937-38 were disastrous for Ukraine, they are 
incomparable with the period of 1932-34, a time when the foundation of 
Ukrainian society was completely destroyed—the intelligentsia and the 
peasantry. The pre-revolutionary “intellectual potential” of the nation that 
survived the revolution and wars was irreversibly lost during this period. 
Sociologists, anthropologists, and historians usually characterize human losses 
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on this scale as an event that eventually leads to a “cultural and spiritual 
collapse” of society.
105
  
A missing generation of scholars, artists, writers and composers in one 
place portends the interruption of the national cultural tradition which in turn 
promotes pernicious behavioral trends, characteristic of “post-genocidal” 
societies.
106
 In a culturally groundless space and place, social connections and 
networks are problematic. Anti-intellectualism is celebrated and even 
considered a necessary attribute of survival. The repression of educators and 
intellectuals in the early thirties in Ukraine echoes throughout all spheres of 
contemporary Ukrainian society. The spatial vacuum and cultural disruption 
persist, and is evident in daily human behavior and in the literature produced 
by contemporary Ukrainians.
107
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Chapter Five  
Mykola Khvyl’ovyi: Suicide or Murder? 
      
To die, my friend, is the simplest and easiest  
thing. Anyone can do this. But to live, 
overcoming everything, is something different. 
To live and fight is worth something. And under 
our circumstances, I can assure you, it is quite an 
achievement. 
 
Mykola Khvyl’ovyi
1
 
 
The Ukrainian writer and slov’ianyn Mykola Khvyl’ovyi played a 
prominent role in establishing Ukrainian national identity in the 1920s. There 
is no doubt that the GPU planned to neutralize Khvyl’ovyi as the most 
dangerous “nationalist element” in Ukraine. A secret GPU file (papka-
formuliar) on Khvyl’ovyi existed for three years before he allegedly 
committed suicide on 13 May 1933. The surveillance reports are filled with 
information that describes Khvyl’ovyi as an opinionated person, independent 
thinker, and nationalist.  
Today it is still unknown whether Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide came as a 
complete surprise to the secret police. What happened that morning, the day 
after Ialovyi’s arrest? 
Khvyl’ovyi invited his friends and slov’iany, the playwright Mykola 
Kulish and writer Oles’ Dosvitnii, for tea to discuss the arrest of Ialovyi. 
According to a number of witnesses, Khvyl’ovyi was disturbed and agitated. 
After the conversation, he found his guitar and sang some songs, then walked 
out onto the balcony, looked around, returned to the dining room and walked 
to his office. Very shortly after this, his friends heard a sound, as if a shelf had 
broken and collapsed. The visitors and Khvyl’ovyi’s wife rushed into his 
                                                          
1
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office. Khvyl’ovyi was sitting in the chair. A gun was lying on the floor. From 
an opening in Khvyl’ovyi’s right temple, a little stream of blood was dripping 
down his cheek.    
After Khvyl’ovyi’s death, the slov’iany, more than ever, perceived 
Budynok Slovo as a threatening place. The American scholar Yi-Fu Tuan has 
noted that “security [of place] lies in routine,” in repetition of activities that 
are connected with a place. Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide violated this routine for the 
slov’iany, and the events of 1933, the peak of repression in Budynok Slovo, 
eventually destroyed it.
2
 A primary and perhaps unconscious source of the 
residents’ seeming stability and confidence, the building now became a source 
of ambivalent feelings. The slov’iany cherished it as the last vestige of their 
privacy, and yet despised it because Khvyl’ovyi exposed its community to the 
authorities. The site became a focus of increased attention from the GPU as his 
gun shot reverberated, summoning ever increasing GPU infiltration into their 
space.  
The GPU intrusion became ubiquitous, changing the personality of the 
building. Routine practices of the residents were altered. The façade doors of 
the building were locked and the trajectory of ingress and egress to and from 
their homes now took them past two or three GPU agents who occupied the 
space of the internal yard day and night. The importance of corners as outposts 
of space, emphasized by Tuan,
3
 materialized in a triangle of fear that the 
residents had to overcome each time they went in or out: the entrance door on 
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3
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the ground floor, and the two wings of the building were guarded. The fear of 
walking through this triangle obscured their perceptions of other elements of 
the intellectual and geographical landscape and landmarks. For instance, the 
other triangle, conceptual and perceptual, that was represented by the 
competing ideas of Khvyl’ovyi, Pylypenko and Blakytnyi about cultural 
construction in Ukraine that had conditioned the Literary Discussion and 
became popular in the 1920s, receded into the shadows in the early 1930s.
 4
 
Their debates became irrelevant in light of state repressions and the physical 
deaths of the slov’iany.
 
The guards, wearing similar outfits which seemed to 
the residents almost like a uniform provided by the GPU, now constituted and 
dominated the space in which they lived. The experience of this newly formed 
triangle, especially its elementary everyday repetition and recognition, as well 
as their individual memories of 13 May1933, amplified their fears. The mixed 
feelings of the slov’iany toward Khvyl’ovyi, their pride in being his neighbor, 
their jealousy of his talents and their pleasure of knowing him, now gravitated 
more toward a negative perspective, changing the perceptions, and 
simulataneously the identity of the place. Once experienced and now 
remembered as flamboyant and exciting, the place became illegible, quiet and 
dismal.
5
 
Who was Khvyl’ovyi, what was his influence on Budynok Slovo and its 
residents, and why did the state perceive him as the most dangerous nationalist 
in Ukraine?  
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Mykola Khvyl’ovyi.
6
       Mykola Khvyl’ovyi.
7
 
 
   
 In order to understand the role Khvyl’ovyi played in the lives of the 
slov’iany, it is worthwhile to examine how his life changed after he moved to 
Budynok Slovo, and to explore how his ideas, attitudes and behavior evolved 
in the literary, social and political context of the 1920s and the early 1930s. An 
analysis of possible connections between Khvyl’ovyi’s role in the Literary 
Discussion (1925-28) and the tragic event of 13 May 1933 will shed light on 
the political climate in Ukraine at the time, and the attitudes of the state and 
the GPU toward the intelligentsia.  
 
Khvyl’ovyi in Scholarly Discourse   
Khvyl’ovyi’s name is often mentioned in the discourse about 
Ukrainian national liberation and anti-colonial sentiment in Ukraine that 
reached its peak during the Literary Discussion of 1925-28, and in the context 
of Stalin’s subsequent massive political repression in Ukraine. Importantly, 
the contradictory nature of Khvyl’ovyi’s character invited similarly 
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contradictory, often mutually exclusive, analyses of his creative writings, 
political activities and human behavior. Khvyl’ovyi’s passionate temper, 
charisma, and, as Myroslav Shkandrij formulated it, the “playfulness,” 
“inconsistencies in the tone,” and “discontinuities” in his thinking have 
contributed to multiple interpretations of his essence as a writer and as a 
human being.
8
 
To illustrate this idea, it would be expedient to mention just a few 
opinions by different authors about Khvyl’ovyi at different times. Many 
Soviet Russian and Ukrainian scholars, as well as Soviet authorities, 
considered him a Ukrainian bourgeois “nationalist, a chauvinist and a fascist,” 
as George S.N. Luckyj noted.
9
 Stalin himself called Khvyl’ovyi an extremist 
who “has nothing to say in favor of Moscow except to call on Ukrainian 
leaders to run away from Moscow as fast as possible,” and ordered the 
Ukrainian party leadership to “combat” Khvyl’ovyi’s extreme views.
10
  
In contrast, Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts’ky, a Canadian specialist in 
Ukrainian intellectual history, had a more positive view of Khvyl’ovyi, calling 
him a “flag-bearer of the ‘Ukrainian renaissance’ of the 1920s.”
11
 He 
considered Khvyl’ovyi a courageous person, a dialectic thinker and a brilliant 
polemicist who opposed Moscow politics. According to Lysiak-Rudnyts’ky, 
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the phenomenon of Khvyl’ovyi should not be determined only in national 
communist terms. Khvyl’ovyi dreamed about national liberation through the 
prism of individual intellectual and creative developments. His notion of the 
“Asiatic Renaissance” identified the eventual emancipation of colonial states, 
and attributed an important role for Ukraine as a geographical and intellectual 
mediator between Europe and liberated nations of Asia.
12
 Yet, Lysiak-
Rudnyts’ky admitted the ambiguities and mysteries of Khvyl’ovyi’s thinking 
that may have been conditioned by constraints the Soviet system imposed on 
his writings. Lysiak-Rudnyts’ky also suggested that Khvyl’ovyi went too far 
in his conflict with Soviet authorities precisely because he was not certain 
about how to proceed, to remain faithful to Communism, or to reject the 
socialist utopia. However, for Lysiak-Rudnyts’ky, Khvyl’ovyi’s evolution 
from a neo-romantic to a pragmatic in his writings suggested his 
disillusionment and a loss of faith in Communism.
13
  
Western émigré historians and scholars of Ukrainian culture and 
literature Luckyj, Hryhorii Kostiuk and Iurii Shevel’ov considered Khvyl’ovyi 
a theoretician of Ukrainian national liberation whose system was radical but 
comprehensible and consistent. They believed that Khvyl’ovyi’s conviction 
and faith in the independent cultural development of Ukraine away from 
Russian influence, and the gravitation of Ukrainian culture toward European 
art conditioned by what Osip Mandel’shtam called toska po mirovoi kul’ture 
were harmonious, natural and politically justifiable.
14
 Luckyj wrote that 
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Khvyl’ovyi “was a master of biting invective and satirical criticism, and a 
brilliant pamphleteer,” and by his pamphlets and essays, he provoked “the 
rage and retribution of the Communist Party.”
15
 For Luckyj, the protest of 
Khvyl’ovyi, “a defiant Ukrainian Communist,” against the regimentation of 
art and society by the state was legitimate, and resulted in “a bold and new 
theory of Ukrainian proletarian literature and culture.”
16
 Kostiuk posited that 
Khvyl’ovyi passionately and sacrificially loved life and Ukraine but despised 
the “slavery psychology” of its intelligentsia.
17
 According to Shevel’ov, 
Khvyl’ovyi lost his struggle with Moscow because of the Kremlin’s massive 
ideological campaign and pressure, and due to the ignorance of the 
intelligentsia (Shevel’ov called it “protointeligentsia”) that originated in the 
Ukrainian countryside.
18
 However, Shevel’ov considered Khvyl’ovyi unique 
not because Khvyl’ovyi proclaimed the necessity for Ukrainian culture to “get 
away from Moscow” in its quest for novelty (this idea existed before 
Khvyl’ovyi), but because of Khvyl’ovyi’s intellectual and moral integrity and 
civic courage, which enabled him to resist Moscow’s desire to keep Ukraine 
culturally provincial.
19
  
The American scholar George G. Grabowicz discussed the paradigm of 
symbolic autobiography that should be associated with Khvyl’ovyi’s prose. 
Grabowicz suggested that the narrative of Khvyl’ovyi’s prose played a 
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mediating role between his life and his art through the deep psychological 
structures of his character, and, therefore, his life and art, being symbiotic and 
holistic, were shaped one through the other, culminating in his suicide.
20
 
Grabowicz also noted that many Ukrainian scholars living in the West 
(Kostiuk, Iurii Lawrinenko, Iurii Boiko-Blokhin and George Shevelov), as 
well as political figures such as Vasyl’ Hryshko and Ivan Maistrenko, 
developed a cult of Khvyl’ovyi because for them he exemplified an accurate 
and desirable vision of the Ukrainian past and future.
21
 Grabowicz also linked 
the cult of Khvyl’ovyi and the interpretational conflation of Khvyl’ovyi’s 
prose and his biography (“he wrote his life, and ultimately his death” scenario) 
with the emergence of a primitive and false interpretation, formulated by 
contemporary right-wing nationalists.
22
 They based their accusations against 
Khvyl’ovyi on his novel Ia (Romantyka), in which the main character, a chekist, 
kills his own mother. For them, Khvyl’ovyi became a fanatical Communist, a 
chekist and a murderer.
 23
 Grabowicz made use of Christeva’s notion of 
intertextuality to analyze Khvyl’ovyi’s style in prose, in which “literary 
allusions, scenes, characters, themes and methods” revealed the possibility of 
constructing an original prose, using mosaic pieces of different universally 
recognizable cultures. Khvyl’ovyi’s characters migrated from one novel to 
another supporting his desire to continue the very same story, the conversation 
with his readers he established in the beginning of his literary career. His 
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psychological inner “I,” conscious and unconscious, and his obsession with 
the images and themes that were important for him, produced art through his 
emotional life, and his life through art.
24
  
The tragic figure of Khvyl’ovyi evokes tremendous interest among 
contemporary Ukrainian scholars, and their investigations resulted in a number 
of thoughtful and innovative scholarly works. The Ukrainian scholar Ivan 
Dziuba believed that Khvyl’ovyi’s exercises in political mimicry, systematic 
public self-denunciations and self-criticisms as methods of adaptation to the 
system were a torture for the writer and resulted in a deep inner crisis. At the 
same time they also enriched his literary works emotionally and 
intellectually.
25
 Ukrainian scholar Mykola Zhulyns’kyi noted that Khvyl’ovyi 
balanced on the edge of art and politics.
26
  
Similarly, the Ukrainian scholar Mykhailo Naienko believes that 
Khvyl’ovyi “was poisoned by Communist ideology,” and was tortured by an 
inner conflict. He tried to transcend Communism through national 
consciousness.
27
 According to Naienko, Khvyl’ovyi’s vacillation, confusion 
and doubts in the appropriateness of his path marked his art, as well as 
personal and social life. 
More recently, the Ukrainian historian Iurii Shapoval has argued that 
Khvyl’ovyi regularly tried to manipulate Soviet power. Surrendering his 
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beliefs under state pressure at one moment, he would persistently continue to 
publicize those same beliefs at another. The state demanded self-criticism, and 
in response Khvyl’ovyi repented. After several instances of public self-
criticism, he returned to his literary activity and editorial work in journals, 
through which he continued to propagandize his convictions. Shapoval is 
convinced that Khvyl’ovyi’s behavior was not cynical. His repentant letters 
should be considered as the “price that he had to pay for preserving his 
intellectual sovereignty, for the right to defend his friends who supported him, 
and finally the price for an opportunity to continue living and writing.”
28
   
Khvyl’ovyi’s contemporaries treated him as a hero and as a talented 
original writer, although they suggested that Khvyl’ovyi the Communist had 
killed Khvyl’ovyi the artist. The writer Ievhen Malaniuk lamented that 
Khvyl’ovyi was a citizen of the imaginary Ukraine which because of the 
“millions of Pylypenkos …cannot come into being.”
29
 Malaniuk posited that, 
jealous of Khvyl’ovyi’s talent and eminent personality, his colleagues 
crucified him, “knowing perfectly well why they hate[d] him so much.”
30
 The 
writer Arkadii Liubchenko considered Khvyl’ovyi a moral leader of the 
intelligentsia.
31
 The critic Volodymyr Koriak noted that Khvyl’ovyi was cruel 
to himself and to others; he was “morbidly sensitive and proud, arrogant and 
severe, but often tender and timid…a dreamer.”
32
 Koriak also characterized 
Khvyl’ovyi as a writer who created not for the proletariat, but for the 
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intelligentsia, although “his soul [was] proletarian.”
33
 The scholar and writer 
Victor Petrov (who wrote fiction under the pseudonym Domontovich) stated 
that Khvyl’ovyi’s disposition or worldview was grounded in an almost 
messianic faith in a renaissance of Ukrainian culture and in a historical 
moment, time and place, categories which were crucial for its reawakening.
34
 
Petrov believed that the quintessence of the conflict between Khvyl’ovyi and 
Moscow laid in the fact that Khvyl’ovyi prioritized notions and categories that 
were rejected and demonized by the party, a “psychological category” against 
a “material base,” an “individual” against “masses,” the “intelligentsia” 
against the “proletariat,” a “civil person” and a “social criterion” against the 
“party.”
35
  
The interwar Galician literary critic Mykhailo Rudnyts’kyi, who lived 
in Polish-ruled Lviv, posited that the bureaucratization and profanation of 
revolutionary ideas provoked a belief in Khvyl’ovyi that change was urgently 
needed. He was disgusted with the musty and stagnant atmosphere produced 
by revolutionary slogans.
36
 However, Rudnyts’kyi suggested that 
paradoxically, Khvyl’ovyi’s pamphlets which made him one of the most 
popular Ukrainian authors (unlike his prose) revealed a total absence of 
ideological cohesiveness, coherence and wholesome elegance. Rudnyts’kyi 
argued that a lack of any attempt to link his impressions to a coherent system 
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or Weltanschauung made Khvyl’ovyi a kind of impressionist.
37
 He described 
Khvyl’ovyi’s writing as “digressions,” “dissonance,” and “scraps from the 
diary of a drunken poet.”
38
 In other words, Rudnyts’kyi believed that 
Khvyl’ovyi’s essays on the theory of art were no more than handy comments 
toward a psychological portrait of Khvyl’ovyi himself and were of no value as 
theoretical guidance to cultural construction. However, Rudnyts’kyi gave 
credit to Khvyl’ovyi the writer because of his originality and literary 
innovations. “One can dislike Khvyl’ovyi but no one can be indifferent to 
him,” wrote Rudnyts’kyi.  
 
Khvyl’ovyi’s Views and the Literary Landscape of the 1920s  
In the 1920s, Khvyl’ovyi was not the only one who understood the 
deplorable condition of Ukrainian literature, and the abnormality of party 
orders designed to control culture in Ukraine. However, a founder of the 
literary organization VAPLITE, he became the central figure of the polemics, 
drawing the fire toward himself and trying to explain that art was not a 
construction project that should involve masses, but an individual quest.
39
  
Khvyl’ovyi’s failure to tolerate unprofessionalism and mediocrity 
resulted in the Literary Discussion that emerged in April 1925. The influence 
of Khvyl’ovyi’s ideas on the Literary Discussion was enormous, although they 
produced a number of strong opponents. Khvyl’ovyi exploded in a series of 
essays that criticized the class approach in art which camouflaged lack of 
literary talent. He denounced graphomaniacs and massovism that, according to 
                                                          
37
 Rudnyts’kyi, 269.  
38
 Rudnyts’kyi, 269, 271.  
39
 Ihor Mykhailin, Hamartiia Mykoly Khvyl’ovoho (Kharkiv: “Linotyp,” 1993), 6, 12-13. 
 219 
 
Khvyl’ovyi, was a credo of the literary association “Pluh.”
40
 In his view, 
massovism and the development of bureaucracy in the literary process were 
anti-social and anti-artistic phenomena.
41
 
 
Khvyl’ovyi’s most active opponent 
Pylypenko, the founder of “Pluh,” together with his adherents, accused 
Khvyl’ovyi of monopolizing the idea of proletarian art 
(Olympism/olimpiistvo). They believed that his arrogance and revisionist 
tendencies jeopardized the authentic understanding of party directions about 
cultural construction in Ukraine. The debates escalated, and Khvyl’ovyi 
followed his article with a series of his pamphlets, in which he advocated the 
need for quality and originality in writing, emphasizing the absence of literary 
taste and professional knowledge among pluzhany (members of “Pluh”). He 
rebelled against literary amateurs and a class approach in literature. Moreover, 
while accepting the greatness of Russian literature, Khvyl’ovyi advocated the 
literary independence of Ukrainian art and the right to follow its own path.  
According to Khvyl’ovyi, European standards needed to be applied to 
a nascent Ukrainian socialist culture. For him, Ukrainian culture was not a 
mere derivative of Russian culture; it should develop independently and orient 
itself along the lines of “psychological Europe;” otherwise, the slave 
psychology of Ukrainian writers and their attempts to mimic and to follow the 
Russian literary tradition would be inextinguishable. For Khvyl’ovyi, the 
image of “psychological Europe” was embodied primarily through the ideas of 
German romanticism.  
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     However, the debates were not purely artistic. Their participants were 
concerned with a broad specter of fundamental national, economic and 
political questions related to Ukraine. Their discourse included social and 
political implications of Ukrainization, and also focused on painful questions 
of speedy industrialization and collectivization in Ukraine. The dilemma was 
whether to pursue independence from Moscow and the preservation of cultural 
distinctiveness, or to effect a complete surrender to the center in political, 
economic and cultural spheres.
42
 Under pressure from Moscow, the necessity 
for writers to take sides gradually became clear.  
Khvyl’ovyi emphasized that for VAPLITE the national sentiment was 
not a fetish but in choosing a new path for Ukrainian culture, vaplitiany were 
inclined to follow their own literary expertise, intellect and intuition, assets 
that drew their strength from the Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian 
cultural tradition. Rebelling against the dictatorship of Moscow about how to 
manage Ukrainian art, Khvyl’ovyi wrote: 
The Union still remains the Union, and Ukraine is an independent unit…Russia is an 
independent state, isn’t it? Yes, it is. In the same coin, we are also independent.
43
 
  
Obviously, these ideas addressed directly to the Ukrainian literary community 
were nothing short of seditious for Moscow. 
No less seditious was Khvyl’ovyi’s theory of an “Asiatic 
Renaissance,” a theory of cultural development in Ukraine. This concept was 
based on the ideas of classical Greek and Roman thinkers, as well as European 
and Russian writers and philosophers. Vaplitiany believed that Ukraine would 
become a beacon for Euro-Asian cultural renaissance. Centered in Ukraine, 
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the renaissance was to embrace China, India and other Asian states. Inspired 
by Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West, and his cyclical theory of 
historical development, Khvyl’ovyi argued that Europe exhausted itself in 
creating feudal and capitalistic societies.
44
 In his view, Russian culture was 
also stagnated because of its tradition of Christian dualism and, therefore, was 
incapable of leading the oppressed peoples of Asia toward the fourth stage of 
human development—the “proletarian phase of civilization.”
45
 The leading 
role of a shepherd in the cultural awakening of Asian states should belong to 
the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia and 
others.  
Furthermore, the idea of independent Ukraine permeates many of 
Khvyl’ovyi’s works. It is especially pronounced in his pamphlet Ukraine or 
Little Russia, and therefore, it was banned from publication. In his polemics 
with the party official of the Agitprom Andrii Khvylia, Khvyl’ovyi denounced 
the pseudointernationalism advocated by Khvylia. Khvyl’ovyi suggested that 
Khvylia ought to stop patronizing Ukrainian writers. He accused him of a 
distorted representation of Ukrainian literature before the Central Committee 
in Moscow, reminding Khvylia that in the past, it was the literature of Little 
Russia; now it was the literature of Ukraine.
46
 He wrote: 
Comrade Khvylia is offended because we called Ukraine an independent state. Go 
figure. Isn’t it independent? Bless yourself, comrade, and read our constitution. Find 
paragraph number one and reread carefully. Or maybe you think that our constitution 
was written by “boys?”
47
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Further, in response to Khvylia, Khvyl’ovyi continued:  
 
We are indeed an independent state whose republican organism is a part of the Soviet 
Union. And Ukraine is independent not because we, Communists, desire this, but 
because the iron and irresistible will of the laws of history demands it, because only 
in this way shall we hasten class differentiation in Ukraine.
48
 
      
These lines were a message of a nascent and independent people, and were 
read and understood as one by Stalin and the Central Committee. 
It is noteworthy that Khvyl’ovyi’s pamphlets are historical and 
political documents, as Shevel’ov fairly noted.
49
 Readers are able to trace in 
them the dynamics of the Literary Discussion, its main events and 
publications, key literary figures who were active participants in the 
discussion and their views. Moreover, through his pamphlets, Khvyl’ovyi fully 
and clearly exposed himself to the regime, and contributed to the center’s view 
about the Ukrainian intelligentsia as a whole. He openly discussed the most 
painful and sensitive topics of the time which helped Soviet authorities label 
Khvyl’ovyi a counterrevolutionary and Ukrainian nationalist.  
In the late 1920s, the state considered his subsequent creative work 
exclusively through the prism of his pamphlets, and the characters of 
Khvyl’ovyi’s prose, and their dispositions and motivations were analyzed in 
the context of Khvyl’ovyi’s reputation earned during the Literary Discussion. 
The features inherent in Khvyl’ovyi’s art amplified his image as a 
nationalist. The leitmotif of his creative work is the “unconquered” nature of 
the kham (the rude crude individuals) who came to power, propagandizing the 
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commune.
50
 Khvyl’ovyi persistently continued to depict chekists and party 
functionaries in dark shrouds. They were presented as ignorant and 
undereducated individuals. For instance, in his “Zaulok” (Sidestreet), 
Mar’iana “gave up the secondary school (“for the hell of it”), and found a job 
in the Cheka.”
51
 Through Ahlaia’s lips, Khvyl’ovyi’s main character of 
Val’dshnepy, he described the Communists as “boring” individuals whose 
worldview was limited to conversations about “Chamberlain with the 
monocle, and the primary party cell.”
52
 In one of his most famous novels Ia 
(Romantyka), Khvyl’ovyi presents the image of a “new commune” (new 
society) through a “black tribunal” of comrades who are in charge of people’s 
lives. “Here sadism is meeting,” he writes.
53
 One of the comrades of the black 
tribunal is a degenerate with a low forehead, the other is an individual “with a 
stone instead of a heart” who signs the resolutions “to be shot” left and right.
54
 
No wonder that Khvyl’ovyi could not be tolerated by Stalin, an individual 
with similar anatomical features and unfinished education. People with narrow 
foreheads were a type the party tended to promote: “less thinking, more 
deeds,” as one scholar noted.
55
 For the Kremlin, through his characters, 
Khvyl’ovyi undermined the authority of the party and discredited the image of 
the party member and the chekist. 
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The State’s Attitudes toward Khvyl’ovyi  
In the 1920s, Khvyl’ovyi’s ideas of a culturally sovereign Ukraine 
infuriated Stalin and literary circles, although the Ukrainian party leaders 
Shums’kyi and later Skrypnyk supported them.
56
 For Stalin, Ukrainization had 
indeed gone out of control and produced a rather dangerous phenomenon for 
the center, the Ukrainian intelligentsia that “looked” to the West and spoke of 
a culturally independent Ukraine. In his 26 April 1926 letter to Kaganovich 
and the members of the Politburo of the KP(b)U Central Committee, Stalin 
criticized the position of the Communist Khvyl’ovyi and suggested that 
Shums’kyi did not fully understand the danger of Khvyl’ovyi and like-minded 
individuals in Ukraine. Stalin’s letter made it completely clear for the secret 
police that the policy of concession to gain the loyalty of Ukrainians was to be 
replaced by sheer force and repression. Moscow and Russophile forces in 
Ukraine could not afford a culturally independent Ukraine. For them, 
Khvyl’ovyi undermined Communist international ideals and the plans to 
create a union. As has been mentioned in Chapter Three, several months later 
on 4 September 1926, following Stalin’s order to combat Ukrainian national 
tendencies in the republic, the Ukrainian GPU issued a secret circular entitled 
“On Ukrainian Separatism,” which marked the starting point of counter-
Ukrainization.
57
 Together with the GPU 30 March 1926 circular “On 
Ukrainian Civic Society,” the document identified the avenues of combating 
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nationally conscious individuals in Ukraine, and stressed the importance of 
surveillance of the adherents of Ukrainization.
58
  
 It is unknown whether Khvyl’ovyi read Stalin’s secret letter because it 
was published in Stalin’s collection of work only after the demise of 
Ukrainization. But certainly Khvyl’ovyi was instructed by Ukrainian 
communists about Stalin’s position, and most likely, by Skrypnyk or 
Shums’kyi with whom Khvyl’ovyi was close.
59
 Ivan Maistrenko suggested 
that only a few people were aware of Stalin’s secret letter at the time but those 
who enthusiastically conducted Ukrainization policies immediately felt its 
consequences. They were accused of national deviations and proclaimed 
“deviationists.”
60
     
 In 1926, the political pressure from Moscow and pro-Soviet forces in 
Ukraine on Khvyl’ovyi and his colleagues steadily increased. The June 1926 
Plenum of the Central Committee KP(b)U summarized achievements of 
Soviet Ukrainization policies but also unleashed attacks on Shumsk’yi and 
Khvyl’ovyi, accusing them of nationalist tendencies and bourgeois thinking. 
Stalin did not forgive Shums’kyi’s proposition to dismiss Kaganovich from 
responsibilities as the leader of the KP(b)U and to appoint a party leader of 
Ukrainian origin instead of Kaganovich. The GPU began to thoroughly 
scrutinize Shums’kyi’s and Khvyl’ovyi’s everyday lives.  
The vaplitiany’s gallant behavior was replaced by the fear of being 
arrested. On 4 December 1926, Khvyl’ovyi, together with his colleagues in 
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VAPLITE Oles’ Dosvitnii and Mykhailo Ialovyi, wrote his first collective 
repentant letter that was published in Visti VUTSVK. They hoped to alleviate 
their unsteady position within the party.They denounced their previous views, 
their “ideological and political mistakes,” and assured the party of their 
loyalty.
61
 The text was formulaic, and the party and Khvyl’ovyi’s opponents 
accused the vaplitiany of political trickery and insincerity.  
The further dynamics of events developed precipitously. At the X 
Congress of the KP(b)U in November, 1927, Kaganovich took revenge and 
gave a speech, in which he severely criticized Khvyl’ovyi’s and Shums’kyi’s 
deviations. He claimed that their vision of the development of national culture 
was bourgeois, and therefore, counterrevolutionary.
62
 On 2 February 1927, 
Shums’kyi was dismissed from the position of the Narkom of Education. In 
January 1927, Khvyl’ovyi and his colleagues were expelled from VAPLITE, 
but Khvyl’ovyi and his family were allowed to leave Kharkiv to treat 
Khvyl’ovyi’s tuberculosis in Vienna.
63
  
Before and during his trip to Vienna, Khvyl’ovyi went through several 
personal crises, publically repudiating his principles, and claiming that he “had 
fallen prey to a national deviation, khvyliovism.”
64
 But he persistently returned 
to an active social and political life. The journal Vaplite continued its activity, 
and published Khvyl’ovyi’s works, as well as the works of other vaplitiany. 
The Soviet press methodically criticized Khvyl’ovyi for his nationalism even 
in his absence. His novel Val’dshnepy which was published in Vaplite in its 
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fifth and sixth issues resulted in the destruction of VAPLITE as a literary 
organization, and in the seizure of the entire circulation of the sixth issue of 
Vaplite by the GPU.
65
 It took Khvyl’ovyi about a month to decide what to do. 
After the forcible collapse of VAPLITE on 28 January 1928 and the official 
banning of his novel Val’dshnepy, on 22 February 1928 Khvyl’ovyi wrote his 
second repentant letter from Vienna which was published in the newspaper 
Communist, and decided to return to Soviet Ukraine.
66
 He assured the party 
that he destroyed the end of Val’dshnepy, and that he would try to restore his 
“blemished party reputation and literary name.”
67
  
The boisterous twenties produced unmanageable chaos and noise 
among the Ukrainian literati. Sensational public debates and scandals helped 
the party establish the ideological profile of their participants. Khvyl’ovyi’s 
role in the radicalization of these debates was paramount. Importantly, by 
1928, Khvyl’ovyi earned a reputation as a rebel and nationalist, and ultimately 
he compromised and exposed his friends and supporters to thorough scrutiny 
by the state and the GPU. Observing the dynamics of these debates, the state 
came to the unsettling realization that the strong intellectual drive of the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia for a new national culture might be effortlessly 
transformed into popular resistance. Val’dshnepy became additional evidence 
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of Khvyl’ovyi’s nationalist and counterrevolutionary intentions for the GPU. 
Together with the literary debates, Val’dshnepy served as an impetus for state 
repressions and conditioned their intensity and extent in the early 1930s. 
 
The Noose Tightened: The Late 1920s    
In December 1928, after Khvyl’ovyi wrote a repentant letter from 
Vienna and returned to Ukraine, the party granted him another opportunity to 
rehabilitate himself. He obtained permission to found an almanac Literaturnyi 
iarmarok (Literary Fair). Literaturnyi iarmarok became an important feature 
in the Ukrainian cultural landscape, but because of pressure from competing 
official literary groups and the party it managed to maintain its position only 
until February 1930. “Prolitfront,” the literary group that was organized in 
April 1930 by Khvyl’ovyi, represented the final attempt to recover the lost 
hopes for independent individual creative work.
68
 However, the members of 
“Prolitfront” failed to withstand political pressure and one by one escaped to 
VUSPP. In December of 1930, “Prolitfront” was disbanded.
69
 What price did 
Khvyl’ovyi pay for the opportunity to create “Prolitfront” after the party 
methodically destroyed literary organizations led by Khvyl’ovyi in the past? 
Massive party purges in Ukrainian cultural institutions in April 1929 
contributed to Khvyl’ovyi’s understanding that the party demanded a new 
round of repentant letters and self-criticisms.
70
 Khvyl’ovyi received a negative 
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evaluation of his social and literary activities. The party admonished him for 
not exposing and explaining mistakes that he made in the past.
71
 At the April 
1929 meeting of the Housing Cooperative of Writers “Slovo,” inspired by the 
vigor of party purges, the party leaders and official writers viciously attacked 
Khvyl’ovyi and Kulish, accusing them of counterrevolution.
72
  
Khvyl’ovyi’s and Kulish’s resistance to aggressive official literary 
dignitaries was powerful and courageous. In Ievhen Kas’ianenko’s speech, he 
claimed that Khvyl’ovyi and Kulish created a bloc with kurkuls.
73
 
Kas’ianenko also complained that they viciously attacked him because he 
criticized Kulish’s play Myno Mazailo in the party newspaper Visti. In turn, 
Kulish was surprised and concerned by the fact that Kas’ianenko and Kost’ 
Kotko offered a negative evaluation of the play after it was approved by the 
Central Committee.
74
 Kulish noted that he would not mind this criticism but 
the fact that Kotko sent this negative report to the party organs was outrageous 
and out of bounds. Khvyl’ovyi defended Kulish, but Pylypenko intervened in 
the conversation and accused Kulish of the desire to capitalize on this scandal. 
He emphasized that the negative article in Communist did not reflect the 
opinion of the party, as Kulish stated. The head of the meeting Ivan Kulyk 
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accused Khvyl’ovyi and Kulish of siding with enemy elements.
75
 As a result, 
Kulish lost his temper and began to use profanity against all those present. 
Kulyk had to close the meeting.
76
 Its atmosphere, conceptually and 
aestetically, resembled the traditions of party politicking at the time, and 
“criticism” of Kulish ordered from above was consistent with the general 
attitudes of the center toward the most prominent Ukrainian intellectuals. This 
incident estranged Khvyl’ovyi from communal affairs.    
The SVU show trial presented another opportunity for Khvyl’ovyi to 
rehabilitate himself in the eyes of the party for his chronic “ideological 
errors.” Today there is a consensus among historians that the SVU, the Union 
for the Liberation of Ukraine, never existed in reality, and was a GPU 
fabrication from start to finish, a scenario that was designed and orchestrated 
by the center in Moscow. Mass arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals resulted in a 
trial that was conducted in the Kharkiv opera theatre in March-April of 1929. 
Forty-five of the most prominent Ukrainian intellectuals were prosecuted in 
the SVU trial for nationalist and bourgeois propaganda and received sentences 
varying from imprisonment to VMN (the “highest degree of punishment,” i.e. 
execution). 30,000 thousand people were arrested as SVU members 
throughout Ukraine.
 77
 Paradoxically, Khvyl’ovyi, whose initiatives were 
routinly strangled at their conception by the party, was assigned the task of 
public accuser at the SVU trial.
 
In spring 1930, Khvyl’ovyi published a series 
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of revelatory articles, in which he denounced khvyliovism as a bourgeois 
phenomenon, and condemned the nationalist counterrevolutionary views of 
the Ukrainian intelligentsia that were illuminated by the state through the trial. 
By 1930, he, as well as other slov’iany, understood that the battle against anti-
Ukrainian stances emanating from Moscow was lost. As Shevel’ov described 
it, “Khvyl’ovyi was on his knees.”
78
 By the time he moved into Budynok 
Slovo, he became “quieter.”
79
  
 
Potential Reasons for Khvyl’ovyi’s Suicide 
Stalin’s growing concern that the influence of the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia on the Ukrainian party leadership had increased and might be 
extended to the peasantry resulted in a number of repressive actions initiated 
by Moscow.
80
 In 1932, the TsK VKP(b) clamped down on all literary 
organizations by issuing the infamous 23 April 1932 resolution which 
disbanded them, and ordered the creation of the Union of Soviet Writers. As 
Iosyp Hirniak characterized it, by this resolution “Stalin drove all literature 
into one herd.”
81
  
By 1933 the atmosphere in Budynok Slovo became increasingly 
oppressive, according to many memoirs. The building was under surveillance 
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“day and night,” and people began to disappear.
82
 By 13 May 1933, Foucault’s 
principle of panopticism was in full flower in Budynok Slovo: the slov’iany 
became objects of information but no longer participants in mutual 
communication.
83
 Common tea ceremonies accompanied by vigorous literary 
discussions, which the state considered nothing but mutual ideological 
contamination, receded into the past. By the day of Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide, the 
slov’iany and the rest of the Ukrainian intelligentsia had already learned the 
safest direction of their personal literary path and social behavior.  
Khvyl’ovyi was certain that his literary activity, as well as his private 
life, was under close scrutiny by the GPU. For him, there was no doubt that his 
friends and colleagues were also closely watched by the secret organs. In his 
report, a GPU agent (under the code name “Engineer”) described Khvyl’ovyi 
as “not only a clever person, but an extremely clever person.”
84
 Khvyl’ovyi 
sensed that his political and social visibility, his civic position, irreconcilable 
with what he saw as the frantic bureaucratization of socialist ideas and the 
profanation of lofty tasks and principles of proletarian literature, encouraged 
the authorities to perceive the entire building where he lived as a “nest of 
Ukrainian nationalism.” In addition, as a sophisticated and knowledgeable 
hunter, Khvyl’ovyi could not fail to identify GPU attempts to follow him. 
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Kostiuk remembered that once Khvyl’ovyi leaned closely toward him and told 
him: “Every single step of ours is followed. Do not give them any pretexts.”
85
  
The extent to which this subject concerned Khvyl’ovyi is revealed in 
Arkadii Liubchenko’s memoirs. Liubchenko remembered that two weeks 
before Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide, he had a long conversation with Khvyl’ovyi on 
the train when they traveled together to the village Lokhvytsia near Kharkiv. 
Among other topics they discussed was the shameful system of the secret 
service in Ukraine, in which half of the population watched the other half.
86
 
Tragically, Khvyl’ovyi’s observations proved to be correct, a fact which was 
confirmed only recently through the secret file, papka-formuliar, that was 
initiated by the GPU in 1930. This secret file contains operational information 
delivered to the GPU by agents who investigated and followed Khvyl’ovyi for 
three years until his death.
87
 
His friends and those who later studied Khvyl’ovyi’s individual history 
and his literary works believed that Khvyl’ovyi’s visibility to Stalin 
exacerbated his psychological isolation and eventually killed him.
88
 As 
American political scientist Murray Edelman argues, this kind of visibility 
usually “increases alienation because, like visibility in a prison or psychiatric 
ward, it is experienced as surveillance and threat. In such settings visibility 
and proximity only emphasize the impossibility of communication.”
89
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Although Khvyl’ovyi limited his personal contacts with other residents in the 
early 1930s, he remained a very significant person for the GPU.
90
  
Khvyl’ovyi’s friends explained his suicide as an act motivated by his 
personal responsibility for those who shared his ideas and who supported him. 
The 12 May 1933 arrest of his best friend Mykhailo Ialovyi became a personal 
tragedy for Khvyl’ovyi.
91
 In his suicide note, Khvyl’ovyi wrote: “Ialovyi’s 
arrest is a murder of the Entire Generation…I am solely responsible for 
Ialovyi’s Generation, me, Mykola Khvyl’ovyi.”
92
  
Interestingly enough, the scenario according to which Khvyl’ovyi 
committed suicide emerged immediately after the actual tragic event on 13 
May 1933, and mainly was instigated by the hasty conclusion of the GPU on 
the same day. To the best knowledge of scholars, no autopsy or ballistic tests 
were conducted, although Khvyl’ovyi’s body was taken somewhere, and 
returned to Budynok Slovo in several hours on the same day. The GPU 
informed the writers’ community that Khvyl’ovyi’s funeral was to be 
conducted quickly the next morning. The widely held opinion that Khvyl’ovyi 
decided to sacrifice himself for the Ukrainian intelligentsia persists. 
Among other possible reasons for Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide, the slov’iany 
have emphasized Khvyl’ovyi’s shocking experience in the Ukrainian villages. 
Mobilized to the countryside to “fight for the grain,” he observed devastated 
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and depopulated villages, and this plunged him into a deep depression, 
according to Liubchenko. Khvyl’ovyi immediately telegraphed the Central 
Committee that the Ukrainian countryside was dying, and requested urgent 
help. The response was laconic. Khvyl’ovyi was informed that “everything 
was proceeding according to plan and the Party’s directives,” and he was 
ordered to return to Kharkiv.
93
 Apparently, this happened two weeks before 
Khvyl’ovyi committed suicide, shortly after his last visit to Ukrainian 
villages.
94
 His reputation as a nationalist was once again affirmed and 
strengthened. Previously compromised by his anti-Communist and 
nationalistic behavior and forgiven many times by the state for his deeds, 
Khvyl’ovyi dared to discuss one of the most sensitive topics among the party 
leaders in Ukraine and in Moscow, the famine of 1932-33. Whether 
Khvyl’ovyi’s moral suffering provoked by what he saw in the countryside was 
a sufficient reason to commit suicide would be difficult to say. However, the 
shock of discovery that he experienced in the countryside might be a factor 
that contributed to his fatal decision.  
Many scholars (Shevel’ov, Dziuba, Shapoval, Pavlychko and others) 
emphasized Khvyl’ovyi’s ambivalence and self-rejection, evidence of his 
inner psychological instability that might have led to his suicide. It appears 
that Khvyl’ovyi’s ideological vacillation finally resulted in his capitulation to 
the Soviet regime, and ultimate death through suicide. Indeed, he was 
psychologically unstable, although it became especially pronounced in the 
early 1930s. Shevel’ov argued that Khvyl’ovyi’s ambivalence was rooted in 
his understanding of the dissonance between his desire to follow his individual 
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path and the impossibility of doing so.
95
 Solomiia Pavlychko suggested that 
Khvyl’ovyi’s ambivalence manifested itself not only in his everyday behavior 
but also through his “hysterical” manner of writing that he exhibited in his 
pamphlets. He even chose psychopathic themes for his prose (Ia Romantyka, 
Sanatoriina zona and others), such as abnormal behavior, hysteria, psychosis, 
nervous breakdowns and personal crises. The unbalanced state of 
Khvyl’ovyi’s mood alternated between periods of mental arousal and 
depression.
96
  
Living in the future that was romanticized and idealized by the 
revolution, Khvyl’ovyi strove for a new Ukraine, the “dream house,” and the 
“house of the future,” in French philosopher Gaston Bachelard’s terms.
97
 The 
politics of the space in which he existed disillusioned him—he stopped 
writing, became inconsistent in his conduct and often drunk in the early 
1930s.
98
 Official literary critics fulfilling the social order of the state facilitated 
the emergence of a truncated and distorted public image of Khvyl’ovyi, “the 
garbled image of a devil,” reduced to the level of his interpreters, as Iurii 
Shevel’ov noted.
99
  
Tragically, Khvyl’ovyi himself frequently talked about his inclination 
to end his life. His melancholia and depression had a long history, and these 
feelings bled through his letters and novels as indicators and precipitators of 
his tendency toward suicide. These underlying patterns of Khvyl’ovyi’s 
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behavior had been described by his friends and contemporaries. Although this 
tendency might have served as an immediate cause of Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide, 
the act itself was surely amplified by his frustration with the cultural policies 
in Ukraine.
100
  
Khvyl’ovyi’s complex emotional state and lack of psychological 
equilibrium present a methodological problem in establishing the degree and 
intensity of his psycho-suicidal impulse. However, even if accepting his 
emotional problems as a basis for his suicide, one should not reject the role of 
social precipitation and motifs in his suicide. 
Some slov’iany, and later some scholars, mentioned Khvyl’ovyi’s 
unhappy family life which might have had a great effect on his final decision. 
Almost a century ago, Emile Durkheim noted that there was a great risk of 
suicides among those who were only slightly integrated into family life. “The 
greater the density of the family the greater the immunity of individuals to 
suicide,” he concluded.
101
 After Khvyl’ovyi divorced his first wife Kateryna 
Gashchenko, he married Iuliia Umantseva who saved his life during the civil 
war.
102
 Umantseva had a daughter Liuba from her previous marriage whom 
Khvyl’ovyi loved as his own daughter. Iraida Kryvych, Khvyl’ovyi’s daughter 
from his first marriage, confirmed Umantseva’s lack of involvement in her 
daughter’s upbringing. Umantseva was devoted to the ideas of revolution and, 
like many women in the 1920s, sacrificed her family life for the Communist 
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party.
103
 She did not have time for her family, let alone for having a common 
child with Khvyl’ovyi, and according to her own testimony to the regional 
prosecutor M.I. Bron on 13 May 1933, she “[came] home only to spend the 
night.”
104
  
According to Kulish, Iuliia Umantseva was far from beautiful, and 
neglected her home, as well as her appearance. Khvyl’ovyi appeared to be 
lonely. Being a frequent guest at the “Berezil’” theatre, he never was seen with 
his wife there but only with his step-daughter Liuba.
105
 Some scholars 
emphasized the extraordinarily strange fact that Khvyl’ovyi’s second suicide 
note was addressed not to his wife but to his step-daughter. Khvyl’ovyi 
tenderly called her “golden lovage.”
106
 The scholar Mykhailo Naienko 
suggested that perhaps both Khvyl’ovyi and Liuba, who in 1930 was 16-17 
years old, experienced some mutual attraction and might even have been 
involved in a romantic relationship. Such rumors existed, and Khvyl’ovyi’s 
friend, the writer and slov’ianyn Ivan Dniprovs’yi left a written statement that 
Khvyl’ovyi’s family life was unhappy.
107
 Avoiding speculation, it is clear that 
Khvyl’ovyi’s marriage to Iuliia Umantseva was unhappy, which could be a 
factor that influenced his decision to commit suicide.      
  Whatever the case might be, during the night after Khvyl’ovyi’s 
suicide, the slov’iany did not sleep. The entire Budynok Slovo boiled. The 
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residents tried to find explanations to the tragedy.
108
 The slov’iany evaluated 
Khvyl’ovyi’s act as heroism. According to the GPU report, the writer 
Dniprovs’kyi lamented that the community of Ukrainian writers made a huge 
mistake failing to inform Maxim Gorky about the conditions in which 
Ukrainian writers found themselves; the writer Iohansen believed that 
Khvyl’ovyi hoped that his suicide would evoke a great international 
resonance; the writer Senchenko argued that Khvyl’ovyi clearly understood 
that he would be arrested after what he saw in the countryside; the writer 
Mykhailo Stel’makh stated that “today there is only one option for a writer, 
death, because material and moral conditions became unbearable.”
109
 
Professor Nemchinov was convinced that the reasons for Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide 
were much deeper than everyone thought. He posited that “the intellectual 
Khvyl’ovyi could not bear the existing barriers.”
110
  
 
The Controversy over Khvyl’ovyi’s Suicide 
In the Soviet Union, the idea that human beings had to be useful to the 
state was unbearable for many intellectuals. Many refused to participate in this 
experiment and committed suicide. In Durkheim’s terms, these suicides were 
purely social acts. In Khvyl’ovyi’s case, if accepting his suicide as the 
legitimate truth of how he died, one can lean to the argument of Khvyl’ovyi’s 
psychological morbidity, an argument that was promoted by the party and 
uttered by some party officials even in their speeches at the cemetery over 
Khvyl’ovyi’s casket.  
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However, in a philosophical sense, Khvyl’ovyi as an individual did not 
kill himself. Rather, social constraints and the entire moral base of society 
made his life impossible. His suicide signaled a deep political and social crisis 
in Ukraine in the early 1930s. Certainly, the knowledge of the true causes of 
Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide would greatly enhance understandings of the political 
and social realities in Soviet society, and particularly among Ukrainian 
intellectuals. But despite the fact that Khvyl’ovyi’s case falls neatly into this 
oversimplified scheme of explanations, several doubts appear to leave space 
for skepticism about whether Khvyl’ovyi actually committed suicide.  
The memoirs of those who were in Khvyl’ovyi’s apartment during his 
suicide and those who entered the apartment immediately after the shot reveal 
significant inconsistencies and contradictions. First, their recollections are 
imprecise regarding the number of people who were present in Khvyl’ovyi’s 
apartment at the moment of his suicide. The slov’iany remembered even 
different people who were invited that morning by Khvyl’ovyi and who 
witnessed his last moments. In this connection, we might recall Walter 
Benjamin’s experience that postulated the dominance of space over physical 
objects, people and time. Benjamin noticed that his memory was overwhelmed 
with various details of the cities he visited, in other words, spatial details. But 
interestingly, people were almost absent from the picture. Memories keep a 
precise spatial map of the past, leaving the appearance of people in the human 
mind only in connection with this map, as a secondary element of realities in 
the past.
111
 Perhaps, something similar happened to those who were in 
Khvyl’ovyi’s apartment after the shot, and they should not be suspected of any 
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deliberate attempt at falsifying the reality. Clearly, confusing testimonies and 
contradictory reminiscences are hardly helpful in restoring the last minutes of 
Khvyl’ovyi’s life. Moreover, they should be expected amid the shock and 
tragedy of the event.  
However, at least one interesting detail is certain. According to all 
memoirs, the GPU arrived at Khvyl’ovyi’s apartment after his suicide within a 
very short period of time, and all Khvyl’ovyi’s documents, including suicide 
notes, his correspondence, unpublished pamphlets, the novel Iraida, the 
second part of Val’dshnepy and other papers were expropriated by the GPU. 
As Kostiuk noted, most likely these documents were destroyed by the GPU 
but this is only a hypothesis.
112
 The residents had a feeling that the secret 
police expected the tragedy.  
In Western, as well as in Ukrainian scholarship, there are no scholarly 
works that examine the possibility of Khvyl’ovyi’s murder by the GPU. The 
only attempt at such investigation was undertaken by the Ukrainian journalist 
and writer Vitalii Shevchenko who demonstrated that there was no conclusive 
evidence of Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide.
113
 For Shevchenko, the most important 
detail related to 13 May 1933 that has not been investigated properly is a little 
hole in the window of Khvyl’ovyi’s study that faces the internal yard. 
According to Iurii Bedzyk, the son of Ukrainian writer Dmytro Bedzyk who 
lived in apartment 66 in the fifth entrance, right across from Khvyl’ovyi’s first  
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Khvyl’ovyi’s balcony on the third floor (apartment 9). 
June, 2012. 
 
entrance,  he was playing in the internal yard with his friends on the tragic 
morning. Suddenly, the boys heard a sound of broken glass. They looked up 
and saw a “spider-web” in the broken window of Khvyl’ovyi’s study. There 
was a small hole in the middle of this spider-web. Most importantly, Iurii 
Bedzyk noted that in several days this opening was covered by a large piece of 
white paper which stayed there for six years until the war.
114
 This disturbing 
detail does not fit the official version of what happened in apartment 9 on 13 
May 1933.
115
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Morever, the configuration of Khvyl’ovyi’s apartment suggests that 
multiple entries into his study make another scenario—the scenario of his 
murder by the GPU—possible. In fact, knowledge of the configuration of all 
apartments in Budynok Slovo helps filter lies and half-truths about the events 
in the building, and constitutes a valuable asset in analyzing criminal cases 
fabricated by the Soviet police.
116
 Three rooms of Khvyl’ovyi’s apartment are 
accessible from at least two other locations in the apartment because of 
multiple doors installed in each room. This configuration allows an individual 
to enter the room from one location and leave it through some other space, a 
factor that should not be overlooked in an analysis of the 13 May tragedy.  
The only hope for solving this apparent dilemma is to recover the 
autopsy protocol that might have been made by pathologists on 13 May 1933 
which should also contain the data of the ballistic test if it was performed. 
However, information recently obtained from professor of medicine in 
Kharkiv, Serhii Krasnokutsk’kyi, revealed that only special permission 
granted by the chief prosecutor in Kharkiv oblast’ would allow a scholar to see 
an archival document, such as an autopsy protocol.
117
 The chances of 
receiving such permission are at this point minimal, and the probability of 
documentary fraud often encouraged by GPU associates in the 1930s is very 
high. Nevertheless, this assumption might inspire future research and this sort 
of investigation could be the subject of scholarly inquiry. 
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Free in the Space of Art 
Khvyl’ovyi’s death, certainly in more dramatic ways than his life, 
transformed the meaning of Budynok Slovo. Instead of a place that celebrated 
privilege and special status, as it was conceived by the writers, their home 
became a politically controlled place and space which held the “potentiality of 
a hostile encounter,” using Edelman’s terms.
118
 The close proximity of death 
made the slov’iany realize with crystal clarity that their home was a place 
where nothing but the alternative existed: either death for their freedom and 
ideals, or life in betrayal of those ideals. In Tuan’s discourse, the possible 
alternative implied the absence of freedom, and therefore, revealed the 
absurdity of having a personal place, their home, in which they no longer felt 
at home.
119
  
Arkadii Liubchenko wrote that life in Budynok Slovo was akin to a 
“forcible existence in a golden cage,” in which “every step, every action were 
under control of your best neighbor, whose voice sounded piercingly behind 
the wall…[people]walked on their tiptoes…and talked quietly as if at the 
cemetery…The building was christened the ‘crematorium.’” 
120
 The slov’iany 
continued to have a place of their own but their space of freedom was 
narrowed to their desks, and only the experience of writing left an illusion of 
freedom at least for some of them. Most began to realize how captive they 
really were only when they began to write or talk. Iuliian Movchan noted, for 
instance, that in his conversations with Sosiura, he never dared to ask Sosiura 
about his experience of being a soldier in the UNR army in which he served as 
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Semen Petliura’s personal guard. Movchan stated that this sort of question was 
dangerous and inappropriate even among close friends.
121
 Sincerity became 
extinct in the beginning of the 1930s, and this disturbed those slov’iany who 
had difficulty adjusting themselves to the new Soviet society. Khvyl’ovyi 
seemed to be disturbed by this for many years, and certainly his residence in 
Budynok Slovo only exacerbated this feeling.  
Perhaps, his sharp intuition and intellect allowed him to understand 
more and to see deeper than other writers. Liubchenko
 
emphasized that 
Khvyl’ovyi could grasp the essence of reality in chaos that was 
incomprehensible for others, and could clearly and laconically formulate it.
122
 
According to Liubchenko, Khvyl’ovyi stated that the worst fate was awaiting 
those Ukrainian writers who, like Abel’s brother Cain, would betray their 
colleagues following Moscow’s orders. “You will see. Beyond shame, death is 
awaiting them. They will be used as much as needed, and then, as useless 
ballast, will be thrown overboard, will be exterminated. You will see,” said 
Khvyl’ovyi to Liubchenko.
123
 Today Khvyl’ovyi’s words sound accurately 
predictive.  
In contrast to many slov’iany, Khvyl’ovyi enlarged his private space 
by creative writing, the world where he was not free, but not enslaved either. 
His intimate thoughts were encapsulated in his prose because of a lack of any 
other permanent, stable or trustworthy space where he could share them. The 
moral and intellectual values Khvyl’ovyi established for himself in this space 
remained unflinching. “When you sit down at the table to write, don’t forget to 
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wash your hands,” Khvyl’ovyi pronounced.
124
 His personal integrity remained 
unchanged, and therefore, Khvyl’ovyi’s creative work is of distinct relevance 
to an analysis of his social and political evolution, and its meaning in the 
context of the history of Budynok Slovo. Attempted conformity led to the 
deterioration of his inner essence, and it took him some time to realize his 
inability to conform.
125
  
The scenario of Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide was understandably presented by 
the Soviet state as the logical closure of his life and his ambivalent personality. 
Those who consider Khvyl’ovyi’s views, convictions and actions confusing, 
inconsistent, and oscillating from one extreme to another might find 
Shapoval’s term “fatal ambivalence” quite accurate.
126
 Yet, ambivalence or 
irrational behavior does not overpower the persistence of his ideas expressed 
in creative writings, in the space where Khvyl’ovyi was most often rational 
and honest, and therefore, free, the space where he could only be himself.  
Khvyl’ovyi’s philosophical wholeness and intellectual integrity seem 
to violate the image of an ambivalent personality. It would be most fair to say 
that he made a fatal mistake: he overestimated his role in history, passionately 
believing in the strength of his argument that would unite the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia in their quest for new proletarian literature and a culturally 
independent Ukraine under the leadership of the Communist party. 
Khvyl’ovyi, like his character Karamazov in Val’dshnepy, could not imagine 
the rejuvenation of the nation without socialism.
127
 He presumed that 
Ukrainian national liberation was possible only within the framework of the 
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Communist proletarian state. The realization that the state propagandized 
Ukrainization in Ukraine, but at the same time, physically exterminated the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia that was supposed to implement it, bewildered him. 
However, as Mykhailin suggested, Khvyl’ovyi the Communist never made the 
last step to eliminate this internal contradiction. He refused to betray his young 
romantic revolutionary ideals.
128
  
 Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide might also be analyzed in the context of his 
spatialized existence, or, in other words, in the context of his awareness of 
spatial and temporal constraints. Following the logic of philosopher J. E. 
Malpas, who tried to establish a connection between human existence in a 
space and human awareness of mortality and death, Khvyl’ovyi was able to 
comprehend, to “grasp” himself in relation to Budynok Slovo and to the social 
and political system in general in which he lived. He managed to realize his 
mortality as something inevitable under the circumstances and as something 
that could be manipulated by him. Death was at his mercy, as he was at the 
mercy of this place, space and time. His home acquired deep meaning for 
Khvyl’ovyi through the memories and sentiments he accumulated there. His 
emotional and experiential attachments to the place might partly explain and 
illustrate this idea, as well as his decision to end his life the way he wanted, at 
a certain time and in a certain place, his home.
129
  
The changing meaning of Budynok Slovo, as well as the changing 
meaning of himself as a writer and as a public figure, undermined 
Khvyl’ovyi’s psychological equilibrium: his home connoted a lack of 
freedom, hopelessness and despair. Time and space dictated new experiences 
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for him, producing new memories, mostly tragic. The future, so clear and 
optimistic in the past, became undefined for Khvyl’ovyi. Since he moved to 
Budynok Slovo, he developed a taste for liquor and began to drink 
uncontrollably. He stopped writing.
130
 Disillusioned and lonely, he certainly 
could commit suicide. However, metaphorically speaking, from the bloodiest 
scenarios to the most benign ones possibly imaginable, Khvyl’ovyi did not 
pull the trigger himself. It was done for him long before 13 May 1933. A 
protracted and torturous murder, committed by the state and by his colleagues 
and fellow writers, preceded his death. 
For several decades, the Soviet regime tried to erase Khvyl’ovyi’s 
name and his works from the cultural memory of Ukrainians. After 1933, his 
books were removed from the state and communal libraries all over Ukraine 
for their nationalist and fascist content.
131
 The Soviet authorities and party 
leaders could not even stand the existence of Khvyl’ovyi’s grave in one of the 
oldest cemeteries in Kharkiv. To make people forget him and others like him, 
they destroyed his grave together with the cemetery, creating a faceless and 
impersonal Park of Youth (Molodizhnyi Park), one of thousands on former 
Soviet terrain. Khvyl’ovyi’s spirit and the remnants of his physical body 
appeared to be more dangerous for the state than Budynok Slovo, a monument 
to Khvyl’ovyi and other slov’iany, the building that survived even the Nazi 
occupation of Kharkiv. Several decades later, the Ukrainain poet Tetiana 
Shamrai wrote about this act of vandalism by the Soviets: 
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There is not enough room for poets in the cemetery, 
Soon they’ll be buried right in the sky.
132
 
 
   
  
Khvyl’ovyi’s funeral. 14 May 1933, Kharkiv.
133
 
 
Khvyl’ovyi’s death further fragmented the slov’iany. Their common 
space and place had been split into many private spaces and places, in which 
Budynok Slovo’s inhabitants preferred to hide. They realized that the counter-
space of their art which was conformed to party demands did not help reduce 
their exposure to repression. The state seemed to negate the differences 
between unreliable, loyal and repentant artists, and this provision encouraged 
them to reassemble the truth, as they understood it, about their art and their 
future as artists and individuals. For the state, this fragmentation was a 
powerful “instrument of political power,” a condition to rule.
134
 The secret 
police continued the process of the sorting of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, 
organizing their social space according to the principle of collective ghettos.
135
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Chapter Six 
The UVO Case and the Repressions of 1933 
  
As the Lavra's bells ring their dirge, 
Iron chekists are being raised. 
With warm, arterial waters 
They will wash the magical lyrics 
That seems senseless to them.  
 
Volodymyr Bazylevs’kyi
1
 
 
 
The year 1933 was marked by the slov’iany’s literary sterility and 
intellectual malaise.
2
 It was also when the most prominent cultural figures, 
residents of Budynok Slovo, were arrested. Their arrest was a part of the mass 
operation designed by the secret police under the code name UVO (Ukrainian 
Military Organization).
3
 Fundamentally ill-suited to the Kremlin’s politics, 
writers and actors were arrested as members of the anti-Soviet nationalist 
organization UVO, and most of them were indicted on the basis of Article 54 
of the Criminal Code of the UKrSSR, whose paragraphs provided very broad 
and vague definitions of crimes.
4
  
As a rule, the suspects were charged with crimes under two or three 
sub-paragraphs of this Article. After preliminary investigation, the prisoners 
were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, forced labor or death by 
special meetings of “extraordinary” (or extra-juridical) state bodies that the 
regime had established in order to carry out its repressive measures against the 
population. These institutions included the NKVD Collegium, the Military 
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Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, committees, troikas, or the 
OGPU/NKVD Special Board (osoboe soveshchanie) in Moscow.
5
  
After being sentenced for crimes against the state, the prisoners fell 
under the jurisdiction of the Main Administration of Corrective Labor 
Camps—the Gulag. By early 1934 the total number of inmates in the Gulag 
was 510,307 people.
6
 As a subdivision of the NKVD, the Gulag administration 
sent the prisoners to various labor camps, fulfilling camp norms and needs for 
labor. The writers were assigned to heavy physical labor and exposed to 
inhumane living conditions. They cut trees, built roads and worked in 
hazardous and harmful gold and silver mines.
7
 Paiky (food rations) were 
minimal, and those prisoners who received no help from relatives were 
doomed to starvation and physical exhaustion. A small percentage of 
Ukrainian intellectuals were provided an opportunity to perform work closely 
related to their intellectual and professional abilities and skills. The majority, 
however, were routinely denounced by NKVD provocateurs and informers for 
their criticism of the punitive organs or Soviet power, and were shot in the late 
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1930s. The luckiest were punished by additional prison terms, confinement in 
isolators, reduction of rations, and increased norms for production.
8
 
Christopher Joyce noted that during the Great Terror prisons and 
camps were swamped with new inmates which resulted in a rapid deterioration 
of living conditions.
9
 In Ukraine, and particularly in Kharkiv, this occurred 
much earlier, in 1932-33. In 1932, the secret police arrested 74,849 people in 
Ukraine, and a further 124,463 in 1933 (a total of 199,312 during these two 
years).
10
 During four years, from 1929 to 1933, the numbers of prisoners in the 
Kharkiv prison (BUPR) increased dramatically. The head of the Kharkiv 
BUPR systematically complained to the authorities that its capacity was 
exceeded by 100%, and asked the prosecutor to take proper measures to 
prevent epidemics and riots.
11
  
Since Ialovyi’s arrest and Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide, the residents of 
Budynok Slovo had lived “with baited breath.” As noted in Chapter Four, 
Ialovyi’s lengthy criminal file was fabricated in a thorough fashion, and his 
detailed confession contained denunciations of many slov’iany. The secret 
police fully prepared the grounds for further mass arrests in Budynok Slovo, a 
place of nationalist “pollution.” The 1933 arrests provoked the residents to 
seek poison ampoules for the inevitable black day.
12
 The arrest of the 
influential party leader and literary figure Andrii Richyts’kyi, a former 
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member of the Ukrainian Central Rada and one of the founders of the 
Ukrainian Communist party (the UCP), became a harbinger of a communal 
horror that occurred immediately after Skrypnyk’s suicide, and the chain of 
tragic events in Budynok Slovo in December 1933.
13
   
 
A Scapegoat: Andrii Richyts’kyi  
Andrii Richyts’kyi was a former editor of Chervonyi prapor, the 
journal of the UKP,
14
 which severely criticized the politics of the KP(b)U that 
were thought to be dictated by the Russian Communist party.
15
 After the 
Comintern resolution of 1925 about the fusion of the UKP and the KP(b)U, 
Richyts’kyi was elected a member of the TsK KP(b)U. He also taught at the 
VUAMLIN
16
 and the Shevchenko Research Institute, and became a prolific 
scholar and writer. As observers noted, his Shevchenko seminars became very 
popular among graduate students: Richyts’kyi’s sharp mind was capable of 
interesting generalizations and his lectures were noted for their freedom of 
spirit and their aspirations for an independent Ukraine.
17
  During the Literary 
Discussion he shared Skrypnyk’s position and enthusiastically supported 
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Ukrainization.
 
Hryhorii Kostiuk characterized Richyts’kyi as an individual 
who took the problems of the Ukrainian people and culture to heart, and this 
made him “dangerous to the party.”
18
  It is no wonder that after Skrypnyk’s 
suicide, the GPU immediately arrested Richyts’kyi as a nationalist deviationist 
and Skrypnyk’s adherent. 
 For the GPU, Richyts’kyi’s past as an independentist and his 
membership in the Ukrainian Central Rada outweighed his Communist 
loyalties. His criticism of Volobuiev’s ideas that advocated an economic 
development of the UkrSSR that would be independent of Russia, was ignored 
by the party and did not contribute to his image as a loyal Communist, as it 
should have done.
 19
 Richyts’kyi’s active participation in denouncing 
shumskism and khvyliovism also meant little. He had been placed on the GPU 
black list since the early 1920s for his vigorous criticism of Ukrainian 
communists who, in Richyts’kyi’s view, were an obedient instrument in the 
hands of the RCP.  
 
Andrii Richyts’kyi, the early 1930s.
20
 
 
                                                          
18
 Kostiuk, 1:402. 
19
 See A. Richyts’kyi’s article “Do problemy likvidatsii perezhytkiv kolonial’nosti ta 
natsionalizmu (Vidpovid’ Mykhailu Volobuevu)” in Bil’shovyk Ukrainy no. 2 (1928): 74-93, 
and no. 3 (1928): 64-83.  
20
 HDA SBU, f.6, spr.69251fp, t.8.  
 256 
 
 In December 1932, he was sent as a TsK party representative to the 
village Novo-Chervone (Arbuzyns’kyi region, Odesa oblast’) to supervise 
grain procurements.
21
 Careful scrutiny of his criminal file reveals that he was 
falsely accused by the GPU of being a sadist who through violence extracted 
grain and other foodstuffs from the peasants.
22
 In truth, a local brigade of party 
activists implemented the terror, beat people, stripped them, and took them 
into the fields, together with their children, where the activists kept them for 
hours in the snow. Forcing women to surrender their hidden grain, the activists 
placed them in barrels and rolled them all over the village. The huts of those 
who resisted the procurements were destroyed.
23
 According to “witnesses,” 
Richyts’kyi ordered mass arrests of the peasants, and kept them imprisoned in 
inhumane conditions. Allegedly, under his “leadership,” several families 
committed collective suicides.
 24
 Interestingly, when the plan of grain 
procurements was fulfilled, and Richyts’kyi returned to Kharkiv, on 8 
September 1933 he was accused of counterrevolution in the countryside and 
arrested by the GPU in Budynok Slovo. 
 The incriminating items confiscated during Richyts’kyi’s arrest 
constituted a collection of the newspaper Dilo published in Lviv in 1929-30, a 
revolver and a set of secret documents of the TsK KP(b)U. Importantly, the 
existence, as well as the presence, of Richyts’kyi’s family (his wife Teofila 
and their two children Mavr and Teofil) was ignored by the GPU: the agent 
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expropriated a bank book for his savings account. His neighbor, the writer 
Oleksa Slisarenko, witnessed the arrest.
 25
  
 On 10 September Richyts’kyi wrote a protest to the Politburo of the 
KP(b)U, in which he rejected all accusations of the heinous crimes he had 
supposedly committed. However, the GPU continued to interrogate him, 
pressing him to denounce halychany, primarily those who worked in Kharkiv 
in cultural institutions.
26
 Richyts’kyi responded that it was time to end this 
farce (trahikomediia).
27
 In his letter to Balyts’kyi, he said he was puzzled by 
the GPU’s claim about his counterrevolutionary UVO links: “I cannot even 
understand where the GPU is seeing ANY links of this sort in Ukraine.”
28
  
 Through the efforts of the interrogators Pustovoitov, Bordon and 
others, incriminating depositions against Richyts’kyi were collected from 
many representatives of the intelligentsia who were arrested as UVO 
“members.” In his 8 June 1933 deposition, Ialovyi, described in detail the 
UVO meetings in which Richyts’kyi participated and actively prepared a 
military coup against the Soviet government.
 29
 Other UVO “members,” 
halychany Vikul, Badan-Iavorenko, Levyts’kyi, Mazurenko, Khrystovyi, 
Repa, Cherniak, Hrytsai, Ozers’kyi, Kyiko-Shelest, and Bilen’kyi-
Berezyns’kyi, also claimed that Richyts’kyi was one of the leaders of the 
UVO.
 30
  
The criminal file of Mykhailo Avdienko, a high official in the 
Ukrainian People’s Commissariat that dealt with Soviet collective farms, 
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confirms that all these individuals were rehabilitated in the late 1950s. 
Moreover, Avdienko himself, whose case the GPU linked to Richyts’kyi’s, 
never admitted his guilt and rejected all accusations and depositions by the 
UVO “members.” Nevertheless, Avdienko was shot in 1937 in a labor camp 
where he had been exiled for 10 years. The behavior of the accused during 
interrogation did not affect the outcome—their fates had been decided before 
the investigative process began.
31
 
The “scapegoat plan” designed by the secret organs was implemented 
within seven months. On 27 March 1934, the Extraordinary Session of the 
Supreme Court in the UkrSSR sentenced Richyts’kyi to death for his 
membership in the UVO. He, it was claimed, used a trip to Odesa oblast’ to 
undermine Soviet power in the countryside.
 32
 To create an illusion of the 
scrupulous preliminary investigation, and to eliminate other witnesses of the 
crimes in Odesa oblast’, the Session sentenced six other people to various 
terms in labor camps.
33
 Despite persistent denial of his personal involvement 
in the crimes in Arbuzyns’kyi region, Richyts’kyi was executed on 25 April 
1934 at 9 P.M. in the Kharkiv prison in the presence of the highest GPU 
officials in Ukraine.
34
  
The most fascinating thing about Richyts’kyi’s criminal case is timing. 
The party had to blame local officials for the famine of 1932-33 and to 
“expose” their mishandling of the collectivization campaign. Richyts’kyi, a 
member of the TsK KP(b)U, was a perfect candidate for the role of a 
scapegoat. Moreover, the “trial” was conducted in the village Arbuzivka in 
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Odesa oblast’, to which the accused were convoyed. 42 victims of 
collectivization were invited to attend the trial to confirm the violent tactics 
employed by Richyts’kyi in collecting grain from the peasants.
35
 The 
importance of this trial for the state is confirmed by the presence of Zynovii 
Katsnel’son, Balyts’kyi’s assistant, who arrived at the trial.
36
 
The need for this public trial is quite obvious. Its publicity helped the 
state reach several goals: first, the center diverted the blame from itself for 
millions of deaths in the Ukrainian countryside in 1932-33; second, the GPU 
exposed the “real” criminals who starved the peasantry in Ukraine; and, third, 
the Ukrainian peasants were appeased by “urgent” measures that helped 
investigate the crimes and punished the guilty. Richyts’kyi was introduced to 
the starving peasants, who were half alive and on the verge of insanity, as the 
one who should be blamed for collectivization and unrealistic plans for grain 
procurement, and they confirmed his crimes. 
Richyts’kyi’s wife Teofila Kravchenko and his two children were 
evicted from Budynok Slovo.
37
 She had difficulties finding employment. After 
she was hired by the DVU, Hryhorii Shtoke was reprimanded by the party 
purge commission for losing his vigilance and hiring an enemy.
38
  
 In 1933, the GPU worked at an extraordinary pace in Ukraine. The 
process of fabricating charges against those arrested or still to be arrested was 
organized efficiently, and suspects were “encouraged” to name as many 
“accomplices” as possible in order to provide the secret police with a 
sufficient amount of “evidence” and grounds to arrest another group of 
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compromised individuals. The number of UVO “members” named during an 
interrogation sometimes reached several dozen, and hundreds of individuals 
were alleged to have planned the overthrow of the Soviet regime. The lists of 
these individuals that were signed by suspects ran to several pages long, and 
were prepared in advance by the secret police, as rehabilitation materials have 
shown two decades later.
39
 Indeed, one could only marvel at the memory 
required to recall so many names. Gradually, lists of Ukrainian “nationalists” 
were expanded, and Richyts’kyi “found himself” in a much bigger company of 
terrorists and counterrevolutionaries. 
  
The professor of world history Badan-Iavorenko’s deposition:  
a partial list of the UVO “members.” 
40
 
        
The rehabilitation certificates are especially revealing because they 
summarize and visually present lists of those who were next in line.
41
 
Depositions (false or real) of those who were already in GPU custody 
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provided sufficient grounds for the subsequent arrest of those who were 
identified as Ukrainian nationalists and who were involved in activities that 
undermined the regime. Moreover, to secure the legitimacy of a suspect’s 
deposition, the GPU generally strove to obtain compromising testimonies from 
several suspects who “in unison” named the same individuals. This scheme 
was rather primitive, but because it was designed by the heads of investigative 
departments there were no doubts among rank-and-file investigators that the 
cases built on this principle would encounter any resistance from their 
supervisors.
42
  
     
          
The teacher of the Kharkiv military school Hryhorii Kossak’s deposition: a 
partial list of individuals who were allegedly members of the UVO.
43
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 Richyts’kyi did not survive Stalin’s terror; a few others did and 
testified about what was happening in interrogation rooms in the 1930s. For 
instance, according to the testimony of the writer and slov’ianyn Ostap 
Vyshnia who survived the Gulag, during the interrogation process he was 
provided with lists of individuals whom he was “requested” to include in his 
deposition. Vyshnia’s interrogator Bordon beat him and applied various 
methods of psychological pressure to ensure that he did so.
44
 As a result, 
Vyshnia signed his confession and included in his testimony those Ukrainian 
intellectuals that were on Bordon’s lists and who, he claimed, were UVO 
members.
45
  
The disappearance of their neighbors encouraged the slov’iany to 
search for ways to escape arrest. Volodymyr Sosiura, for instance, wrote a 
poem “The Defeat” which, as he claimed later, was aimed at “nationalists” 
Ialovyi, Richyts’kyi and Vyshnia.
46
 Fear penetrated the very essence of the 
writers’ existence and spilled out onto the pages of their art. In 1933 their 
everyday choice was between moral principles or social sanity, conformism 
and sycophancy. Budynok Slovo became a site where even the most faithful 
and powerful Bolsheviks felt helpless and doomed. One of them was Serhii 
Pylypenko, the founder of the cooperative “Slovo.”   
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Serhii Pylypenko 
 
 Serhii Pylypenko’s arrest made it crystal clear to the writers that no 
one was immune, even influential party members and faithful Bolsheviks. By 
the time of Pylypenko’s arrest, the Shevchenko Research Institute was 
completely destroyed: its leadership was dismissed and repressed, and most 
faculty members were arrested. The convenient location of the Institute (near 
the main headquarters of the GPU) facilitated the efficient work of the secret 
police. Often the arrested members of the Institute were walked by two guards 
from their place of work to their final destination—the Kharkiv GPU prison. 
Some time before his arrest, Pylypenko was dismissed from his position as 
director of the Institute and excluded from the party. Everyone understood that 
it was a matter of time before the GPU visited Pylypenko in his apartment to 
fulfill the formalities—the search of the apartment and arrest.
47
 The GPU 
began to investigate Pylypenko two months before his arrest. The 1955 
rehabilitation process revealed that the secret police opened an operational file 
(papka-formuliar) for Pylypenko on 3 October 1933.
48
 This file was marked 
under number 16703, and it would be reasonable to assume that by October 
1933, there were approximately 17,000 individuals, almost certainly 
representatives of the intelligentsia in Ukraine who were “investigated” 
because of the fictional crimes they committed.   
 GPU agents came to apartment 20 on 29 November1933, accompanied 
by the janitor Petymko.
49
 Pylypenko’s arrest was not sanctioned by the 
prosecutor, and was conducted on the basis of a resolution signed by 
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Proskuriakov, Sherstov and Dolinskii.
50
 The document stated that Pylypenko 
was in charge of a terrorist nationalist organization that planned to assassinate 
the head of the Radnarkom Vlas Chubar.
51
  
It took the GPU about three weeks to obtain Pylypenko’s confession. 
On 19 December 1933, he testified that he was a member of the UVO, and he, 
Dosvitnii and Vyshnia indeed considered assassinating Chubar. According to 
Pylypenko, the last two also planned the assassination of Postyshev.
52
 As has 
been demonstrated in Chapter Three, the methods of the Kharkiv GPU helped 
break the accused rather quickly. Family connections and sensitivities were 
effectively exploited by GPU agents to extract the confession of a suspect. In 
Pylypenko’s case, his family circumstances were advantageous for 
Proskuriakov who happened to be Pylypenko’s interrogator. Pylypenko had 
four close relatives, all females (his wife Tatiana Kardinalowska, two little 
daughters—eight-year-old Esta and four-year-old Mirtala, and his sister who 
lived in Kharkiv). Likely, this factor was used to manipulate him. The 21-22 
December 1933 minutes of the interrogation reveal that Pylypenko not only 
named Khvyl’ovyi, Ozers’kyi and Ialovyi as conscious nationalists but also 
testified that they all agreed to employ “individual” terror against Soviet 
power. Vyshnia was supposed to assassinate Postyshev, and Pylypenko—
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Chubar.
53
 On 2 January 1934, Pylypenko revealed many other names of the 
slov’iany who allegedly participated in the conspiracy.
54
  
To pressure Pylypenko, the GPU employed several denunciations, 
allegedly made by his neighbors and colleagues, Gzhyts’kyi, Demchuk, 
Atamaniuk, Marfievych, Ialovyi, Strukhmanchuk, Vikul, Hrytsai, Dosvitnii 
and Volobuev.
55
 Twenty pages of testimonies and two meetings with 
Pylypenko, likely fabricated by the GPU, proved to be sufficient for 
sentencing him to death. In their letter to the prosecutor, Proskuriakov, 
Dolinskii and Kozel’skii advocated applying to Pylypenko the highest degree 
of punishment. The assistant to the GPU prosecutor in the UkrSSR Krainii 
approved the petition.
56
 On 3 March 1934, the OGPU Collegium ordered 
Pylypenko’s execution, although its exact time and day, as well as the place of 
his burial, remain unknown.
57
  
Pylypenko occupied several important positions in the literary 
establishment and cultural institutions and was no small figure in the party. As 
his 1954 rehabilitation materials revealed, Pylypenko had been interrogated by 
the head of the GPU Balyts’kyi and the heads of secret departments 
Aleksandrovskii and Kozel’skii. Moreover, during these meetings, the 
Secretary of the Kharkiv Obkom of the KP(b)U Postyshev was also present.
58
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Postyshev was a frequent guest in the cellars of the GPU and was personally 
involved in many cases of Ukrainian “nationalists.”
59
 
Needless to say, Pylypenko’s confession was obtained through severe 
physical and mental tortures.
60
 Pylypenko’s wife Kardinalowska who was 
allowed to see her husband in prison (but only in the presence of the 
prosecutor) mentioned several telling details that pointed toward physical 
torture applied to her husband in prison. She stated that many people talked 
about torture in the Kharkiv GPU prison, but what she saw with her own 
eyes—the thin, exhausted and morose appearance of her husband—only 
confirmed her fears.
61
 
     
          
Serhii Pylypenko, 1920.
62
   Serhii Pylypenko.
63
 
                                                                           
 
After Pylypenko’s arrest, the residents of the Writers’ Home knew 
there were no untouchables in Budynok Slovo. Some began, fearfully and 
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obediently, to await their turn. Some were in panic, selling private possessions 
and frantically seeking hiding places.  
 
The “Decemberists” of 1933 
 7 December 1933 was a tragic day for two families in Budynok 
Slovo—the Gzhyts’kyis and the Desniak-Vasylenkos. By 1933, Volodymyr 
Gzhyts’kyi had become a famous writer, and his novel Chorne ozero (The 
Black Lake) published in 1929 was favorably received by the writers in 
various republics. But Gzhyts’kyi’s Galician origin compromised him in the 
eyes of the Soviet regime (see Chapter Three), as did his service in the 
Ukrainian Galician Army (the UGA) before 1919, which was interpreted as an 
insidious influence which shaped his independenist’s mindset. Gzhyts’kyi’s 
membership in the literary organization “Zakhidna Ukraina” that was formed 
in the late 1920s and had more than 30 Galician writers and artists exacerbated 
                      
Volodymyr Gzhyts’kyi,    Volodymyr Gzhyts’kyi in 
the late 1920s.
64
    his study, 1971.
65
 
  
 
the GPU’s hostile attitude toward him.
66
 In 1933 the GPU instigated a series of 
critical essays published in the Ukrainian press that denounced Gzhyts’kyi’s 
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novels and his vision of the relationships among national minorities. He was 
accused of nationalist deviations, particularly in his novel Chorne ozero.
67
 
Gzhyts’kyi like many other slov’iany attempted to rewrite the novel according 
to the principles of partiinist’ in literature that were promoted by the party.
68
 
However, this did not help him avoid arrest. Nothing could divert it—
Gzhyts’kyi had been on the GPU black list since the late 1920s.  
 In the Kharkiv GPU prison, Gzhyts’kyi, like so many other prisoners, 
was psychologically crushed in three weeks. On 26 December, he confessed 
that he was a member of the UVO and belonged to its Kharkiv chapter led by 
Pylypenko.
69
 Evidently, Pylypenko’s deposition about Gzhyts’kyi’s “crimes” 
had served as the pretext for the latter’s arrest. Gzhyts’kyi’s interrogator was 
Nikolai Grushevskii who “worked” with many Ukrainian writers.
70
 According 
to Gzhyts’kyi’s July 1955 rehabilitation testimony, during preliminary 
investigations Grushevskii did not beat the writer but exhausted him with day 
and night interrogations, regularly threatening to shoot him in the interrogation 
room if he did not sign the minutes of the interrogation.
71
 Gzhyts’kyi 
confessed that after some time in prison he was unable to tolerate the brutality 
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and pressure to which Grushevskii subjected him, and signed all protocols, 
naming the slov’iany Dosvitnii, Vyshnia, Andrii Paniv, Volodymyr Dukyn, 
Vasyl’ Desniak, Andrii Holovko, Ivan Kyrylenko and Ivan Senchenko as 
UVO members.
72
  
Many Galicians also fell victim to Gzhyts’kyi’s depositions. Among 
them were Myroslav Irchan, Ivan Tkachuk, Mykhailo Kachaniuk, Mechyslav 
Hasko, Iosyp Hirniak, Dmytro Zahul, Vasyl’ Atamaniuk, and Mykhailo 
Kozorys.
73
 They were all arrested as UVO “members.” Grushevskii himself 
wrote Gzhyts’kyi’s depositions that described in detail the plan to assassinate 
Chubar. According to Grushevskii’s fiction, Gzhyts’kyi, Dosvitnii, Vyshnia 
and Shtanhei had conceived the assassination and would have implemented it 
if the GPU had not forestalled their crime by arresting all active members of 
the UVO.
74
 Gzhyts’kyi, intimidated and frightened, confirmed his preliminary 
investigation deposition before the OGPU troika which sentenced him to 10 
years in prison.
75
  
Although Gzhyts’kyi’s degree in agricultural sciences saved him from 
being shot like most Ukrainian intellectuals on 3 November 1937, the state 
had no intention of releasing him because of his “nationalist” past. In 1946 he 
received another term of 4 years in labor camps for conducting anti-Soviet 
propaganda and agitation. Throughout his incarceration he was employed as a 
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specialist in agriculture in special settlements, and his knowledge was 
beneficial to the Gulag system.
76
  
Like many families in the 1930s, the Gzhyts’kyi family was destroyed 
by the system. Gzhyts’kyi never returned to Kharkiv: as a former prisoner, he 
was forbidden to live in big cities.
77
 As the wife of a Ukrainian nationalist, 
Gzhyts’kyi’s wife Mariia was evicted from Budynok Slovo. She found herself 
in the town of Izium in the Kharkiv oblast’. Although Gzhyts’kyi did not 
maintain personal contacts with her, he sent Maria some money that helped 
her survive.
78
  
Only in the 1960s, did Gzhyts’kyi return to his literary career. He was 
released in 1956 and resided in Lviv.
79
 He never returned to Kharkiv, but it 
became the center of many of his novels, several of which were 
autobiographical. Gzhyts’kyi’s attitude toward the city of his youth was 
ambivalent. The desire of his main characters to blend into the city’s 
landscape alternates with a complete rejection of the spiritual and intellectual 
space of the place. The indecisiveness, vagueness and often contradictory 
nature of perceptions of Kharkiv’s urban space marked Gzhyts’kyi’s late 
works.
80
 Moreover, Gzhyts’kyi’s traumatized memory produced an explicitly 
positive image of the place where he was born as a writer, and at the same 
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time—an implicitly negative place that influenced the inner core of his 
characters and shaped his fate.
81
   
 In December 1933, the plenipotentiary of the secret department of the 
Kharkiv GPU Grushevskii was extraordinarily busy. He worked as an 
interrogator on several cases simultaneously. Among them was the case of the 
slov’ianyn Vasyl’ Desniak-Vasylenko who was arrested on the same night as 
Gzhyts’kyi. It is likely that the arrest of two residents of Budynok Slovo who 
lived in the same fifth entrance (Gzhyts’kyi lived on the first floor in 
apartment 52, and Desniak resided on the third floor in apartment 60) was a 
matter of convenience for GPU agents. As many other slov’iany, Desniak was 
arrested without the prosecutor’s sanction in the presence of the commandant 
of Budynok Slovo Litvinenko, and the document about his arrest was signed by 
three people—the Kharkiv GPU officials Grushevskii, Sherstov and 
Dolinskii.
82
 Desniak was accused of anti-Soviet conspiracy and membership in 
the UVO. The search lasted until morning, and the most incriminating 
evidence of his crime that was confiscated was a revolver with two spare 
magazines, 15 bullets, and his correspondence.
83
 
Desniak was a Ukrainian literary critic, journalist and scholar. In the 
cooperative “Slovo,” he was a party secretary, and also worked in the People’s 
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.
84
 He published pro-Soviet articles and 
maintained firm Bolshevik positions. The formal pretext for Desniak’s arrest 
was Ialovyi’s denunciation. Ialovyi claimed that Desniak as a UVO member 
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had recruited members for the counterrevolutionary organization among the 
faculty members and students in the university where he worked.
85
 
Desniak’s 10 December 1933 confession follows the typical scheme 
that was designed by the secret police. Curiously, the first page of this 
document (page 12 in the criminal file) was apparently written by Desniak—in 
Ukrainian. The remaining pages (13 to 95) are written in Russian, and the 
handwriting significantly differs from that on page 12 which provokes doubts 
about the authenticity of Desniak’s detailed deposition. Desniak confessed that 
his views were shaped under the influence of political parties, and he could be 
considered a “Ukrainian nationalist and a radical esser [SR].”
86
 Desniak’s self-
denunciation left no opportunity for him to avoid a severe verdict. He also 
claimed that he was an active participant in the Ukrainian Borot’bist party, and 
Matvii Iavors’kyi had recruited him into the UVO. In all, the leitmotif of the 
confession is that the Ukrainian literary circles were frustrated with national 
party politics and government attitudes toward the Ukrainian culture, and 
therefore, their activities were aimed at resisting the status quo.
87
 The GPU 
expected him to denounce other slov’iany, and the names of Ivan Lakyza, 
Samiilo Shchupak, Oleksa Slisarenko, Mykhailo Semenko, Mykola Bazhan 
and Iurii Ianovs’kyi were written into the scenario of conspiracy.
88
  
Desniak’s criminal file reveals an interesting biographical detail that 
certainly was of great interest to the GPU. Desniak’s wife was a niece of the 
Ukrainian historian and academician Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi. Desniak’s 
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deposition (or the interrogator Grushevskii’s fiction
89
) illustrates the degree of 
Desniak’s hatred toward the scholar Hrushevs’kyi. It is unclear whether 
Desniak was sincere about this, or if this narrative had been constructed 
deliberately to affirm his Soviet position. The writer lamented that he had 
insufficiently criticized Hrushevs’kyi’s works and his political views.
90
 To 
amplify his pro-Soviet attitudes, Desniak mocked Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi’s 
“history” of Ukrainian national liberation and Volodymyr Vynnychenko’s 
“history” and his four volume work The Rejuvenation of the Nation, and 
diminished their worth by putting both of these histories in quotation marks in 
the text. Perhaps once in the interrogation room, Desniak realized that a pro-
Soviet stance might soften his verdict.
91
  
Desniak’s criminal file reveals a stark dissonance between the pro-
Bolshevik position exhibited in his essays over the years and his arrest as a 
Ukrainian nationalist. The interrogator Grushevskii creatively explained 
(through Desniak’s confession) this dissonance. Supposedly, the UVO 
members (Iavors’kyi, Desniak and others) agreed to publish negative critical 
articles against Ukrainian intellectuals who earned a reputation as national 
deviationists in order to camouflage their own nationalist essence and to avoid 
being accused of Ukrainian nationalism.
92
 This crafty plan of the uvisty was 
“exposed” by Grushevskii, and the text of interrogation protocols was 
approved by his supervisor.   
Moreover, the creative interrogator wrote that Iavors’kyi and Desniak 
were in complete control of the admission process to the Academy of Science, 
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and only individuals with a strong Ukrainian identity were admitted there as 
graduate students. The activity of the UVO members was aimed at the creation 
of a cultural institution—the Ukrainian Academy of Science—that was 
nationally oriented and independent from Russia. Their future plans allegedly 
included Ukraine’s political and economic break from the RSFSR. Desniak 
signed these statements, hoping that Grushevskii would help him save his life, 
as the latter promised.
93
 
On 24 February 1934, according to the decision of the GPU Collegium 
troika in the UkrSSR, Desniak was sentenced to 5 years of exile in 
Kazakhstan. However, in Desniak’s case the secret police executed the routine 
scenario of “conversion” for Ukrainian nationalists. In Ural’sk (Kazakhstan) 
where Desniak served his term, on 24 June 1938 he was arrested and accused 
of being a German spy, although no evidence was provided. On 19 October 
1938, according to the decision of the UNKVD troika in Alma-Ata oblast’, 
Desniak was sentenced to death. The verdict was implemented on 20 October 
1938.
94
   
During the period from 1956-1961, all people who had been mentioned 
as Desniak’s accomplices were rehabilitated. Moreover, the rehabilitation 
commission learned that Desniak had never been mentioned in Iavors’kyi’s 
criminal file, the person who allegedly recruited Desniak to the UVO.
95
 On 23 
January 1965, Desniak was rehabilitated as the victim of a fabricated criminal 
case against him.
96
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 A week after the arrests of Gzhyts’kyi and Desniak, on 15 December 
1933, the secret police arrested the slov’ianyn and Ukrainian writer Mykhailo 
Panchenko.
97
 Oles’ Dosvitnii was next in line, Khvyl’ovyi’s closest friend and 
a former member of VAPLITE, a literary association that had by then become 
for the state synonymous with nationalist heresy and ideological transgression. 
      
Oles’ Dosvitnii 
 In the 1920s, cultural exchange between the Soviet Union and 
European states had not yet ceased. Professional gatherings and conferences in 
Europe were popular among the writers. The slov’iany made trips abroad 
rather frequently where they were closely observed by the secret police. 
Whereever the slov’iany traveled—Vienna or Prague, Berlin or Venice—GPU 
agents followed them and wrote thorough reports to their supervisors about 
meetings attended and individuals contacted. The Ukrainian writer Oles’ 
Dosvitnii came under special scrutiny because he was among the few 
slov’iany who before the revolution had lived in the United States of 
America.
98
 Moreover, although in 1918 he returned to Ukraine and worked for 
the Bolsheviks and the Red Army, he spent some time in Eastern Galicia and 
Bukovyna—in Western Ukraine—which in the eyes of the Soviet state 
stigmatized him as a Ukrainian nationalist.
99
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Oles’ Dosvitnii in San-Francisco (U.S.A.), 1917.
100
 
 
  
Dosvitnii exacerbated the Soviet government’s suspicion of his 
supposed nationalism during the SVU trial in 1929. He, together with his 
friends Khvyl’ovyi, Ialovyi, and Kulish, dared to publicly express doubts 
about the legitimacy of GPU accusations against prominent Ukrainian 
intellectuals. They even went to the Central Committee to enquire about GPU 
actions related to this case. They asked Balyts’kyi to explain and to provide 
evidence of crimes committed by the members of the SVU.
101
 The GPU had 
never forgotten these writers’ distrust. 
In January 1930, when Dosvitnii and his family moved to Budynok 
Slovo and three years before his arrest, Dosvitnii wrote in his autobiography: 
“Now I am 39 years old, I have two daughters and I am absolutely certain that 
we will build socialism.”
102
 The same document contains another statement 
made by the dedicated builder of socialism Dosvitnii, which the GPU found 
incredibly useful in fabricating a criminal case against him. Dosvitnii wrote: 
“Do not have any doubts that I mastered the use of a shotgun, machineguns of 
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all sorts and grenades better than the writing skill.”
103
 The passionate builder 
of socialism conceived a novel about collectivization in 1933, and wrote a 
poem “Partisans” that became a libretto for Vasylii Smekalin’s opera. 
Vsevolod Meerhol’d was interested in staging this piece in Moscow but the 
GPU prepared another scenario for Dosvitnii.
104
 
On 30 August 1933, writing to the Central Committee, Dosvitnii 
complained that he did not understand how one could consider his novel 
Kvartsyt (Quartzite) harmful. He noted that in one of the critical essays in 
Literaturnaia gazeta, some author claimed that through this novel, Dosvitnii 
tried to justify vaplitianstvo and khvyliovism. Moreover, Dosvitnii stated that 
Khvylia had read the novel, and he, Dosvitnii, made revisions to the novel 
according to Khvylia’s comments. He suggested that these attacks against him 
were mere harassment, or a misunderstanding. He noted that after his 
completion of the party assignment to help fulfill bread procurements in the 
countryside, he would like to make an appearance before the Central 
Committee to discuss this painful issue.
105
 However, as Dziuba noted, this 
“polemic was completed by chekists.”
106
 On 19 December 1933, Dosvitnii was 
arrested as a member of the UVO and accused of anti-Soviet conspiracy. 
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Oles’ Dosvitnii—standing, far right, 1925.
107
 
 
 
 Dosvitnii is mentioned in nearly all criminal files of those who were 
accused of membership in the UVO. The GPU pressed him to sign a 
confession that he, together with Vyshnia, Gzhyts’kyi, Volodymyr Shtanhei 
and others, planned the assassination of Chubar, the head of the Ukrainian 
Radnarkom.
108
 Interestingly, the assassins change from deposition to 
deposition. Dosvitnii himself confessed that he was supposed to assassinate 
Postyshev.
109
 A month earlier, Mykhailo Datskiv who in 1926 was the director 
of Les’ Kurbas’s theatre “Berezil’” testified that Dosvitnii recruited the 
Ukrainian theatre director Les’ Kurbas into the UVO.
110
 But according to 
Datskiv, he, Kurbas, and Hirniak formed a terrorist group that was supposed to 
assassinate Postyshev.
111
 The interrogator Grushevskii likely left his imprint in 
Datskiv’s criminal file, but simultaneously “investigating” Dosvitnii, 
Grushevskii overlooked an elementary requirement of consistency in both 
criminal cases. The supposed participants in the plot are different, and their 
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interactions had been left unexamined in both criminal files. However, the 
interrogators’ sloppy work had been accepted by their supervisors, Dolinskii 
and Kozel’skii.
112
 Dosvitnii was sentenced to death, while Datskiv received 10 
years in labor camps.
113
 
  Grushevskii’s efforts to broaden the circle of unreliable writers, many 
of whom lived in Budynok Slovo, received full attention of the investigator. 
The contradictory and illogical depositions of the arrested tightened many 
slov’iany in a firm knot while in reality many rarely communicated with one 
another.
114
 However, the interrogators produced the narrative of a nationalist 
conspiracy without any consideration of the social and human bonds (or their 
absence), that existed among Ukrainian intellectuals. According to many 
depositions, enemies or friends, they all worked together in an underground 
political organization, regularly met, and their mutual dislike for each other 
was never an obstacle in their close interactions. The slov’iany who were still 
free and who could confirm the absence of contacts between Gzhyts’kyi and 
Dosvitnii had never been invited for questioning. In fact, they were themselves 
candidates for arrest. The accusations were built exclusively on the 
depositions of those who were never intended to be released. In his 
rehabilitation certificate, the KGB official Arkhypovych who examined many 
criminal files where Dosvitnii had been mentioned admitted that his case was 
a complete fabrication. The contradictory nature of the materials of the 
preliminary investigation constituted the basis for his conclusion.
115
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In 1955, when Dosvitnii’s case was re-investigated, his wife Maria 
Kurs’ka was shown the minutes of two interrogations—26 December 1933 
and 14 January 1934, in which Dosvitnii denounced himself and his friends. 
Kurs’ka confirmed that both protocols had Dosvitnii’s handwriting.
116
 There is 
evidence of his psychiatric disorder during preliminary investigation, a result 
of severe beatings, and the GPU records suggest that Dosvitinii might have 
died in Grushevskii’s office from torture on 9 June 1934 before his 
execution.
117
  
As a common practice, after the arrest of her husband, Kurs’ka with 
her two little daughters had been evicted from Budynok Slovo, and eventually 
the family found itself in Moscow. In 1934, Kurs’ka was excluded from the 
party for maintaining contact with Dosvitnii (she was bringing him parcels 
while he was in prison).
118
 On 31 May 1956, Kurs’ka received a notification 
from the TsK of the Communist Party in Ukraine that her husband had been 
rehabilitated on 18 May 1956.
119
 But the Soviet authorities continued to lie 
about his death. Kurs’ka received a certificate, which stated that Dosvitnii 
“died” in 1942 from a heart attack.
120
 Moreover, cynically, on 7 June 1955, the 
rehabilitation commission in Kyiv (Kondrat’iev) wrote to the Military 
Prosecutor of the Moscow Garrison S.A. Smirnov and asked him to 
interrogate Kurs’ka, who was still living in Moscow, to get answers to 
questions that were crucial to the KGB: first, where did the interrogator 
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Grushevskii’s sister live who could testify about the tortures of Dosvitnii in 
prison by Grushevskii; second, had Kurs’ka saved the search protocol (if she 
had it was to be confiscated from her); third, where did Gzhyts’kyi’s wife 
reside (she apparently had a letter about Gzhyts’kyi’s tortures in prison, and 
Kurs’ka claimed that she saw the letter); fourth, who else, besides 
Gzhyts’kyi’s wife, knew about any details of this case; and finally, did 
Kurs’ka have specific evidence about her husband being physically 
tortured?
121
          
 Obviously, the atmosphere of secrecy and minimal publicity about the 
tortures as a routine practice in the GPU prison was equally important for the 
secret agency in the late 1950s as it had been in the 1930s. The extent of 
illegality was reduced during the Khrushchev Thaw, yet the inclination to 
operate employing the same patterns remained a trademark of the Soviet secret 
police. Kondrat’iev’s request to confiscate from relatives of the slov’iany 
evidence of physical torture that had been employed in the Kharkiv GPU in 
the 1930s appears to be a transparent cover-up operation aimed at avoiding 
criminal responsibility of the agency that continued its traditions even after 
Stalin’s death.  
 The talks and rumors in Budynok Slovo about the GPU inmates’ 
horrible experiences cultivated a strong determination among the writers: they 
were not going to fall victim to the barbarity of the Kharkiv GPU agents. 
Many thought of suicide and prepared themselves accordingly.
122
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Ostap Vyshnia and Les’ Kurbas 
 The very mention of these two names suggested all-Union and even 
international fame. Ostap Vyshnia (the pen name of Pavlo Hubenko) was a 
Ukrainian writer who became famous because of his short humorous stories 
that criticized harmful manifestations of bourgeois art, literature and life in 
general. The objects and themes of his satirical articles gradually expanded 
and embraced many social vices, from bureaucratic behaviors of state officials 
to free love. His language of expression was inventive, and his essays were 
witty and amusing. Through his publications in the press, Vyshnia won 
popular love and respect even in the most distant villages of Ukraine and 
many other Soviet republics.
123
  
Les’ Kurbas was an innovative theatre director whose original manner 
of expression impressed even sophisticated spectators in many European 
countries. He created a theatre-laboratory “Berezil’” which became the most 
celebrated theatre in Ukraine (first based in Kyiv, it moved to Kharkiv in 
1926). Kurbas became one of the first people in Ukraine to be granted the title 
of People’s Artist (narodnyi artyst).
124
 Similar to the artist Vasilii Kandinsky, 
Kurbas emphasized the significance of the unconscious in art. He was strongly 
influenced by Marxism and the Marxist idea (which he understood as one of 
individual liberation), and this served Kurbas as an inspiration and condition 
of personal artistic liberation. But the bureaucratization of cultural institutions, 
growing artistic conformism and the attacks against his creative art by 
proletarians provoked by the state frustrated Kurbas to the point that he 
allowed himself to engage in severe public criticism of those representatives 
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of the masses who were clearly “hired” by the state to compromise Kurbas as 
an artist and as a citizen. 
New archival evidence, particularly the minutes of Kurbas’s public 
“crucifixion” at city party meetings in the early 1930s, reveals long exhausting 
battles he led against those factory workers who claimed they did not 
understand Kurbas’s unconscious impulses, the foundation of his creative 
art.
125
 By party order, the workers invited to these meetings rejected Kurbas’s 
productions and complex form of art, demanding “easy” to understand 
performances. The discrepancy between the enormous popular success of 
Kurbas’s productions and the public “tribunals” that admonished him as a 
director triggered his frustration with party bureaucrats who, as Shkandrij 
noted, “manipulated the press and public, planting attacks and negative 
reviews” about Kurbas’s art.
126
  
 Despite the differences in their genre, their form of creative art and 
even in their personalities, by 1933 Vyshnia and Kurbas were both perceived 
as Ukrainian nationalists. There was a common trend that united them in the 
eyes of the state: they both were residents of Budynok Slovo, a symbol of 
freedom and seditious thinking. Their free spirit and artistic creativity 
confirmed their membership in the club of nationalists.    
In the early 1930s, the political atmosphere in Ukraine stimulated a 
proliferation of press articles that portrayed Vyshnia as a nationalist and a 
wrecker. The authors of critical articles argued that Vyshnia’s popularity could 
be explained by popular bad literary taste and the low cultural level of the 
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masses that the writer encouraged and perpetuated. The rationale was that 
during the difficult time of socialist construction Vyshnia’s literature 
demoralized people: the people needed “serious literature,” not humor and 
laughter. Vyshnia’s political and civil dignity and pride were wounded. He 
retorted: “Why should we build a new life crying?”
127
 However, the 
underlying reason for attacks against Vyshnia was that his art was “deeply 
national,” as Iurii Smolych noted, and the GPU sensed it.
128
 The secret police 
had begun investigating him as a Ukrainian nationalist in 1924: papka-
formuliar grew rapidly. He was routinely observed until 4 January 1955 when 
the secret police stopped processing him and the file was sent to the 
archives.
129
  
 Similarly, the tension between Kurbas and the authorities developed 
gradually and in 1933 reached its apogee. In the 1920s, the party had 
established a practice of regular reports by the creative intelligentsia to the 
City Council in Kharkiv.
130
 Kurbas was to report about the ideological, 
political and economic conditions of the theatre in the presence of the workers 
of Kharkiv factories and cultural organizations, writers and party officials at 
meetings arranged by the Kharkiv Party Secretariat.
131
 The Secretariat also 
created a special Commission of Art within the Sector of Narkomosvita which 
could provide an ideological evaluation of cultural products, such as a new 
novel or a new theatre production.
132
 The workers who were invited to these 
meetings routinely criticized “Berezil’” for its excessive creativity and 
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“counter-revolutionary” vision.
 133
 The Secretariat managed to find workers 
who were displeased with Kurbas’s productions. It is more than likely that a 
careful selection process had produced these workers, who had been coached 
and instructed about “proper” behavior at the meetings. Of course, they were 
aware of the targets that the party had established in advance.  
The party was also dissatisfied with the Ukrainian writers who wrote 
for the theatre. Mykola Kulish, Kurbas’s best friend, talented playwright and 
slov’ianyn, was systematically attacked for diminishing the role of the 
proletariat and casting the Soviet power functionaries as idiots in his plays.
134
 
Kurbas courageously defended Kulish, and categorically disagreed with the 
idea that Kulish had to make further changes to his work. At one party 
meeting, Kurbas lost his temper and suggested that the whole scandal around 
Kulish’s work and Kurbas’s interpretations occurred because spectators 
“failed to bring their brains to the theatre.”
135
  
The attacks on Kurbas and Kulish resulted in a party resolution that 
proposed inviting representatives of factories to participate in the creation of 
theatre performances, as well as in the theatre’s financial meetings. It was 
decreed that letters would be sent to all cultural organizations to inform them 
about this innovative practice—the penetration of Ukrainian culture by the 
working masses. Kurbas was frustrated with this state of affairs and qualified 
such an approach as nonsense.
 136
 The degree of Kurbas’s suffering as a 
director and actor who had to bend under state interventions and to allow 
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amateurs in the theatre was tremendous and had lethal consequences for his 
soul, to use the Ukrainian writer Mykhailo Slaboshpyts’kyi’s metaphor.
137
      
In the state’s view, “Berezil’” had estranged itself from the working 
masses, and proletarian art as such, which contradicted the scheme of building 
a new proletarian culture. The attacks on “Berezil’” intensified and reached 
their zenith in 1933.
138
 Some slov’iany publically denounced Kurbas. The 
head of the VUSPP Ivan Mykytenko argued that Kurbas’s activities were 
harmful for theatre development in Ukraine. The literary critic Samiilo 
Shchupak believed that Kurbas’s attitude was arrogant toward the proletariat 
and its culture. The poet Leonid Pervomais’kyi also characterized Kurbas’s 
artistic approach as “petty bourgeois and nationalist.”
139
 Some actors of the 
theatre contributed to the harassment of Kurbas, those who were intimidated 
by the majority of party leaders hostile to Kurbas, and those who did not 
believe in his genius.
140
 In an atmosphere of hostility and instability, Kurbas 
began to doubt his theoretical views. He publically admitted their 
contradictory nature. He was confused, and his senses failed to help him 
identify who was his friend, and who was his enemy.
141
   
In October 1933, newspapers published a resolution of Ukraine’s 
People’s Commissar of Education about the theatre “Berezil’.” It stated that 
the theatre did not live up to the lofty tasks of Ukrainian Soviet art, because 
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Kurbas pushed the theatre toward Ukrainian nationalism.
 142
 The Secretary of 
the Narkomosvita Khvylia signed the order to dismiss Kurbas from the 
position of chief-director of the theatre “Berezil’.” The title of People’s Artist 
was of course also taken away from him. In November 1933, reporting to the 
party at the Joint Plenum of the TsK and TsKK KP(b)U, Postyshev stated that 
one of the achievements in combating Ukrainian nationalism was the dismissal 
of Kurbas, an “evil genius,” who led “Berezil’” to a “political and artistic dead 
end.”
143
  
 Vyshnia and Kurbas were arrested on the same day—26 December 
1933 but in different places. Vyshnia was arrested in Budynok Slovo, and 
Kurbas—in Moscow where he was directing King Lear (starring Solomon 
Mikhoels) at the GOSET, Gosudarstvennyi evreiskii teatr (State Jewish 
Theatre).
144
 But both ended up in the Kharkiv GPU prison. 
For the janitor Petymko, this was another sleepless night, like many 
other nights in December of 1933. Some residents noted that Petymko 
completely neglected his responsibilities as a janitor. The explanation was 
simple. His working hours shifted, and the nature of his work became rather 
monotonous: during the daytime he was sleeping, and at night he served as a 
witness during lengthy searches and arrests of the slov’iany.
145
  
Vyshnia and Kurbas were accused of membership in the UVO, of a 
conspiracy to assassinate Postyshev, Chubar and Balyts’kyi, and of organizing 
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a military uprising to overthrow the Soviet regime.
146
 Very shortly after the 
arrest, Vyshnia confessed to these charges, denounced his colleagues and 
signed all the protocols.
147
 In the custody of the Moscow secret police, Kurbas 
had been denying criminal charges against him for two months.
148
 In February 
1934, he was convoyed to Kharkiv where after two weeks he wrote his 
confession.
149
  
We will never know what methods were applied to Kurbas in prison. 
Kurbas’s criminal file reveals that two GPU operatives worked with Kurbas—
the associates of the SPV Gol’dman and Sokolov.
150
 Sherstov and Dolinskii 
also signed the documents related to Kurbas’s criminal case. Interestingly, 
Pera Gol’dman was a woman who created informational certificates on many 
Ukrainian literary figures and was among a few in the secret police who 
survived the Great Terror.
151
 
On 3 April 1934, the assistant to Kharkiv prosecutor Krainii asked 
Kurbas whether he had complaints about the GPU treatment toward him 
during the preliminary investigation, and whether anyone forced him to 
confess. Kurbas answered: “Absolutely none. At all stages, the attitude was 
rather tactful and extraordinarily polite.”
152
 Moreover, Kurbas stated that now 
he felt “rejuvenated, similar to a hysteric who was successfully treated by Dr. 
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Freud.”
153
 The Ukrainian historian Volodymyr V’iatrovych has noted that 
Kurbas’s answers to Krainii seemed “zombie-like,” and were far from the 
truth.
154
 Professional work as a theatre director in the labor camps healed 
Kurbas’s morbid state of mind to some extent, and he returned to his normal 
psychological state and logical judgments, if this was possible at all there for a 
person of intellect and culture.
155
 However, according to the scholar Natalia 
Kuziakina, in the camps Kurbas attempted to commit suicide.
156
  
Importantly, the criminal files of the slov’iany share one remarkable 
detail. Almost all arrested suspects claimed under interrogation that Budynok 
Slovo and its apartments served as a meeting place for the members of the 
nationalist organization UVO which ultimately incriminated all the residents 
of criminal counterrevolutionary activities, the writers and their family  
                                                                                 
Ostap Vyshnia.
157
     Ostap Vyshnia, the 1950s. 
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members. The circle was closed, and the terror of the building proceeded into 
its chronic stage.   
Vyshnia survived twice. His interrogator Bordon, and GPU Kharkiv 
officials Dolinskii and Kozel’skii sentenced Vyshnia to death.
158
 But the 
Central Executive Committee in Moscow altered the verdict to 10 years in 
labor camps in the Komi ASSR.
159
 Vyshnia would have been executed in the 
camps in 1938, when camp authorities investigated a nationalist conspiracy 
that resulted in thousands of deaths. However, while being transported from 
Kozhva to Chib’ia for additional investigation, Vyshnia fell ill with 
pneumonia. The guard dumped him in one of the camp hospitals, “to die or to 
recover.”
160
 Meanwhile, Yezhov was replaced by Beria, and the Great Terror 
of 1937-38 ended. Vyshnia who was doomed to be executed in Chib’ia 
recovered and survived.
161
 
 
                                          
Les’ Kurbas, the 1920s. Les’ Kurbas during the 
preliminary investigation,  
28 December 1933, Kharkiv. 
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On 9 April 1934, Kurbas was sentenced to 5 years in prison in 
Kazakhstan which for the other prisoners seemed like a verdict equivalent to 
treatment at a resort or an acquittal. For some reason, the secret police sent 
him to the BBK (to the town of Medvezh’egorsk), and eventually he ended up 
in the Solovky.
162
 As a halychanyn and independent thinker, Kurbas had little  
chance of surviving in the Gulag. On the basis of several denunciation reports 
and Ezhov’s 1937 infamous order no. 00447 which stated that 10,000 people 
in the camps had to be shot, the UNKVD troika in Leningrad oblast’ 
sentenced Kurbas to death.
163
 He was executed in Sandarmokh on 3 November 
1937 like many other slov’iany.
164
 The exact location of his remains in 
Sandarmokh is unknown but his symbolic grave is in Kharkiv cemetery no.13, 
where his wife Valentyna Chystiakova and his mother Vanda Kurbas, both 
actresses of the theatre “Berezil’,” are buried. Kurbas was rehabilitated on 19 
April 1957.
165
 
Kurbas’s wife Chystiakova was neither repressed nor evicted from 
Budynok Slovo. Moreover, the secret police never searched their apartment. In 
her 1956 letter to the General Prosecutor of the USSR Rudenko, Chystiakova 
sadly noted that this tactic provided grounds for her to believe that the 
accusations against her husband were not serious, or even false.
166
 Kurbas’s 
fate was predetermined and additional formalities seemed unnecessary. 
Ironically, in 1968 a KGB associate was instructed to study Kurbas’s criminal 
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file to familiarize himself with “the foundations of the secret intelligence 
service” within the framework of “chekist advanced studies.”
167
 Almost forty 
years after the acts of repression, the work of chekists in the 1930s still served 
as an example of excellence for their successors.
168
 
As individual histories of the slov’iany demonstrate, fear as an element 
of their lived experience in Budynok Slovo inevitably was transferred to a 
different setting— prison cells and interrogation rooms. But this feeling was 
skewed by the various personalities of the slov’iany, and manifested itself in 
symptoms that were polar opposites. For some, fear grew to an unbearable size 
and volume, and paralyzed the will. For others, it was transformed into 
stoicism. Richyts’kyi’s stoic behavior was not adopted by everyone. Most 
were driven by fear, perpetrating acts of betrayal. Their confessions to 
mythical crimes might free them from prison and prolong their lives. 
After the elimination of the most talented and independent artists such 
as Khvyl’ovyi, Vyshnia and Kurbas by the secret police, the slov’iany wanted 
simply to live. The mother of the American literary radical Max Eastman 
wrote once to him: “Conformity is beautiful until it requires a sacrifice of 
principle,—then it is disfiguring.”
169
 But for the writers, conformity in art and 
their “disfigured” literary talent were no longer a concern. The fear of losing 
life discharged other fears from their minds—the fear of losing dignity and 
principles, and the fear of an intellectually and morally handicapped existence. 
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The esthetics and culture of the building in which the writers lived, the state’s 
attitudes toward the intellectual elite, and problems of a financial and personal 
nature were all interwoven, which drew them as a community into a stupor. 
Moreover, they realized that there were no sympathizers, empathizers or 
supporters who would protect them or alleviate the terror. 
The physical removal of the slov’iany constituted a disciplinary 
measure the state chose to apply in order to clarify the rules of existence in 
Soviet space to any other literary practitioners who might serve as 
propagandists of Soviet culture and institutions. There were “too many 
Ukrainians,” as the top party leadership in Moscow suggested, and the work 
could be optimized by the reduction of the number of cultural workers, 
especially when some of them were ideologically troubling for the center and 
obscured the path to the radiant future.
170
  
Importantly, the arrests of the most popular intellectuals had not 
scandalized Ukrainian society or its conscience in the 1930s. Just the opposite, 
many accepted the confessions of the “enemies” at face value.
171
 People were 
made to believe that the most dangerous elements, concealed enemies of the 
socialist state, were finally neutralized, and they celebrated the fact. A slave 
psychology cultivated by the state, multiplied by fear of being imprisoned, 
manifested itself at purging meetings and on the pages of Ukrainian 
periodicals. As the Serbian film director Emir Kusturica perceptively 
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commented on popular compliance in societies, “freedom is always difficult; 
slavery is always easy.”
172
 
On 26 October 1934, the head of Holovlit (Glavlit) Tkach, issued 
resolution no. 187 that ordered all regional branches to immediately extract 
from book stores, libraries and schools individual and collective publications 
written by Ukrainian “nationalists.”
173
 Although all slov’iany who were 
repressed during Stalin’s reign were rehabilitated posthumously, the fate of 
their works was tragic and their return to readers was thorny and dramatic.  
In the 1950s, after careful re-investigation of criminal cases linked to 
the UVO, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR 
concluded that the UVO, as well as criminal cases of those who were accused 
of membership in this organization, was a complete fabrication by Soviet 
secret organs.
174
 Despite the official acknowledgement of criminal activities 
committed by the secret police against the Ukrainian intelligentsia, in the 
1960s the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 
Ukraine Andrii Skaba announced: “We rehabilitated people but not their 
ideas!”
175
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Chapter Seven 
Unnecessary Bloodstained Confessions: The 
Repressions of 1934 
 
The whole concept of civic courage 
becomes meaningless in the era of 
Stalin, for it is not an act of courage to 
throw yourself under a truck.  
 
Adam B. Ulam
1
 
 
The Spatiality of the Terror 
The terror of 1933 reduced the residents of Budynok Slovo to 
submissive, desperate individuals who focused on solving the tasks of daily 
life, and were no longer devoted primarily to constructing a new Ukrainian 
culture. Some slov’iany succumbed to authority, living their lives quietly and 
in isolation, and hoping in this way to avoid repression; others became 
accomplices of the regime. The American scholar Adam B. Ulam has noted 
that “the temptation to avoid becoming victims by becoming accomplices was 
irresistible.” 
2
 The hope of being spared from repression competed with a 
sense of doom and helplessness in the face of the ubiquitous state and its 
punitive apparatus. Desensitized to their neighbor’s suffering, some slov’iany 
justified state violence, believing blindly that the new nation was beset with 
enemies and spies—an attitude cultivated in them through terror. False 
confessions appeared credible to many, and fictitious accusations seemed 
convincing. As Kostiuk has noted, the souls of the slov’iany appeared to have 
been “utterly possessed by the NKVD.”
3
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What has been termed “planned inconsistencies” and “the element of 
surprise” in the work of the GPU/NKVD produced a state of permanent 
uncertainty that disoriented people: no one was certain whether he or she was 
a target or a potential survivor.
4
 Social behavior conformed to a simple 
principle, “to see nothing where nothing was supposed to be seen and hear 
nothing where nothing was supposed to be heard”—a strategy aimed at 
protecting the individual from frightening realities.
5
 As Orlando Figes has 
posited, resignation or passivity (packing a bag for camps in advance or 
looking the other way during the arrest of neighbors) was one of the most 
emblematic features of mass terror.
6
   
The state implemented terror, mobilizing people by ideological 
propaganda. The favorite bugbear in these years was appealing to its citizens 
to be vigilant in fighting Ukrainian nationalism. For Soviet leaders, ideology 
was the “only title to legitimacy.”
7
 Curiously, malignant tendencies, such as 
local nationalism and the bureaucratization of the local elite, which were 
officially criticized in the republic and labeled by the state as 
counterrevolutionary, emanated from the center—from the party and 
government officials in Moscow. However, filtered through the ideological 
lens of raison d’etat, the hypocrisy was obscured in the popular mind. The 
ideological justification of terror appealed for popular assistance in 
institutionalizing and legitimizing the status quo. 
Beyond state ideological propaganda, the slov’iany were also spatially 
entangled in irreversibly compromising personal or professional relationships 
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with their fellow writers and neighbors who were arrested. Their “nationalist” 
past and professional interactions with the accused served as the evidence of 
criminal activity that was routinely used by the secret police against the 
slov’iany. They learned to adjust their deformed and elastic consciences to the 
new circumstances and settings. In 1934 they began to confess to planning 
assassinations not only of local party leaders but also of Stalin himself.
8
  
Importantly, denunciations became a spatially attached phenomenon—
their major production occurred in the GPU/NKVD prison through coercion 
and force. More than sufficient materials were “produced” by those who had 
been arrested to apprehend a fresh group of writers. Moreover, the principle of 
spatial “encapsulation” broke people psychologically before they found 
themselves in prison. The secret police encircled the residents and isolated 
them from the external world and from each other through economic measures 
and a fear for their lives.
9
  
Intriguingly, at a certain point the information about the center’s plan 
to conduct mass operations in Ukraine and to cleanse the republic of 
“nationalists” leaked through the chief assistant to the general prosecutor 
Antin Prykhod’ko who regularly informed the Kharkiv intelligentsia about the 
political “winds” and moods that emanated from Moscow. The key 
messengers were Khvyl’ovyi and Sokolians’kyi.
10
 Prykhod’ko had warned 
them that early arrests of halychany in Ukraine were just a prelude. The GPU 
had been planning mass arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals nationwide, and the 
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community in Budynok Slovo would suffer the most. However, in May 1933 
Khvyl’ovyi committed suicide, and in December 1933 Ivan Sokolians’kyi was 
arrested, as well as Prykhod’ko.
 11
 The transmission of information about 
maneuvering in Moscow, planned operations in Ukraine and the move against 
local nationalism was interrupted and virtually ceased, leaving the slov’iany in 
complete darkness.  
As noted earlier, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the centerpieces of 
preliminary investigations were denunciations and confessions. In 1934, 
confessions were no longer deemed crucial to the interrogators. The absence 
of confessions had no effect on the final verdict, as we will see.  
In 1934 Budynok Slovo remained the main focus of the search for 
nationalists. The place determined the nature and degree of guilt, and the 
specifics of their punishment. The building and its residents (“nationalists,” 
“Borot’bists” and “counterrevolutionaries”) became a “fatal brand,” using 
Shapoval’s term, and their transgressions and misdeeds were perceived by the 
secret police as not an individual but a collective affair.
12
   
Stalin’s speech at the January 1934 XVII Congress of the VKP(b), 
known as the “Congress of Victors,” officially justified and legitimized mass 
repressions of Ukrainians, and presaged further mass killings. Stalin 
proclaimed: 
There are debates about which deviation constitutes the main danger, Great Russian 
nationalism or local nationalism. Under existing conditions—these debates are 
useless. The deviation against which one has stopped fighting presents the most 
danger…Not so long ago in Ukraine, the gravitation toward Ukrainian nationalism 
was not the main danger, but as soon as we stopped fighting against it and allowed it 
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to grow to the point that it blended with interventionists, this deviation became the 
chief danger.
13
 
 
   In early February, Stalin made a decision to reorganize the OGPU and 
to create a Union-wide agency with republican branches. After painful 
debates, on10 July 1934, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR 
finally approved the reorganization of the OGPU into the People's 
Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD).
14
 The open struggle for power 
between Balyts’kyi and Genrikh Yagoda resulted in the appointment of 
Yagoda as the new head of the NKVD.
15
 Balyts’kyi’s defeat for the 
prestigious position of the head of the NKVD in Moscow prompted him to 
double his zeal in eliminating “nationalists” in the republic. 
  
Oleksa Slisarenko: Temporary Surrender  
The UVO was a truly “stretchable” organization, to which the NKVD 
added “members” incessantly in 1933 and 1934.
 16
 The 29 April 1934 arrest of 
the Ukrainian writer and the former chief editor of the largest private 
publishing house “Knyhospilka” Oleksa Slisarenko was inevitable. He was 
linked to symbolists and futurists, and in the 1920s he had been an active 
member of the literary associations “Hart” and VAPLITE.
17
 In 1927, he wrote 
an acutely critical letter to Maxim Gorky, a response to Gorky’s insulting 
                                                          
13
 I. Stalin, Stat’i i rechi ob Ukraine (Moskva: Partizdat, 1936), 223.  
14
 On the reorganization of the OGPU in 1934, see Paul Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police: Public 
Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926-1941 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2009), 151-57. 
15
 Iurii Shapoval, Volodymyr Prystaiko and Vadym Zolotar’ov, ChK-GPU-NKVD v Ukraini: 
Osoby, Fakty, Dokumenty (Kyiv: Abris, 1997), 60, 63. 
16
 Shapoval, “Fatal’nyi brend.” 
17
 For details on Slisarenko, see V.H. Donchyk, ed., Istoriia Ukrains’koi literatury XX stolittia 
(Kyiv: Lybid’, 1994), 1:587-95; Myroslav Shkandrij, Modernists, Marxists and the Nation: 
The Ukrainian Literary Discussion of the 1920s (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian 
Studies Press, University of Alberta, 1992), 20, 42, 91-3, 107-08, 152-4. On Ukrainian 
futurism, see Halyna Chernych, “Do istorii ukrains’koho futuryzmu,” Radians’ke 
literaturoznavstvo no. 8 (1989): 54-63.   
 300 
 
letter about the possible translation of his novel Mother into Ukrainian. 
Slisarenko’s response did not go unnoticed in Moscow. His novels Plantatsii 
(Plantations), 1925 and Bunt (Rebellion), 1928 irritated the authorities 
because in the former, Slisarenko romanticized a “powerful peasant force,” 
and in the latter, the writer depicted a rebellion against the authorities initiated 
by the students of an agricultural school. Soviet literary critics accused 
Slisarenko of revising Marxist ideas about the decisive forces of the 
proletarian revolution.
18
   
The Kharkiv GPU prison “hospitably” welcomed another slov’ianyn. 
On 25 May 1934, after the customary three weeks of physical and mental 
abuse, Slisarenko wrote a confession addressed to his interrogator Bordon.
19
 
The writer stated that he was a member of a counterrevolutionary organization 
which planned the demise of the Soviet regime and “the establishment of the 
fascist dictatorship in Ukraine.”
20
 Clearly, a man who was committed to the 
struggle for state sovereignty in Ukraine would hardly have characterized his 
noble mission as a “fascist” one. The adjective qualifying the term 
“dictatorship” was likely suggested or written by Bordon, who was also 
responsible for the boundless self-criticism and self-indictment allegedly 
written by Slisarenko. To expedite Slisarenko’s demoralization and to extract 
his confession, Bordon arranged a meeting between Dosvitnii and Slisarenko. 
At this encounter, Slisarenko’s friend and neighbor Dosvitnii confirmed 
Slisarenko’s membership in the UVO, which broke the latter’s spirit and 
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prompted him to confess.
21
 In doing so, he denounced the slov’iany Mykola 
Bazhan, Maik Iohansen, Valerian Pidmohyl’nyi, Hryhorii Epik, Petro Panch, 
Valerian Polishchuk, Arkadii Liubchenko, Mykola Kulish, Hordii Kotsiuba 
and Mykhailo Dolengo, and testified that they planned assassinations of party 
and secret police leaders. Slisarenko also explained his nationalist behavior as 
a protest against the famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine and Soviet collectivization 
policies that changed his “Soviet positions” and orientation.
22
   
However, Slisarenko’s awakening occurred when Bordon least 
expected it—after two months of preliminary investigation. Slisarenko’s 
stubbornness hindered the progress of the preliminary investigation. 
Slisarenko was kept in prison about a year before his trial, but in this time 
Bordon failed to break him. Meanwhile, the Soviet government issued the 
infamous 1 December 1934 law “About the procedure of preliminary 
investigation of cases connected to the preparation and implementation of 
terrorist acts.”
 23
 This law was specifically designed for recalcitrant inmates 
like Slisarenko, and Bordon could expedite it without any problems. But he 
was famous for his desire to humiliate the arrested and to accomplish their 
complete moral, intellectual and physical destruction. 
Bordon was unable to achieve this: Slisarenko denied his depositions 
during his trial on 19 March 1935, which was held by the Military Tribunal of 
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the Ukrainian Military District. He claimed that he signed his first two 
protocols out of fear and under Bordon’s pressure, and in them had confessed 
to crimes that he had never committed. Bordon, he claimed, was cruel, and 
often violent.
24
 According to Slisarenko, Bordon threatened to shoot him on 
the spot, in the interrogation room, to poison him in his prison cell and to 
employ repression against his family.
25
 Moreover, Slisarenko testified to the 
Tribunal that he was made to believe that his wife had died. He developed 
hallucinations, and under these circumstances he was given protocols to sign. 
He also pointed out that the dates of meetings that allegedly were held in 
Budynok Slovo by the members of the nationalist organization were false, and 
he could easily prove that he had never participated in them. These dates 
coincided with his father’s funeral and professional errands that had taken him 
out of Kharkiv.
26
  
The court members also learned that Slisarenko’s numerous requests 
for meetings with the military prosecutor and Balyts’kyi had gone unheard. 
Slisarenko also explained that his colleagues’ depositions about his terrorist 
activities (those of Irchan, Pylypenko, Dosvitnii, Ialovyi, Cherniak, Mondok, 
Hirniak) made no sense to him, and he insisted that despite the fact that most 
were his neighbors in Budynok Slovo, his communication with them had been 
limited.
27
 He declared that these testimonies were insinuations and lies, and 
they were extracted by force: people were frightened, intimidated and had like 
himself been morally broken.
28
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Oleksa Slisarenko.
29
  
 
The Tribunal ignored Slisarenko’s explanations altogether, and 
charged him with membership in the UVO, and with organizational activities 
related to the alleged planned assassination of Postyshev.
30
 He was sentenced 
to 10 years in labor camps and was exiled to the Solovky, but in October 1937 
he was accused of nationalist activities in prison, and sentenced to death by the 
UNKVD troika in the Leningrad oblast’.  Like many other slov’iany, he was 
shot by the GB captain Matveev in Sandarmokh on 3 November 1937.
31
  
Evidently, the presence of the accused at their trials was a formality. 
Even a superficial analysis of the procedure of these trials suggests that the 
outcome was always preconceived by the members of dvoikas, troikas, and 
tribunals. The victims’ revelations about the police’s violent practices had no 
effect whatsoever on the prosecutor or trial members. In 1934, there were only 
two sentences passed in most cases—10 years in labor camps or the death 
penalty. 
By 1934, the objectives and traditions of the GPU in Ukraine had been 
clearly delineated thanks to the efforts of Balyts’kyi who became a key figure 
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in fighting Ukrainian nationalism. His speeches abounded with epithets, such 
as “Petliurite” “nationalist,” “wrecker,” and precisely under his leadership 
several mass operations against conspirators in the agricultural sector, 
underground political parties and among Ukrainian intellectuals were 
conducted by the secret police.
32
 At the XII Party Congress in Ukraine, in 
January 1934, Balyts’kyi emphasized that underground nationalist groups, 
including Borot’bists, remained active in Ukraine, a fact that required 
vigilance and further mobilization of efforts and resources available to the 
secret police.
33
 Slisarenko became the first slov’ianyn to be arrested in 
Kharkiv which had ceased to be the Ukrainian capital. In March 1934, 
government offices, as well as the secret police departments, were moved to 
the new capital of Ukraine—Kyiv. The restructuring of state administration, as 
well the reorganization of its infrastructure, slightly decelerated the work of 
the GPU/NKVD. However, in just a few months, repression of the slov’iany 
and other “nationalist elements” recommenced with renewed force in response 
to Balyts’kyi’s call. November 1934 brought more tragedies to Budynok Slovo. 
The Galicians, the Krushel’nyts’kyi family, were arrested as Ukrainian 
nationalists and terrorists who planned to dethrone the Soviet regime.  
 
The Krushel’nytskyi Family: The Fatal Misstep 
On 5-6 November 1934, the secret police conducted a series of 
operations in Kharkiv, Kyiv and Moscow, arresting twenty-two prominent 
Ukrainian writers under the pretext of their alleged membership in the 
Association of Ukrainian Nationalists (the OUN), among whom were the 
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slov’iany Antin, Ivan and Taras Krushel’nyts’ki. Significantly, here the OUN 
connotes not the well-known Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists that 
functioned in Western Ukraine but the Association of Ukrainian Nationalists 
(Ob’iednannia ukrains’kykh natsionalistiv), an organization that had been 
fabricated in the imaginations of the NKVD. The secret organs claimed that 
emissaries of the OUN in Western Ukraine infiltrated Soviet Ukraine for the 
purpose of organizing branches of this organization. They allegedly found 
support among the remnants of other nationalist organizations, such as the 
UVO and the Nationalist Borot’bist Organization and, according to the 
NKVD, created chapters in Kharkiv, Kyiv and Moscow. The conspirators 
allegedly planned terrorist acts against party and government leaders in the 
republic and in Moscow.
34
  
Antin Krushel’nytskyi was a Ukrainian writer, literary critic, teacher, a 
former minister of education in the UNR in 1919 and an editor. After the 
collapse of the UNR, he moved to Vienna, and returned to Galicia in 1925. 
But in May 1934, under pressure from the Polish authorities in Western 
Ukraine and encouraged by Ukrainization in the UkrSSR, he made a mistake 
which proved fatal for his family.
35
 On 11 May he moved to Kharkiv to work 
for the national and cultural revival of Soviet Ukraine.
36
 His sons Ostap (a 
journalist and film critic) and Bohdan (an economist and teacher) arrived in 
Kharkiv together with their parents. A third son Taras (a writer, musician and 
political figure) with his wife Stefa joined the family two months later. Antin’s 
daughter Volodymyra (a doctor, writer and cultural figure) and his son Ivan (a 
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 Ivan Dziuba, Z krynytsi lit (Kyiv: KMA, 2006), 1:221; L.I. Krushel’nyts’ka, Rubaly lis... 
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poet, literary critic and artist) who settled first in Kharkiv in 1932 asked the 
family to join them, so their re-union was congenial and desirable for all 
family members.
37
 In hindsight, this might have been a GPU trap to lure the 
family back to Soviet Ukraine.
38
 One of the most active members of the 
cooperative “Slovo” Hryhorii Epik promised Antin that he and his family 
would eventually receive their own apartment in Budynok Slovo,
 
but a 
temporary solution for the large Krushel’nytskyi family was found thanks to 
Vrazhlyvyi’s hospitality and the efforts of leaders in the cooperative 
“Slovo.”
39
 The family was first placed in different apartments, and later 
several members of the family moved to Vrazhlyvyi’s three-room apartment. 
Here they found themselves in the heart of the fragmented and frightened 
literary community.
40
 
By the early 1930s, nearly 50-60,000 political immigrants from 
Western Ukraine, seduced by Soviet propaganda, had arrived to build a new 
socialist life in Soviet Ukraine. The Krushel’nytskyi family was among the 
last immigrants to the Soviet state which by 1934 had dramatically reduced 
contacts with Western Ukraine in anticipation of war. In 1934, among 128 
applications to the USSR’s Lviv consulate, only 14 families received 
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permission to immigrate, including the Krushel’nytskyis.
41
 They intended to 
settle in Soviet Ukraine permanently, and therefore brought all their material 
possessions with them, including Antin’s extraordinarily large library and their 
home furnishings.         
  
The Krushel’nyts’kyi Family. Sitting from left to right: 
Volodymyra, Taras, Maria, Larysa (Ivan’s daughter) and Antin. 
Standing: Ostap, Halia (Ivan’s wife), Ivan, Natalia (Bohdan’s 
wife), Bohdan.  
 
  As Antin’s granddaughter Larysa remembers, the family did not even 
have an opportunity to unpack their suitcases and to normalize their everyday 
life in Budynok Slovo.
42
 Five months after their arrival in Soviet Ukraine, 
apartment 54 was cleared of its residents. On the eve of the anniversary of the 
October Revolution, during the night of 5-6 November 1934, Antin and his 
two older sons Ivan and Taras were arrested, and transported to Kyiv to be 
tried together with other writers who were accused of Ukrainian nationalism 
and membership in the OUN.
43
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Taras admitted his guilt, Ivan did not, but they were hastily shot on 17 
December 1934, soon after Kirov’s murder, three days after the verdict was 
signed by the “itinerant session” (vyiizdna sesia) of the Military Collegium of 
the USSR Supreme Court led by Ul’rikh.
44
 29-year-old Ivan and 25-year-old 
Taras were shot together with the famous Ukrainian writers Hryhorii Kosynka, 
Dmytro Fal’kivs’kyi, Oleksa Vlyz’ko, and Kost’ Burevii (in total 28 people).
45
 
Interestingly, Vlyz’ko was accused of membership in the OUN, and active 
participation in various meetings. It would be difficult to imagine him an 
active participant or speaker because at the age of 13 he lost his ability to hear 
and speak as a complication of an infectious disease.
46
 Bohdan, Ostap and 
Volodymyra were arrested a month later—in December 1934, and together 
with their father, were sent to Solovky. None of them returned alive.
47
  
Ivan’s daughter, six-year-old Larysa, together with her two aunts, was 
taken to Kursk and later to Lviv where she miraculously survived the terror.
 
As Larysa wrote later, “the large Krushel’nyts’kyi family factually ceased to 
exist.”
48
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 Antin’s case was handled by Bordon who applied to him a set of 
standard methods of pressure exercised on other slov’iany.
49
 Bordon accused 
Antin of leadership in the OUN, an organization that like many others, as we 
have seen, had been entirely concocted in the GPU offices. Antin allegedly 
planned to demolish the Soviet regime through a chain of terrorist acts against 
party and government leaders.
50
 The 56-year-old Antin initially believed that 
his arrest was a terrible mistake which would be resolved very quickly.
51
 
However, the investigation of other OUN “members” gained momentum, and 
Antin was soon convoyed to Kyiv. His case was assigned to Grushevskii and 
Sokolov, famous for their ability to break a suspect’s will.
52
  
After two weeks of investigation, on 28 November 1934, Antin 
confessed that he had come to Soviet Ukraine to conduct counterrevolutionary 
activity for the OUN, although he denied his children’s membership in the 
organization.
53
 On 5 December 1934, he claimed that he personally had 
recruited the slov’iany Kulish and Epik to the OUN.
54
 Grushevskii and 
Sokolov were not interested in Antin’s denunciation of his children. Their 
names had been mentioned in depositions of other halychany, such as Iulian 
Bachyns’kyi (a journalist and political figure) and Roman Skazyns’kyi (a 
journalist and editor of the Natsmenshvydav Publishing House). One of those 
who also testified against the family—including Antin, Volodymyra, Taras 
and Ivan—was Bilen’kyi-Berezyns’kyi, a provocateur and GPU agent.
55
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Besides their alleged membership in the OUN, the most “powerful evidence” 
against Antin’s children was their origin. For instance, Volodymyra was 
accused of being the daughter of the former “Petliurite Minister of Education,” 
which ultimately confirmed her guilt in the eyes of the NKVD.
56
  
Not surprisingly, after the arrests of her entire family, the wife of 
Antin, Maria Krushel’nyts’ka, became fatally ill, and on 28 August 1935, she 
died entirely alone in one of Kharkiv’s hospitals. Her grave was destroyed by 
the Soviets, like many other graves of Ukrainian intellectuals and political 
figures, including Mykola Khvyl’ovyi. 
57
  
The re-union of other members of the family occurred in Sandarmokh 
posthumously. As the “leader” of the OUN, Antin was sentenced to 10 years 
in labor camps, and along with many Ukrainian intellectuals, he was convoyed 
to Solovky. Bohdan, Ostap and Volodymyra denied the accusations against 
them but nevertheless were sentenced to five years in prison camps.
58
 
Volodymyra was transferred from the White Sea-Baltic camp to Solovky on 
27 May 1935 where she had the opportunity to see her father.
 59
 Following a 
verdict of the NKVD troika in the Leningrad oblast’, Antin was shot on 23 
October 1937, and Bohdan, Ostap and Volodymyra—on 3 November 1937, as 
Ukrainian nationalists.
60
  
 Antin Krushel’nyts’kyi’s criminal file contains an interesting 
operational note, which confirms enduring beliefs and speculations of scholars 
about the fate of “evidence” confiscated by the secret police during arrests. 
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The NKVD expropriated books, documents, correspondence and other 
personal papers that belonged to the suspects. Among them were poems, plays 
and novels that had never been published. Rumors in subsequent decades held 
that they were preserved in the archives of the secret police. However, many 
witnesses testified that before the Nazi troops occupied Kharkiv, black smoke 
had been hovering over the GPU building for days—the secret police had been 
burning its archives.
61
 The 16 June 1941 operational note in 
Krushel’nyts’kyi’s file revealed that the secret police had indeed kept 13 
notebooks of Krushel’nyts’kyi’s novel Motherland written in Ukrainian. The 
note also stated that on 4 June 1941 the notebooks had been burned, likely in 
anticipation of the German invasion. Similar acts of vandalism are evident in 
archive and library copies of publications produced in the 1920-30s: Antin 
Krushel’nyts’kyi’s forewords and articles have been cut out from journals with 
scissors and his name thoroughly crossed out with black ink by Soviet 
censors.
62
  
 GPU/NKVD documents demonstrate that the arrests of the 
Krushel’nyts’kyi family were an operation thoroughly prepared by the secret 
police. The fabrication of this case was instigated and supervised by the head 
of the 2
nd
 secret department Dolinskii and the head of the SPV in the Kharkiv 
oblast’ Govlich.
63
 Three members of this family were strategically arrested on 
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the same night in Budynok Slovo, which saved the secret police time and 
additional resources. Three others were hunted down one by one in various 
places—they were on trips connected with their professional activities. The 
entire operation was completed efficiently and quickly within a month.   
The Ukrainian scholar and dissident Ivhen Sverstiuk has noted that 
thanks to the scholar Larysa Krushel’nyts’ka’s memoirs, knowledge about this 
tragedy has been publicized and broadly discussed. The Krushel’nyts’kyi’s 
case exemplified the drama of the Ukrainian intelligentsia who had been 
moved by a feeling of duty to maintain national cultural traditions. Antin 
realized too late that his family had no chance for survival in Kharkiv, and 
perhaps never forgave himself for bringing his beloved wife and children to 
Kharkiv. Yet, he saved the lives of several prominent Ukrainian intellectuals 
from Galicia by discouraging them from emigrating to Soviet Ukraine.
64
 
Indeed, the members of the Krushel’nyts’kyi family who were educators and 
writers, whose excellent European education allowed them to master several 
languages and who had experienced life in Vienna, Prague and Lviv, 
embodied the best traditions and free spirit of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and 
these assets, including their origins, biographies and dispositions, made them 
political offenders in the eyes of the system.
65
 For similar reasons, the 
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slov’ianyn and halychanyn Valerian Polishchuk was destined to be the next 
victim of Stalin’s terror. 
 
Valerian Polishchuk: “An Artist with Nerves Stretched like Strings”
66
  
     In 1924, the Ukrainian writer Valerian Polishchuk visited Moscow to 
receive his visa for his trip to Berlin. Vsevolod Meerkhol’d connected 
Polishchuk with Lev Trotsky through the Kremlin telephone line. Polishchuk 
wanted to talk with Trotsky about the “old Russian inertia related to Ukrainian 
culture, which Moscow inherited from tsarism.” In his letter to his wife Elena 
Konukhes, Valerian complained that the line had been interrupted constantly 
and filled with foreign sounds. “Apparently, the GPU,” wrote Polishchuk in 
his letter.
67
  
 It seems likely that the secret police were listening to Polishchuk’s 
conversation with Trotsky. What was even more probable is that his letter to 
his wife was subjected to perlustration, the oldest and most reliable method of 
surveillance employed by the secret organs. Naively, Polishchuk in his letter 
exposed not only himself as a person who was concerned about Ukrainian 
culture but also his colleagues, the slov’iany Tychyna and Dosvitnii, who, 
according to Polishchuk’s description, “had more national complaints about 
the Russians” than he.
68
 His “political physiognomy” therefore was 
established by the GPU quite early, and his further social and professional 
activities only confirmed their portrait of him as a Ukrainian nationalist.  
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 Polishchuk’s relationships with the slov’iany were complicated. 
Rebellious by nature, Valerian fought Khvyl’ovyi, Tychyna and others 
through his polemical articles. Verbal debates alternated with physical fights, 
for instance with Sosiura, although they were based on sexual jealousies.
69
 In 
the 1920s, as leader of the literary association of constructivists “Avanhard,” 
Polishchuk gathered similar rebels around him—the future slov’iany Leonid 
Chernov-Maloshyichenko and Raisa Troianker. They gained a reputation as 
“fellow traveler” writers, and the party establishment grew skeptical about 
their ideological dependability. After his arrest, during his first interrogations, 
Polishchuk reluctantly admitted that the association “Avanhard” had a 
counterrevolutionary essence and its publications facilitated a nationalist spirit 
among literati.
70
   
 Polishchuk intensified the GPU’s interest in him during the first 
Congress of Soviet Writers in Moscow to which he was delegated as a 
Ukrainian writer. At the meeting of Soviet writers with Stalin, Polishchuk 
asked Stalin why Voronezh oblast’ and a part of Kursk oblast’, mostly 
inhabited by the Ukrainians, had not been included in the UkrSSR, a question 
that had been debated for some time between Skrypnyk and the Moscow 
leadership.
71
 Polishchuk did not receive any answer at the time. However, this 
question was thoroughly discussed later with his interrogator Proskuriakov 
when Polishchuk was imprisoned.
 72
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 Polishchuk was arrested on 5 December 1934 in the presence of the 
administrator of the Budynok Slovo Pavlo Lytvynenko, after Polishchuk wrote 
to the head of the culture department of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U 
Mykhailo Killeroh.
73
 In this letter, Polishchuk complained that the state 
publishing houses “Radians’ka literatura” (Soviet Literature) and “LIM” 
refused to publish his prose because of its supposed “nationalist” content, and 
that he was no longer able to feed his family through his professional 
activity—for two months he had been selling his library.
74
 The NKVD found a 
solution for Polishchuk’s hardships—he was accused of membership in the 
Anti-Soviet Borot’bist Organization, a newly fabricated case against 
Ukrainian nationalists.
75
  
Polishchuk was denounced by several individuals who attributed the 
most heinous crimes to him, including the attempted murder of Stalin.
76
 The 
depositions of the journalist of the newspaper Komunist Mykola Liubchenko 
alleged that Polishchuk, as well as the other slov’iany Kulish and Epik who 
were arrested shortly after Valerian, were members of the Anti-Soviet 
Borot’bist Organization.
77
 In depositions that we now know were false, Oleksa 
Slisarenko called Polishchuk the leader and “inspiration” of terroristic 
activities planned by the organization.
78
 Vasyl’ Vrazhlyvyi confirmed 
Polishchuk’s membership in the organization, and revealed that Polishchuk 
reported to him that he saw Postyshev and Kosior in the middle of the night 
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walking in Sumskaia Street, in the center of Kharkiv. According to 
Vrazhlyvyi, Polishchuk believed that this situation was a perfect setting for 
their assassination, and was surprised that they were not afraid to wander 
unguarded at night.
79
 Similarly, Epik who was arrested shortly after 
Polishchuk claimed Polishchuk’s leadership in the Kharkiv branch of the 
organization, and that he together with the slov’iany Valerian Pidmohyl’nyi 
and Vasyl’ Vrazhlyvyi had prepared terrorist acts against the Ukrainian party 
leaders, which were to be implemented  on the eve of the October holidays.
80
 
Epik went even further, and testified that Polishchuk recommended Levko 
Koval’ov as a reliable candidate for the assassination of Stalin in Moscow.
81
 
After this statement, any struggle seemed to be a lost cause. 
Polishchuk’s confession and the depositions of his colleagues were sufficient 
evidence at the time to sentence Polishchuk to death. However, the 
interrogators of Epik and Polishchuk—Khaet and Proskuriakov—considered it 
necessary to prolong the torture of the slov’iany through ochnye stavki during 
which the intimidated writers often confirmed lies imposed on them by their 
interrogators.
82
 Khaet and Proskuriakov arranged meetings between Epik and 
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Polishchuk, and between the Kyiv poet Ievhen Pluzhnyk and Polishchuk.
83
  
Epik attacked Polishchuk and lied about a supposed conversation that had 
occurred between them in Epik’s apartment in Budynok Slovo in early 
September 1934. Epik insisted that they discussed the need for “terrorist 
activity” and testified that Polishchuk had been in charge of the Kharkiv 
terrorist group. Polishchuk denied Epik’s accusations and stated that the nature 
of his conversations with Epik had never been political but purely artistic and 
literary.
84
 Pluzhnyk testified that Polishchuk was a member of a nationalist  
 
                                     
Valerian Polishchuk.
85
  Valerian Polishchuk in 1933,  
Kharkiv.
86
 
 
organization and wanted to take revenge on Moscow for Khvyl’ovyi’s and 
Skrypnyk’s deaths. Polishchuk defended himself and denied everything.
87
  
Polishchuk’s transformation finally occurred in Kyiv where he was 
convoyed from the Kharkiv prison. On 8 January 1935, the interrogators 
finally broke his spirit. The tone of his depositions dramatically changed. 
“Looking back, I realized how much harm I did to the Soviet state,” declared 
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Polishchuk.
88
  He continued, “Nationalism that was deeply rooted in me 
obscured my path to socialism.” 
89
 A lyric poet who established himself as 
such because of his original literary style and his command of the Ukrainian 
language, Polishchuk suddenly “revealed” himself as a crude primitive who 
used bureaucratic language, indeed socialist in content but very far from 
“national” in its form. In an awkward crude form, Polishchuk begged for 
forgiveness for his “formalistic behavior in Kharkiv during the preliminary 
investigation,” and stated that “only the investigation in Kyiv demonstrated to 
him the depth of the nationalist abyss into which he was falling.”
90
 
The interrogator Proskuriakov was pleased by this sudden turn of the 
investigative process. He immediately wrote a report to his supervisors, in 
which he characterized Polishchuk as a Ukrainian chauvinist, and noted that 
the journal “Avanhard” in which Polishchuk published his nationalist 
lampoons would be attached to his criminal file as evidence of his 
counterrevolutionary activities. Moreover, Proskuriakov suddenly discovered 
in himself the abilities of a literary critic, and provided a brief analysis of 
Polishchuk’s “vulgar pornographic” prose.
91
  Polishchuk’s notes (bloknoty) 
that were confiscated during his arrest, as well as his little telephone book, 
were also added to his file as evidence of his hostility to the regime and his 
connections with nationalists.
92
    
Very few cases were fabricated without the assistance of Bilen’kyi-
Berezyns’kyi who denounced Polishchuk, as well as 17 other people who were 
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tried together with Valerian.
 93
 By the middle of March 1935, in view of the 
overwhelming evidence (considering the prosecution’s standards) of 
Polishchuk’s guilt, further investigation of his case was considered 
inexpedient. Even his best friend and slov’ianyn Valerian Pidmohyl’nyi finally 
testified against him.
94
  
During the preliminary investigation, out of 17 people involved in the 
alleged Borot’bist conspiracy, only Koval’ov denied all charges and never 
made a confession to the imaginary plans to assassinate Stalin. Polishchuk 
admitted his guilt only partially.
95
 He was among those who signed all 
protocols and fully repented for the crimes he allegedly committed, but denied 
the depositions of his colleagues. The Military Prosecutor Bazykin who in 
1956 reinvestigated the case noted that in conjunction with this criminal case 
of 17 people, he reexamined more than 53 group criminal cases that contained 
the materials for more than 100 people. Many of them had been rehabilitated, 
and a great number of them never confessed to the crimes for which they were 
charged. According to Bazykin, the depositions are confusing and 
inconsistent, and as the interrogators assigned to these cases testified 
(Grushevskii, Bordon, Pustovoitov, Proskuriakov and others who were 
repressed and executed in 1937), the cases had been fabricated by them 
individually or collectively, and these actions had been encouraged and 
approved by their supervisors.
96
 Even leaving aside an analysis of the 
interrogators’ testimonies in 1937, as well as their role in fabricating criminal 
cases against Ukrainian intellectuals (this topic deserves a separate 
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investigation), it would be fair to suggest that the prosecution left no legal 
space for the suspects to resist the allegations. The absence of evidence and, in 
many cases, the absence of confessions were not obstacles to the prosecution 
finding their victims guilty and sentencing them to death, or to ten years in 
prison, a term that was equal to a death penalty in the severe climatic and 
political conditions of northern camps. However, the prosecution habitually 
worked toward the confession of the suspect to preserve the façade of 
legalism, and to make it easier to “find fresh inculpations,” as Robert 
Conquest has noted.
97
  
On 27-28 March 1935, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court 
sentenced Polishchuk to 10 years in labor camps,
98
 but in Solovoky on 9 
October 1937 the NKVD troika sentenced him to death for “maintaining 
counterrevolutionary positions and continuing spying terroristic activity.” 
Polishchuk was shot in Sandarmokh on 3 November 1937.
99
 
Following Polishchuk’s arrest, his family was evicted from Budynok 
Slovo, and his wife Elena with two children Marko and Liutsyna found shelter 
at her sister’s place in Moscow.
100
 Through the efforts of Polishchuk’s family, 
on 31 November 1962, 25 years after his death, he was rehabilitated like many 
other slov’iany.
101
 Polishchuk’s wife Elena greatly contributed to the process 
of rehabilitating her husband, although her health was poor at the time. She 
testified before the commission and vigorously rejected all accusations against 
Polishchuk.  
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However, her testimony revealed some discrepancy between the 
content of Polishchuk’s criminal case and Polishchuk’s last words to his 
wife.
102
 During their meeting in prison, he claimed that he never signed any 
papers and never confessed to any crimes. Polishchuk also assured her that he 
was innocent and those who had denounced him and with whom he had had 
ochnye stavki could not “look him straight in his eye.”
103
 On this basis, the 
forging of Polishchuk’s protocols, as well as his signature, without him being 
aware of this fact, seems very likely. The scenario of personal embarrassment 
about his moment of weakness when he denounced himself as a Ukrainian 
nationalist, and the unlikelihood that he would reveal this to his wife seems 
equally possible. Whatever the case might be, besides Koval’ov who had 
never accepted his guilt, Polishchuk was the only slov’ianyn among 17 people 
bound together in one criminal case who accepted his guilt only “partially,” as 
the prosecution verdict stated. There are reasons to believe Elena’s testimony, 
especially given the ability of the GPU to squeeze at least “partial” 
confessions out of the suspects. As Conquest suggested, obtaining full or 
“partial” confessions made NKVD operatives successful in the eyes of their 
supervisors; unsuccessful ones “had a short life-expectancy.”
104
     
As has been shown, inconsistencies and approximations in fabricating 
cases were allowed and approved by the high officials in the secret police. The 
sloppiness that was manifested in Ialovyi’s case in 1933 grew into deliberate 
negligence and a new indifference in composing rough drafts of interrogation 
protocols by GPU agents. As the practice demonstrated, operational and 
investigative inconsistencies meant little in the final analysis of criminal files 
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by their supervisors, as well as during the final stage of investigation—the 
trial. For instance, according to the former director of the Blakytnyi House 
Maksym Lebid’ who was arrested in December 1934, Polishchuk was 
denounced as a UVO member, although according to many other depositions, 
he was portrayed as a member of a new, freshly conceived by the secret 
organs, Ukrainian nationalist organization, the OUN.
105
 However, this 
dissonance did not seem to be important in the final analysis of Polishchuk’s 
guilt. Lebid’s deposition had been added to Polishchuk’s criminal file as 
evidence proving Polishchuk’s guilt.  
Moreover, in his earlier interrogation protocols, Epik (or his 
interrogators) claimed that Polishchuk was the leader of the nationalist 
organization but in his 19 January 1935 conversation with the prosecutor, Epik 
posited that among the leaders of the organization he knew only Mykola 
Kulish and Antin Krushel’nyts’kyi.
106
 Vrazhlyvyi insisted that Polishchuk was 
just a member, and the leader was Epik.
107
 Several days later, during ochnaia 
stavka with Valerian Pidmohyl’nyi, Epik returned to his previous story, and 
Polishchuk again “became” the leader of the organization.
108
 Clearly, the GPU 
agents abandoned the idea of comparing these depositions with data obtained 
from the suspects who had been arrested earlier. But most ironically, the 
interrogators were no longer concerned about the logic and logistics of events 
and consistencies in people’s depositions even within one criminal file. The 
principle “anything goes” indeed worked, and was reinforced from above.  
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Incongruously, attempts to justify and accommodate these 
inconsistencies were undertaken in 1955 when the rehabilitation campaign 
gained momentum. Despite the fact that some UVO “members” had already 
been rehabilitated and the fabricators of the UVO and other cases had been put 
in prison and shot in 1937, the plenipotentiary of the 1
st
 department of the 
KGB Tkachenko composed a report, in which he narrated the history of the 
UVO in Soviet Ukraine. As he “discovered,” the UVO was eventually 
transformed into the OUN, and the members of this organization, the writers 
in Kharkiv, were active participants who even helped corrupt the Communist 
movement in Western Ukraine.
109
 According to the “writers” from the secret 
police, the Anti-Soviet Borot’bist Organization gathered under its umbrella the 
remnants of the UVO and OUN, an attempt to conslolidate all nationalist 
forces in Ukraine under the leadership of former Borot’bists. Interestingly, 
Tkachenko never mentioned that other than claims about the alleged 
membership of so many people in all these organizations and allegations about 
alleged anti-Soviet terrorist activities as described by the suspects, these 
criminal files contained no concrete evidence of the existence of these 
organizations. Ukrainian nationalism, as well as Borot’bism, was simply a 
“fatal brand,” repeating Shapoval’s terms, which determined the fate of 
Ukrainian intellectuals in the 1930s.
110
  
The early December 1934 arrests swept away another cohort of 
talented Ukrainian writers in Budynok Slovo. On the basis of denunciations, 
the NKVD harvested six more writers and journalists in Budynok Slovo, 
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destroying their families and irreversibly changing the personal lives of their 
members. Among the arrested were Andrii Paniv, Volodymyr Shtanhei, 
  
                 
Andrii Paniv.   Valerian Pidmohyl’nyi.   Ivan Lakyza. 
 
 
                
 Mykola Kulish.                            Vasyl’ Vrazhlyvyi. 
 
          
Valerian Pidmohyl’nyi, Mykola Kulish, Ivan Lakyza and Vasyl’ 
Vrazhlyvyi.
111
 Each of these writers, “Decemberists of 1934,” deserves a 
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separate narrative. Their literary gifts and desire to serve Ukrainian culture, as 
well as their close connections with those who were arrested in 1933, made 
them guilty in the eyes of the secret police.  
Growing from the GPU’s reports, fictitious nationalist Ukrainian 
organizations mushroomed with extraordinary speed in the republic. 
According to a legend, some powerful GPU/NKVD leader suggested shutting 
all the doors and windows in Budynok Slovo to prevent the writers’ escape, 
and, when the time was “right,” arresting them all at once in order to save 
gasoline for the agency.
112
 The definition of writers as artists “with nerves 
stretched like strings,” provided by Polishchuk, acquired a second meaning in 
the context of relentless repressions. Hypersensitivity, and sophisticated and 
subtle understandings of realities that characterize artists no longer manifested 
themselves within the community of Budynok Slovo. These qualities were 
replaced by nervousness and paranoid fears of approaching death, feelings that 
overwhelmed the writers, ultimately affecting the spatial organization of their 
existence in many different ways. The behavioral change of the slov’ianyn 
Hryhorii Epik, who was arrested on the same night as Polishchuk, on 5 
December 1934, when considered through the prism of a new space and 
attitudes toward him which confronted him after his arrest, reveals the 
limitations of human nature under coercion and torture.
113
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Hryhorii Epik: A Return to Roots   
The American behavioral geographer Joseph Sonnenfeld has argued 
that “personality implies behavior or a predisposition to behave” in a certain 
way under certain circumstances.
114
 He has insisted that individual attitudes, 
perceptions and values are validated through behavior, and precisely 
individual personalities stand in the way of the homogeneity of any population 
or community. True, the community of the writers had never been 
homogenous, although it had been conceived as such. The spectrum of 
individual personalities of the writers was broad which contributed to 
disagreements and even conflicts among them and resulted in gradual 
fragmentation of their community.  
However, many behavioral psychologists would add another factor that 
might have facilitated their societal destruction, as well as the individual 
corruption and moral deterioration which was observed in prison. This factor 
might be seen as an “incongruity” between their beliefs and values, and social 
and political realities, including the values of their interrogators. This 
“incongruity” resulted in a chronic state of frustration that in turn produced 
behavioral change. When in prison the slov’iany encountered hostile attitudes 
toward them, uttered straightforwardly and bluntly, and upon learning 
information dissonant with their beliefs and values, they either changed them, 
or denied and discounted the integrity of this information.
115
 
The painful choice of goals and actions that the slov’iany faced in 
prison was determined by their needs, and first of all, by the need for 
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survival—the need to resist extinction.
116
 For some, individual survival was 
less important than for others. Martyrdom and personal beliefs and principles 
for which people were willing to die became a fact in the history of violence, 
terror and repression. However, the avoidance of suffering and pain, both 
physical and moral, certainly was a priority for the majority of the slov’iany.  
Hryhorii Epik’s story illustrates a personal tragedy of surrendering his 
beliefs and principles for the sake of survival, which ruined his internal core 
and produced extraordinary moral suffering for him. Frightening realities of a 
new place and space of his residence that drastically contrasted with his 
environment in Budynok Slovo forced him to accept and internalize new 
beliefs and values, previously foreign for him. This positioned him against the 
cultural and social standards of the community of writers. Skillfully 
manipulating public opinion, state propaganda reinforced and mythicized 
Epik’s malicious image of not only a Ukrainian nationalist and a terrorist but 
also an image of an immoral human being. As a result, in memoir literature, 
Epik’s image has been established as different from those of other slov’iany, 
as a deviation from the moral norm in the given landscape—Budynok Slovo. 
He has been ascribed a reputation as a traitor that was incompatible with the 
lofty aesthetics of the writers’ community.   
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Hryhorii Epik. 
 
Yet, in the context of this research, little was found in Epik’s behavior 
that could be considered substantively different or unusual. His behavior 
before and after arrest fell neatly into a common scheme of human behaviors 
exhibited under the pressure of state violence. An analysis of Epik’s actions 
under interrogation and in the labor camps seems indicative of the 
commonalities in human reactions to physical and moral abuse rather than of 
non-typical responses to this sort of violence. Epik’s life story illuminates the 
distortions of human personality and psyche under Stalinism which erased, or 
rather altered principles and ideals, and poisoned people’s perceptions of each 
other.  
Those who knew Epik remembered him as affectionately as a sincere, 
friendly and sensitive person, although it appears that Epik’s contemporaries 
more favorably wrote about his personality than about his creative work.
117
 In 
1930, Epik realized that it would be more sensible to avoid confrontations 
with the regime.  For instance, in late December 1930, Epik escaped to 
Odesa’s cardiological sanatorium under a false pretense to treat his 
myocarditis, although the true reason was a desire to avoid participating in the 
dramatic events related to the liquidation of the literary association 
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“Prolitfront” instigated by the state, the association to which he belonged.
118
 
He realized that the days of “Prolitfront” were numbered, and any affiliation 
with this group would complicate his further literary career. His life and 
literary work became more and more subjected to politics, and the populist 
expectations of his readers and the party began to dictate his literary agenda. 
In 1931 and 1932, Epik wrote pro-Soviet proletarian novels Persha 
Vesna (The First Spring) about the collectivization campaign, and Petro 
Romen, a hymn to a new positive type of proletarian worker. The Moscow 
newspaper Literaturnaia gazeta published an article that characterized Petro 
Romen as a significant work in an ideological and artistic sense. Epik was 
called a proletarian writer and an engine of the mass proletarian literary 
movement in Kharkiv.
119
   
Yet, Epik entirely shared Khvyl’ovyi’s ideas about a separate path of 
Ukrainian culture, and his only hope was that Skrypnyk might be able to save 
the Ukrainian language and culture from russification.
120
 The events of May 
and July 1933 when Khvyl’ovyi and Skrypnyk committed suicide broke Epik 
mentally and intellectually. By the time of his arrest, Epik realized that there 
was an abyss between the goals of the party leaders and the aspirations of the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia. Intellectual autonomy in Soviet society was a 
chimera, and neither his professional skills nor political loyalty to the party 
were of great importance to the authorities. Intellectuals were a commodity 
that could be used in the ideological struggle against counterrevolutionaries 
and, after the task was completed, were to be thrown in the dustbin of history 
as nationalists and terrorists. In January 1934, about a year before Epik’s 
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arrest, he told Kostiuk: “The situation, my friend, is simple: no matter what we 
write—they will beat us. Apparently, they do not care about our artistic works, 
they care about our lives.”
121
  
Evidently, this was a painful confession to make for a person whose 
conscience had been co-opted and subdued by the privileges and fame that 
Soviet power had allowed him to enjoy for a decade. The last days Epik spent 
in Budynok Slovo before his arrest were days of personal crisis that might have 
led to his further moral degradation and mental deterioration. The arrests of 
his neighbors and the feeling of claustrophobia in Budynok Slovo might have 
destroyed him psychologically. Moreover, he could no longer function 
normally at work—he was the chief editor of the Publishing House “LIM,” 
and the political atmosphere in Ukraine paralyzed his everyday professional 
activities.
122
  
In the eyes of the secret police, Epik was compromised by his 
membership in VAPLITE and Prolitfront, and most importantly, by his 
friendship with Kulish and Khvyl’ovyi.
123
 Interestingly, the NKVD resolution 
about Epik’s arrest was signed on 7 December 1934 in Kyiv but the Kharkiv 
NKVD arrested him two days before this without proper documentation, 
although Litvinenko and the writer Oleksandr Kopylenko were invited as 
witnesses during his arrest.
124
 On 5 December 1934, Epik was convoyed to 
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Kyiv where other “members” of the Borot’bist organization were under 
preliminary investigation.
125
 
The NKVD records shed some light on Epik’s feelings of doom and 
the inevitability of arrest during these last days. The NKVD operative 
Luk’ianov who arrested Epik wrote in his report that Epik and his wife were 
very calm during the arrest, and apparently they had prepared for the arrest in 
advance. Epik’s wife Vira had sold his hunting gun and collected money 
others owed them. Epik told the agent that he had no hopes of being released 
any time soon, and according to Luk’ianov, “Vira smiled all the time” during 
the search.
126
 Perhaps, she still cherished the hope of the imminent return of 
her husband. 
After his arrest, Epik instantly confessed to his supposed membership 
in the Ukrainian nationalist organization and to counterrevolutionary 
activity.
127
 He explained that his actions were a protest against state 
collectivization policies and its result—the famine of 1932-33.
128
 He claimed 
that Ialovyi, Khvyl’ovyi and Kulish inspired him to believe that Soviet power 
had to be demolished, since it constrained the political, economic and cultural 
development of Ukraine. But he named Kulish as the person who allegedly 
recruited him into the nationalist organization after Khvyl’ovyi committed 
suicide.
129
 The interrogator Khaet also extracted from Epik depositions that 
cast the slov’iany Antin Krushel’nyts’kyi, Dosvitnii, Polishchuk, Kulish, 
Ianovs’kyi, Slisarenko, Vrazhlyvyi, Pidmohyl’nyi, Kopylenko, Senchenko, 
Paniv and Lakyza as Ukrainian nationalists and potential terrorists. Epik also 
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denounced a number of writers from Kyiv (Kosynka, Pluzhnyk, Antonenko-
Davydovych and Fal’kivs’kyi), and Moscow (Koval’ov), stating that they 
were members of the Kyiv and Moscow nationalist branches.
130
 He claimed 
the organization had been seeking support from German fascists, and Antin 
Krushel’nyts’kyi was allegedly responsible for establishing these contacts 
through the German consulate in Ukraine.
131
 According to Epik, the members 
were planning the assassination of Stalin, an initiative that emanated from 
Kulish.
132
  
Epik’s criminal file also includes excerpts from the interrogation 
protocols of Ialovyi, Cherniak, Demchuk, Chychkevych, Pylypenko, 
Ozers’kyi, Gzhyts’kyi, Tkachuk, Irchan, Slisarenko, Lebid’, Fal’kivs’kyi and 
Burevoi that portrayed Epik as a conspirator and an active participant in 
preparing assassinations of Ukrainian party and NKVD leaders, as well as 
Stalin.
133
 The circle of denunciation was closed, and the routine NKVD tactics 
ensured the arrest of the next group of the slov’iany. On 13 March 1935, 
Pustovoitov, Proskuriakov and Dolinskii ordered the destruction of Epik’s 
correspondence, as well as his books that were confiscated during his arrest: 
evidently, it was deemed inexpedient either to keep them or to return them to 
his family.
134
 Epik, like 15 other “members” of the alleged conspiracy, was 
sentenced to 10 years in labor camps, and spent several years in Solovky.
135
 
Yet, as we have seen, the NKVD continued to fabricate false denunciations 
against these putative Ukrainian nationalists even in the labor camps. Despite 
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his exemplary behavior, Epik was not an exception.
136
 At the age of 36, he 
was sentenced to death and shot on 3 November 1937 in Sandarmokh by the 
GB captain Matveev.
137
  
On close scrutiny, the language of Epik’s interrogation protocols 
provokes some doubts about the authenticity of his deposition. Semantically, 
some sentences are poorly constructed, and seem unlikely to have been the 
work of a professional writer. In his testimony to Khaet and the prosecutor, for 
example, Epik “used” such awkward expressions as “ɩɪɨɲɥɨɟ ɞɚɜɢɥɨ ɧɚɞɨ 
ɦɧɨɣ,” “ɪɚɡɞɟɥɹɥ ɦɨɢ ɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɢɫɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɟ ɜɵɫɤɚɡɵɜɚɧɢɹ” and so on.138 It 
is likely that Khaet had formulated this document for him some time before or 
after the interrogation.
139
 
Of course, at the time and many decades later evidence that Epik’s 
testimonies had been fabricated was unknown, and the myth of his treachery 
remained unchallenged. One of the first, and most important, steps in 
scapegoating Epik was Postyshev’s speech at the Plenum of the Ukrainian 
Union of Writers in summer 1935.
 140
 Following this event, Epik’s image as a 
traitor has been solidly imbedded in the history of Stalin’s repressions in 
Ukraine. Postyshev quoted Epik’s letter to Balyts’kyi, in which the author 
allegedly recanted his terrorist and counterrevolutionary activity against the 
leaders of the Communist party, and demanded that the authorities shoot him 
and his accomplices, famous Ukrainian writers whom he called “murderers,” 
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and whom he compared to “rabid dogs.”
141
 The credibility of Postyshev’s 
statement, as well as Epik’s behavior under arrest, remains questionable, 
although his behavior in labor camps was described as morally low which 
could be a consequence of the physical torture and mental pressure he had 
suffered during his interrogation.
142
 He had a young and beautiful wife, Vira 
Omel’chenko and a little son who might both have served as a lever for the 
NKVD to pressure Epik to surrender.
143
  
The stigmatized images and reputations of the writers pursued them 
even in the camps. What exacerbated Epik’s image as a “fallen person” in the 
eyes of his friends and colleagues was his behavior in Solovky. According to 
the accounts of Solovky inmates, including Semen Pidhainyi, Epik 
intentionally stayed away from the Ukrainians and befriended criminal 
elements. He was so delighted when the prison authorities declared him a 
shock worker that he began to write a novel about chekists who “saved the 
soul of an unfortunate counterrevolutionary.”
144
 Only after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union did scholars recover the prison reports that verified Pidhainyi’s 
description. The agent characterized Epik as a faithful party member who did 
not lead any “unhealthy conversations” in Solovky.
145
 The authorities even 
trusted him enough to be an editor of the Solovky newspaper, and granted him 
a free pass from the monastery, as Vasyl’ Mysyk stated.
146
 Sadly, Epik 
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internalized the oppression, fully accepted his own position as a powerless 
victim of terror, and surrendered his principles and human dignity. 
A prisoner of Solovky, Ivan Kubrak, evaluated Epik’s efforts at 
personal survival in the following manner: 
In his stories, he [Epik] depicted the kulaks’ characters schematically, hoping that he 
would be able to deceive Soviet power which defeated the kulaks in his stories. He 
believed that because of his stories’ content he would be released, and would return 
to Ukraine. No way in hell. I am certain that Epik would return to us feeling guilty 
and would finally realize that he was mistaken in his trust of Soviet power. Soviet 
power neither forgives nor forgets anything.
147
   
     
Pidhainyi had confirmed that in Solovky the slov’iany, instead of simply 
admonishing Epik, despised him and preferred to avoid him. Intellectual 
isolation and moral degradation intensified Epik’s suffering, and after two 
years in Solovky, shortly before he was executed, Epik begged the Ukrainian 
community to forgive him. His re-union and, most importantly, redemption 
occurred through a chain of painful compromises, risky actions and internal 
transformations: he refused to work, eliminated his contacts with criminals, 
and burned his short stories and the novel about the chekists.
148
    
Epik went further than other slov’iany in proving his loyalty to Soviet 
power, yet he was among many who signed protocols of interrogation 
fabricated by the GPU. Perhaps his literary activities and life circumstances 
would explain his extreme transformation under the Soviets. His life was a 
chain of adjustments designed to conform to the system. His trick with 
myocarditis was one of many, which helped little in repairing his 
compromised reputation in the late 1920s. On 8 March 1935, Epik wrote: “I 
love life so much that I do not want and I cannot believe in my death—the 
desire for life is so powerful in me that in principle I cannot believe in 
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death.”
149
 This feeling encouraged his further adjustments to a new spatial 
existence in the camps. He composed his letters to his wife from Solovky but 
at the same time they were addressed to an invisible censor: “Our best 
friends…are Soviet power and its representatives” (13 April 1935); “I feel 
wonderful and so happy like never, [I am] in love with the mother Revolution 
in a such way that there is no and there won’t be any force that would be able 
to ruin my joy” (11 April 1935).
150
 His overwhelming fear of death and an 
irresistible desire to live and to return to a normal comfortable life with his 
family in Budynok Slovo led him to another compromise. He decided to write 
in Russian. To persuade the authorities of his reforging, he wrote ten short 
stories in Russian—Solovetskie raskazy (The Solovki Stories).
151
 
Encouraged by the news that his stories had been sent to Moscow, 
Epik was certain that he would be released ahead of schedule. “I will be with 
you and our little son, and will produce interesting and significant [literary] 
work,” he wrote on 19 April 1937.
152
  The “incongruity” between Epik’s 
expectations and realities, and the futility of his hopes and new beliefs 
provoked his awakening, although it occurred very belatedly. The fear of 
death enslaved his spirit, but the bondage lasted until humiliation in the camps 
became unbearable. Epik returned to his friends who silently welcomed him 
back to the space of dignity and ostensible internal freedom. 
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Displacement, “Prisonization,” and Social Exclusion 
By 1934, culture and intellectual thought had been hijacked and abused 
by the institutionalized state terror, and those creative processes that still 
occurred in the place were reduced to a glimmer and de-humanized because of 
the conformity of their producers.
153
 The dynamics of the repression made the 
writers realize that the battle for culture that they began in the 1920s was lost. 
In the 1930s, they were fighting for their lives. In 1934 the GPU/NKVD’s 
spatial fixation on Budynok Slovo turned into open war against the slov’iany, 
and transformed the interrogation rooms into sites of violence and 
manipulation on one hand, and resilience or capitulation on the other. 
Fabricated by the police, denunciations of the intelligentsia arrested prior to 
1934 had been used as a formal pretext for future arrests. Biographical data 
that had been gathered by the GPU since the dawn of Soviet power in Ukraine 
were of great help in identifying Ukrainian “nationalists” and in preparing lists 
for their arrest. The magnitude of slipshod operational practices combined 
with the ease of the closure of preliminary investigations approved by the 
higher level of command—the interrogators’ supervisors—suggests the 
existence of a political agenda that emanated from the center to eliminate as 
quickly as possible the dissenting voices in Ukraine. 
Importantly, by this time, several GPU operatives had gained expertise 
during at least a decade of investigating the Ukrainian literati, and they were 
considered experts in cultural affairs in Ukraine by their supervisors. Only 
they were assigned to work with Ukrainian intellectuals. By now, readers are 
familiar with their names—Bordon, Pustovoitov, Proskuriakov, Grushevskii, 
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Sokolov and others.  Through surveillance of the building, the interrogators 
exhibited familiarity with its cultural atmosphere, and professional 
connections and friendship links, information that was used against the 
slov’iany. Of course the NKVD’s interest in thoroughly examining those links 
was minimal. This was unnecessary. A priori, the slov’iany were put on the list 
of “nationalists” who were perceived as a group of confederates, friends and 
accomplices. Their confessions to “crimes” no longer played a crucial role 
either for the final outcome of the preliminary investigation, or for the future 
verdict that was prescribed in advance.  
The past of its residents shaped the meaning of Budynok Slovo the 
secret police prescribed to it—it was not a home for people but a gathering 
place where nationalist conspiracies hatched. This repugnant meaning 
included aspirations and values of the Ukrainian intelligentsia that were 
merely identified as Ukrainian nationalism. Routine displacement of its 
residents, it was believed, would disrupt the sense of national belonging, 
which became the first step to a radical solution of regional nationalism.
154
 
The criminalization of Budynok Slovo socially immobilized the residents and 
deprived them of expectations and goals to which they aspired in the 1920s. 
Those who remembered the past grieved over their lost relatives; newcomers 
preferred private leisure, and avoided sharing common space, a “prerequisite 
for politics.”
155
 State power was not invisible or subtle—it was open, 
aggressive, violent and persistent in demanding loyalties to the center, shaping 
a new kind of slov’iany who had been chosen to survive.  
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 Those displaced who were separated from their families and each other 
were reunited in their last days and deaths. Their final journey to Solovky and 
then to Sandarmokh produced more uncertainties and questions for them: they 
were trying to understand why they, the most faithful Bolsheviks, were 
eliminated in Ukraine, a question that Khvyl’ovyi could not or would not 
answer.
156
 In fact, nothing seemed clear and certain for them, neither their 
lives nor their deaths. The temporality of their hopes for art and life left them 
with the perception of life as a senseless and meaningless enterprise.   
 The British scholar Nick Flynn has reminded us that the social and 
psychological influence of incarceration and the transformations of the human 
mind in prison remain poorly understood.
157
 This study illustrates the 
overwhelming trend of self-indictments among the slov’iany which are 
explained by unbearable tortures to which they were subjected by the secret 
police. Moreover, the dissemination of ideology continued in prison, and 
certain human personalities were predisposed to embrace and subscribe to a 
new ideology and new behavioral trends (Epik’s case). New space imposed 
authority, and spatial and temporal constraints placed on the slov’iany limited 
their desires and opportunities for resistance. The arsenal of the interrogators’ 
methods was inexhaustible. Beyond physical tortures, they used techniques, 
such as bullying, humiliation and deception, which often were sufficient to 
break the suspects. Some were able to overcome “privations and exercise self-
determination,” but most fell low morally and intellectually.
158
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However, besides personality, spatial factors and the longevity of 
exposure to state surveillance also played a significant role in human behavior 
in prison. The Krushel’nyts’kyi family exemplified this supposition: most 
family members rejected “prisonization” and had never confessed to crimes 
that were ascribed to them by NKVD agents.
159
 They had no time to absorb an 
aesthetic and culture of fear and denunciations developed in Budynok Slovo, 
they were arrested too quickly, almost immediately after their immigration 
from Galicia.  
Importantly, the punishments of the transgressors, Ukrainian 
“nationalists” in most cases, and their reformation and rehabilitation never 
accorded with the initial purpose of Soviet penal policy that was publicized 
and propagandized by the Soviet regime, social inclusion. Conversion had 
never occurred in labor camps, replaced instead by violent deaths. Most 
rehabilitation processes had been conducted posthumously as a formality and 
as a tribute to the prevailing political trends during the Khrushchev Thaw.       
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Chapter Eight 
Repressions of 1935-1936: “Wrong” Places for Tea 
Ceremonies 
 
Everything is a lie… 
 
Ivan Vyrhan
160
 
 
Counter-Ukrainization in Progress 
In 1936 Proskuriakov, the interrogator working on the group case of 
Ukrainian artists, known as the Boichukists, told Natalia Piasets’ka, the wife 
of Ivan Lipkovs’kyi, an artist and professor at the Kyiv Art Institute, that her 
husband’s guilt lay in “drinking his tea somewhere, where he should not have 
it.”
161
 The residence of Lipkovs’kyi’s teacher Mykhailo Boichuk was 
associated with crime and transgression, and a “wrong place to be” for many 
people. Boichuk once stated that a great wall, similar to the Great Wall of 
China (“a barrier even for birds”), should be erected between Russia and 
Ukraine so that Ukrainian culture would have an opportunity to develop. This 
statement reached the NKVD.
162
 Friends, colleagues and guests of the world-
famous artist began to disappear one by one. The NKVD also arrested two of 
his closest friends and best students, Ivan Padalka and Vasyl’ Sedliar, who 
happened to live in an equally dangerous place, Budynok Slovo.
163
 
The state evaluated places not only from a geopolitical perspective, but 
also from a cultural one, on the basis of its perceptions about ethnic coherence, 
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unity of residents and their susceptibility to nationalist propaganda. These 
perceptions of communities that occupied a given territory or place shaped the 
government’s imagination about their inclination to resistance. The 
importance of this evaluation became clear to the Bolsheviks immediately 
after they took power in Ukraine, especially in the context of their attempts to 
collectivize the peasantry. The collectivization process and cultural 
construction in Ukraine were anything but a smooth integration of the region 
into the Union.
164
 The state quickly developed coercive mechanisms and 
found ways to justify its violence to cope with nationalist tendencies in the 
countryside and in the cities. Despite the claims of building national culture, 
the state exhibited little interest in regional unity. On the contrary, through 
terror it fragmented the local population. “Nationalist” and “deviationist” 
groups were uncovered on what seemed like a daily basis by the secret police, 
creating the popular perception that Ukraine seethed with resistance and was 
“contaminated by enemies.” Ukraine as a geographical place and cultural 
space, as any other region in the Soviet Union, helped the secret police to 
identity, to define and to exclude these “enemies.” 
The 1929-1934 mass operations against “nationalists” signaled a 
radical departure from the nationality policy proclaimed in 1923. Although 
popular or internal party discussions about Ukrainization had been forbidden, 
Postyshev in his speeches routinely returned to this question, arguing that 
“nationalists” after their defeat would choose the most convenient position for 
themselves: they would accuse Moscow of defeating Ukrainization and 
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promoting counter-Ukrainization and russification in the republic.
165
 
Postyshev mocked and “unmasked” this “enemy” tactic. He admonished local 
party bosses for the failure of Ukrainization, accusing them of obstructing the 
center’s efforts to Ukrainize the republic. Yet, the center ordered the use of the 
Russian language in most, if not all, party and official documentation, which, 
it was claimed, was more accessible to the masses. The party suggested that 
Russian had become the international language of all progressive humanity, 
and people could now read the great works by Lenin and Stalin in the 
original.
166
 
This sharp public rearticulation of party policies which manifested 
itself in the rhetoric of public speeches, party orders and circulars came as no 
surprise to the the slov’iany. During the Literary Discussion (1925-28), they 
learned that a tremendous gap existed between the party’s words and deeds. 
Trapped spatially and mentally in their homes and local realities, many 
intellectuals tried to escape into art, laboring in the field of socialist realism.
167
 
Mikhail Epstein has noted that “in Soviet society, labor bec[ame] a form of 
escape from the freedom that importunately leaves one alone with oneself, 
with one’s conscience.”
168
 The residents learned to compartmentalize reality; 
many worked hard to forget about the fate of their neighbors and to ignore the 
inevitably approaching tragedy of personal arrest.
169
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Many redefined themselves as translators because they could not 
publish works of their own; some focused on teaching; and some continued to 
write about marvelous socialist achievements and crucify their colleagues for 
nationalist deviations.
170
 Some did it routinely with visible enthusiasm; 
others—only when they felt threatened. Through intimidation and fear, the 
state facilitated disunity among the residents which precluded their resistance 
to terror. Fragmented and ideologically confused, the slov’iany shared the 
place of their residence not on the basis of common values, but on the basis of 
what Pitirim A. Sorokin would characterize as “spatial contiguous 
adjacency.”
171
  
However, continuing to share the same professional space and physical 
place of residence, different groups of people assimilated new customs, new 
politics and norms of social conduct for the purpose they all shared—physical 
survival. Analyzing this sharing of the same space, Sorokin has pointedly 
stated: 
…territorial proximity imposes upon the neighbors a set of common interests and 
makes them solidary within the limits of these interests, no matter how different they 
may be in other respects. Breathing the same air, absorbing the same sociocultural 
atmosphere, the interacting neighbors cannot fail to develop some similarities and 
common ways of behavior… Exposed to [the] same natural and social environment 
to which they have to adapt in order to live, individuals develop a community of 
interests imposed by their territorial adjacency.
172
 
 
For the majority, their art became their primary field of adjustment in the quest 
of survival. As a result, the period of 1935-1936 was characterized by 
mediocre literature in Ukraine, a product of the gradual assimilation and 
eventual homogenization of artists’ mentalities with the corresponding and 
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inevitable leveling of their individualities.
173
 Even the most independent and 
talented artists accepted what Theodor Adorno called the “infantile” socialist 
realism that had been proclaimed by the Soviet Union in 1934.
174
 Rather than 
an approach or style, it was a “loathsome literary salad,” as Andrei Siniavsky 
defined it, which could hardly be called art.
175
 The ideas that were supposed to 
emanate from the writers’ minds and human experiences were preliminarily 
chewed and digested by semi-literate party officials, and then regurgitated as 
prescriptions for art which, in its vulgarized and cliché-like form, appeared on 
the pages of the proletarian press.
176
      
However, literary impotence was not the only problem facing writers; 
large-scale political events exacerbated their inner instabilities and 
inadequacies. Between 1934 and 1937, as one scholar euphemistically noted, 
Sergei Kirov, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, and Valerian Kuibyshev “departed the 
central leadership as a result of unusual deaths.”
177
 Kirov was assassinated on 
1 December 1934, Kuibyshev supposedly died of heart failure on 26 January 
1935, and Ordzhonikidze committed suicide (as the public learned later) on 18 
February 1937. These developments inspired imaginations and encouraged a 
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great deal of speculation about who “ordered” the deaths.
178
 Whatever the case 
might be, one might argue with certainty that the Soviet government 
thoroughly concealed the circumstances of their deaths, and Stalin used 
Kirov’s assassination as a pretext for intensifying repression, which was soon 
translated into further repression of the slov’iany.
179
 
The year 1935 was marked by a hunt for spies, such as Trotskyites, 
Zinovievites and concealed enemies who were former members of various 
political parties. The numbers of arrested in Ukraine superseded those of the 
arrested in any other Soviet republic.
180
 In September 1936, Nikolai Ezhov 
was appointed head of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs. He was 
an advocate of radical methods in the struggle against regional 
administrations. Ezhov promoted a conspiracy theory in which the bread 
procurement crises of 1932, Kirov’s murder, and an intricate factional struggle 
among Ukrainian party leaders were constituent elements.
181
 Shortly after his 
appointment, another expert on Ukraine, Kaganovich, stated that “under 
Yezhov things are going well! He set to work firmly, in a Stalinist way.”
182
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Yet things were not going well for the slov’iany. Since 1934, the 
composition of Budynok Slovo had changed, and because of constant arrests 
continued to do so. In 1934, some writers moved to Kyiv, the new capital of 
Ukraine, where “Rolit,” a building similar to “Slovo,” was built as an official 
writers’ residence. According to the new slov’ianyn Teren’ Masenko, Ivan 
Kulyk, the head of the Union of Writers, brought a part of the slov’iany to 
Kyiv—those who were famous and whom Kulyk personally liked.
183
 Life 
became extremely difficult for those who were left behind. Private publishing 
houses were eliminated, and the State Publishing House (DVU) was moved to 
the capital. Nina Cherednyk, the director of the DVU, sometimes came to 
Kharkiv but usually the city’s writers had to go to Kyiv to persuade the DVU 
to accept their work for publication.
184
 Many writers and their families could 
hardly make ends meet.  
Leonid Iukhvyd and Ivan Plakhtin, the new slov’iany who had moved 
into Budynok Slovo in the apartments of those who had been arrested, now led 
the Kharkiv chapter of the Union of Writers. To adhere to the party line and to 
demonstrate popular participation in Soviet cultural construction, they 
arranged regular purge meetings in the Union of Writers, to which they invited 
workers (“the masses”) who, together with official literary critics, harshly 
criticized the writers’ creative work.
185
 The warm, generous and admiring 
attitudes that writers had experienced in the early twenties had by now been 
replaced by popular suspiciousness, distrust and irritation. Kharkiv became a 
“flattened social landscape,” where a lack of sympathy for human suffering 
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was commonplace. The close proximity and the omnipresence of death 
eradicated pity and produced friendships grounded in superficiality and 
insincerity.
186
  
Despite the stigma attached to the building, new writers immediately 
filled the apartments in Budynok Slovo that were vacated by the departure or 
arrest of previous residents. Among new residents were the young Teren’ 
Masenko, Ivan Kaliannyk, Ivan Kovtun (Iurii Vukhnal’), Leonid Iukhvyd, and 
Stepan Kryzhanivs’kyi. Like no other place, Budynok Slovo embodied for 
them the elite club to which they aspired to belong.
187
 As a repository of early 
hopes and good memories, the building continued to attract writers, despite 
their dark and pessimistic imaginings about the present and the future.
188
  
Through the press, the state discursively transformed Budynok Slovo 
into a reservoir of Ukrainian nationalism. Importantly, the place, the Ukrainian 
language and Ukrainian self-identification, not ethnic identity, determined the 
fate of the slov’iany. The state’s demands for social purification reinforced the 
authority of the secret police, and the process of spatial mythmaking 
proceeded with increasing tempo throughout the second half of the 1930s. 
Because of the totalizing fear of repression, Budynok Slovo became neither a 
site of protest, nor active resistance. Its disputed territory was conquered 
without warfare, and the victors, the state and the secret police, adjusted the 
place to their needs, changing its aesthetics and purpose. State violence 
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divided the slov’iany and forced them to search for ways of survival not 
collectively, but individually.  
 
The Russian Tolmachiov as a Ukrainian Nationalist  
 In October 1934 the purge commission discussed the political image of 
those who worked in the publishing house “LIM.” The commission 
scrupulously analyzed the decisions made by the LIM primary party cell and 
the behavior of its members.
189
 The journalist and the slov’ianyn Hryhorii 
Piddubnyi-Tolmachiov was expelled from the party  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Hryhorii Piddubnyi-Tolmachiov. 
 
 
for a “series of nationalist errors” that he had allegedly made in his 
professional activities. Piddubnyi publicly complained about the decision that, 
he claimed, had been made in a totally authoritarian manner, without even 
providing him an opportunity to speak in his defense.
190
  
Piddubnyi’s actual transgression was his cooperation with the former 
Ukrainian government, the Directory, his membership in the Ukrainian Party 
of Socialist Revolutionaries (SR), and his contacts with members of the 
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dissident wing of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU) led by 
Roman Turians’kyi and Iosyp Vasyl’kiv.
191
 After his experience as a member 
in the Australian Socialist Party, Piddubnyi returned to Ukraine before the 
revolution and joined the Ukrainian SRs, and later the Directory, where he 
collaborated with Pavlo Khrystiuk and other members of the Central 
Committee. After the defeat of the UNR, Piddubnyi  emigrated to Austria 
where he joined the Communist Party of Austria, and became an editor for the 
KPZU press.
192
 His subsequent break with the KPZU in 1923 meant little for 
the commission, and his past work in the West made him vulnerable during 
the massive campaign against Ukrainian nationalists in the thirties.
193
  
Like many others, Piddubnyi returned to Ukraine in 1926 and began to 
work for the People’s Commissariat of Enlightenment, which in the eyes of 
the state and the secret police was contaminated by nationalists and anti-Soviet 
elements. He was excluded from the party twice, in 1929 (after which his 
membership was renewed), and again in 1934.
194
 The last exclusion became 
fatal for him. He forgetfully or conveniently did not update his biography, 
although this was demanded by party ethics.
195
 The commission accused him 
of hiding his “counterrevolutionary past” and links to Galicians—Mykhailo 
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Hrushevs’kyi in particular—and claimed that it could not trust a person who 
over three years had not provided a single critical essay about socialist 
construction in Ukraine.
196
 “The charge of ‘silence’” as evidence of a crime 
and conspiracy against the state was broadly employed by purge 
commissions.
197
 Moreover, Piddubnyi’s knowledge of English, German and 
French made him even more suspect.
198
 
Piddubnyi’s testimony on 5 October 1934 to the purge commission is a 
valuable document because it is recorded verbatim in a stenographic report. 
This testimony reveals the dismal atmosphere of the 1930s, and the 
unwavering popular interest in having an apartment in the elite and famous 
Budynok Slovo.  
According to Piddubnyi, in June 1933 he contracted typhus and lay ill 
for three months. During this period, he lost his jobs in the publishing houses 
“LIM” and “Zakhidna Ukraina.” By late 1933, he recovered, although there 
were complications—he could not walk properly. Because Piddubnyi lived in 
Budynok Slovo, the cooperative “Slovo” kindly invited him to become the 
cooperative’s head. This was an opportunity for Piddubnyi to make some 
money in addition to his literary income.
199
  
In late November 1933, Piddubnyi received a letter (he did not specify 
from whom), in which the author insisted on being provided with an apartment 
in “Slovo.” The author also stated that if his request was not satisfied, he 
would submit materials on Piddubnyi to the purge commission.
200
 Piddubnyi 
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publicized the letter at a meeting of the cooperative, and its board decided to 
pass the letter on to the Party Organizational Committee. In December 1933, 
Budynok Slovo, as we have seen, was shaken by arrests. Shortly after, 
Piddubnyi was informed by the LIM (he was still registered in its primary 
party cell) that he had been expelled from the party. The news came as a 
complete surprise to him. Members of the cell demanded that he surrender his 
membership card but Piddubnyi refused to do so. The LIM party leadership 
then wrote a report that Piddubnyi had been a member of various nationalist 
parties in the past, and conducted wrecking activity in the cooperative 
“Slovo.”
201
 After Piddubnyi complained about these illegitimate actions to the 
Party Control Commission, his party membership was renewed, although a 
commission was created to evaluate Piddubnyi’s literary work. After 3 months 
of hard work, the commission concluded that his books and articles did not 
contain “nationalist deviations.”
202
 
During the meeting of the purge commission, another slov’ianyn, Ivan 
Lakyza, insistently asked Piddubnyi who financed his trip abroad and how he 
sustained himself there for several months. Everyone in the commission 
believed that the Ukrainian government in exile supported Piddubnyi in 
Austria. Piddubnyi patiently explained that he made a living by publishing 
books and articles in various Ukrainian newspapers and journals. The 
commission interrogated Piddubnyi about his connections with “Western 
Ukraine,” and Gzhyts’kyi and Irchan in particular, who by this time had been 
arrested as Ukrainian nationalists and UVO members. Piddubnyi claimed that 
he did not have any personal relationship with either of them, although he had 
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lived with Gzhyts’kyi in Budynok Slovo.
203
 Today it is difficult to verify 
Piddubnyi’s claims. It is possible that he attempted to distance himself from 
“nationalists” in an attempt to save his politically correct image and to prevent 
his expulsion from the party, a tactic practiced by many.
204
 
In the eyes of the commission, this “distancing” of course did not free 
him from responsibility to report to the proper agencies about Gzhyts’kyi ‘s 
and Irchan’s anti-Soviet stances as members of the association with which 
Piddubnyi maintained close professional relationships. According to the 
commission, Piddubnyi did not exist in isolation, and might have heard 
something negative about those two who later were arrested as Ukrainian 
nationalists. Wendy Z. Goldman aptly noted that the political culture at the 
time implied that “there were no penalties for writing a zaiavlenie 
[denunciation] without evidence, [but] not writing one at all could invite 
serious consequences.”
205
 At the very least, Piddubnyi was guilty of not 
submitting his thoughts about “suspicious” individuals to the party or the 
NKVD. 
Then the head of the commission asked Piddubnyi about his 
connections with Ialovyi and other slov’iany: “What kind of relationship did 
you have with the nationalists that were arrested in your cooperative building, 
and who exactly were your friends, and why did you tell Senchenko that S. 
was arrested and that you were now afraid that you would also be arrested?” 
Piddubnyi confirmed that he saw Senchenko and shared with him the 
information that Dosvitnii and Panchenko were arrested, but denied saying 
that he anticipated his own arrest. Piddubnyi assured the commission that he 
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had no close relationship with any slov’iany; he just shared a place of 
residence with them.
206
 Employing standard interrogation practices, the head 
of the commission forced Piddubnyi to reveal his attitude toward VAPLITE, 
shumkism and Skrypnyk. Piddubnyi identified these phenomena as petty 
bourgeois and national deviations.
207
  
 During the discussion, his fellow writer and slov’ianyn Ievhen 
Kas’ianenko expressed concerns about Piddubnyi’s political instability and 
doubts about his SR past. Other members supported Kas’ianenko and 
suggested that Piddubnyi’s tortuous life was unclear to them, as were the 
motives of his prompt emigration from Kyiv abroad, three weeks before the 
Bolsheviks took over the city.
208
 For the commission, Piddubnyi’s escape from 
Kyiv implied a reluctance to contribute to the Soviet cause, and his “leftist” 
position was only a cover-up for his spying and enmity toward the Soviet 
Union.  
The slov’ianyn Ivan Mykytenko joined the chorus of the indictors and 
suggested that Piddubnyi contributed nothing to socialist culture, and the party 
organization could not trust him to fulfill any party task or responsibility. 
Moreover, “when according to the party directive, we were to help 
Communists from various organizations to reside in Budynok Slovo in the 
apartments of nationalists who had been arrested,” Mykytenko continued, 
“there was no way to find Piddubnyi anywhere. . . . You were hiding in order 
not to fulfill the party directive on moving people to the building, people we 
need. We needed to consolidate forces for struggle [against nationalists], and 
in the cooperative some ‘Communist’ was sitting [and obstructing our efforts]. 
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How can we allow him the privilege of being a Communist?...The face of 
Piddubnyi is facelessness,” concluded Mykytenko.
209
 The purge commission 
supported Mykytenko, and stated that Piddubnyi’s maneuvers as the chief of 
the cooperative “Slovo” were counterrevolutionary, and that he was a “class 
enemy.”
210
  
In his final statement, Piddubnyi emphasized that perhaps those who 
accused him of doing little for the writers who lived in the cellars had 
forgotten that he himself resided in the cellar of Budynok Slovo with three 
children, one of whom had tuberculosis. He regretted that he did not do more 
as a party member and a writer but he asked the committee not to diminish his 
revolutionary past.
211
 
Piddubnyi hoped that the state would not dare touch him, a former 
tsarist political prisoner and revolutionary who personally knew comrade 
Artiom.
212
 However, approximately three months after Piddubnyi’s public 
humiliation at the purge meeting, on 15 January 1935 he was arrested as an 
UVO member. Kostiuk recalled that the arrests of the slov’iany one by one in 
late 1934 and early 1935, including that of Piddubnyi, distressed him: “What 
to do? Where to go? Where should one find a safe place? There was no 
answer.”
213
 Piddubnyi’s wife Erna likely felt the same way, especially when 
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the GPU came to search the apartment two days later after the arrest of her 
husband. According to the secret police’s documents, during a second search, 
in the presence of the commandant of the building Iakiv Fish and a militia 
member Ivan Bondarenko, the NKVD expropriated Piddubnyi’s foreign 
passport, personal correspondence and photographs. Interestingly, during this 
search an NKVD operative brought back 130 rubles in cash, 28 rubles and 70 
kopeks in checks (oblihatsii) and two keys from the apartment, for which Erna 
had to sign a receipt.
214
 The NKVD returned the confiscated funds perhaps 
influenced by Piddubnyi’s revolutionary past or because of his three children.  
One month after Piddubnyi’s arrest and before the closure of the 
preliminary investigation, the medical commission in the Kharkiv NKVD 
prison concluded that there were no health impediments to Piddubnyi’s 
exile.
215
 Piddubnyi’s fate was sealed. Collecting indicting testimonies of 
Piddubnyi’s “accomplices” was merely a technical matter. 
According to the NKVD’s scenario, Piddubnyi was recruited into the 
UVO by Fed’ Bei in Prague and sent to Ukraine to prepare the assassinations 
of Postyshev and Balyts’kyi. Piddubnyi’s interrogators, Bliok, Lisitskii, 
Iakushev and Kaminskii,
216
 included in his file the depositions of supposedly 
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active UVO members Oleksandr Badan-Iavorenko, Vasyl’ Atamaniuk, Foma 
Prystupa, Mykhailo Chychkevych, Petro Demchuk, Petro Tymets’kyi and 
many others. Allegedly, Piddubnyi was a member of the Vienna UVO chapter 
and was sent to Ukraine to undermine the Soviet regime.
217
 The language of 
the depositions reveals that they were not likely written by the accused.
218
 It 
would be difficult to imagine that the arrested would complicate an unenviable 
position by using definitions such as “counterrevolutionary nests” 
(characterizing their places of meeting), or “anti-Soviet organization” 
(describing its goals, structure and functions). In other words, interrogation 
protocols appear to be composed not by an “insider” who was a part of the 
conspiracy and who would be interested in softening the language of 
definitions but by an “outsider” who expresses himself in the jargon of the 
institutional force and thereby reveals his critical attitude toward alleged 
concealed enemies of the Soviet Union.  
Furthermore, Piddubnyi’s recalcitrance surprised his interrogators. He 
was questioned five times during the period from 19 January 1935 to 20 June 
1935 but categorically rejected all accusations and characterized the 
depositions of his former colleagues as insinuations and fantasies.
219
 Perhaps, 
paying tribute to Piddubnyi’s revolutionary past and his connections with high 
party officials in Moscow, the Secret Political Department (SPV) 
surreptitiously decided to re-investigate the case despite the VTsIK 1 
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December 1934 resolution that required completion of preliminary 
investigations of terrorists within 10 days. However, the Military Prosecutor 
Perfil’iev learned about the SPV’s decision. He was livid because of the 
SPV’s attempt to ignore the principle of its subordination to the law. Perfil’iev 
personally supervised all cases involving “terrorist activity.” He wrote a letter 
of complaint to the Ukrainian NKVD leadership. The logic of his rationale 
was striking. Perfil’iev insisted that Piddubnyi’s case should be expedited 
according to the 1 December 1934 resolution, because any attempt to prove 
Piddubnyi’s guilt would be problematic. It would require cross-examining 
those who could confirm Piddubnyi’s membership in the UVO, but the 
problem was that all the “witnesses” had been already exiled to the North. 
Perfil’iev recommended that the resolution should be applied in Piddubnyi’s 
case to avoid complicating matters. In addition, he reminded the SPV that in 
future it should consult with him directly instead of making inappropriate 
decisions about terrorists.
220
  
Piddubnyi’s verdict was immediately prepared in late June, and in 
early July 1935 it was sent to Moscow for approval by the Special Meeting of 
the NKVD in the USSR.
221
 On 14 September 1935, Piddubnyi was sentenced 
to 5 years in labor camps. He ended up in Solovky, together with Kurbas, 
Kulish, the Krushel’nyts’kyi family and many other slov’iany.
222
 He wrote 
three letters from Solovky, one to Postyshev in 1935, and two to Ezhov in 
1936, in which he stated that people had libeled him.
223
 These letters were the 
cry of a disillusioned and crushed individual trying in the name of Soviet 
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justice to “recall” the names and actions of people who, he stated, were anti-
Soviet and dangerous to the state. He desperately tried to align himself with 
the system of societal values, and the aesthetics of self-censorship and 
denunciation. The camp practice of “reforging” morally destroyed Piddubnyi. 
The energetic revolutionary and distinguished author turned into a sick, 
miserable, weeping human being. In his last letter, Piddubnyi shamelessly 
begged the authorities to convoy him to Leningrad to an eye clinic. Lime had 
gotten into his eye during his work in the camps, and he had been suffering 
from inflammation for three months. He developed an eye tumor and began to 
lose his vision. His letters remained unanswered.
224
 On 9 October 1937, the 
NKVD troika in Leningrad oblast’ sentenced Piddubnyi to death as a 
Ukrainian nationalist, and he was executed in Sandarmokh on 28 October 
1937, as were many other slov’iany.
225
 
Piddubnyi was rehabilitated posthumously on 27 November 1970, by 
which time only a few remembered that Piddubnyi was the author of 50 books 
and many articles. The Stefanyk Scientific Library in Lviv possesses a rare 
copy of Piddubnyi’s memoirs Midiani zahravy (Copper Skies), which he 
wrote in Australia and which were expropriated by the secret police from his 
apartment. This is a rare example of a work that survived after the repression 
of its author.
226
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The Head of the Cooperative “Slovo” Petro Lisovyi 
 Petro Svashenko (Lisovyi) was one of the most popular journalists in 
Ukraine, and had a biography that could be considered politically expedient 
for the thirties. He was born to a peasant family. In 1919 he became a member 
of the VKP(b), and worked in Chernihiv and Nizhyn for the Soviet regime. He 
began to publish his essays in the newspapers Selians’ka Pravda and Visti 
VUTsVK in Chernihiv. After 1924 his short stories were published in various 
Ukrainian newspapers and journals, and as separate books. In 1923 he joined 
the literary association “Hart,” in which he met Blakytnyi, Khvyl’ovyi, 
Tychyna, Iohansen, Polishchuk and many other talented writers who in the 
middle of the twenties created the cooperative “Slovo.” In 1929 Lisovyi joined 
the literary association “VUSPP,” a group favored by the party, although 
Dosvitnii tried to persuade him to join “Prolitfront.” This clever political move 
helped Lisovyi become an assistant to the chief editor of the party newspaper 
Visti VUTsVK.
227
 
 During the July 1929-June 1930 purge in the primary party cell of 
Visti, Svashenko’s origins became problematic for the commission conducting 
the purge: his father was identified as a kurkul’, and his service in the 
“Petliurite” cause compromised him in the eyes of the purge commission. 
Moreover, the commission learned that Svashenko served in the White and the 
UNR Armies, and from 1917-1919 was a member of the Borot’bist party and 
the Ukrainian SR party. He was excluded from the party for hiding these 
biographical details.
228
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Svashenko managed to restore his party membership, but not for long. 
A 27 December 1934 letter of denunciation by Horokhovs’kyi and Minchev to 
the NKVD operative Bliok launched a series of attacks on Svashenko.
229
 It 
 
Petro Lisovyi. 
 
appears likely that Bliok had ordered the party purge commission to eject 
Svashenko from the party as a Ukrainian nationalist and former Borot’bist. 
The plan was implemented in January 1935. Svashenko’s neighbors and 
fellow writers from the party organization of the Union of Writers Volodymyr 
Kulyk and Ivan Kyrylenko facilitated the task. They wrote a letter that 
evaluated him negatively as a party member and as a writer.
230
 This evaluation 
induced the commission to further harass Svashenko: its members accused 
him of political passivity. They suggested that he had hid in the countryside 
from April to September 1933, and did nothing to combat the kurkuls.
231
 
Svashenko argued that neither the 1929 nor the 1935 party decisions were fair: 
he had taken such a long vacation with the permission of the Organizational 
Committee of the Union of Writers, Visti and the party organization. 
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Moreover, the Holovlit, Svashenko stated, had never withdrawn any of his 
works, and the label of “nationalist” seemed to be completely out of place.
232
 
The harassment of Svashenko extended to his inner sphere, his home. 
After Piddubnyi was fired from the position because of “nationalist 
deviations,” Svashenko was elected head of the cooperative “Slovo.” He 
worked together with Itsyk Fefer, a Jewish writer who was responsible for 
ideological issues in the building as the cooperative’s partorg.
233
 On 15 
December 1934, Svashenko wrote a letter of complaint to the cooperative’s 
party committee that had decided to disfranchise him and ultimately to dismiss 
him from his position for his irresponsibility as a party leader in the 
cooperative. Svashenko argued that he attempted to find reasonable solutions 
to all issues related to the elite apartments in Budynok Slovo, despite pressures 
from above and below.     
  His letter reveals that after the special revision commission of the 
Oblzhytlospilka identified “mild financial violations” in the cooperative 
“Slovo,” Svashenko raised the question of re-considering Litvinenko as the 
administrator of Budynok Slovo.
234
 With the support of other members of the 
cooperative, Svashenko wrote to the Party Committee in Dzerzhyns’kyi 
Region recommending a reliable party member who was interested in 
becoming the new chief. The Committee sent two people to the cooperative. 
However, as soon as they learned about the chief’s specific additional 
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responsibility to assist the NKVD’s night arrests in the building, both 
immediately rejected the offer.
235
 Iakiv Fish on the other hand agreed, and 
Svashenko wanted to discuss the issue about firing Litvinenko at the All-
Union Congress of Writers. Litvinenko complained to Fefer and the leadership 
of the cooperative that he had no place to live. Fish exchanged his old 
apartment for Litvinenko’s apartment in Budynok Slovo, and the problem was 
solved.
236
 
Svashenko provided another example of his hard work on evicting the 
slov’ianyn Slisarenko’s wife Vyshnevs’ka from the building. He explained 
that often he and his fellow members on the cooperative’s board were 
powerless in making a decision about the transfer of an apartment from an 
arrested writer to some other member of the Union of Writers who deserved 
this privilege as a distinguished cultural worker. This process, Svashenko 
stated, was not always smooth because some powerful party members 
regularly insisted that empty apartments be given to acquaintances who 
deserved the place more than anyone else.
237
 
However, because of Svashenko’s trouble with the party purge 
commission, the slov’iany treated Svashenko with disrespect, as if they knew 
that his fate was already sealed. The residents and potential residents were 
preoccupied with their own problems: the former were worried about their 
survival through this turmoil and hoped to keep their apartments; the latter 
craved entry into the elite cooperative in hopes of gaining the status of literary 
dignitaries. Both groups, mentally inert and ideologically ossified, considered 
the place a safe anchor, because they still believed it was a place of inclusion. 
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 Svashenko was of course unaware that the most powerful organization, 
the NKVD, had collected several damning depositions against him from his 
fellow sloviany Pylypenko and Epik, and the evidence of his supposed crimes 
had been prepared two years prior to his arrest.
238
 But his premonition of an 
approaching catastrophe made him act.  
Svashenko undertook several measures to prevent the inevitable. 
Hoping for help, he wrote letters to one of his acquaintances Sergei 
Bernshtein, a Russian linguist who lived in Moscow, and to the Party Control 
Commission within the Central Committee of the VKP(b).
239
 He even tried to 
escape to the North, and offered his services to a research station, in case they 
needed cadres. He received a response only from the North. In March 1935, 
the head of the cadre office informed him that the Northern Sea 
Communication Office would be able to use him in the Arctic region but only 
after he completed a special training course.
240
 Svashenko was running out of 
time.  
He was arrested on 25 April 1935.
241
 He and his family resided in 
apartment 40 on the first floor, which had formerly housed a kindergarten for 
the writers’ children. The prestige of the building was so great that the value 
of each apartment had been inflated over the years, despite the repression of its 
residents. A little café, a laundry room and a kindergarten had been 
eliminated, and new residents, as they were assigned a higher status in 
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literature and the arts, moved to these apartments. The location of the 
apartment made it easier for the NKVD operatives to remove Petro’s extensive 
library, journals and various documents. The director of the building Iakiv 
Fish witnessed Svashenko’s arrest and search, as did Svashenko’s wife 
Anastasiia, his son Pavlo and daughter Olesia. 
242
 The details of the encounter 
between Svashenko and Fish, the former employer and his employee, are 
unknown. Today’s employers could easily become tomorrow’s arrested in 
Budynok Slovo.  
Svashenko’s first interrogation on 29 April 1935 was devoted to a 
discussion of the counterrevolutionary nature of his library. According to the 
interrogator Tsvetukhin, books about Ukrainization in the Kuban’ region by 
various authors, including Svashenko, Lev Trotsky’s books 1905 and 
Literatura i revoliutsiia, and works by Volodymyr Vynnychenko revealed 
Svashenko’s nationalist views.
243
 Knowing that to argue with the organs 
would have negative consequences, Svashenko immediately agreed that his 
attitudes toward the sensitive topic of the Kuban’ (both the territorial and 
linguistic aspects) were completely erroneous.
244
 After two weeks in the 
Kharkiv prison, on 19 May 1935, he also agreed with Tsvetukhin that the 
literary association “Hart” was a bourgeois nationalist group of writers, and 
his, Svashenko’s, writings were the work of a nationalist which could be used 
by class enemies in their struggle against Soviet power.
245
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Further events developed precipitously. In late June 1935, despite the 
absence of any resistance on his part, the Kharkiv NKVD sent him to Kyiv.
246
 
On 19 July 1935, almost three months after his arrest, Svashenko finally 
learned the essence of the charges against him. He was accused of 
membership in a counterrevolutionary nationalist organization. To his 
interrogator Haponov’s laconic question “Do you accept these charges?” 
Svashenko not only provided an affirmative answer but offered details on the 
structure and membership of the organization. According to Petro, the writers 
Kas’ianenko, Panchenko, Poltorats’kyi, Semenko, Malovychko and Dykyi 
were also members of this organization (four of them were slov’iany), and 
allegedly “part of the all-national underground.”
 247
 Moreover, Svashenko 
emphasized that he became a nationalist under the influence of Mykhailo 
Hrushevs’kyi’s works, and his views had been solidified in Galicia during the 
First World War as a protest against the russification policies, and the 
complete destruction of Ukrainian culture conducted by Bobrinskii in Eastern 
Galicia.
248
 
Svashenko also testified that Budynok Slovo and his own apartment, 
along with those of Kas’ianenko, Panchenko and Dykyi, served as gathering 
places for so-called “chetverki,” meetings usually attended by four people. 
According to Svashenko, Kas’ianenko was the leader of the organization. He 
advocated cooperation with German fascism that would help Ukraine break 
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from the USSR.
249
 Svashenko alleged that group discussions usually centered 
around collectivization policies in Ukraine and the inevitability of a peasant 
rebellion if these policies escalated. Dykyi’s contributions to discussions were 
immense because he was always informed about the recent news on the 
national and cultural front, and according to Svashenko, he regularly warned 
slov’iany about coming arrests.
250
 
Supposedly, responsibilities were strictly distributed among the 
members of the organization. Svashenko testified that the futurist and 
slov’ianyn Mykhailo Semenko maintained connections with the terrorists 
Shkurupii and Vlyz’ko, plotting assassinations; Kas’ianenko conducted 
subversive activities in the aviation industry; Poltorats’kyi implemented 
cooperation between Kyiv and Kharkiv chapters; Malovychko recruited new 
members in the writers’ circles; and Svashenko himself traveled to the 
countryside and informed the organization about the peasants’ moods.
251
 
Svashenko’s self-indictment fully satisfied the NKVD, and on 2 August 1935 
he signed his final confession and confirmed that his depositions were correct. 
In short, he “disarmed” (rozzbroevsia) and admitted his guilt before the 
state.
252
   
The SPV’s assistant head Dolinskii and the interrogator Haponov 
attached publications by the slov’iany who had been previously arrested, and 
books by Vynnychenko and Skrypnyk to Svashenko’s file as evidence of his 
counterrevolution, and added two condemning testimonies, one allegedly 
made by Pylypenko on 29 May 1934, and the second by Epik on 15 February 
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1935.
253
 Pylypenko’s testimony is clearly fabricated, because by 3 March 
1934, the secret police had completed the “investigation” of Pylypenko’s case, 
and the OGPU Collegium had ordered Pylypenko’s execution on that day. 
Although the exact time and day of his execution, as well as the place of his 
burial, remain unknown, the possibility of interrogating Pylypenko on 29 May 
1934 after the closure of his case seems highly unlikely. Nevertheless, 
Dolinskii and Haponov concluded that the suspect was a member of an 
organization that was a logical extension of the UVO, OUN and Borot’bist 
“nationalist” organizations.
254
 On 27 March 1935 the Special Collegium of the 
district court in Kyiv sentenced Svashenko to 5 years in labor camps.
255
  
For some unknown reason, the authorities neither repressed Petro’s 
wife Anastasiia Pavlivna, nor his brother Semen Svashenko who became a 
famous film actor.
256
 In 1956, Anastasiia still lived in Budynok Slovo but from 
their apartment 40 she moved to apartment 36, formerly Arkadii Liubchenko’s 
place. Svashenko’s son Pavlo returned from the Second World War front 
handicapped. Anastasiia and their daughter Olesia survived the German 
occupation in Kharkiv, and, as Oleksii Poltorats’kyi testified, they preserved 
their dignity and integrity. During a rehabilitation process in the 1950s, 
Anastasiia claimed that her husband was an honest Soviet person, and exposed 
the secret police as a group of criminals who forced Petro to sign false 
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depositions.
257
 They beat him and employed other illegal tools to make him 
confess. When in 1937 Anastasiia went to see Petro in the camps (Medvezh’ia 
Gora), he told her that the interrogators had threatened to repress and shoot all 
his family, including their children. He signed interrogation protocols and 
gave his word as a Communist that he would tell nothing to anyone. 
Anastasiia also testified that Petro asked her to conceal this fact from their 
children, and to raise them as faithful Soviet citizens.
258
  
Questioned as witnesses during Svashenko’s rehabilitation, the 
survivors of Stalin’s repression characterized Svashenko as a conscientious 
and honest Communist and Soviet citizen. They were genuinely surprised and 
at a loss to explain the reasons for his arrest. The former slov’ianyn and writer 
Andrii Holovko characterized Svashenko as a mediocre writer but politically 
“mature” person.
259
 The writer Oleksii Poltorats’kyi shared Holovko’s 
perceptions of Svashenko, and emphasized that in contrast to Mykhailo 
Semenko’s “drunken” life, Svashenko was a good family-oriented person.
260
 
Importantly, Poltorats’kyi continued, the slov’iany had never been connected 
on the basis of politics and nationalism, but maintained relationships on the 
basis of their literary tastes and interests.
261
 The interim head of the Chief 
Administration on Protecting Military and State Secrets in the Press (Ukraine) 
Z. Berdychevs’kyi could not explain why the books of Lisovyi (Svashenko) 
had been destroyed in all public libraries. The Ukrainian Holovlit order no. 
288 of 25 November 1938 had not provided reasons for such a decision.
262
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The fate of Svashenko in the labor camps is unknown. He never 
returned home. Likely he perished there, and he was rehabilitated twenty years 
later, on 17 October 1956 due to lack of evidence of his criminal activity 
against the state. Ironically, the Communist Party made a decision to restore 
Svashenko’s honest name as a Communist only on 19 March 1990, almost 
forty years after his rehabilitation and a year before its own demise.
263
 
 
The Boichukists Vasyl’ Sedliar and Ivan Padalka  
Ukraine produced a number of extraordinarily talented artists, such as 
Vasilii Kandinskii, Kazimir Malevich, Oleksandr Murashko, Fedir 
Krychevs’kyi, and Vsevolod Maksymovych.
264
 Others included Mykhailo 
Boichuk and his students Vasyl’ Sedliar and Ivan Padalka. They belonged to 
the Boichuk school whose members were known as the Monumentalists or 
Boichukists.
265
 Their creative manner was marked by “inventiveness and 
intellectual vitality,” as well as by “technical proficiency and conceptual 
depth,” features that found little appreciation among state officials.
266
 
Moreover, Boichuk as a leader inspired his students to search for national 
roots in their art. Sedliar and Padalka embraced this idea, and contributed a 
great deal to the Ukrainian artistic renaissance, an art movement that was 
suspect to the NKVD. Despite their adjustments to the system, they could not 
                                                          
263
 AU SBUKhO, spr.010318, t.2, ark.98,104, the last arkush that does not have a number. 
264
 Wilson, 135-36. 
265
 Mykhailo Boichuk (born in 1882 in the village Romanivka in Ternopil’ region in Galicia), 
served in the Austrian army, before his arrest he was a professor in the Kyiv Art Institute. See 
HDA SBU, f.6, spr.46293fp, t.1, ark.92. Monumentalism refers to a modernist avant-garde 
artistic trend that emerged in Ukraine in 1918, and was characterized by blending Ukrainian 
Byzantine and Early Renaissance styles. It was manifested in Boichuk’s, Padalka’s and 
Sedliar’s art, such as frescoes, massive in size.  
266
 Shkandrij, Modernists, 102. On the Boichukists, see also Myroslava M. Mudrak, “The 
Graphic Arts: From Page Design to Theatre,” in Modernism in Kyiv: Jubilant 
Experimentation, ed. Irena R. Makaryk and Virlana Tkacz (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2010), 431-33, 440n38. 
 371 
 
fully accommodate themselves within “massovism.” Their individual talents 
were too unique for a state that demanded unification and homogenization, 
and their art was perceived as nationalist, and ultimately, as anti-Soviet.
267
  
In fact, the secret organs, encouraged by criticism of Boichukists in the 
press, found an imbalance between the “national” and the “socialist” in their 
art, one that favored the former. As Myroslav Shkandrij has noted, 
conceptually and stylistically their art was close to Khvyl’ovyi’s ideas and the 
goals of VAPLITE, and this particular similarity was sensed by the NKVD 
and treated as a potential threat to Soviet ideology.
268
 The art of the 
Boichukists was characterized as political heresy and counterrevolution, 
particularly because of its artistic appeal to the peasantry who in the early 
thirties were being sent by the NKVD to the North for resisting bread 
procurement quotas. 
In conversation with Edward Strikha, Pablo Picasso noted that Diego 
Rivera was the first to identify Vasyl’ Sedliar as a great artist with a great 
future. Picasso considered himself the second to note the uniqueness of 
Sedliar’s talent, and Iakov Tugenhol’d as the third who expressed admiration 
for Sedliar’s distinctive artistic manner. Finally, Picasso continued, during the 
Exhibition of Ukrainian Graphic Art in Moscow, professor Sidorov admitted 
that Sedliar was the best artist in the USSR.
269
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Sedliar’s career as an artist developed meteorically. In February 1919 
he joined the Boichuk school of monumental art at the Ukrainian State 
Academy of Art in Kyiv, an event that shaped his artistic career and life. Some 
artists called him Boichuk’s right hand because of the way he followed and 
defended Boichuk’s artistic principles.
270
 In 1922 he was appointed director of 
the Artistic Ceramic Professional School in Mezhyhir’ia near Kyiv, to which 
he invited as guests and lecturers Les’ Kurbas, Oleksandr Dovzhenko, Ostap 
Vyshnia, Volodymyr Sosiura, Iurii Ianovs’kyi, Oleksandr Kopylenko and 
other future slov’iany.
271
 In the late twenties Sedliar agreed to move to 
Kharkiv. He reluctantly accepted an offer to work for the People’s 
Commissariat of Education. From Sedliar’s letters to Oksana Pavlenko we 
learn about his moral suffering because of the conformism demanded of him 
by external state pressure.
272
 In 1933-1935, together with Mykhailo Boichuk, 
Ivan Padalka, Kyrylo Hvozdyk and Oksana Pavlenko, Sedliar completed the 
decoration of the Chervonozavods’kyi Theatre in Kharkiv. Their collectively 
executed frescos were still marked by their unique talents as 
“monumentalists,” although the stamp of socialist realism bled through the 
large-scale works (20-40 square meters each) and bore witness to the artists’ 
surrender to party demands. The pronounced figures of Lenin, Stalin and 
Postyshev were included in the fresco composition. Nevertheless, the 
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Boichukists’ art was severely criticized for formalism and characterized as a 
“manifestation of fascist ideology on the cultural front.”
273
  
During these productive years, Sedliar and Padalka shared apartment 
26 in Budynok Slovo.
274
 In 1932-33, when there were mass arrests in the 
building, they were especially nervous, and tried to spend most of their time 
away from home. Sedliar later stated that they were worried for their own 
lives, and extremely confused because innocent people, faithful Communists, 
had been arrested. Apparently, he continued, they had a defect in the eyes of 
the state: they were Ukrainians, and hence, suspects.
275
  
Teaching at the Kharkiv Art Institute, Padalka also worked after 1933 
as an art editor in the Publishing House “LIM.” Sedliar also served as an 
illustrator for various publications in the early thirties (by Heo Shkurupii, Ivan 
Franko, Vladimir Maiakovskii, François Rabelais, Andrii Holovko and many 
others). Since 1933 the official press had regularly published critical articles 
that identified the Boichukists as nationalists and counterrevolutionaries, and 
after 1933 it still continued to cultivate this image.
 276
 The Boichukists made 
several attempts to adjust their work to party demands and to repent. It is 
surprising that they were arrested only in late 1936. Yet, in this there must 
have been some logic. Katerina Clark emphasized that “textual authority 
became a major means of legitimization,” and that “the Stalinist regime of the 
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1930s favored written texts.”
277
 Perhaps in the party’s view words were more 
powerful propaganda than images, and as a result the writers had been swept 
aside first by the repression.
278
  
In 1935, when two Art Institutes in Kyiv and Kharkiv merged, Sedliar 
and Padalka accepted the offer of Andrii Khvylia, the ideological chief on the 
cultural front in Soviet Ukraine, to return to teach in Kyiv. However, Sedliar 
enjoyed teaching at the Institute for only two weeks. Under Khvylia’s 
pressure, he, once again, reluctantly took a position as secretary of the 
Organizational Party Committee at the Union of Artists.
279
  
On 16 September 1936 Ivan Padalka was arrested. Sedliar expected to 
be arrested any moment; he even wrote a letter to Postyshev that was 
confiscated during his arrest.
280
 In the autumn of 1936, when Sedliar returned 
to Kyiv after his business trip, he learned that he had been excluded from the 
Organizational Party Committee, fired from the Kyiv Art Institute and evicted 
from his apartment. Apparently, feeling guilty for his vicious attack against 
Sedliar at the 1933 First Plenum of the Organizational Bureau of the Ukrainian 
Union of Artists for his formalist art,
281
 Andrii Khvylia persuaded Sedliar to 
return to Kharkiv in the middle of November 1936. Khvylia secretly told 
Sedliar that in the NKVD Padalka testified about his (Padalka’s) alleged 
membership in a nationalist fascist organization. Khvylia suggested that it 
would be sensible of Sedliar to disappear from Kyiv for a while. Sedliar 
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urgently left the capital and resided in apartment 25 in Budynok Slovo in 
Kharkiv, Pavlo Khrystiuk’s place of residence before his arrest.
282
    
On 23 November 1936, the Kyiv NKVD operatives Gol’dman and 
Pustovoitov, and their supervisor Dolinskii signed the resolution that the artist 
Vasyl’ Sedliar was an active participant of a nationalist fascist organization.
283
 
On 26 November 1936, Sedliar was arrested in Budynok Slovo in the presence 
of Ivan Verhun (acting as the interim commandant of the building in the 
absence of Iakiv Fish), and was urgently convoyed to Kyiv for preliminary 
investigation.
284
 
The minutes of the first interrogation dated 4 December 1936 began 
with Sedliar’s full and complete capitulation before the interrogators: 
Interrogators Proskuriakov and Grushevskii: What are you guilty of? 
Sedliar: I am guilty of my active participation in a Ukrainian nationalist movement 
on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR; I was a member of a counterrevolutionary 
nationalist fascist group led by Boichuk, and occupied one of the leading positions in 
it. 
Our counterrevolutionary group was a part of the entire counterrevolutionary 
Ukrainian arborescent fascist underground, a group which represents the basis for 
subversive work, conducted by German fascism and foreign counterrevolutionary 
centers in the USSR. 
Interrogators Proskuriakov and Grushevskii: What was the main goal of your 
counterrevolutionary group and of the entire fascist underground in general? 
Sedliar: Our main goal, the goal of all Ukrainian nationalist fascists, was the creation 
of an independent national Ukraine, a goal that could be implemented only through a 
forcible break of Ukraine from the USSR.
285
 
 
Sedliar allegedly claimed that Boichuk was in charge of their terrorist fascist 
organization, and that he and Padalka were the organization’s most active 
members.
286
 According to Sedliar, Padalka openly criticized Soviet power, 
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especially its nationality policies.
287
 Sedliar testified that this organization was 
formed in early 1934 when a group of artists worked on fresco painting in the 
Chervonozavods’kyi Theatre in Kharkiv. He stated that Boichuk agitated the 
artists against Soviet power, which had destroyed the Ukrainian peasantry and 
intelligentsia, and as a result, the “Ukrainian culture and nation were 
dying.”
288
 Later the artists Ievhen Kholostenko, Mykola Rokyts’kyi, Serhii 
Tomakh and Vasyl’ Ovchynnykov were recruited into the organization.
289
 
According to Sedliar, the chapters of the organization that recruited student 
youth functioned in Kyiv and Kharkiv.
290
 
 The NKVD was interested in incriminating as many Ukrainian artists 
and cultural figures as possible as anti-Soviet formalists and counter-
revolutionaries. Sedliar’s case prepared the ground for several arrests, 
including those of the artists Kyrylo Hvozdyk, Vasyl’ Kas’ian and Mykhailo 
Derehus—members of the artistic association ARMU (1925-1932)—as part of 
a fascist organization.
291
  Among those who were framed as nationalists was 
also Andrii Khvylia.
292
 To extract the maximum number of compromising 
details, the NKVD operative Gol’dman prolonged Sedliar’s preliminary 
investigation four times (to 1 March 1937, 10 April 1937, 20 May 1937 and 1 
June 1937).
293
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Ivan Padalka.         Vasyl’ Sedliar.
294
 
    
 
 Ochnye stavki served as the final unequivocal evidence of the artists’ 
guilt. The 22 February 1937 ochnaia stavka between Sedliar and Padalka 
helped the secret police to indict Boichuk and several other artists and 
professors from the Kyiv Art Institute and the Union of Artists. Under the 
pressure applied by interrogators, both artists confirmed the NKVD theory of a 
nationalist conspiracy among artistic circles in Kharkiv and Kyiv.
295
   
In his deposition Epik claimed that both artists were involved in 
criminal terrorist activities conducted by residents of Budynok Slovo. Sedliar 
confirmed the allegations and his links to the nationalists Mykhailo Ialovyi, 
Maksym Lebid’ and Mike Iohansen.
296
 Mere affiliation with the slov’iany was 
an indication of guilt, and Sedliar’s interrogators were fully satisfied with this 
minimal information. They did not proceed any further in establishing the 
nature of these relationships. Similarly, Padalka identified Epik, Lebid’, 
Valerian Polishchuk and Slisarenko as members of the Ukrainian nationalist 
underground.
297
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Boichuk was taken into custody on 25 November 1936, almost 
simultaneously with Sedliar. It took the NKVD about two weeks to match 
Boichuk’s testimony with the depositions made by Sedliar and Padalka. The 
scenario written by the NKVD about the assassinations of Kosior and 
Postyshev linked Boichuk, Sedliar and Padalka in one nationalist group, and 
the theme of Boichuk’s origin was extensively massaged in the minutes of the 
Boichukists’ interrogations. 
298
 Boichuk’s nationalism of course emanated 
from his Galician upbringing, and Galicia was at the root of his convictions 
and subsequent transgressions.  
The agency thoroughly purged the entire Kyiv Art Institute in the late 
thirties. Besides Boichuk, who was identified as “the leader” (glavar’), an 
“inveterate nationalist” (makhrovyi natsionalist), and a “fascist” in depositions 
of other Ukrainian intellectuals,
299
 the Galician Serhii Iakubovs’kyi, chair of 
the department at the Kyiv Art Institute and editing assistant of the journal 
Bil’shovyk Ukrainy, was also arrested as a member of the nationalist 
conspiracy. Under torture, Iakubovs’kyi confirmed the existence of the fascist 
organization in the institute, and the membership in it of Boichuk, Sedliar and 
Padalka.
300
 On 13 July 1937 the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of 
the USSR sentenced Boichuk, Sedliar and Padalka to death.
301
 They were shot 
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on that very day in Kyiv.
302
  The three had been included in Stalin’s 26 June 
1937 list of those to be executed, a list that was also signed by Kaganovich 
and Voroshilov.
303
 The verdict prepared by the Collegium was a mere 
formality. The artists’ fate had already been decided by Stalin two weeks prior 
to the court hearing.  
However, their physical deaths seemed insufficient for the state. Their 
art had to be destroyed, a policy which was immediately implemented. Their 
frescoes in the Chervonozavods’kyi Theatre in Kharkiv were washed off and 
the walls were painted over, 75 of Sedliar’s illustrations for Taras 
Shevchenko’s book of poetry doomed the publication to complete 
annihilation. The entire circulation of 1933 was purged from libraries and 
burned, and their art work, where possible, was destroyed.
304
 Sedliar’s works 
were cut, burned, or doused with acid. Only four of his works survived in the 
Ukrainian National Art Museum in Kyiv.
305
  
In 1937 when the Boichukists’ interrogator Nikolai Grushevskii was 
himself arrested, he testified that the case against these artists had been a 
complete fabrication.
306
 The GPU/NKVD carefully planned arrests, and the 
suspects had been identified far in advance. For instance, other people’s 
depositions condemning Boichuk for his anti-Soviet activities were dated 
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1931, five years prior to the artist’s arrest. They are vague and contradictory 
but proved ample and satisfactory for NKVD officials in 1937.
307
 Antin 
Onishchuk, the seksot who fabricated evidence against this group of artists, as 
well as the interrogators who “investigated” their criminal cases, Grushevskii, 
Khaet, Proskuriakov and Pustovoitov, all perished during the Great Terror. 
They were accused of membership in an anti-Soviet organization that operated 
within the secret organs.
308
 
 
Ethnically Diverse Ukrainian Nationalists 
In early November 1936 Vazonov, the assistant to the district 
prosecutor, assigned to investigate special cases, signed the order to arrest a 
group of slov’iany: Ivan Kovtun (Iurii Vukhnal’), Oleksii Savyts’kyi (Iukhym 
Hedz’ or Oles’ Iasnyi), Ivan Kaliannykov (Ivan Kaliannnyk) and Samiilo 
Shchupak. All but Shchupak were arrested in Budynok Slovo. Shchupak, who 
in 1934 moved to Kyiv, resided in the Rolit building where he was arrested on 
10 November 1936. Vasyl’ Chechvians’kyi-Hubenko, Ostap Vyshnia’s 
brother, was arrested together with them.
309
 They were accused of membership 
in a Ukrainian nationalist fascist organization and of terrorist activity against 
party members. 
Vukhnal’ and Savyts’kyi, both former members of “Pluh,” wrote 
humorous short stories and feuilletons (feileton), a genre that became rather 
popular in the 1920s-30s but always remained suspect for the party 
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establishment.
310
 Vukhnal’ was also a talented novelist, and Savyts’kyi was a 
gifted playwright. In the early thirties, a writer’s sense of humor was treated as 
a political problem. In the party’s view laughter and humor were 
counterproductive to the obligatory heroism, seriousness and grandiloquence 
required of cultural producers, features that were appropriate to the heroic time 
and place. Because of the severe criticism to which these two writers were 
subjected in 1933, and because of the famine and the arrests of the 
intelligentsia that silenced many slov’iany, both writers stopped writing, and 
published almost nothing during this period.
311
 
With the exception of Shchupak, this group of the slov’iany were 
friends who lived in one place, spent time together, and worked for the same 
journals at different times of their literary career. For the NKVD, any form of 
grouping, personal or professional, posed the risk of a conspiracy. These close 
  
           
Iurii Vukhnal’.       Oleksii Savyts’kyi.  Ivan Kaliannykov.  Samiilo Shchupak. 
 
 
human links and connections were used as a pretext for sweeping away those 
who did not seem to be a part of Soviet cultural construction. Despite the fact 
that among them were individuals of Russian (Piddubnyi, Kaliannyk) and 
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Jewish (Shchupak) origin, for the secret police they all shared a Ukrainian 
identity by virtue of the space and place they shared (Budynok Slovo), the 
language they spoke (Ukrainian), and the art they produced (Ukrainian) . 
 Vukhnal made as many friends as he did enemies because of his 
epigrams and short stories, in which he mocked graphomaniacs who 
successfully adjusted themselves to party demands, and therefore were 
promoted by the authorities. His unforgettable character Sashko Indyk who 
bragged about his “red” inspiration, his peasant origin and talentless but 
optimistic poetry became the subject of severe criticism by official writers.
312
 
Before Vukhnal’s arrest on 2-3 November 1936, he was excluded from the 
party as a nationalist and counterrevolutionary. During the search of his 
apartment, the NKVD operatives found in Vukhnal’s library 
“counterrevolutionary” publications by those slov’iany who had already been 
arrested by the secret police, which served to confirm his reputation. 
Paradoxically, instead of keeping these publications as evidence of Vukhnal’s 
political unreliability, the Kharkiv NKVD decided to burn his library.
313
 This 
seemingly insignificant detail demonstrates that the decision about Vukhnal’s 
verdict likely had been made by this date, prior to the completion of the 
preliminary investigation and the court verdict, and therefore such evidence 
was no longer necessary. 
Vukhnal’s 4 November 1936 interrogation minutes reveal the concerns 
of an open and sincere person who lamented the party appointed chief editors 
of leading Ukrainian journals who understood nothing about literature. 
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Moreover, he also expressed concerns about the elimination of the best 
Ukrainian writers by the NKVD.
314
 Ten days later, on 14 November 1936 
Vukhnal’s tone changed dramatically: he confessed that under the influence of 
Kulish, Epik, Chechvians’kyi and Valerian Polishchuk he became a member 
of a nationalist anti-Soviet group. It is noteworthy that all these individuals 
had been arrested. Vukhnal’ knew about these arrests and his intentions seem 
transparent; he apparently did not want to blemish the reputation of those who 
were still free. These tactics made sense. The arrested often provided the 
NKVD with the names of individuals already dead, imprisoned or exiled. 
However, during the next interrogation, Vukhnal’ denounced Mykhailo 
Semenko, Antin Dykyi, Ivan Plakhtin, a pilot named Makarov and professor 
Trehubov, people who were not in the custody of the NKVD.
315
  
 On 3 February, under unknown circumstances, Vukhnal’ again 
changed his story, and testified that as a member of the literary associations 
“Pluh,” “Molodniak,” and “Prolitfront,” he was influenced by anti-Soviet 
propaganda published on the pages of these journals but he assertively stated 
that he had been divorced from his counterrevolutionary stance since 1935.
316
 
After this sudden turn in the preliminary investigation, the NKVD operative 
Lisitskii left Vukhnal’ alone for approximately three-and-a-half months. There 
is no way to know what happened to Vukhnal’ during this time in prison, 
whether he had been routinely abused or the interrogator Lisitskii simply 
forgot about him. Yet it is known that Vukhnal’ was convoyed to Kyiv to the 
Luk’ianovs’ka prison.
317
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 The NKVD operative Akimov replaced Lisitskii in both cases 
(Vukhnal’s and Kaliannyk’s). Unsigned pages of interrogation minutes 
became a frequent phenomenon under Akimov, and could have been easily 
forged by the interrogator. At best, the signature of the arrested was on the last 
page of the minutes. On 13 May 1937, Akimov met Vukhnal’ in the 
interrogation room with the statement: “You are continuing to resist. [We] 
strongly suggest that you should stop your disavowal.”
318
 Akimov informed 
Vukhnal’ that his resistance made little sense because his guilt was confirmed 
by the depositions of Savyts’kyi and Chechvians’kyi. Moreover, these 
individuals claimed that Vukhnal’ was also linked to a member of the 
Ukrainian nationalist underground Mykola Bazhan, the brother of his 
mistress.
319
 Vukhnal’ denied the insinuations.
320
  
 Importantly, the interrogators had no interest in cleansing the file to 
eliminate the evidence of their negligence, such as unsigned pages of protocols 
and illogical gaps during interrogations. They also failed to erase the traces of 
their concerted, visible efforts to emphasize Vukhnal’s guilt, and their 
avoidance of including information that might reveal Vukhnal’s innocence. 
For instance, Chechvians’kyi’s depositions about regular meetings in 
Vukhnal’s apartment and discussions about terrorist activities against party 
leaders proved to be false. Vukhnal’ testified that during the time period 
identified by Chechvians’kyi, he was on a business trip in Leningrad and 
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Odesa but this information had been ignored by Akimov as insignificant.
321
 
Furthermore, the protest written by Vukhnal’ that reveals Akimov’s 
manipulative tactics during ochnye stavki serves as a testament to the 
interrogator’s belief in his impunity. Vukhnal’ stated that Akimov refused to 
include in the minutes his questions to Chechvians’kyi and Chechvians’kyi’s 
responses that contradicted Chechvians’kyi’s depositions against Vukhnal’, 
just as Akimov denied Vukhnal’ permission to write additional statements in 
the minutes. Vukhnal’ demanded to hold these sessions in the presence of the 
prosecutor but his demands went unaddressed.
 322
  
These details and the interrogator’s tactics reveal the level, degree and 
type of organizational and procedural patterns established in the interrogation 
rooms, their culture and aesthetics. Extensive descriptive literature on 
interrogation practices confirm (as does an analysis of many cases of the 
slov’iany) the absolute certainty on the part of NKVD operatives concerning 
what results they were to obtain in the course of each criminal case. Similarly, 
Vukhnal’s case demonstrates a preconceived agenda, which was followed 
slavishly by the NKVD despite his persistent and adamant denial of all 
charges, including during the May 1937 conveyer interrogations through 
which he was put by Akimov. 
Confessions or their absence played little role in final verdicts. 
However, the recalcitrant evoked the interrogators’ fury, and they continued to 
torture the accused to satisfy themselves, not to fulfill the need for additional 
evidence or to appease their supervisors. The materials of the 1950s 
rehabilitation commissions and the correspondence between the KGB and 
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relatives of the slov’iany shed light on the methods the NKVD routinely 
employed in interrogation rooms. Vukhnal’s brother Leonid testified that he 
escaped from a little window in the bathroom (the apartment was located on 
the first floor) when the NKVD came to arrest Vukhnal’. Leonid saw his 
brother in prison during the last day before he was shot. According to Leonid, 
it was difficult to recognize Iurii; he was mutilated and beaten up. Vukhnal’ 
told Leonid: “Lenechka, brother, I am not guilty.”
323
 The last statement in 
Leonid’s letter to the KGB authorities reads as following: “Your archive is a 
total fabrication.”
324
    
 Through similar practices, the NKVD operatives Iakushev and the 
“second supporting violin” Lisitskii quickly broke Oleksii Savyts’kyi. The 
duet of these two interrogators proved to be effective. On the second day after 
his arrest, Savyts’kyi confessed that he belonged to a Ukrainian nationalist 
fascist organization that worked in the deep underground.
325
 Allegedly besides 
Chechvians’kyi and Vukhnal’, Savyts’kyi named Mykhailo Semenko, Terentii 
Masenko, Ivan Kaliannyk, Amvrosii Buchma, Maksym Ryl’s’kyi, Antin 
Dykyi and Ivan Plakhtin as members of the anti-Soviet organization.
326
 
Savyts’kyi supposedly confirmed that ideologically he was recruited into this 
organization in 1927 by the brothers and “fascists” Chechvians’kyi and 
Vyshnia when he joined the editorial board of the journal Chervonyi Perets’ 
(Red Pepper). “They cultivated an enemy of Soviet power in me,” 
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Savyts’kyi’s protocol stated on 28 November 1936.
327
 Savyts’kyi allegedly 
characterized Ivan Kaliannyk as an “active fascist,” because there were cases, 
according to Savyts’kyi’s testimony, when Kaliannyk beat other writers in 
Budynok Slovo, and hence was capable of terrorist acts against party 
leaders.
328
 The authorship of these accounts is of course doubtful. The level of 
reasoning assigned to Savyts’kyi, an individual with a sharp mind, great sense 
of humor and poise, appears rather childish, crude, and even under the extreme 
stressful circumstances of interrogation, highly incongruous. 
Most importantly, the accounts of the conspiracy constantly changed, 
depending on the NKVD’s perception of its requirements at the time. In 
October 1937, Mykhailo Semenko who was named by Savyts’kyi in 1936 as 
one of the members of a nationalist fascist organization suddenly became the 
one who in 1933 recruited Vukhnal’, Chechvians’kyi and Savyts’kyi and 
created one of many terrorist groups that was supposed to assassinate 
Kosior.
329
 Savyts’kyi’s story about his recruitment by Chechvians’kyi and 
Vyshnia had been abandoned and forgotten by the secret police.
330
 
The lieutenant of the State Security Lisitskii was also assigned to 
investigate Ivan Kaliannyk’s case.
331
 Kaliannyk was a subtle poet and a former 
member of the literary association “Prolitfront.” In late 1934, Kostiuk 
remembered Kaliannyk, who was usually emotional and flamboyant, as sad 
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and depressed because of the routine arrests in Budynok Slovo.
332
 Kaliannyk 
earned a reputation as a hooligan because he beat a bureaucrat from the DVU 
who insulted his wife. A chorus of voices accused Kaliannyk of terrorism, and 
compared him to Nikolaev, who assassinated Kirov. This baseless idea was 
supported by party hawks in the Union of Writers. Ivan Kyrylenko was 
especially active in harassing and damning Kaliannyk as a “relative” of 
Nikolaev, and on 15 November 1935 Kaliannyk was ejected from its 
membership.
333
            
Kaliannyk was an ethnic Russian, as was his wife Oleksandra 
Sherbakova. He dropped the ending –ov in his last name, an indication of 
Russian ethnicity, due to Pavlo Tychyna’s advice to write in Ukrainian.
334
 But 
he admired Russian poetry, and could cite by heart Pushkin for hours.
335
 
Kaliannyk’s transformation into a Ukrainian poet and Ukrainian speaker was 
sufficient ground for the secret police to accuse him of membership in a 
Ukrainian nationalist fascist terrorist organization. In light of his arrest during 
the night of 3-4 November 1936, this detail is darkly ironic. Kaliannyk’s 
favorite hero of the revolution was Felix Dzerzhinskii, the founder of the 
Cheka.
336
 The night search in Budynok Slovo was conducted in the presence of 
the ubiquitous chief of the building Iakiv Fish.
 
Among books by Epik, 
Vukhnal’, Masenko and Hrushevs’kyi that were deemed counterrevolutionary, 
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the NKVD operatives found a portrait of Alexander I, an outrageous fact that 
was used against Kaliannyk as evidence of his political unreliability.
337
  
In the Kharkiv prison, Kaliannyk rejected the accusations and managed 
to tolerate Lisitskii’s tortures for approximately a month. On 28 November 
1936 he confessed that Kulish and Epik had enticed him into anti-Soviet 
activities, and the writers Savyts’kyi, Masenko, Serhii Borzenko, 
Chechvians’kyi, Vukhnal’, Ivan Shutov and Ivan Khutors’kyi were his 
accomplices. All were supposedly members of the Ukrainian nationalist 
underground.
338
 Interestingly, some of those whom Kaliannyk identified as 
members of the organization and counterrevolutionaries, like Mykola 
Nahnibeda, Ivan Shutov, Serhii Borzenko, Teren’ Masenko and Borys 
Kotliarov, were never repressed.
339
 Like Vukhnal’, Savyts’kyi and 
Chechvians’kyi, Kaliannyk was convoyed to Kyiv in the middle of April, 
where he confirmed his deposition to the new interrogator Akimov.
340
 Akimov 
encouraged Kaliannyk to also include in the list of enemies Antin Dykyi and 
Mykhailo Semenko, who were arrested shortly after Kaliannyk’s 
confession.
341
 
 The code names for different Ukrainian nationalist groups were used 
interchangeably, and the treatment of members of all these imaginary 
organizations was virtually the same: they constituted a part of the Ukrainian 
nationalist underground. An interesting twist in the history of this particular 
group of the slov’iany manifested itself in the accusation signed in July 1937 
by the assistant to the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs in the UkrSSR 
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V. Ivanov and the assistant to the Prosecutor in the USSR A. Vyshinskii. It 
stated that the NKVD had uncovered a Ukrainian counterrevolutionary 
Trotskyist terrorist organization. This name had never been used during the 
preliminary investigation.
342
 The conclusion alleged that the members of the 
conspiracy had connections with the Trotskyite-Zinov’ievite center in 
Moscow, implemented Kirov’s murder on 1 December 1934 and during 
subsequent years prepared terrorist acts against the leaders of the VKP(b).
343
 
On 14 July 1937, Vukhnal’, Savyts’kyi’, Kaliannyk, Chechvians’kyi 
and other “members” of the conspiracy were sentenced to death as terrorists 
by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. The Collegium 
worked hard this day. In accordance with Stalin’s 26 June 1937 order, also 
signed by Kaganovich and Voroshilov, 20 people were sentenced to death, 
including the Boichukists. Vukhnal’ was the only one who denied the 
accusations during the closed court hearing. Kaliannyk confirmed his guilt, as 
did other “members” of the supposed organization, and asked the court to 
preserve his life because, he stated, he “behaved well during the preliminary 
investigation.” The verdicts were implemented the next day. The conspirators 
were shot on 15 July 1937 in Kyiv, and the place of their burial remains 
unknown.
344
  
As a routine practice, the families of the accused were evicted from 
Budynok Slovo, and their possessions were appropriated by the NKVD. Vira 
Mykhailivna, Savyts’kyi’s wife, was also repressed and exiled to the Gulag. In 
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the late 1940s, their son Vitalii found traces of his mother in Mahadan.
345
 
Oleksandra Vasyl’ivna, Kaliannyk’s wife, was arrested in October 1937 and 
sentenced to 8 years in labor camps. In the 1950s they were rehabilitated.
346
 
Kaliannyk’s daughter Zhanna was allowed to see her father’s criminal file, 
fabricated by the secret police, only after a prolonged battle with the 
authorities in 1990.
347
 On 28 September 1990, Zhanna wrote: “The KGB does 
its business as usual and stubbornly conceals mysteries about non-existent 
crimes even from the children [of the accused], who have already become old 
people.”
348
    
Samiilo Shchupak’s fate was similar, although he established himself 
as an official literary critic and journalist who vigorously supported the party 
line. Among his supporters were Andrii Khvylia, Vlas Chubar, Ievhen Hirchak 
and even Joseph Stalin. A long-time editor of the Kyiv newspaper 
Proletars’ka pravda (Proletarian Truth) and a past leader of the Kyiv chapter 
of the literary association “Pluh” (since 1924),
349
 Shchupak actively 
participated in the Literary Discussion in the 1920s, and criticized Khvyl’ovyi 
and “fellow traveler” writers for their ideological deviations.
350
 A former 
slov’ianyn, he was arrested on 10 November 1936 in Kyiv. His arrest 
embodied a new NKVD practice that would blossom during the Great Terror: 
the elimination of servants who had implemented their assigned tasks and 
were no longer needed. 
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 Since 1930, Shchupak had lived in Kharkiv but moved to Budynok 
Slovo’s apartment 5 only in 1933 after the death of the writer Leonid Chernov-
Maloshyichenko.
351
 Khvyl’ovyi lived two floors above, in apartment 9. The 
brief time they shared as neighbors did not facilitate their rapproachment. Just 
the opposite; it exacerbated their mutual dislike. Khvyl’ovyi was not the only 
one who did not get along with Shchupak. The Futurists group was especially 
frustrated with Shchupak’s attacks. In 1928, Oleksa Vlyz’ko characterized 
Shchupak as a person who “definitely disgusts us all.”
352
 Shchupak edited the 
journals Kritika and Literaturna Hazeta, and joined the literary association 
VUSPP, which was compliant to the party and began to dominate cultural 
discourse through the latter’s support. VUSPP aggressively imposed the views 
of its overseers in art, which further aggravated Khvyl’ovyi, but he was no 
longer in a position to challenge them.
353
 The relationship between Shchupak 
and Khvyl’ovyi remained quite inimical. In autumn of 1933, Shchupak also 
played an active role in the harassment of Kurbas, accusing him of hatred of 
the proletariat and proletarian culture.
354
  A year later Shchupak moved to 
Kyiv and resided in Rolit, as did other cultural and party elite. 
On 10 February 1935, Shchupak published an article in the newspaper 
Komunist “A Hostile Distortion of the History of Literature” (“Vorozhe 
spotvorennia istorii literatury”) which was fully in tune with Postyshev’s 
guidance regarding Ukrainian culture and literature. With an accountant’s 
precision, Shchupak challenged all “combat forays” undertaken by nationalist 
writers in Ukraine. He mentioned the works written by the slov’iany 
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Khrystiuk, Desniak, Richyts’kyi and many others, and characterized the 
authors as “double-dealers.” The slov’iany Ivan Lakyza and Volodymyr 
Koriak were identified as class enemies and bourgeois counterrevolutionaries. 
Shchupak embodied the aesthetics of literary criticism of the 1920-30s that 
was marked by “primitive stereotypes” and the desire to establish a “dead 
police-like order in literature.”
 355
 Iurii Shevel’ov perceptively noted that 
Shchupak as a literary critic used the “logic of an ax”, and his thinking was 
highly politicized and conformed to the most current party resolution.
356
 He, 
and others like him, created a new genre, a “genre of political 
denunciation.”
357
 
The state strove to control not only people’s public and private spheres, 
but also their personality. Shchupak became a product of the Soviet social 
engineering experiment, although his political flexibility and sovetskist’ did 
not save his life. A faithful Communist who followed party directives 
unquestionably and persistently, Shchupak became another November 1936 
victim of the NKVD. The preliminary investigation was rather brief. After 
three interrogations, he was accused of membership in the 
counterrevolutionary Trotskyist organization that had implemented Kirov’s 
murder, and recruited young literary cadres into this organization. The 
Ukrainian writer Oleksandr Kopylenko allegedly was one of the recruited.  
Shchupak’s past membership in the Bund meant little for the final analysis of 
his wrecking activities against the state. The only tangible evidence of his guilt 
were books, confiscated from his library and written by Kamenev, Zinov’ev, 
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Tomskii, and Skrypnyk—publications that were identified as “ideologically 
harmful and counterrevolutionary literature.”
358
 The 10 March 1937 10-minute 
closed meeting of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court in Moscow 
was a litany of falsehoods, as were thousands of other trials. Following Andrei 
Vyshinskii’s manual Handbook on Criminal Procedure (Kurs ugolovnogo 
processa), which suggested that the confession of an accused was sufficient 
proof of a crime, the main participants of the meeting, Vasilii Ul’rikh and 
Andrei Vyshinskii, sentenced Shchupak to death. He was executed the same 
day.
359
  
Technically, Shchupak was accused of being a Ukrainian nationalist 
because he was a member of the same anti-Soviet organization as Piddubnyi, 
Svashenko, the Boichukists, Vukhnal’, Savyts’kyi and others. Being Jewish, 
Shchupak possessed a double-identity, and was fully immersed in Ukrainian 
culture and Ukrainian literary discourse. Moreover, there was another aspect 
of his self-identification, the Marxist or Communist one. However, he wrote in 
Ukrainian, spoke Ukrainian and was associated with a place that housed a 
“nest of nationalists,” Budynok Slovo. All these factors played a decisive role 
for the NKVD officials who decided his fate.
360
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In 1935, the campaign against nationalists and oppositionists was 
disguised as an “inspection of party documents.” Local party organs, fulfilling 
the May 1935 order of the Central Committee, created commissions which 
from May to December 1935 purged party members, subsequently arresting 
them. The party acted in collaboration with the NKVD, and their common 
reports were sent to Nikolai Ezhov who personally supervised the purge and 
repression.
 
 The Ukrainian NKVD transferred to the party approximately 
17,368 dossiers on people who were supposed to be expelled from the party 
and later arrested by the secret police.
361
 The statistics of the 1934-36 
repression in Ukraine are revealing: in 1934 30,322 people were arrested, in 
1935—24,934, and in 1936—15, 717. The years preceding the Great Terror in 
Ukraine took the lives of 70,973 people. Most of them were executed or died 
in the camps.
362
 
In 1935-36, dozens of anti-Soviet nationalist organizations were 
“uncovered” throughout Ukraine. According to the Memorial Society data (in 
the Kyiv branch), “in the second half of 1935, the number of cases examined 
by special collegiums of oblast’ courts increased by 95 percent, compared to 
the first six months of that year. In the first half of 1936 this number increased 
by 20.8 percent.”
363
 The increased number of criminal cases during the 
transitional period before the Great Terror seemed to confirm Stalin’s doctrine 
about the intensified class struggle during the last stage of socialist 
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construction, which had been successfully achieved, according to Stalin’s 
1936 Constitution.     
The individual histories of the slov’iany presented in this chapter 
confirm the notion that people’s doubtful pasts mattered, years of loyal service 
to the Soviets did not. Those who earned a reputation as Ukrainian 
nationalists, even those who were not ethnic Ukrainians, were subject to arrest. 
Despite different ethnic backgrounds (Russian, Ukrainian and Jewish) and 
different aesthetic, artistic and social values, the slov’iany represented for the 
state a multi-bonded group who shared the same space, and more importantly, 
the same language.  
The rhetoric and methods employed and publicized by the central 
secret organs reinforced the local traditions in the Ukrainian NKVD. By 
January 1935, the NKVD in Moscow completed the investigation of “crimes” 
committed by the former oppositionists Zinov’iev, Kamenev, Ievdokimov, 
Bakaev and their accomplices, who had allegedly prepared assassinations of 
Stalin, Molotov, Chubar’, Postyshev, Kosior and Eikhe. The mechanics of 
procedures and aesthetics embedded in these cases reassured the vigilant 
secret organs in Ukraine that they were not lagging behind.  
The NKVD scheme repeated itself over and over again. The scenario 
conceived by the interrogator included criminal charges, depositions of other 
individuals as incriminating evidence, and the prescription of the punishment. 
Confessions were an optional, rather than a mandatory part of the 
investigation. Formal procedures of trials and casual impositions of death as 
penalty without the slightest attempt at considering the alternatives to routine 
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killings have been symptomatic of the system’s dealings with alleged 
“nationalists.”         
As this chapter demonstrates, the emotional condition of the slov’iany 
and their fears were entangled with the place to which they belonged, leaving 
them no room for resistance to accusations of conspiracy in prison. Vukhnal’s 
stoicism was a rarity. In his book The Myth of the State, Ernst Cassirer 
emphasized the significant role of emotional identification of the masses under 
totalitarianism, which is necessary for creating a myth, a powerful tool of 
societal regimentation.
364
 Patiently cultivated by the state through incessant 
propaganda, the popular emotional (often unconscious) condition shaped 
people’s individual and collective behavior, inspiring them to fight for the 
system or to surrender to it, if needed. The slov’iany could not escape either 
one of their identifications, spatial or emotional. They belonged to a 
community of supposed nationalists who were “entrenched” in Budynok Slovo, 
and most importantly, they were converted into, or rather enslaved, as builders 
of Soviet culture.  
The behavior of slov’iany under arrest demonstrated that humans 
cannot tolerate anxiety for very long. Psychoanalysis explains that people 
develop defense mechanisms that help them inhibit, camouflage or eliminate 
their anxiety. The experience of constant external danger and expectation of 
arrest, combined with inner constraints and the impossibility of writing freely, 
induced most slov’iany to deny their reality and the trauma of betrayals, and 
accept lies about nationalists and enemies who contaminated the building.
365
 
                                                          
364
 Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State, ed. Charles W. Hendel (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, 1955).   
365
 Lawrence A. Pervin, Personality: Theory, Assessment, and Research (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1970), 232. 
 398 
 
They attended purge meetings, and with vigor sentenced their 
colleagues to definite death through their overpowering criticism. Finding 
themselves in interrogation rooms, they also accepted the version NKVD 
operatives provided—that their neighbors and fellow writers were a part of a 
nationalist conspiracy. Some not only believed it but also began to doubt their 
own innocence. Those who were still free continued to believe that they were 
part of the revolutionary elite, desired elite apartments, fought for them 
beyond human dignity, and innocently drank tea, where they “should not have 
had it.”  
399 
 
Chapter Nine 
The Great Terror: Reshaping Social and Cultural 
Space    
 
  
How can you not understand? 
Everything is constantly changing here. 
. . . Because it is the Zone… 
 
Stalker
1
 
 
 
No Victors 
By 1937 the slov’iany had been fully absorbed into the new political 
culture that manifested itself in widespread denunciations and arrests. They 
compromised each other through condemnations in the press, by adopting the 
party’s language, or rather slang that habitually cast the writers as “anti-Soviet 
snakes (gadiny)” and “Trotskyist filth.” The process of simultaneous societal 
homogenization and fragmentation continued in the republic, and as Evgeny 
Dobrenko noted, “language [was] transformed into a space of disunity, not 
unity,” despite its desired ends of accord, peace and fruitful communication.
2
 
This behavior bolstered the state mechanisms of selecting men who would be 
awarded the title of Soviet writers. In Ukraine only a few were elevated to this 
rank. They were bureaucratized, seduced by the state’s perks. The most 
important one, granted by the secret police, was life; they needed no other 
encouragement to support state programs. Those who were eager to participate 
in national cultural construction were expelled from the Ukrainian Union of 
Soviet Writers and were eliminated as nationalists for their anti-Soviet and 
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terrorist activities. One historian noted that “people also helped [to prolong the 
terror], both individually and collectively, to create the whirlwind they 
experienced.”
3
 Indeed, political culture, state violence and fear cultivated from 
above stimulated extensive popular participation, drawing in the masses and 
those who stood above them. 
Oleg Khlevniuk has noted that there were several factors that shaped 
the Great Terror. The most crucial one for the regime was to ensure complete 
control and regimentation of society through fear, to suppress dissenting 
voices and opposition to the regime in order to maintain the “sole authority of 
the leader.”
4
 The terror therefore provided an opportunity to fully exercise 
power in order to accomplish ideological, political and economic tasks in the 
ways Stalin envisioned. The 22 February-7 March 1937 Plenum of the Central 
Committee identified two primary targets for mass repressions and 
executions—the oppositional cadres in the highest echelons of power whose 
behavior would be unpredictable in the context of an increasing threat “from 
outside,” and a potential “fifth column” that would jeopardize construction of 
a monolithic state.
5
 
The state facilitated the elimination of these enemies through the 
routine restructuring of operational and court procedures. By mid-1937, 
troikas were replaced by dvoikas, which included a prosecutor and an NKVD 
head. Of course, dvoikas dealt with cases outside the judiciary, and their chief 
responsibility was to increase the tempo: criminal cases were to be handled 
quickly according to prescribed schemata, and the verdicts were to be carried 
                                                          
3
 Goldman, 136. 
4
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out immediately according to the infamous order of 1 December 1934.
6
 
Blessed by the Politburo, on 30 July 1937, the People’s Commissar of Internal 
Affairs Nikolai Ezhov issued the notorious order no. 00447 “On an Operation 
to Repress Former Kulaks, Criminals, and Other Anti-Soviet Elements.” The 
operation was to be launched in early August 1937 and be completed within 
four months. The remaining slov’iany neatly fell into one of the categories 
specified in the document, the category that targeted “terrorists” and “spies.” 
The quota established for those to be arrested in Kharkiv oblast’ was 1,500 
people who were to be sentenced to death, and 4,000 people who were to be 
exiled for 8-10 years in labor camps.
 7
 
The archival evidence available today to historians leaves no doubt 
about Stalin’s personal supervision of the NKVD’s operations during the 
Great Terror. Ezhov never acted independently, and his decisions were fully 
shaped by Stalin’s instructions. On 17 January 1938 Stalin ordered Ezhov to 
continue repressive operations that targeted ethnic and national groups, 
including those in Ukraine where, as he pointed out to Ezhov, “the SRs were 
very strong.”
8
 
During the Great Terror, the slov’iany were hunted down in territories 
geographically distant from Budynok Slovo, even when people disconnected 
their lives and memories from their former place of residence. Those who still 
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resided in Kharkiv prepared themselves for arrest by burning personal 
correspondence, diaries and books with the autographs of their colleagues who 
had perished in the early thirties. The patterns of people’s psychology were 
characteristic of communities under surveillance—friendships transformed or 
disintegrated, pervasive primitive alcoholism replaced social gatherings and 
poetry evenings. The aftermath of the Great Terror reveals no final victories or 
final defeats on either side (the slov’iany or their intrrogators). Despite the 
physical elimination of both by the system, the two groups remained in 
opposition to each other, which became evident in the rehabilitation materials 
of the 1950s. The gravitation to self-destruction among the writers who 
survived until 1937-38 was a manifestation of the feeling of doom and a 
protective mechanism against state violence. In prison, they presented 
malleable material for NKVD operatives, for whom the rationale for mass 
repression also began to evaporate during the summer of 1937. 
      
Mykhail’ Semenko and Ivan Kulyk: Semantics Stripped of Meaning 
In 1937, with a renewed vigor the party began to “uncover” bourgeois 
nationalists among Ukrainian intellectuals, blaming them for “wrecking” 
activities by creating a “fascist” Ukrainian language in which all words that 
resembled Russian words had been purged. They were accused of neglecting 
the Russian language as the language of instruction in Ukrainian secondary 
schools and schools of higher education, acts that were qualified as attempts 
aimed at the “separation of Soviet Ukraine from the USSR and the restoration 
of capitalist slavery.”
9
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Initiated by Stalin, the 13 January 1937 resolution of the TsK VKP(b) 
“About the unsatisfactory party leadership in the Kyiv oblast’ committee of 
the KP(b)U and the shortcomings in work of the KP(b)U” launched a new 
wave of mass repression in Ukraine. This resolution demoralized not only the 
Ukrainian party leaders but also those who held leading positions in Ukrainian 
cultural institutions. According to Ezhov’s 31 July 1937 order to the local 
NKVD organs, approximately 270,000 people had to be repressed. The mass 
terror in the republic lasted from January 1937 to late 1938, and swept away 
the remaining slov’iany, as well as their tormentors.
10
    
One of the more recognizable slov’ianyn arrested during the Great 
Terror was Mykhail’ Semenko, an avant-garde futurist poet whose language 
and quest for new forms of expression had been very distant from party 
prescriptions and proscriptions. Yet, he aligned himself with the ideas of the 
Russian Futurists (the proletarian poet Vladimir Maiakovskii and his circle),
 11
 
and argued that art had to “perform socially useful tasks.”
12
 Solomiia 
Pavlychko argued that for Semenko, Futurism was the “analogy of socialism 
in real life,” in that it poeticized and supported the destruction of class enemies 
and approved of violence for the sake of the Revolution.
13
 In the 1920s, 
Semenko deservedly became the leader of the Ukrainian Futurists, whose 
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expectations for their art were grounded in European modern traditions.
14
 
They vigorously rejected the orthodoxy of Taras Shevchenko. Semenko even 
published a collection of his own poems entitled Kobzar (1924) in an attempt 
to demolish Shevchenko’s cult following in the minds of the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia.
15
 Indeed, Semenko had a “difficult” relationship with the 
Ukrainian cultural icon. Protesting against what he saw as stagnant cultural 
norms and traditions, he even publicly burned a volume by Shevchenko.
16
 
 The Literary Discussion “spoiled” Semenko’s relationships with 
several Ukrainian writers, artists and with the theatre director Les’ Kurbas.
 17
 
Semenko and his literary association “Nova Heneratsia” (New Generation) 
organized a crusade against Kurbas and his theatre “Berezil’,” and against 
Boichuk and his circle.
18
 Often Semenko’s criticism went beyond artistic 
analyses, and resembled what Hryhorii Kostiuk called “ideological and 
political battles.”
19 
On the pages of Nova Heneratsia, Semenko also attacked 
VAPLITE and Khvyl’ovyi, identifying the views of vaplitiany as fascist.
20
 In 
the context of the political culture of the time these intellectual attacks seemed 
quite normal, but in the light of preceding friendships and alliances—tragic, 
because initially these men constituted a group of like-minded individuals.  
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Like vaplitianstvo, Semenko’s Futurism, bold poetry-painting 
(poezomaliarstvo), was for the state not only a form of literary transgression 
but primarily an ideological statement of freedom and “otherness.” By the 
early thirties, under party pressure Semenko surrendered his principles to 
socialist realism.
21
 In the vortex of party harassment, criticism, and literary 
unification Semenko repudiated Futurism, and wrote several pieces in an 
uncharacteristic manner and disastrous from a literary point of view.
22
 Alcohol 
became an anesthetic for Semenko to dull his new experiences and 
uncertainties. It helped him ignore the vulgarity of his artistic transformation.
23
 
From 17 August-1 September 1934, the first Congress of Writers of the 
USSR took place in Moscow where for the first time the words “Soviet 
literature” were uttered repeatedly.
24
 Iurii Smolych noted that Semenko who 
attended the Congress perfectly understood what was going on at the 
Congress—freedom of creativity had been fully paralyzed.
25
 One day at this 
Congress became especially memorable for the secret police. A leaflet was 
distributed among the delegates that read: “Our real literature is behind bars, 
and you who gathered here have abandoned it. You should be desecrated and 
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thrown out as garbage.” For three years, the NKVD searched unsuccessfully 
for the author of this proclamation.
26
 
 
Mykhail’ Semenko.
27
 
 
 
On 26 April 1937, Semenko was arrested as an active member of a 
Ukrainian fascist terrorist organization and the author of the seditious leaflet.
28
 
Because Semenko often traveled to Kyiv, the secret police issued two orders 
for his arrest—one for the Kharkiv NKVD department, the second—for the 
Kyiv NKVD department. Semenko was arrested in the hotel “Kontinental’” in 
Kyiv, the place of residence of his wife, Natalia Uzhvii. Although by this time 
the couple was separated, most of Semenko’s possessions were confiscated at 
Uzhvii’s place.
29
  
Despite Semenko’s open leftist positions, his membership in the 
Borot’bist party and his work together with Oleksandr Shums’kyi for the 
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People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Kyiv in the early twenties 
blemished his reputation.
30
 Myron Akimov (Ehides) had been “working” with 
Semenko for two months, May and June. On 7 July 1937, he asked Semenko 
to confirm his membership in the nationalist organization. Semenko refused.
31
  
One can only imagine what happened to Semenko during the period 
from early July to early September 1937. But on 4 September 1937 he wrote a 
letter to Leplevskii, the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs, stating that he 
resisted justice for 4 months and 8 days, and now he was willing to provide 
truthful information about his membership in the Ukrainian nationalist fascist 
terrorist organization and about other members in the hope that Soviet power 
would forgive him for his crime.
32
 Semenko’s detailed confession of his 
crimes follows the letter to Leplevskii.  
Semenko claimed that he was recruited into the organization by Andrii 
Khvylia in 1927, and its alleged leaders were Ialovyi, Khvylia and Pylypenko. 
The organization supposedly planned to murder party leaders, to dethrone the 
Soviet regime and to establish an independent Ukraine with the assistance of 
Germany. Ironically, it would be practically impossible to implement these 
plans under the watchful eye of the NKVD in Ukraine, yet the secret police 
wrote the scenario of conspiracy without “digging deeply” into the potential 
technicalities of such a daunting task. Routinely, terrorism was scripted as one 
of the methods employed by the organization. According to Semenko, the 
slov’iany Savyts’kyi and Vukhnal’ were active participants in terrorist plans.
33
 
Galicians were also imbedded in the scenario of terrorist conspiracy: Semenko 
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supposedly maintained connections with Ukrainian nationalists in Galicia who 
worked for the newspaper Novyi chas and provided leadership and support.
34
  
The practice of ochnye stavki remained common during the Great 
Terror. By engraving in their minds the visual image of their denouncer and by 
instilling horror and shame for their acts, these experiences kept the arrested 
subdued during the court hearing, a condition which facilitated the admission 
before the prosecutor of crimes they had “committed.” Semenko was also 
subjected to this procedure. During the 17 September ochnaia stavka between 
Semenko and Andrii Mykhailiuk, Semenko claimed that the organization had 
prepared to assassinate Kosior on 1 May 1937, and a bomb was made and 
passed to Mykhailiuk who was supposed to throw it at Kosior during a street 
demonstration. To intimidate the arrested, usually more than one agent 
conducted the meeting. In Semenko’s case, three people monitored the 
procedure—Daniil Lifar’, Akimov and Proskuriakov.
35
 Both Semenko and 
Mykhailiuk confirmed the scenario and signed the minutes of the meeting.
36
 
Interestingly, the political dynamic in Ukraine at any given time 
accurately found its reflection in the texts of criminal files. Semenko was in 
prison during great perturbations that involved leading party figures in 
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Ukraine, as well as the executors of their will— NKVD associates. In January 
1937 the TsK accused Postyshev of failure to combat enemies in Ukraine. He 
was withdrawn from the republic in March 1937, and was arrested in Moscow 
the next year. Balyts’kyi was arrested on Ezhov’s order on 7 July 1937.
37
 The 
system began to cannibalize itself.  
Consequently, the details of Semenko’s conspiracy were enhanced and 
the “plot” thickened. A reader of Semenko’s criminal file might be completely 
lost in the devilish whirlwind of names and events related to the “conspiracy” 
plotted by Ukrainian nationalists against the state. Importantly, the language of 
depositions remained bureaucratic and mediocre, more characteristic of 
Akimov and Proskuriakov than Semenko: 
I continued to be a malicious nationalist, who was trying to find an outlet for my anti-
Soviet views. My trip abroad and my meetings with the prominent representatives of 
the Ukrainian immigration not only strengthened my hostile convictions but also 
pushed me to fight against the VKP(b) and Soviet power in an organized fashion.
38
 
  
 
On 16 October Semenko received an assignment to write a substantial 
report about Ivan Kulyk, a former slov’ianyn, a member of the TsK VKP(b) 
and of the Central Executive Committee in the Ukrainian SSR, and the 
director of the Party Publishing House of the TsK VKP(b). In 1934, Kulyk 
was appointed the head of the Union of Writers in Ukraine, and since 1935 he 
was also an editor of Literaturna Hazeta and the journal Radians’ka literatura. 
The task of denouncing Kulyk was not accidental, and the subsequent flow of 
events was not fortuitous. Kulyk’s best friend was the second person in the 
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Ukrainian GPU Karl Karlson, Balyts’kyi’s assistant.
39
 When in the summer of 
1937 Moscow began a fundamental cleansing of the Ukrainian NKVD, on 26 
July 1937 Karlson was transferred to the NKVD in Moscow.
40
 On the very 
next day, the NKVD arrested Kulyk. Nikolai Ezhov personally reported to 
Stalin about Kulyk’s arrest.
41
    
It is unknown whether Semenko was informed that the most influential 
individual in the Union of Writers, Ivan Kulyk, had been arrested. There are 
no traces in his file about how he spent the last two summer months of his life. 
In July and August the secret police was shaken by internal investigations of 
its own workers who, it was claimed, had conspired against the state and 
created an anti-Soviet organization within the secret police. The secret police 
had supposedly arrested innocent people in Ukraine to provoke a rebellion 
that, it was hoped, would lead to the destruction of the Soviet regime in 
Ukraine. Adam B. Ulam characterized the paradoxical dynamic of 1937 as a 
“kaleidoscopic pattern of Communist rule,” when “yesterday’s heroes [were] 
becoming today’s traitors and enemies.”
42
   
For the state, this maneuver was politically expedient from several 
perspectives. First, the party leadership found a scapegoat that could be 
blamed for mass killings in Ukraine; second, the witnesses of outrageously 
illegal procedures blessed by the party could be effectively eliminated; third, it 
was time for the rotation of the cadres in Ukraine, a regular practice to prevent 
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real conspiracies and corruption among NKVD agents. The promotion of 
Ukrainian chekists to leading positions in the NKVD in Moscow was out of 
the question—they had to be silenced. 
Most GPU/NKVD operatives involved in Ukrainian operations and 
who had interrogated many slov’iany were arrested during the summer months 
of 1937. In late July 1937, Nikolai Grushevskii and Serhii Pustovoitov were 
put in prison. 
43
 According to their testimonies, Peisakh Rakhlis, Solomon 
Bruk, Oleksandr Sherstov, Boris Kozel’skii, Mykhail Aleksandrovskii and 
many others were members of an anti-Soviet terrorist organization that 
operated in the secret organs.
44
 Even Balyts’kyi was alleged to be a leader of 
the terrorist organization.
45
 Those who had implemented the largest operations 
in the history of the secret police and were responsible for millions of deaths 
in Ukraine, specialists in Ukrainian culture and “cultural producers,” were 
now considered regional nationalists and conspirators themselves.  
The sweltering summer months of 1937 were stressful for the secret 
police. The number of the arrested in Ukraine put tremendous pressure on 
prison facilities. On 20 August 1937, Leplevskii complained to Ezhov that 
Ukrainian prisons were overcrowded— there were 43,000 people there—
because only 30-50 percent of the arrested were being sentenced to death and 
executed. Many of those held in the prisons had been sentenced to labor 
camps, but could not be sent on their way because to do so would be to exceed 
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the quota established for the gulag. Accordingly, he proposed an increase in 
the quota of those sent to the gulag.
46
 Perhaps, these “organizational 
difficulties” prolonged Semenko’s life for several months.  
During the Great Terror, the assistant head of the fourth department 
UGB UNKVD Fiodor Fiodorov-Berkov, himself a Jew, conducted arrests, 
overwhelmingly of Jews. From 12 August 1937 to 6 April 1938 troikas 
“investigated” 412 criminal cases composed of 1341 individuals (not counting 
those who were shot by the decree of the Special Meeting of the NKVD in 
 
Ivan Kulyk—standing far left.
47
 
 
Moscow). Most were Jews. They were accused of counterrevolutionary 
activity and anti-Soviet propaganda. 918 were sentenced to death, 402 people 
received ten years in labor camps, and 21 individuals were sent to the North 
for eight years.
48
 In light of these events, Kulyk, a Jew (his real name was 
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Yisroel ben Yehuda Iudelevych), had little reason for optimism, although 
Kulyk never emphasized his Jewish heritage.
49
 
As part of the NKVD’s routine, Kulyk’s arrest was prepared by 
Semenko’s extensive denunciation which served as evidence of Kulyk’s 
crimes. Semenko portrayed Kulyk as a sympathizer of former vaplitiany and 
as a “deviationist” who promoted counterrevolutionary moods among young 
people.
50
 Semenko wrote that during one of their meetings in 1932 Kulyk tried 
to recruit him in a counterrevolutionary organization but he, Semenko, “was 
already a member,” so he promised Kulyk to “think about his invitation.” 51  
For the NKVD, Semenko’s deposition was exactly what was needed to 
indict Kulyk who openly carried himself as a Ukrainian and a Ukrainian 
writer.
52
 Moreover, he was the head of the Ukrainian Union of Writers, a 
factor that also played a role in Kulyk’s arrest, because in 1937 Moscow 
ordered the rotation of the party cadres in Ukrainian institutions.
53
  
 Not surprisingly, Kulyk had a different version of his 1932 meeting 
with Semenko. On 2 October 1937 Kulyk provided an interesting account 
about how in the summer of 1932 he recruited Semenko into a 
counterrevolutionary terrorist organization. Kulyk allegedly stated that it was 
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easy because he had compromat on Semenko about his connections with 
Galicians and UVO members.
54
 Kulyk named Semenko’s two close friends—
Geo Shkurupii and Oleksa Vlyz’ko who of course were also named as 
members of the conspiracy.
55
 According to Kulyk, Semenko’s group “Nova 
Heneratsia” was anything but a literary association—all members were 
Ukrainian nationalists and part of an anti-Soviet organization. 
 Kulyk, like Shchupak, a Jew and a Ukrainian Communist, was fully 
immersed in Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian literary discourse. Beyond 
being a poet, writer, literary critic, journalist and editor, he was also an 
influential politician and party leader. What became the problem for the center 
and the secret police that decided Kulyk’s fate: his past, his convictions or his 
identity to which he was faithful? A Jew from Uman’ who spoke Ukrainian, 
Russian and Yiddish, a sympathizer of Khvyl’ovyi and vaplitiany, how did he 
survive the repression of the early thirties? The years Kulyk spent in the 
United States were a distant past for the NKVD, and to a certain extent, being 
a coal miner in Pennsylvania provided Kulyk with a reputation as a hard 
working proletarian and a trustworthy Marxist. Appointed the first leader of 
the Union of Writers in Ukraine, as expected, at its first Congress (1934) 
Kulyk discussed two antagonistic tendencies in Ukrainian literature, the 
nationalist as represented by Mykola Kulish’s art and the proletarian as 
reflected in Ivan Mykytenko’s plays.
56
 Nevertheless, his affiliations, networks 
and friendships played a significantly negative role in his future. Among his 
friends were Mykola Skrypnyk, Iurii Kotsiubyns’kyi, Volodymyr Zatons’kyi 
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and Nikolai Bukharin, “nationalists” and “Trotskyites.”
57
 Although he helped 
the state tame the spirit of the Ukrainian cultural renaissance in the 1920s, his 
links to the literary association “Hart” and to Khvyl’ovyi were highly suspect 
and had never been forgotten, neither had his enthusiastic support of 
Ukrainization. Despite his multiple identities, he chose Ukrainian as his 
language of everyday use, a preference that ran counter to the growing 
Russocentric stance that emanated from Moscow. Kulyk’s belief that Ukraine 
could be de-russified and de-colonized within communism, a belief that 
seemed quite normal in the early 1920s, was perceived as seditious thinking in 
the early 1930s. His ideological zeal in reinforcing party directives, and his 
literary work, which employed a “red revolutionary framework” in the early 
thirties, only delayed his arrest.
58
 
 By 1935, Kulyk had deteriorated as a writer: his literary works recited 
newspaper slogans and sang odes to the party leader.
59
 He surrounded himself 
with devotees whose literary talent was doubtful and the desire for emulating 
the party functionary (Kulyk) was boundless.
60
 However, the slov’iany and 
literary critics Mykailo Dolengo and Volodymyr Koriak praised Kulyk’s 
creative art, which was characterized as revolutionary.
61
 Paraphrasing the 
Ukrainian writer Oleksii Poltorats’kyi, the political culture of the 1930s 
cultivated a certain type of literary dignitary, namely “Shchupakulyk” or 
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“Shchupakoriak,” whose works were praised publicly but despised and 
mocked secretly in the 1930s.
62
  
 
The delegation of Ukrainian writers on the BBK (1933). 
From left to right: Leoinid Pervomais’kyi, Arkadii Liubchenko, Ivan Kulyk, 
the head of the BBK construction Semen Firin, Antin Dykyi, Itsyk Fefer, Iakiv 
Horods’koi (Iakiv Bliumkin), Ivan Senchenko, Pavlo Usenko.
63
 
 
 
 Despite Kulyk’s tremendous efforts to internalize the existing political 
culture of the time, the summer of 1937 was his last, as it was for Semenko. 
During his first interrogation, Kulyk “confessed” that when he, a Jew, was 
approached by Kost’ Kotko and Mykhailo Ialovyi to join a Ukrainian 
nationalist counterrevolutionary organization, he immediately agreed because, 
as he stated, he perceived himself as a Jewish savior of the Ukrainian people. 
Of course the Union of Writers was only an instrument for implementing the 
goals of the organization, according to Kulyk.
64
 However, in accordance with 
the tasks of the day, uncovering those who simply were Ukrainian nationalists 
seemed insufficient for NKVD operatives. Their foreign connections were to 
be identified to expose the conspiracy’s international dimension. For Kulyk’s 
                                                          
62
 Oleksandr Poltorats’kyi, “Panfuturizm,” in Mykhail’ Semenko, Vybrani tvory, ed. Anna 
Bila (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 2010), 326. The last name created by Poltorats’kyi was composed 
from two last names Shchupak and Koriak, the slov’iany and literary critics. The first name of 
Poltorats’kyi was Oleksii (1905-1977).  
63
 The photograph was published in Literaturna hazeta, 30 September 1933, p. 1. 
64
 TsDAHOU, f.263, op.1, spr.37630, t.1, ark.5-49; Musienko, 292.  
 417 
 
interrogators Vladimir Styrne and David Pertsov, this did not appear to be a 
problem. They “elaborated” on Kulyk’s experience abroad as a Ukrainian 
consul in Canada, and his communication with countless Ukrainian émigrés 
and foreigners was utilized as the foundation for the alleged international 
conspiracy designed to undermine Soviet power in Ukraine.
65
 Kulyk was 
accused of membership in a Ukrainian nationalist organization and of being a 
spy of the British and German Intelligence Services. On 7 October 1937, he 
was sentenced to death and shot on 10 October 1937.
66
 Shortly thereafter 
Kulyk’s tormentors suffered the same fate.  
Semenko and Kulyk, both “leftists” and “party activists,” with mixed 
identities, in which the Marxist one dominated, were “rooted out of life, 
together with [their] archives” at a moment of complete inner disarray, 
personal crisis and confusion.
67
 Semenko’s former friend and futurist Oleksii 
Poltorats’kyi emphasized that from 1930 to 1937 Semenko “was completely 
destroyed morally and physically—he was drinking heavily, engaged in 
regular debauchery, and through his behavior corrupted his friends the 
slov’iany Ivan Malovychko, Ievhen Kas’ianenko and Mykhailo Panchenko.”
68
 
According to Poltorats’kyi, two years before his arrest Semenko spent most of 
the day drinking together with Vukhknal’. Vukhknal’ was famous for his 
nationalist beliefs. However, Poltorats’kyi insisted that all these people were 
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linked by their literary tastes, not politics.
69
 During closed court hearings, both 
confirmed their crimes against the state to the Military Collegium of the 
Supreme Court of the USSR. On 23 October 1937 in the court room Semenko 
humbly asked the court to spare his life. That same day Semenko was 
sentenced to death through execution, and was shot the next day in Kyiv.
70
  
On 17 December 1956 the Kyiv Military Prosecutor reopened the case 
upon the request of Semenko’s children Rostyslav and Iryna, and two 
members of the Ukrainian Union of Writers, Oles’ Honchar and Iurii 
Smolych.
71
 The reinvestigation of Semenko’s case demonstrated that 
Semenko’s name had never been mentioned in the criminal file of Ialovyi, 
who allegedly recruited Semenko into the anti-Soviet organization, and 
Semenko’s “conspirators” had been rehabilitated in the 1950s because of false 
charges against them.
72
 Moreover, the depositions made by the interrogators 
Grushevskii, Pustovoitov and many others, who had been arrested in summer 
1937, revealed that the entire staff of regional NKVD departments had 
fabricated criminal cases against the Ukrainian intelligentsia on orders from 
the NKVD in Kyiv and Moscow. However, these depositions had been 
ignored despite the fact that they had been obtained before October 1937 when 
Semenko and Kulyk were executed. Clearly, there was little interest in saving 
the writers from injustice. The scenario of their execution was sanctioned by 
Moscow, as well as the elimination of the top leadership and rank-and-file 
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lieutenants of the Ukrainian NKVD.
73
 On 22 October 1957 Semenko was 
rehabilitated by the Military Collegium of the USSR due to the absence of any 
grounds for his arrest.
74
  
While rehabilitating “nationalists” in the 1950s, the secret agency 
continued to obstruct the search for the truth by relatives. Like Kaliannyk’s 
daughter, who struggled with the KGB to see her father’s file for years, 
Rostyslav Semenko led a protracted battle with the agency for the right to see 
his father’s criminal file. His appeals to humanity, negative statements about 
the secret agency, and quotations from Khrushchev’s speeches about a 
“chekist with a chicken brain who viciously tortured Postyshev,” complicated 
his access to the file.
75
 For some time, the KGB comforted Rostyslav with the 
information that the chekisty Leplevskii, Akimov, Levin and Matvii Herzon 
who investigated Semenko’s case had been arrested and executed in the late 
thirties for Trostkyite wrecking activity.
76
 Rostyslav was persistent and 
managed to receive permission to read his father’s file. He believed that 
Uzhvii had denounced Semenko to buy her freedom. He found no evidence of 
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this in the file, although he discovered his father’s weakness during 
investigation, which shocked him.               
Both Semenko and Kulyk were arrested in Kyiv but the stigma of 
Budynok Slovo, the place where both once resided, and their Ukrainianness, 
which was associated with Kharkiv and the Ukrainian cultural revival, 
dominated the imagination of their interrogators. The narrative of conspiracy 
was intricately tied to the building and its residents, Semenko’s and Kulyk’s 
real and prescribed friends,  individuals who had already been executed by 
1937,  and those who were awaiting their turn to be arrested shortly after July 
1937.
77
 
The fates of Semenko’s and Kulyk’s wives are astoundingly different. 
Uzhvii was never repressed and was canonized by the party as the first 
Ukrainian Soviet theatre actress. In 1940 she received a Stalin Prize. Yet to 
serve her a reminder of Semenko’s fate, in 1937 the NKVD arrested and shot 
her two brothers, Ievhen and Nazarii.
78
 Uzhvii’s appeal to Georhii Zhukov to 
help save at least Ievhen went unheeded. 
On 5 August 1937, a week after Kulyk’s arrest in Kyiv, Kulyk’s wife 
Liutsiana Piontek who was the editor of the publishing house “Art” 
(Mystetstvo), was arrested as a foreign spy who conducted espionage in 
Ukraine on behalf of foreign intelligence services.
79
 They had separated in 
June of 1937. However, her name was associated with Kulyk, a noted figure in 
the party and in the Union of Writers.
80
 During her first interrogation on 19 
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August 1937 she immediately confessed that she had been a British spy, and 
was recruited in 1926 by her husband Ivan Kulyk.
81
  
To secure the death penalty for Piontek, the interrogator Bondarenko 
made her sign the minutes about her cooperation with Poland and Germany.
82
 
Supposedly, the foreign intelligence services had been interested in Soviet 
economic progress, and on Kulyk’s orders in1930 she, a German by birth, had 
collected data about the mood and attitudes toward collectivization among 
Ukrainian peasants. Piontek supposedly tried to discredit the VKP(b) and the 
policies of the Soviet Union in the eyes of foreign states.
 83
 On 22 September 
1937 the NKVD troika sentenced Piontek to death, and she was executed on 
25 September. 
84
 She was buried in Bykivnia, a village near Kyiv, where the 
Kyiv NKVD dumped the bodies of the executed.
85
 
As noted in Chapter Four, during the Great Terror, the NKVD 
substantially downsized criminal files and expedited preliminary 
investigations. Liutsiana Piontek’s file is one of the shortest criminal files in 
the history of Soviet terror. It constitutes 57 pages and memorializes the terror 
on paper: the virtual absence of any investigation, the futility of human 
resistance and the brevity of human life while in the NKVD’s custody. The 
text supposedly written by Piontek is formulaic and meaningless because of its  
                                                          
81
 HDA SBU, f.6, spr.37631fp, ark.16, 17 zv.   
82
 HDA SBU, f.6, spr.37631fp, ark.22zv. 
83
 HDA SBU, f.6, spr.37631fp, ark.37,39. 
84
 HDA SBU, f.6, spr.37631fp, ark.51-53. Only two interrogations preceded the decision (19 
August and 11 September 1937). 
85
 See Piontek’s name among those victims who were buried in Bykivnia in A.I. Amons, ed., 
Bykivnians’ki zhertvy abo Iak pratsiuvala “Vushcha dviika” na Kyivshchyni: Dokumenty i 
materialy (Kyiv: MAUP, 2007), 544. For details about Bykivnia see Marko Carynnyk, 
“Bykivnia. I—zhodnoho obvynuvachenoho,” Vsesvit no. 10 (1992): 183; and Hiroaki 
Kuromiya, «The Bykivnia Mass Graves» in his The Voices of the Dead (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2007), 20-4. As many other victims, Piontek was rehabilitated 
on 19 December 1956 by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. See 
HDA SBU, f.6, spr.37631fp, ark.56-56zv. 
 
 422 
 
  
National Park “Bykivnians’ki mohyly” (Bykivnia, Kyiv, Ukraine). 
July 2009.  
 
 
numerous inconsistencies. It also contradicts the master narrative created by 
the secret police several years earlier. The interrogators attempted, as always, 
to interweave the present conspiracies into the past master narrative about 
Ukrainian nationalism, yet in this file these attempts are completely incoherent 
and full of factual and logical errors. Consistent with the past master narrative, 
however, is the identification of the same group of people as the chief “actors” 
in the criminal cases. Almost all of them are entangled in a tight knot and 
associated with one place in Ukraine—Budynok Slovo. 
 
“It Is Better to Hit Harder:”
86
 The NKVD’s 1937 Crop of the Privileged  
In 1937 the political atmosphere in Ukraine was characterized by two 
major developments: the continuous repression of the intelligentsia, and 
massive and aggressive russification of Ukrainian society from top to bottom. 
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The most active rivals who were suspected of separatist tendencies and 
nationalist aspirations in Ukraine had been eliminated. In Kyiv, the new 
Ukrainian capital, the Russian newspaper Sovetskaia Ukraina became the 
chief official periodical and the organ of the TsK KP(b)U.
87
  
In late August and early September 1937, as a result of the refusal of 
the Ukrainian TsK to dismiss Kosior, Liubchenko and Petrovs’kyi from their 
leading positions and the rejection of Khrushchev’s candidature for the 
position of first secretary of the Ukrainian TsK, the Ukrainian party leaders 
were arrested one by one within several months. Nine out of nine members of 
the Politburo of the Ukrainian TsK were arrested and shot. None of 12 
members of the Ukrainian government could avoid prison. Only four people 
out of 17 members of the Supreme Rada of the UkrSSR, and 12 people out of 
57 members of the TsK KP(b)U remained untouched. Eighty per cent of party 
secretaries of oblast’, city and region executive committees in Ukraine were 
arrested, and 15,861 people in the primary party cells were effectively 
purged.
88
 By the late 1930s, the remnants of administrative and economic 
autonomy in Ukraine were successfully eliminated. A wave of arrests spread 
also through the Ukrainian NKVD organs.      
  A new campaign against local nationalisms was widely illuminated by 
the Soviet press. Pravda published a series of articles that condemned local 
nationalisms in Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Buriat-Mongolia, Karelia, Tadzhikistan, 
Kirghiziia, Bashkiriia, Kazakhstan and Dagestan. At the same time, many lead 
articles emphasized the leadership of Russian people in socialist construction, 
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and their titles were similar to the one published in Pravda on 27 September 
1937, “The Great Russian People—First Among Equals.”
89
  
 In 1937, the Soviet secret police in Ukraine worked quickly and 
efficiently. The roles within the agency were strictly prescribed and distributed 
on the basis of political reliability, personal connections, loyalty, and 
professionalism. The goals and mechanisms of the NKVD’s operational and 
investigative work were carefully thought out and monitored by the party and 
the center.
90
 The interrogators carried out their duties responsibly with full 
understanding of what was expected of them. On 17 July 1937, the Central 
Executive Committee of the USSR granted Ezhov the highest award named 
after Lenin (orden Lenina). On the front page of the newspaper Literaturna 
hazeta, published by the Ukrainian Union of Writers, the Ukrainian writers 
published their congratulatory panegyric to Ezhov and expressed their 
gratitude for the chekist’s work in cleansing the ranks of Ukrainian writers of 
“Trotskyite, spy and nationalist scum.” They also assured Ezhov that 
Ukrainian writers would be “real chekists,” and promised him they would 
work to eradicate foreign agents on the literary front.
91
     
 The message of the Ukrainian writers served the NKVD as a reminder, 
and Budynok Slovo was again shaken by arrests. In August the slov’iany 
Ievhen Kas’ianenko, Maik Iohansen and Mykhailo Bykovets’ were arrested. 
These writers had little in common. They had different educational 
backgrounds, worked in different cultural institutions in Kharkiv and in the 
1920s belonged to different literary associations. The caliber of their literary 
talents also differed. Yet in the eyes of the NKVD they were “inteligentiki” 
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(little intellectuals) who were sheltered in a place that cultivated Ukrainian 
nationalists.
92
 
 Moreover, the hysteria about spy activities and networks that 
“ensnared” the entire republic, a rhetoric that filled the press and party 
meetings at the time, made certain individuals in the House of Writers 
especially vulnerable to the terror. Their ultimate “nationalisms” and 
“wrecking” activities in literature were conditioned by their past and their 
positions that they occupied in 1937-38. For instance, Ievhen Kas’ianenko 
worked as an engineer at the Kharkiv aviation factory, and his three brothers 
were essentially the founders of the Ukrainian aviation and aircraft industry—
all four possessed knowledge that was considered secret. Maik Iohansen, who 
was of German/Swedish origin with a photographic memory and had an 
encyclopedic scientific knowledge, was a friend of Kurbas and Khvyl’ovyi, 
had mastered several languages and experimented in literature productively. 
Mykhailo Bykovets’ was the director of the Kharkiv chapter of Litfond, an 
organization that existed under the umbrella of the Union of Writers and was 
sponsored by the state. He was in charge of state funds and perks distributed 
among writers.
93
 
Kas’ianenko’s guilt before the party was of course his membership in 
the Borot’bist party and his service in the Central Rada. In March 1918 he 
joined the ranks of the KP(b)U and earned the new regime’s trust by working 
in Bolshevik newspapers, translating Friedrich Engels’s works and the 
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program of the RKP(b) into the Ukrainian language. In the 1920s, he was a 
representative of Ukraine in Germany (he worked for the Foreign Trade 
Administration), and was also appointed editor of the Ukrainian party 
newspaper Visti VUTsVK. 
Before Kas’ianenko’s arrest on 7 August 1937, he, like Svashenko and 
many other slov’iany, was expelled from the party—a preliminary step to 
prosecution.
94
 The writers were fully at the mercy of the NKVD. When 
another victim had been selected, the secret organs sent a confidential note to 
the primary party cell in which the victim held his or her party membership. 
The party committee then urgently held a meeting, at which the victim was 
publicly denounced as a nationalist and an enemy of the people. After a 
unanimous vote to expel the victim from the party, the party organization 
notified the NKVD by sending the following statement: “So-and-so has been 
expelled from the party. Recommended: to sanction his arrest by the NKVD.” 
In Kas’ianenko’s case, the letter of “recommendation” was signed by Hykalo, 
the secretary of the regional committee, and sent to Reikhman, the head of the 
Kharkiv Oblast’ Administration of the NKVD.
95
 The procedure was a mere 
formality, and in this case the NKVD was not patient enough to wait for the 
decision made by the primary party cell. The NKVD arrested Kas’ianenko two 
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weeks prior to the delivery of Hykalo’s letter to Sovnarkomivs’ka Street, the 
NKVD headquarters in Kharkiv.  
During Kas’ianenko’s arrest, Petymko, the janitor of Budynok Slovo 
who had survived the repression of the early 1930s, surfaced and faithfully 
continued his duty as a witness to arrests in the building. On 7 August, he 
witnessed the search and confiscation of Kas’ianenko’s possessions, materials 
that were deemed compromising to the owner. Seditious items, such as 
personal correspondence, notes, books by Semenko, Trotsky, Bukharin, 
Bachyns’kyi and Skrypnyk were confiscated. Interestingly, Kas’ianenko’s 
valuables, including his watch, were taken during the second search on 11 
August, apparently because the police were certain that he would no longer 
need them.
96
  
The haste with which individuals were processed and tried in “court” 
in 1937-38 was reflected on the pages of their files. The length of 
Kas’ianenko’s file is 106 pages, including his 1 September 1937 confession, 
one witness account, and several denunciations of other individuals who were 
arrested before and after Kas’ianenko. Interestingly, on 12 September 1937 he 
denied all accusations and stated that he had conducted no anti-Soviet work 
and had never been a member of any anti-Soviet nationalist organization.
97
 It 
seems likely that Kas’ianenko signed his confession under torture: Ivan 
Drushliak, the interrogator famous for his violent nature, together with another 
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NKVD operative Fedir Tsvetukhin, worked with Kas’ianenko approximately 
three weeks before the confession was obtained.
98
 Abram Simkhovich, the 
head of the NKVD’s 4
th
 department, sanctioned the application of torture and 
beatings, and therefore Drushliak and Tsvetukhin believed that such practices 
were not only permitted but also required.
99
 
Importantly, Kas’ianenko’s confession reflects the NKVD operatives’ 
preconceptions about the proper content of its final draft. They were working 
along two lines that are generally consistent with the rhetoric of this period. 
First, Ukrainian nationalists allegedly sought an alignment with Germany and 
Poland. As a borderland territory, nationalists thought that Ukraine would be 
occupied in the inevitable war with Germany. Losses would be minimized if 
Ukraine proclaimed independence and cooperated with the allies against the 
Soviets.
100
 Second, the interrogators clearly attempted to frame the leading 
figures of the Union of Writers (Pavlo Baidebura, Leonid Iukhvyd, Ivan 
Senchenko and Teren’ Masenko) as Ukrainian nationalists and to link them to 
the case of Iakir and Tukhachevskii, whose alleged conspiracy had been 
uncovered in June 1937.
101
 To link several group cases of state treason and 
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terrorism in cultural institutions, the army and the NKVD, Kas’ianenko’s 
interrogators fabricated a confession about productive cooperation among 
foreign branches of an anti-Soviet nationalist organization, and its Moscow 
and Kyiv chapters.  Kas’ianenko’s confession was “supported” by a clearly 
fabricated witness’s account. This witness happened to be Kas’ianenko’s niece 
Nina Kas’ianenko-Dmitrieva.
102
 
She testified that during her 3 January 1936 visit to her uncle in 
Budynok Slovo, she had encountered 48 people whom she had never met 
before, and that her uncle had mentioned 10 revolvers that had to be obtained 
before their visit to Moscow and Leningrad. The conspirators supposedly 
discussed the assassinations of Stalin and Voroshilov. During her second visit 
to Budynok Slovo on 3 September 1936, she found 20 strangers in 
Kas’ianenko’s apartment, and the conversation revolved around Zinov’ev’s 
and Kamenev’s execution. Those present had been allegedly sympathetic 
toward Zinov’ev and Kamenev. According to Nina’s deposition, the 
conspirators believed that if Stalin and Voroshilov could be eliminated, there 
would be a great opportunity to inspire the working class in Ukraine to rebel 
against the Soviet regime.
103
 To amplify the credibility of Nina’s testimony, 
the NKVD operatives included the minutes of two of Nina’s depositions (7 
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September 1936 and 8 September 1936), which are almost identical. Yet 
Nina’s second account reveals that 6 individuals had also been selected to visit 
Moscow and assassinate Stalin. After completing the mission in Moscow, they 
were to travel to Leningrad to assassinate Voroshilov.
104
 The absurdity of the 
plan supposedly narrated by Nina is rather obvious, yet some exploration of 
the putative plot that linked so many people together (Ukrainian writers, Iakir, 
Tukhachevskii, and even Stalin and Voroshilov) might shed light on the 
concealed dynamic that impelled the actions of the secret organs at the time. 
According to some historians, one reason for the terror of 1937-38 was 
the uncovering by the NKVD in May-June 1937 of Tukhachevskii’s 
conspiracy. Some believe that this conspiracy was fabricated, as were many 
others during the 1930s. Others tend to believe that Tukhachevskii was 
involved in a real conspiracy against Stalin and serious preparation (at least on 
the level of discussion among the highest echelons of power) for a coup d'état 
had been conducted.
105
 It is common knowledge that Stalin never trusted 
Tukhachevskii. Molotov also considered him unreliable. However, as the 
Russian historian Leonid Naumov has argued, despite these factors, Stalin 
promoted Tukhachevskii to the position of Voroshilov’s first assistant, and 
supported him until late 1936 and early 1937.
106
 What happened in June 1937 
when the group of Tukhachevskii, Iakir, Uborevich, Primakov and other 
prominent Soviet Army commanders were tried behind closed doors and 
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hastily shot, a procedure that noticeably differed from the previous show trials 
of Zinov’ev, Kamenev, Bukharin and other noted party leaders? How might 
these developments be connected with the repression in the Ukrainian NKVD 
that began in early summer 1937? 
The link the NKVD operatives tried to establish between the Ukrainian 
writers who were arrested in August 1937 and the conspiracy in the Army was 
quite plausible. Iona Iakir, who was tried together with Tukhachevskii, was the 
commander of the Kyiv Military District. Territorially and socially, Iakir and 
the Ukrainian intellectual elite might have crossed at some point, or in the case 
of a conspiracy, Iakir might have approached someone who had a reputation 
as a nationally conscious intellectual. Yet, the question remains: Why did 
Stalin reconsider his attitude toward Tukhachevskii? What made Stalin believe 
in his conspiracy?
107
According to Alexander Orlov’s reminiscences (he was 
the NKVD resident in several foreign countries during Stalin’s reign), the 
arrest of this group of commanders was motivated by a real conspiracy against 
Stalin. Allegedly, the infamous Vissarionov’s file that was found accidentally 
by the NKVD operator Isaak Shtein was the reason for their decision to 
eliminate Stalin. The file revealed that Stalin was a secret informer of the 
Tsarist police, and from the military commanders’ perspective this titillating 
detail was incompatible with his high rank in the party and government.
108
 If 
the idea of a real plot is accepted, one of the conspirators, fearing discovery, 
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might have leaked the information to Stalin, and a chain of arrests followed, 
which also devoured the top leadership in the Ukrainian NKVD. 
Because of several inconsistencies, Orlov’s narrative may raise doubts 
about its own credibility. However, the dynamics in Ukraine demonstrate that 
Stalin believed in this conspiracy and even promoted Leplevskii (who was in 
charge of Tukhachevskii’s case) to the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs 
in the Ukrainian SSR on 14 June 1937.
109
 The “Ukrainian trace” in 
Tukhachevskii’s case encouraged Leplevskii to intensify the repression in the 
republic. He especially emphasized the role of Ukrainian nationalists who, in 
his words, were organized as a “nationalist counterrevolutionary 
underground.”
110
  
Interestingly, mass arrests of Ukrainian chekists began after Mykhail 
Frinovskii, Ezhov’s first assistant, visited Kyiv in June 1937. He introduced 
the new Narkom, Leplevskii, but he had a more important and special task— 
to uncover a conspiracy within the Ukrainian NKVD that was related to 
Tukhachevskii’s plan.
111
 The narrative of a complex amalgamated plot against 
the state and Stalin was quickly fabricated in the bowels of the NKVD, a plot 
that included NKVD officials, military officers, Ukrainian nationalists, 
borderland service men and militia operatives. The narrative perfectly suited 
the agenda and tasks of the day, which were outlined by Frinovskii. In the 
search for Ukrainian nationalists, the NKVD agents habitually turned their 
eyes toward Budynok Slovo, a place that seemed to breed nationalist cadres. 
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Drushliak and Tsvetukhin collected the depositions of the slov’ianyn 
Mykhailo Bykovets’ (arrested on 24 August 1937) who claimed that 
Kas’ianenko was a member of the anti-Soviet nationalist organization, the 
slov’ianyn Antin Dykyi (arrested on 13 October 1937) who stated that 
Kas’ianenko recruited him into the organization, and several other literary 
workers who confirmed Kas’ianenko’s membership in the organization. Even 
the “old” confession of the slov’ianyn Hryhorii Epik (arrested 5 December 
1934) became evidence of Kas’ianenko’s guilt.
112
 Kas’ianenko resoundingly 
rejected the depositions of his former colleagues during ochnye stavki.
113
 
Nevertheless, on 24 December 1937, Drushliak, Fiodorov and Reikhman 
proclaimed him guilty of terrorist activity and membership in a nationalist 
organization, and sent his case to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court 
of the USSR. During a closed meeting in Moscow on 30 December 1937 
Kas’ianenko told the court that “all of it [was]…a lie.”
114
 The NKVD decided 
to execute Kas’ianenko on New Year’s Eve, 31 December 1937, inaugurating 
the coming year with more violence and death. 
The talented Ukrainian writer and translator Maik Iohansen was 
arrested on 18 August 1937, a week after Kas’ianenko.
115
 The confession that 
Kas’ianenko signed on 1 September 1937, in which he allegedly claimed that 
Iohansen was the most active member in the anti-Soviet nationalist 
organization, played no role in Iohansen’s arrest. The NKVD had already 
determined Iohansen’s fate much earlier, and his arrest occurred before 
Drushliak and Tsvetukhin broke Kas’ianenko. Moreover, Kas’ianenko’s 
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deposition was not even included in Iohansen’s file as important evidence. 
Apparently for Iohansen’s interrogator Abram Zamkov, it was easier to 
fabricate new depositions than to examine dozens of other files in the search 
for testimonies that would denounce Iohansen.
116
    
Iohansen’s knowledge of foreign languages was phenomenal, and he 
was famous for this among the slov’iany. He once told Iurii Smolych: “I will 
lay down after dinner for an hour—I have to learn the Serbian language.”
117
 
This was no joke. He was one of the most active translators of world literature 
(especially of poetry and plays), and a number of the plays he translated were 
performed by Berezil’. He was also the editor and compiler of excellent 
dictionaries. Because of his skills and natural intelligence, various subjects in 
the arts and science came easy to him.
118
 He never wrote drafts of his poems    
 
Maik Iohansen
119
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or prose; there was only one draft, the final one. His contemporaries 
commented that Iohansen did not take seriously the “cultural life” of the police 
cell that was being cultivated in Ukraine by Moscow, and he found the 
atmosphere of the “Communist police culture” not only foreign but also 
harmful for himself as an artist.
120
 
The NKVD worked with Iohansen almost two months (from 19 August 
to 16 October 1937) before he signed every page of a 40-page interrogation 
protocol that is filled with details about his interactions with the slov’iany.
121
 
Khvyl’ovyi, Ialovyi, Vyshnia, Dosvitnii, Liubchenko, Hirniak and Slisarenko 
were characterized as nationalists. According to Iohansen, the essence of his 
conversations with them can be reduced to several points: first, it was 
impossible to develop Ukrainian culture and literature within the framework of 
Soviet power; second, the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine was artificially created 
for the purpose of exterminating the Ukrainian population; third, Ukrainian 
writers were constantly harassed and could earn a living only by translating 
Russian or foreign writers; and, fourth, the best strategy for a writer would be 
to leave Ukraine for Russia to save oneself from repression in Ukraine.
122
  
Iohansen allegedly testified that Andrii Richyts’kyi told him that he 
was sent to the countryside to assist in extracting (“vykachka” khleba) grain 
from the peasants, and that he was terrified by the condition of the villages. 
Richyts’kyi supposedly informed Iohansen that he was convinced that peasant 
rebellions were inevitable.
123
 Iohansen confessed that he was a member of a 
counterrevolutionary nationalist organization, and that his goals were to recruit 
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the youth and the peasantry into the organization through his writings that 
agitated for overthrowing Soviet power in Ukraine.
124
 Iohansen, or his 
interrogator Zamkov who likely composed the narrative of the confession, 
made Epik and Richyts’kyi responsible for inspiring Iohansen to  
counterrevolutionary activity.
125
 However, the minutes of the 17 October 1937 
interrogation reveal that Mykhail’ Semenko gave orders to other members of 
the organization—Kas’ianenko, Malovychko, Poltorats’kyi, Dykyi and 
Iohansen.
126
  
On the basis of two interrogations and several indicting testimonies, 
Simkhovich, Polovetskii and Reikhman closed Iohansen’s preliminary 
investigation and sent his case to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court 
of the USSR.
127
 During the court hearing, on 26 October 1937, Iohansen fully 
admitted his crime and confirmed his depositions. He was shot the next day in 
Kyiv.
128
 Like other criminal files of 1937, Iohansen’s is quite short—110 
pages; it also includes the materials of the rehabilitation commission. On 20 
March 1958, the Supreme Court of the USSR, specifically its head of justice 
Likhachev, signed Iohansen’s rehabilitation.
129
  
Iurii Shevel’ov identified Iohansen as one of the most prominent 
Ukrainian writers who was not likely eliminated for his nationalist beliefs or 
activities. Shevel’ov posited that Iohansen was least interested in national 
problems, and the regime eliminated him for his “universalism, humanism, 
intelligence, giftedness and spiritual aristocratism.” He was removed not 
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because he was against Soviet power, but because he did not pay any attention 
to it.
130
 “Theatricality” in life and “mystification” in art were much more 
interesting and important for Iohansen than politics, and Budynok Slovo was 
his playground.
131
  
Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide in 1933 broke Iohansen, who anticipated his own 
death. He wrote: “I, Maik Iohansen, will die in 1942, and, settling down in the 
kingdom of shadows, will have an intelligent conversation with Hesiod, Heine 
and Miguel de Cervantes.”
132
 Iohansen’s words echoed the fears of Pluzhnyk, 
who, observing the city from a window, wrote: “Kyiv is so beautiful, I love it 
so much! But I won’t live here, we’ll be destroyed, all of us, all writers with a 
brain—they cannot tolerate us; they see potential enemies in us.”
133
 Tragically, 
the feeling of doom was overwhelming among the slov’iany. By 1937, it was 
transformed into an absolute certainty of the approaching end. 
The slov’ianyn Mykhailo Bykovets’ was arrested on 24 August in a 
picturesque place, the Novi Sanzhary region of Poltava oblast’, where he was 
resting during his vacation.
134
  Bykovets’ was a journalist, one of the founders 
of the literary association “Pluh,” and the right hand of Pylypenko. In the early 
and mid-twenties, Bykovets’ worked as an inspector in the People’s 
Commissariat of Education (the department of social upbringing and 
children’s safety). As a state employee and head of the department, he 
attended various meetings with high party and GPU/NKVD officials. Perhaps 
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his acquaintance with Balyts’kyi played a certain role at the time of his arrest. 
He survived the 1933-early 1934 repression in the People’s Commissariat of 
Education, the terror that swept away almost all of Skrypnyk’s staff, and the 
peak of the repression in Budynok Slovo in 1933 when the most prominent 
writers were shot or exiled to the gulag. However, he was picked up shortly 
after Balyts’kyi’s arrest in July 1937, which might have played a fatal role in 
Bykovets’s fate.
135
  
The most interesting detail about Bykovets’ concerns his interests, 
which the police overlooked for many years. Bykovets’ was involved in 
collecting bibliographical information seemingly about every figure who ever 
worked in Ukrainian culture, from ancient times until 1930. His friend and 
neighbor Vasyl’ Sokil claimed that Bykovets’s catalogue was a treasure for 
 
Mykhailo Bykovets’ is standing far right.
136
  
 
 
historians of Ukrainian culture, and consisted of thousands of cards with 
biographical and bibliographical information about various figures. In 1937 
this catalogue was temporarily located in the cellars of the Kharkiv NKVD, 
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along with the cataloguer.
137
 According to Iurii Smolych, for several days 
prior to the occupation of Kharkiv by German troops in 24 October 1941, 
smoke covered the internal yard of the NKVD headquarters in 
Sovnarkomivs’ka Street, spreading ashes through the central streets of 
Kharkiv. The secret police was burning its archives.
138
 It seems likely that 
books, correspondence and unpublished literary work of the slov’iany, 
confiscated by the GPU/NKVD, and possibly Bykovets’s catalogue perished 
at that time.
139
 
An analysis of Bykovets’s criminal file and its contents indicates that it 
belongs to the category of “conveyer” cases fabricated in haste in 1937. 
NKVD operatives wasted neither time, nor paper. Over the preceding decade 
of political terror in Ukraine, the procedure of arrest, search and preliminary 
investigation had been developed and became a routine. The scenario of 
interrogation had been worked out in detail, and the minutes of Bykovets’s 
interrogation reflect the same trend so characteristic of many other cases 
fabricated during the Great Terror. Shortly after the arrest, he was conveyed to 
Kyiv to the Luk’ianivs’ka prison, but only on 13 September 1937 did the 
prosecutor of the Kyiv Military District sign the order for his arrest.
140
 Two 
weeks after his arrest, Bykovets’ confessed that he was a “conscious Ukrainian 
nationalist” and that his views had been shaped by Vynnychenko, 
Hrushevs’kyi and Iefremov. Among other “nationalist” influences, he 
identified the slov’iany Paniv, Pylypenko, Vyshnia and Sosiura. In this list, 
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only Sosiura remained free. Allegedly, Bykovets’ claimed that he was 
recruited into a counterrevolutionary nationalist organization by Vyshnia. The 
minutes are written by hand, and have Bykovets’s signature. However, 
stylistically and grammatically, it is clear that the text of Bykovets’s answers 
was created not by a writer or an experienced journalist but by an individual 
with limited literary skills. The pathos of dialogues relating to the 
“recruitment” procedure reflects neither the style of Vyshnia, nor of Bykovets. 
They are written in Russian: 
Vyshnia: Misha, do you love the place where you were born? 
Bykovets’: Of course. 
Vyshnia: Are you ready to give up your life for it? Will you defend dearest Ukraine? 
Bykovets’- to the interrogator: I responded by agreeing.
141
 
 
 
 Bykovets’ supposedly denounced dozens of Ukrainian intellectuals. 
Among them were those who were arrested in 1933-35 and the slov’iany who 
were still alive (Mykola Dukyn, Dmytro Bedzyk, Ivan Kyrylenko, Ivan 
Mykytenko, Ivan Senchenko, Petro Panch, Pavlo Tychyna, Volodymyr 
Sosiura and Oleksandr Dovzhenko). Dovzhenko’s ideas about Ukrainian 
independence, Bykovets’ supposedly claimed, were close to those of the 
organization, and its members internalized them as guidance in their 
activities.
142
 An uncritical eye stunned by dozens of names and intricate 
connections among individuals might imagine a multi-layered conspiracy that 
united the most prominent intellectuals in Ukraine who planned to demolish 
Soviet power in the republic. Primitive linguistic and contextual constructs 
used in the minutes of interrogation constitute revealing elements that might 
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turn readers from the imagined conspiracy to a more careful evaluation of the 
text as a kind of theatre of the absurd. 
 One of the most prominent topics that Bykovets’s interrogator, the 
NKVD operative Shterenberg, developed during the preliminary investigation 
was the 1932-33 famine and Soviet collectivization in Ukraine. Shterenberg 
had previous experience in conducting investigations of Ukrainian 
nationalists—the intelligentsia and the peasantry—and he wrote the script of 
Bykovets’s testimony in a way that was quite typical for most criminal cases 
fabricated in Ukraine at the time.
143
 Bykovets’ allegedly testified that the 
slov’iany regularly discussed the tragedy, concluding that Soviet power would 
be fatal for Ukraine in the context of the countryside’s complete destruction.
144
 
This line in the scenario manufactured in Bykovets’ file provided the required 
link between the intelligentsia and the peasants, and conveniently provided the 
vision of a potential organized rebellion and Ukraine’s secession from the 
Union. 
 Bykovets’ spent his last birthday on 3 September in prison. As in most 
1937-38 cases, Shterenberg’s preliminary investigation was rather brief. It 
took less than two months and three interrogations (11 September, 3 October 
and 17 October) to “prove” Bykovets’s guilt. During the court hearing, he 
admitted his crimes before the state, and asked the court to preserve his life. 
On the basis of alleged denunciations (that in reality were also fabricated) by 
Ialovyi, Bilen’kyi-Berezyns’kyi, Paniv, Epik and other literary figures, the 
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People’s Commissar of the NKVD in Ukraine Leplevskii and the Prosecutor 
General of the USSR Vyshinskii sentenced Bykovets’ to death. A day after the 
verdict, on 24 October 1937, he was shot.
145
 Quite possibly his body was 
buried in Bykivnia near Kyiv among the other tens of thousands of individuals 
who spent their last days in the Luk’ianivs’ka and other prisons in Kyiv in 
1937-38.
 146
 At the moment of the execution, he was only 43, the same age as 
his friend and colleague Pylypenko. Together they founded “Pluh” and both 
belonged to the cohort of conscious Ukrainian intellectuals who nurtured 
Ukrainian culture and disseminated knowledge about it.
147
    
 October 1937 was fatal for three other slov’iany: Volodymyr Koriak, 
Ivan Mykytenko, and Antin Dykyi. Koriak belonged to the older generation of 
revolutionary intelligentsia, as did Pylypenko and Kulyk. As they did, he 
accepted and internalized the idea that socialism should be the basis for 
cultural development in Ukraine.
 148
 In 1923 Koriak became one of the 
founders of the literary association “Hart” but in 1926 joined the VUSPP 
which served as the party’s organization of proletarian writers, with the task of 
shaping literary trends in Ukraine. Among his “brothers in arms” were Ivan 
Kulyk, Ivan Mykytenko and Ivan Kyrylenko, a group that was despised by 
most slov’iany.  
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Although an orthodox Marxist and party member, Koriak had 
committed one “sin” for which he was criticized in the press: in 1917-20, he 
had been a member of the Ukrainian Borot’bist party.
149
 In an article 
published on 10 February 1935 in the newspaper Komunist, Samiilo Shchupak 
posited that Koriak believed in Borot’bism as the chief inspiration of Soviet 
Ukrainian literature.  
Koriak’s battles with Khvyl’ovyi, who became his main adversary in 
the 1920s, earned Koriak some credit in the eyes of the NKVD. However, this 
was soon forgotten.
150
 Despite his Jewish origins (his real name was 
Bliumshtein), Koriak spoke Ukrainian and was a Ukrainian scholar. His 
professorship in Ukrainian literature at the Kharkiv Institute of People’s 
Education was a constant irritant to the secret police.  
    
Volodymyr Koriak 
 
 
 On 5 September 1937, Leonid Iukhvyd published a scathing article 
about Koriak’s nationalism. Iukhvyd stated that Koriak’s Istoriia literatury 
(History of Literature) had been written by an enemy and a bourgeois 
                                                          
149
 Musienko, 261.  
150
 Shevel’ov in Dziuba, 2: 318-19, 330. See also Shkandrij, Modernists, 89, 100, 104, 105, 
130.  
 444 
 
nationalist, and his reputation as a professor was overblown.
151
 
Simultaneously, his former colleaques were forced in prison to sign papers 
against Koriak as a member of a Ukrainian fascist organization that functioned 
under Semenko’s leadership.
152
 In September 1937 Koriak was expelled from 
the party as a “bourgeois nationalist,”
153
 and on 1 October 1937 he was 
arrested.  
He was denounced by Volodymyr Iurynets’, an NKVD informer who 
denounced many of the slov’iany.
154
 On 24 July 1937 Iurynets’ testified that as 
a secret informer since 1933, he had written dozens of false reports about the 
existence of nationalist and terrorist organizations in Ukraine. Put under 
pressure by the NKVD operative Pustovoitov, who constantly demanded 
information about new nationalist groups, Iurynets’ wrote several reports 
about Koriak: in 1934, 1935 and 1936. According to Iurynets’, Pustovoitov 
identified the general points that had to be reflected in his report. For example, 
Koriak supposedly propagandized nationalist fascist ideas among the 
Ukrainian youth. Although Iurynets’ knew nothing about this, he elaborated 
on Koriak’s terrorist activities over 162 pages.
155
  
The most fascinating thing is that already in July 1937, when a great 
number of NKVD informers and operatives had been arrested, the NKVD 
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suddenly appeared to have “discovered” the massive scale on which criminal 
cases against the Ukrainian intelligentsia had been fabricated. However, the 
secret police quickly executed the “fabricators” and then continued to arrest 
those whom the “fabricators” had denounced. Despite testimonies by NKVD 
informers and operatives such as Iurynets’, Bilen’kyi-Berezyns’kyi, 
Onishchuk, Karbonenko, Borodchak, Bruk, Hrushevs’kyi (among many 
others) about the fabrication procedure that had been put in place, the 
repression raged on until the beginning of the war. The NKVD continued to 
methodically eliminate “nationalists,” or those who knew too much about the 
implementation of the terror against them. Paradoxically, often on the same 
day (as in the case of Iurynets’ and Koriak) the NKVD sentenced to death the 
informer for providing false information, and arrested the victim who had been 
falsely denounced. As was the case with most slov’iany, Koriak immediately 
confessed that he belonged to a Ukrainian counterrevolutionary organization, 
and was executed on 22 December 1937.
156
    
On 15 August 1937, Ezhov issued order no. 00486 “About the 
operation concerning the repression of wives and children of traitors of the 
Motherland.”
157
 Of course this document did not radically change the way 
NKVD practices had operated in Ukraine since the early thirties. As 
demonstrated in previous chapters, the secret police had arrested the wives of 
many slov’iany before 15 August 1937.
158
 These arrests were accompanied by 
the confiscation of possessions. However, the practice was now legitimized by 
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Moscow, and the details of the procedures were stipulated. Sofiia Koriak’s 
arrest came three weeks after her husband’s, and she was exiled to Karaganda 
for 5 years. Paradoxically, the NKVD violated Ezhov’s order, and did not 
arrest Koriak’s daughters: seventeen-year-old Oksana and twenty-two-year-
old Halyna. Their mother survived the exile. In 1956, Halyna wrote to 
Khrushchev requesting that her father be rehabilitated.
159
 The request was 
satisfied.  
The story of Koriak’s former colleague in VUSPP Ivan Mykytenko 
appears less clear and transparent.  As “the general secretary” of VUSPP, in 
the 1920s Mykytenko was supported by two important party figures in the 
Central Committee of the KP(b)U: the head of Agitprop Andrii Khvylia and 
the secretary of the Central Committee in cultural affairs Panas Liubchenko.  
                   
Ivan Mykytenko. 
 
Most slov’iany avoided contact with him and despised him as a talentless 
careerist. It usually took Mykola Kulish 7-9 months to write a play. 
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Mykytenko responded to a party resolution with a new play in two weeks. His 
Dyktatura is an example.
160
  
In January 1937, Mykytenko in his speech at the Extraordinary XIV 
Ukrainian Congress of Soviets stated: “the great Soviet people . . . over the 19 
years of their new history has built a life that poets will glorify for centuries,” 
and that “the Ukrainian people has not forgotten and will never forget the 
bloody crimes of nationalist counterrevolution.” His speech was interrupted 
several times with vigorous long-lasting applause (burkhlyvi dovhotryvali 
oplesky).
161
  
 
In the presidium of the Extraordinary XIV Ukrainian Congress of Soviets 
from left to right: Vsevolod Balyts’kyi, Panas Liubchenko, Mendel’ 
Khataevych, Pavlo Postyshev, Stanislav Kosior, Ievhen Veher, Hryhorii 
Petrovs’kyi and Oleksii Stakhanov.
162
 
 
 
Political changes in late spring and early summer of 1937 were fatal 
for Mykytenko. The leading figures of the Central Committee and the NKVD 
were dismissed and arrested.
163
 The Great Terror consumed both of 
Mykytenko’s patrons. Andrii Khvylia was arrested on 13 August 1937 as a 
member of the bourgeois nationalist organization of former Borot’bists. Panas 
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Liubchenko was denounced at the August Plenum of the Central Committee of 
the KP(b)U by Khvylia, who accused him of heading a counterrevolutionary 
nationalist organization in Ukraine. Liubchenko shot his wife Mariia Krupenik 
and committed suicide on 27 August 1937.
164
   
In September, the now vulnerable Mykytenko became a target for 
press attacks. He was accused of concealing his past, specifically that he was 
born into the family of a kurkul’. But most importantly, anonymous articles 
identified Mykytenko for his links to “enemies of the people” and for 
participating in Trotskyist nationalist sabotage operations together with other 
members of the Union of Writers. In early October 1937, he was dismissed 
from all positions in the Union of Writers, removed as an editor of the 
publishing house “Radians’ka literatura” (Soviet Literature), and on 3 October 
was expelled from the party.
165
 On 4 October 1937 Mykytenko told his wife 
that he was going to the NKVD to surrender his firearms. He never returned. 
Over the years, the NKVD provided his wife with various explanations. 
Finally in March 1956, the agency informed Mykytenko’s wife that his body 
had been found on 18 October 1937 in the suburbs of Kyiv with a bullet in the 
head. Not surprisingly, the medical commission concluded that Mykytenko 
committed suicide.
166
  
 In the context of the “extreme politics” of the time, Mykytenko’s 
suicide was not an unusual phenomenon.
167
 He anticipated his end, and his 
close connections with the leadership in Ukraine made him more aware than 
others about the treatment that writers received in the NKVD prisons. Another 
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explanation for his decision is also plausible. According to Vladimir 
Shlapentokh’s understanding of the second half of the 1930s, loyalty to the 
regime increased due to “the growing social mobility, the continuation of 
repression, the brainwashing of the people, the regime’s total isolation, and 
some amelioration of the standard of living.”
168
 Shlapentokh divided the 
mental worlds of the people of the Stalin era into three categories: those who 
supported the regime; those who hated it; and those who “tried not to think 
about ideological matters and spent very little time, emotion, or thought on 
any world beyond everyday life.”
169
 Mykytenko clearly belonged to the first 
category, and as a loyal Communist, he could not understand how the regime 
that supported him for years turned its back on him. Disillusioned and 
depressed, he might have committed suicide. 
 The fate of the slov’ianyn Antin Dykyi is more evident than that of 
Mykytenko, although his life was filled with opaque turns and developments. 
For a person without a job and who published little, Dykyi led an extravagant 
lifestyle and always seemed to have funds for alcohol and food. According to 
several accounts, he liked to drink and gamble. He loved vulgar jokes, and was 
characterized as a womanizer.
170
 The Kharkiv intelligentsia was puzzled by 
his ability to draw funds from mysterious sources. His habit of bragging about 
his connections with the NKVD, and even about providing information to the 
slov’iany who would be arrested next added a mystifying aura to his image.
171
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In November 1929, a time of massive party purges, Dykyi managed to 
maintain his position as a party member, although the purge commission was 
amazed at Dykyi’s extraordinarily low cultural and political level.
172
 The 
slov’iany considered him almost illiterate, although they gave him credit for a 
wonderful story-telling gift.
173
 The NKVD might have effectively used this 
   
Antin Dykyi. 
 
 
skill, although there is no evidence of Dykyi’s cooperation with the secret 
police. Obviously, he could not compete with those informers who submitted 
extensive written reports to the NKVD and were highly educated individuals, 
such as Volodymyr Iurynets’, who was a professor and academician. 
At the moment of his arrest on 13 October 1937, Dykyi worked as a 
director of the Kharkiv historical museum.
174
 The ubiquitous janitor Petymko 
witnessed the arrest and search of Dykyi’s apartment, which became a treasure 
trove for the NKVD. Besides Dykyi’s documents and correspondence, they 
confiscated a hunting gun, ammunition, two gold brooches, four pairs of gold 
                                                          
172
 DAKhO, f.P15, op.2,  spr.11, ark.9.  
173
 Uliana Pasicznyk, ed., The Ever-Present Past: The Memoirs of Tatiana Kardinalowska, 
transcr. by Assya Humesky, trans. Vera Kaczmarska (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of 
Ukrainian Studies Press, 2004), 147. Ivan Maistrenko, working for the newspaper 
Chornomors’ka komuna in Odesa in the 1920s, provided Dykyi with a stipend for learning the 
Ukrainian language, although, as the subsequent accounts about Dykyi demonstrated, the 
result was disappointing. See Maistrenko, Istoriia, 242.   
174
 AU SBUKhO, spr.016310, t.1, ark.6,9. 
 451 
 
earrings, two gold rings, a gold ring with a diamond, and a camera.
175
 The 
signature on the receipt about confiscating these items is illegible. 
Almost for a month Dykyi had been beaten by a number of 
interrogators: Samiilo Spivak, Polovetskii, Simkhovich and Reikhman. 
However, the most sophisticated torturer was Drushliak.
176
 The Kharkiv 
interrogators Mykhailo Nikitin and M.O. Gokhberg, who refused to apply 
physical force to Dykyi and other prisoners, were chastised and admonished at 
NKVD meetings and called inteligentiki. Drushliak and operatives like him 
were presented by their supervisors as examples of how to “properly work 
with” the arrested.
177
 Dykyi surrendered on 6 November 1937. He himself 
wrote a confession, in which he claimed that he had been recruited to a 
counterrevolutionary nationalist organization by Kas’ianenko. He identified 
Dukyn, Koriak, and Bykovets’ as members of the organization, and also 
reported that he personally recruited the slov’iany Plakhtin, Iukhvyd, Dukyn 
and Senchenko into the organization.
178
  
Clearly, in Dykyi’s case, the period of beatings is equal to the period of 
“preliminary investigation.”  It took the NKVD three weeks to complete it. His 
criminal file included, alongside Dykyi’s 6 November confession only two 
interrogation protocols (13 November and 14 November), three ochnye stavki 
(5 November, 8 November and 22 November), and two denunciation excerpts 
                                                          
175
 AU SBUKhO, spr.016310, t.1, ark.6-8. 
176
 Samiilo Spivak (1904-?) had been working in the SPV of the UNKVD in Kharkiv oblast’ 
since 1934. In December 1940 he was dismissed from the organs because he was sick. He 
survived the Second World War, and in 1949-50 he was a deputy head of the 4
th
 department of 
the UMGB in Izmail oblast’. See Zolotar’ov, ChK, 441. The information about Dykyi’s 
torture in the Kharkiv prison became known to researchers through the secret police’s 
investigative materials and rehabilitation documents, and Ivan Bahrianyi’s account. See AU 
SBUKhO, spr.016310, t.2, ark.99-100; AU SBUKhO, spr.017800, t.1, ark.242. 
177
 AU SBUKhO, spr.016310, t.2, ark.100.  For details about Mykhailo Nikitin, see 
Zolotar’ov, ChK, 460; about M.O. Gokhberg-Orlov, see Bazhan and Zolotar’ov, 86.   
178
 AU SBUKhO, spr.016310, t.1, ark.10-12. 
 452 
 
from other criminal files. With the full set of required materials, his case was 
passed on to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR.
179
 
During the court hearing on 30 December 1937, the now broken and pacified 
Dykyi fully admitted his guilt, confirmed his depositions, and asked the court 
to believe in the sincerity of his repentance and to save his life.
180
 On the same 
day the Collegium sentenced him to death and ordered the confiscation of his 
possessions, which, as in all other cases involving the slov’iany, had already 
been done before the order was given. In contrast to the information provided 
in Tatiana Kardinalowska’s memoirs,
181
 Dykyi was executed on 31 December 
1937 in the Kharkiv prison, on the same day as his friend and slov’ianyn 
Ievhen Kas’ianenko. Their bodies were likely buried in the 5
th
 kvartal (bloc) of 
the Lesopark zone in Kharkiv.
182
 We will never know whether it was just 
another job for the Kharkiv NKVD executioners to shoot a number of people 
on New Year’s Eve, or whether they took special pleasure in murdering 
“nationalists” and “enemies of the people,” and considered this a special 
holiday gift.
183
 
Dykyi’s wife Anastasiia Mykolaiivna survived the 1930s repression 
and resided in Lviv oblast’. On 30 January 1950 she was arrested as the 
mother of an OUN member and was exiled to special settlements in the 
North.
184
 Her fate is unknown. The 28 May 1959 certificate about Dykyi’s 
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rehabilitation was sent to Inta Badulina, his daughter from his first marriage, 
who resided in Kharkiv. Inta’s question about why her father’s apartment was 
sealed by the NKVD after his arrest remained unanswered.
185
  
  
1938: The Remaining Slov’iany Were Swept Away 
In January 1938, Nikita Khrushchev replaced Stanislav Kosior as the 
first secretary of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U. In his memoirs, 
Khrushchev immediately characterized the situation of the cadres in Ukraine 
at the time of his arrival in the following manner: “I had the impression that 
the Tatar Khan Mamai had passed through. There were neither…secretaries of 
party regional committees, nor heads of regional executive committees. There 
was not even a secretary of the Kyiv city party committee.”
186
 Following a 
similar fundamental purge of the Ukrainian NKVD in 1937, the need for new 
cadres in the secret organs became an extremely important problem. In early 
1938, an NKVD cadre officer reported that the Kharkiv oblast’ desperately 
needed NKVD operatives. Approximately 80 vacancies were opened for heads 
of various departments and rank-and-file operational workers. The avalanche 
of arrests had brought about the requirement for more staff.
187
 The Central 
Committee of the KP(b)U solved this question by issuing a resolution in 
February 1938, according to which 150 high party officials were appointed as 
heads of NKVD departments in various regional offices, and 500 rank-and-file 
party members, as well as Komsomol members, were appointed as 
plenipotentiaries: interrogators (operatives) and their assistants. The Kharkiv 
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NKVD received a fresh infusion of personnel in the form of 30 new heads and 
80 operatives.
188
  
“New blood” facilitated the efficiency of the NKVD’s work, and 
regional NKVD heads assured the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs 
Aleksandr Uspenskii that the operation concerning the underground Ukrainian 
nationalist movement was under control.
 189
 Special analytical groups labored 
to evaluate the mental condition of the arrested, and the number and tempo of 
confessions under investigation. They provided the results of their work in 
graphic form, drawing charts, tables and diagrams, and attaching these 
documents to their written reports to Uspenskii.
190
  
Khrushchev actively supported the NKVD’s actions against 
nationalists and continued to implement the counter-Ukrainization prescribed 
by Moscow. Only one-tenth of those Ukrainian writers who were published in 
1930 who were still alive were able to publish their work in 1938.
191
 The 
offensive was directed not only against the Ukrainian language but also 
against German, French and Polish languages. Khrushchev proclaimed that 
there was no need for teaching foreign languages in Ukraine. Spies and 
nationalist “trash” would be eradicated, and “all peoples [would] learn the 
Russian language.”
192
 On 20 April 1938, the Soviet People’s Commissariat of 
the USSR and the KP(b)U issued a resolution “On the mandatory learning of 
the Russian language in non-Russian schools in Ukraine.”
193
 In October 1938 
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the Politburo considered the question of fundamentally reorganizing national 
schools in the context of their russification.
194
   
Armed with these party orders, and re-energized by new cadres, the 
NKVD arrested three more slov’iany in February-March 1938: Ivan 
Kyrylenko, Hryhorii Kotsiuba and Volodymyr Dukyn.  
Kyrylenko was a faithful Komsomol and party leader. However, many 
writers had criticized his moral conduct. He was notorious for his careerism 
and subservience to the party
 
.
195
 In 1934, as a privileged party member, 
Kyrylenko had moved to Kyiv and taken up residence in Rolit. He became the 
secretary of the Union of Writers and the head of its primary party cell. 
Simultaneously, he was the editor of the journal Chervonyi Shliakh, and held a 
privileged position as a deputy in the All-Ukrainian Central Executive 
Committee. He conducted a fight against nationalist deviations in Ukraine, 
including khvyliovism. Kyrylynko gave a speech at Khvyl’ovyi’s 14 May 1933 
funeral, over the grave of the person who despised him the most. Kyrylenko 
characterized Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide as his “last regrettable mistake.”
196
 As an 
adamant fighter against Ukrainian nationalism, Kyrylenko was eventually 
selected by Hryhorii Petrovs’kyi as his personal secretary.
197
 Still obsessively 
pursuing a top position within the party, Kyrylenko found himself among 
those who were to be eliminated during the Great Terror. 
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Ivan Kyrylenko
198
 
From 5 December 1936, the NKVD began to collect surveillance 
materials on him. A dozen secret informants followed him and delivered to the 
NKVD regular reports which on 13 November 1938 were organized in a 
separate operational file (papka-formuliar).
199
  On 21 February 1938 two 
NKVD operatives were waiting for Kyrylenko in his apartment. They 
confiscated everything that could be carried out by hand, including 
Kyrylenko’s typewriter, and the remaining possessions were sealed in two 
rooms of the apartment. Clearly, the NKVD did not expect him to return home 
after the preliminary investigation.
200
 
 Five days after his arrest, Kyrylenko wrote to Uspenskii: 
It is difficult and easy to write this petition. This is a paradox, and a feeling that is 
familiar to any man who experiences a deep crisis of his mentality and psyche. 
It is difficult because I have to revive memories about crimes against the party, and 
about people with loathing and disgust, and to shudder at the thought of them. 
It is easy because each fact of my shameful past surrendered to the investigators frees 
my soul and my consciousness from the grave disease of nationalism. I am becoming 
cleaner; I am becoming transparent; I am becoming more amenable to a new fruitful 
life, to which I want to give myself to my last breath. 
It is easy because with every fact of my past I surrender, I excoriate the shameful 
scabs of nationalism that have deeply penetrated my soul, and I begin to see myself 
as the person I was before 1932, an active Komsomol member, a young member of 
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the party able to fight for its ideals, a developing Soviet writer whose first books 
found a vivid response in the flaming hearts of Ukrainian youth.
201
 
 
The main term Kyrylenko employed to characterize the slov’iany and his 
colleagues in the Union of Writers was “enemy.” Pylypenko, Khvyl’ovyi, 
Kulyk, Ovcharov, Hirniak, Vyshnia, and his former friend Mykytenko fell into 
this category: they allegedly united Ukrainian nationalist forces to overthrow 
Soviet power in Ukraine through an armed insurrection.
202
 In exhaustive detail 
the 26 February 1938 letter explained the goals of the organization and named 
its active members. Kyrylenko’s first and only interrogation occurred on 4 
May 1938, which was recorded as a detailed 33-page document in his criminal 
file.  
Importantly, Kyrylenko’s papka-formuliar offers a fascinating 
description of how the minutes of Kyrylenko’s interrogation were constructed. 
Operational files shed light on how the NKVD worked with the arrested, and 
what materials were purged from their criminal files and why. In Kyrylenko’s 
case, he himself typed the first draft of his interrogation meeting on his 
Remington typewriter, the one that was confiscated by the NKVD during his 
arrest. This draft (47 pages) was written on 23 March 1938 and is included in 
the papka-formuliar. The text is dotted with amendments and contains a plan 
that Kyrylenko had to follow: he was to narrate the organization’s conspiracy 
to conduct terror and launch a rebellion. The text also has multiple notes and 
comments written in different handwritings, inks and pencils.
203
 In the 
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conclusion of this draft, Kyrylenko lamented that being an active party 
member, he had never had the time to write a high-quality text, and completed 
the minutes of the interrogation with the following lamentation: “Party, 
people, readers—I am all yours. Accept me into your family or crush me as a 
worm. I do not see any other way for myself.”
204
 The inner suffering of the 
arrested was of little interest to interrogators, and they ordered the omission of 
this paragraph from the final draft of the minutes. 
 Careful scrutiny of the minutes of this interrogation reveals that the 
NKVD tried to compromise several cultural institutions in Ukraine. The 
NKVD targeted the Kharkiv party regional committee (obkom), although its 
first secretary Mykola Demchenko had already been replaced by Mykola 
Hykalo, who followed Stalin’s orders slavishly.
205
 Using Kyrylenko’s 
confession, the Kharkiv obkom was depicted as a nest of nationalists that 
produced new “anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist cadres.”
206
 The Kharkiv and 
Kyiv chapters of the Union of Writers and its leadership were also identified 
as potential victims. They, it was claimed, were also members of a nationalist 
organization. Virtually, all major Ukrainian writers were mentioned in the 
minutes as conspirators, and ultimately the NKVD even questioned the very 
existence of the chapters of the Writers’ Union in Ukraine and the Ukrainian 
Litfond.
207
 Iurii Ianovs’kyi, Andrii Holovko, Natalia Zabila, Teren’ Masenko, 
Hryhorii Kotsiuba, Iurii Smolych, Ivan Mykytenko, Petro Panch and Ivan Le 
“smuggled nationalist chauvinist concepts” into their works, and Zinaida 
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Tulub, Maksym Ryl’s’kyi and Arkadii Liubchenko glorified Ukraine’s past, 
romanticized the Zaporozhian Cossacks and nurtured nationalist sentiment in 
their works.
 208
 In the state’s view (as it was reflected in the NKVD’s 
interrogation), Ukrainian cultural institutions appeared to struggle against 
Soviet domination in the Ukrainian SSR and set a bad example for other 
republics. The Belorusian SSR and Georgia were especially susceptible to 
nationalist propaganda, and, as Kyrylenko’s testimony indicated, the 
Ukrainian nationalist organization had established connections with local 
nationalists in these two republics.
209
  
 In addition, although rhetorically the party condemned antisemitism, 
Stalin’s antisemitic stance surfaced in the NKVD’s practices. The summer of 
1938 was marked by the quiet removal of Jews from the secret organs, as well 
as from the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, where in early 1939 
Maxim Litvinov, whose background was Jewish, was replaced by Viacheslav 
Molotov. Stalin advised Molotov: “Remove the Jews from the Narkomat.”
210
 
Kyrylenko’s criminal file reveals an explicit attack in Ukraine on those listed 
in the category of “unreliable” Jewish writers. Among them were Avraam 
Abchuk, Itsyk Fefer and Itsyk Kipnis.
211
 Through Kyrylenko’s deposition, 
Savva Holovanivs’kyi, Leonid Pervomais’kyi and Fefer were framed as 
enemies who produced utterly “Trotskyite works.”
212
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 To finalize Kyrylenko’s case, the interrogator Akimov habitually 
tailored the testimonies of party leaders, writers and journalists into the file 
that confirmed Kyrylenko’s membership in the anti-Soviet terrorist nationalist 
organization.
213
 On 21 August and on 21 September 1938, various 
interrogators (Proskuriakov, Kopylov and Grankin) made sure that Kyrylenko 
was ready to confirm his crime before the court. The latter dutifully played his 
assigned role.
 214
 
 Significantly, neither the papka-formuliar, nor Kyrylenko’s criminal 
case contain concrete facts or details of conspiracy. However, this was no 
obstacle for the vyezdnaia sessiia of the Military Collegium of the Supreme 
Court of the USSR that took place in Kyiv on 23 September 1938. Behind 
closed doors, Kyrylenko confirmed his crimes against the state and asked the 
court for an opportunity to “remove the blemish of being an enemy of the 
people.”
215
 The Collegium sentenced him to death and the verdict was 
implemented on the same day.
216
  
In September 1955 in his letter to the head of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR Klimentii Voroshilov, Kyrylenko’s brother 
Oleksandr wrote that in 1939 he obtained an appointment with the chief 
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deputy of the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs in the Ukrainian SSR 
Amaiak Kobulov. Unaware of his brother’s death, he tried to persuade the 
organs that Ivan was an honest Communist. Kobulov told him: “If you 
continue to make noise, you will follow your brother.” 
217
 Oleksandr had the 
courage to ask for his brother’s rehabilitation only during the Khrushchev 
Thaw; it was granted on 28 May 1957.
218
 Ironically, on 16 June 1989, the 
Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Ukraine 
posthumously restored Kyrylenko to its ranks shortly before its own 
disbanding.
219
  
Unfortunately for the writers Hordii Kotsiuba and Volodymyr Dukyn, 
who were arrested in Budynok Slovo on the same day, 21 March 1938, the 
retreat of the mass terror came too late.  
Hordii Kotsiuba was an educated man, although some colleagues 
considered him a mediocre writer. In 1917 he graduated from the Petersburg 
University and became a lawyer. His membership in two parties, the 
Ukrainian party of socialist revolutionaries (October 1917-May 1918) and the 
Ukrainian Communist Party of Borot’bists (1918-1920) made him suspect to 
the Soviet regime. In 1920 he edited the Borot’bist newspaper Poltavs’kyi 
borotbist. He never joined the KP(b)U as did other Borot’bisty, and remained 
a non-party writer until his arrest.
220
 As far as the state was concerned, 
Kotsiuba was also a member of the “wrong” literary associations (Hart, 
VAPLITE and Prolitfront), and never was interested in joining the “right” one, 
VUSPP. He was one of the founders and editors of the journal Sliakhy 
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mystetstva in Kharkiv (1921-23), and worked as a journalist for various 
newspapers and journals in the 1920s-30s. In 1934 he became a member of the 
Union of Writers.
221
  
Kotsiuba was arrested without the prosecutor’s sanction as a member 
of an anti-Soviet organization of Ukrainian SRs which allegedly prepared an 
armed insurrection against Soviet power in Ukraine. Spivak, Fiodorov-Berkov 
and Grigorii Teleshev signed the order for his arrest, but interestingly enough, 
they no longer considered it necessary to specify the address at which the 
victim had to be arrested. They put only two words on the address line: “Dom 
‘Slovo’.” 
222
 Almost a decade of surveillance and arrests implemented by the 
secret organs in Budynok Slovo made this place familiar to nearly the entire 
staff of the Kharkiv NKVD. The janitor Petymko also served as an excellent 
navigator to the exact place of residence of the next victim. 
Kotsiuba’s criminal case exemplifies the key trends and patterns of the 
Great Terror. The year 1938 was characterized by an increasing number of 
group criminal cases. State violence reached its apogee. The terror against the 
cultural elite swept away people of different professions. Together with 
Kotsiuba, nine more men were arrested. Among them were Tymofii Pushkar 
(a party bureaucrat), Arsenii Khomenko (a demographer), Mytrofan Maliuha 
(an agricultural engineer), Serhii Zarudnyi (a planning engineer of 
“Iuzhspetsstroi”), Oleksandr Stepurs’kyi (a chemist and engineer of 
“Masloprom”), Ivan Voskoboinikov (an artist), Oleksandr Kulykov (a doctor 
and radiological specialist in the Institute of Emergency Surgery), Vasyl’ 
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Pochtarenko (an economist in the Kharkiv Tractor Factory), and Ivan Batiuk 
(an agricultural engineer). 
The testimonies against Kotsiuba collected by the NKVD reveal that 
he was a “khvyl’ovyst” (supporter of Khvyl’ovyi) and that the anti-Soviet 
organization to which he supposedly belonged included Panas Liubchenko, 
Andrii Khvylia, Hryhorii Hryn’ko, Ievhen Kas’ianenko and Volodymyr 
Koriak. The slov’iany Ivan Senchenko, Antin Shmyhel’s’kyi, Natalia Zabila, 
Maik Iohansen and Petro Panch were also allegedly active members of the 
organization. Kotsiuba’s task was to mobilize peasants in kolhospy (the 
collective farms) and to organize military detachments in the Valkovs’kyi 
district.
223
 According to Ivan Sokolians’kyi, Kotsiuba collected facts about the 
arrests and executions of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, collectivization and the 
attitudes of Soviet authorities toward the Ukrainian language. Kotsiuba, 
Sokolians’kyi claimed, burned the notebooks, fearing his arrest.
224
 
Although Kotsiuba was arrested on 21 March 1938, he was first 
questioned only on 5 June 1938, according to his file.
225
 It is unknown how 
long it took the NKVD to break Kotsiuba, but the first “proper” protocol that 
reflected the NKVD’s agenda was attached to the file in early June. Kotsiuba 
stated that he lived with the idea that “Ukraine [should be] only for 
Ukrainians” until his arrest.
226
 His deposition shows that, on a micro-level, the 
organization planned to stop bread export from Ukraine, and on a macro-level,    
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Hryhorii Kotsiuba.
227
 
 
 
to overthrow Soviet power and to create a nationalist state. 
228
 Assistance had 
been expected from Galicia, and the organization allegedly prepared several 
districts in Kharkiv oblast’ for an insurrection, including Valky, Zmiiov and 
Lokhvytsia.
229
  
 Curiously, in 1938 several NKVD operatives usually worked with the 
arrested, a rule that reinforced the method of krugovaia poruka, which made 
no single man responsible for the outcome of each criminal case.
230
 In 
Kotsiuba’s case, Zamkov, Shevchenko and Krits led the preliminary 
investigation.
231
 They scrupulously arranged ochnye stavki among all ten men 
investigated in this case, and one can only guess what sort of preparation the 
victims had endured. Most of them confirmed the allegations, and denounced 
each other. Through denunciations of each of those arrested, hundreds of 
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The lists of those who were to be arrested because of denunciations made by 
“Kotsiuba’s group.”  
 
people were arrested on false accusations of membership in the 
organization.
232
 Kotsiuba’s case and his forcibly obtained testimony allowed 
the NKVD to arrest 104 people.
233
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During the 17 December 1938 court hearing of the Kharkiv Military 
Tribunal, Kotsiuba stated that he felt “he had become younger” and would be 
able to work for Soviet power. “I beg the court, he said, to grant me an 
opportunity to expiate my guilt. I beg you to return me to my family.”
234
 The 
tribunal sentenced Kotsiuba to death, and the place of his burial is unknown.
235
  
The Ukrainian writer Mykola Dukyn was taken to the Kharkiv NKVD 
prison on the same night with Kotsiuba. In the early 1920s, he had been a 
teacher in Izium but in 1928 by Pylypenko’s invitation he moved to Kharkiv 
to work for the journal Pluh. Until his arrest in 1938, he earned a living 
through translation and literary work.
236
 In 1934, Sosiura moved to Kyiv, and 
Dukyn and his family moved into his apartment, number 57 on the second 
floor. When Dukyn was taken downstairs by NKVD operatives, his desperate 
cry cut through the silence of the night: “I am not guilty! I am not guilty!!!”
237
  
Dukyn was accused of membership in an anti-Soviet terrorist 
nationalist organization.
238
 He set a record for the Kharkiv prison: the NKVD 
operatives Mikotkin and Shevchenko obtained his confession 5 months after 
his arrest on 17 August 1938.
239
 In his Sad Hetsymans’kyi, Ivan Bahrianyi, 
who happened to be in the Kharkiv prison together with Dukyn, vividly 
described the sophisticated torture to which the NKVD subjected prisoners, 
including Dukyn. Bahrianyi remembered Dukyn as depressed and indifferent. 
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He suffered from a sense of shame at his own weakness.
240
 The 
“neighborhood” of 340 people packed into a cell designed for 50, diseases, 
dirt, thirst and hunger were negligible in comparison with the moral suffering 
Dukyn experienced.
241
 
 
Mykola Dukyn. 
 
 
In February 1939, possibly encouraged by the change in the NKVD, 
Dukyn denied his previous deposition.
242
 His criminal case was sent to Kyiv, 
and finally to Moscow. Miraculously, Dukyn’s verdict exemplified the 
“positive” changes and even the “Beria thaw” that ordinary people imagined 
or hoped to see.
243
 Perhaps his persistent denial of the accusations played a 
role. On 29 October 1939 a Special Meeting of the NKVD in Moscow 
sentenced Dukyn to 5 years in labor camps. The word “terrorist” disappeared 
from the verdict but the accusation of “nationalist” of course remained. In 
total, Dukyn spent 1.5 years in prison before he was exiled to the Oneglag.
244
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In 1943 the term was prolonged until the end of the war. On 10 October 1943, 
Dukyn died from tuberculosis in the camp hospital.
245
 
 During the Great Terror, the dynamics in the two places that are of 
central interest for this study, Budynok Slovo and the NKVD, were 
simultaneously similar and different. The similarity rested in the rapid 
disappearance of both writers and torturers; they were executed as fast as the 
NKVD could process their criminal cases. The difference appears in the 
general social atmosphere (“the air of the time”) in the two places and the 
professional involvement of the two social groups that occupied them. During 
and after the terror of 1937-38 in Ukraine in general, and in Budynok Slovo in 
particular, “there was a complete cemetery-like silence,” as one observer 
stated.
246
 People feared their surroundings, everything and everyone, those 
who stood below and above them. They sedated their condition with alcohol 
and meaningless activities. Families quietly deteriorated; friendships 
degraded; everyone had something to conceal. The writers’ literary 
engagement was reduced to complimentary articles praising the state and its 
leaders, and effusive responses to Stalin’s awards. Yet, the NKVD was 
reminiscent of a blast furnace in which nationalist conspiracies were fabricated 
and eradicated with exhilarating vigor and speed. The secret agency operated 
in haste through constant avraly (all hands on deck), although no 
organizational chaos was apparent. NKVD groups worked cohesively and it 
seemed they took pleasure in what they had been doing. The principle 
“anything goes” that was delegated to them from above eased and ritualized 
the procedure of “uncovering” nationalists in the republic. Confusion among 
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NKVD associates did emerge in the summer of 1937 when the staff of their 
department began to disappear into prison cells, and this confusion found its 
reflection in the criminal files that were fabricated at the time. They received 
treatment that was very familiar to them as professionals: they were executed 
with “no pretense of investigating [their] cases.”
247
   
The archival evidence suggests that the terror of 1937-38 in Ukraine 
that swallowed kurkuli, religious figures, immigrants, German and Polish spies 
and other enemies of the state continued to target “Ukrainian nationalists.” In 
1937, despite the fact that they all allegedly “belonged” to a broad network of 
the “Ukrainian nationalist underground,” the NKVD fabricated individual 
cases against them. In contrast, in1938, the NKVD produced mostly group 
cases against “Ukrainian nationalists,” repeating the pattern of the early 
1930s.
248
 As a result of their methodical elimination, by 1937-38 the slov’iany 
had been dispersed and marginalized as state enemies, and many literary 
talents among them never blossomed. The writers feared to write, or were 
transformed by a self-censorship that destroyed them as artists and 
individuals.
249
  
Importantly, the national vector of the Great Terror in Ukraine in 
general, and in the building in particular, should be considered in the context 
of foreign policies and Stalin’s imagination that the Soviet Union would be 
strangled by a vicious triangle consisting of Poland, Germany and Japan—the 
states that in his view supported the formation of a “fifth column” in Ukraine 
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and the creation of a republic of “nationalist counterrevolutionaries.” Notably, 
most of the individuals mentioned in this chapter were included in the lists 
personally signed by Stalin, which predetermined their fate. The top party 
leadership secretly and unanimously voted for sentencing the writers to death 
before preliminary investigations and court hearings, which of course, 
considering Stalin’s resolution, were a mere formality.
250
 The slov’iany 
Semenko, Iohansen, Bykovets’, Koriak, Dykyi and Kyrylenko were among 
other Ukrainian intellectuals who made it into these lists in 1937-38. As far as 
Stalin was concerned, they represented oppositionists, the “SRs” and 
“nationalists,” and had to die.  
Stalin’s perception of Budynok Slovo was shaped by the writers’ 
national cultural aspirations of the 1920s. This perception was ossified and 
strengthened by the peasants’ resistance to collectivization and by 
Ukrainization in the republic, factors that fashioned the goals and patterns of 
the pre-war repression. Tragically, its tentacles reached even the former 
slov’iany who resided in geographical locations other than Kharkiv. Besides 
the Kyivites, the NKVD arrested the former slov’iany who resided in 
Cherkasy and Chernivtsi, and accused them of organizing nationalist bands 
and detachments to dethrone Soviet power. Among them were the Ukrainian 
writers and journalists Onoprii Turhan and Ivan Vyrhan.
251
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The epithet “fascist” accompanied any definition of nationalism and 
any nationalist conspiracy, into which the NKVD enrolled free-minded 
individuals and conformists, party members and non-party members, the 
privileged and the non-privileged. The conspiracies were written by the 
Akimovs and Drushliaks, and their “members” were ultimately guilty of state 
treason and terrorism. The prescribed collective guilt negated considerations 
of individual guilt or its absence.  
An analysis of the secret police’s practices and the deeds of 
interrogators suggests that the majority of NKVD agents did not believe in the 
premise of a total national conspiracy in Ukraine. It did not exist, and 
therefore, no real efforts to investigate the cases were undertaken. Routine 
fabrications of criminal cases, cynical scoffing at and beating of the arrested 
appear to indicate the virtual absence of any evidence of such a conspiracy. 
For most NKVD operatives, morality became a commodity that was used to 
their advantage. They rejected it as a universal philosophical concept, but 
rhetorically employed it when it was professionally and politically expedient. 
The “commoditization” of morality and its applications in interrogation rooms 
tormented the arrested. Some believed they could make a deal with 
interrogators by accepting their rules (as occurred in Kyrylenko’s case). Many 
lost their moral orientation, as did Dukyn, and the latter’s human evolution or 
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rather regression frightened him and made him suffer more than the applied 
physical torture.
252
   
NKVD operatives held fast to the state, embodying and preserving it, 
and sustaining its totality. However, the defectiveness and amorality of the 
system manifested itself in the “purging of the purgers,” a phenomenon of 
fatal self-cannibalization.
253
 “Yesterday’s executioners became today’s 
victims:”
254
 the Ukrainian party leaders Kosior, Postyshev, Zatonskii and 
Chubar were arrested in early 1938 and shot in February 1939.
255
 The cascade 
of arrests in the Ukrainian NKVD that began in the summer of 1937 included 
David Epel’baum, head of the fourth UGB NKVD department in the Kharkiv 
region, and a group of ten other NKVD associates who on October 25-29, 
1939 were sentenced to death or ten years in labor camps for their criminal 
conduct during investigations and for fabrications of criminal cases.
256
  
The state clashed with the preexistent cultural space and national 
sentiment in Ukraine, and in its attempts to reshape this space, defined its own 
circle of “insiders” and “outsiders” and its own system of values. The top 
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party leadership simultaneously hierarchized, homogenized and fragmented 
social spaces and places in Ukraine, and then consigned their participants 
altogether to the trash bin of history as an obstinate, aging, used and unneeded 
material.
257
  
Pressured by the state’s regulatory mechanisms, the slov’iany and the 
secret police produced a new common space of social interaction. Their 
perceptions of this new common space differed for some time: for the former 
it was fragile and confusing; for the latter durable and emboldening. By the 
Great Terror, few sincerely believed in the future of such a space: the lies were 
transparent for both parties, and the mediating role of the third party in the 
socialist enterprise, the state, was confusing and ambiguous, especially for 
those who identified themselves with the state. The fear of the state’s 
“monumentality” and power suppressed most desires by the slov’iany to resist 
violence, and in 1937 also penetrated the NKVD’s organs.
258
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Conclusion 
In the 1920s, Ukrainization in the republic had been a ploy and a 
concession to Ukrainian communists to win their support and loyalty, and by 
1925, in the center’s view, it had gone out of control. The consequences of 
Ukrainization appeared to be unpredictable, and in 1925 Lazar Kaganovich 
was sent to Ukraine to oversee and to “normalize” the situation.
1
 He played a 
crucial role in subsequent repressive tactics of the secret police. On Stalin’s 
order and through Kaganovich’s endorsement, in 1926 the Ukrainian secret 
police, the center’s eyes and ears in the republic, designed a special operation 
to tame Ukrainian nationalism. The course of counter-Ukrainization was to be 
implemented through mass repression which the secret police began to apply 
from 1929. Importantly, counter-Ukrainization was clearly an anti-Ukrainian 
policy which targeted not Ukrainian ethnicity as such but rather was directed 
against the development of Ukrainian national identity and Ukrainian 
statehood that were perceived as a challenge to the center’s control and as 
harbingers of separatism. According to GPU circulars, art could not be a 
private or national affair, and those who believed so were simply nationalists 
and separatists. Moreover, Ukraine had more serious tasks than art production. 
To assist the victory of socialism, Ukraine had to continue to provide grain 
and the steady inflow of cash for the state. Indeed, the industrialization project 
and the rapid installation of the Soviet infrastructure would be in jeopardy 
without Ukraine’s contribution.  
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From early on, it was Moscow’s understanding that the enterprise 
called the USSR could not be realized without Ukraine. Stalin also believed 
that Ukraine was the “second weak spot of Soviet power” after Turkestan, in 
which the party persecuted Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev for his “nationalism.”
2
 
Stalin’s suspicion of Ukrainian separatist tendencies was amplified by the 
GPU, which on his order became actively engaged in the search for a 
nationalist conspiracy in Ukraine. Subsequently, the hysteria surrounding such 
a conspiracy was mutually reinforced and encouraged, and the witch hunt for 
Ukrainian separatists escalated, reaching its apogee during the Great Terror. 
Significantly, the decision to eliminate the local elite in Ukraine, 
whose national sentiment had been induced by the Twelfth Congress, matured 
shortly after 1923, and predetermined the outcome of Ukrainization and 
shaped the future tactics and methods of the secret police. The demands of the 
national communists Oleksandr Shums’kyi, Mykola Khvyl’ovyi and Mykhailo 
Volobuiev who advocated political, cultural and economic autonomy of the 
republic exacerbated Stalin’s frustration, and the campaign against shumskism, 
khvyliovism and volobuevshchyna grew into terror against the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia, many of whom resided in Budynok Slovo.
3
 Secret GPU 
documents that were prepared in 1926 (the 30 March 1926 circular “About the 
Ukrainian Citizenry” and the 4 September 1926 circular “On Ukrainian 
Separatism”) identified four main goals in eradicating Ukrainian nationalism 
(see Chapter Three). Transparently, from as early as 1926, the GPU effectively 
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drew a line of demarcation between “us” and “them,” and most importantly, 
divided society into “right” and “wrong” places, the attendance of which 
elevated people to privileged positions, or on the contrary compromised them 
for life in the eyes of the secret police. Budynok Slovo became a primary focus 
of scrutiny by the secret police in light of these goals. The composition of 
residents, most of whom were prominent Ukrainian writers, actors and artists, 
allowed the secret police to be extraordinarily efficient in implementing one of 
the bloodiest operations in Ukraine.  
The secret agency played a key role in propagating an unappealing 
image of Ukrainization for the center. In the late 1920s, it was more and more 
frequently characterized as ‘Petliurite’ Ukrainization that was carried out by 
“nationalist deviationists,” and that served as propaganda for those who 
resisted industrialization and collectivization policies. Ultimately, a 
“perverted” version of Ukrainization, it was claimed, led to resistance to grain 
procurements and revolts in the countryside. 
Significantly, while “devising” a nationalist conspiracy, GPU/NKVD 
operatives never failed to frame the Ukrainian intelligentsia as supporters of 
the peasantry, as we have seen. The writers’ depositions forcibly extracted 
from them or fabricated by their interrogators illuminate the slov’iany’s 
convictions that Moscow instigated the famine in Ukraine to change the ethnic 
composition of the republic, which would solve the Ukrainian question once 
and for all. From the state’s perspective, these ideas were false and seditious. 
The persistence of the efforts undertaken by the secret police to indict the 
slov’iany for this seditious thinking can be traced in criminal files from 1932 
to 1938. Moreover, according to the scenario written by the interrogators, the 
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intelligentsia organized military detachments among the peasantry preparing a 
coup d’état, accusations that, decades later through the efforts of rehabilitation 
commissions, proved to be complete fabrications.
4
  
Furthermore, as has been demonstrated, for the center the physical 
elimination of the supporters of Ukrainization was as important as the 
elimination of the Ukrainian language as a means of communication and 
transmission of Ukrainian cultural traditions. The very existence of national 
cultural institutions and projects in Ukraine, such as national encyclopedias, 
committees on Ukrainian spelling, linguistics and history, theatres and 
university departments, institutions that employed the Ukrainian language, 
became problematic for the center. By the late 1930s, almost all Ukrainian 
institutions were closed, modified and restructured with a greater orientation 
toward their essential russification. The repression of cultural figures in 
Ukraine in the 1930s affected thousands.
5
 In arresting “terrorists” in Ukraine 
who allegedly were organized in groups to demolish Soviet power in the 
republic, the secret police functioned almost exclusively as the agency that 
eliminated political opposition to the regime. In the administration’s eyes the 
GPU/NKVD’s terror was “moral” by definition because it was implemented to 
unite the state, and the secret police’s leaders in Moscow and Ukraine were 
regularly rewarded with medals and privileges for uncovering another 
organization of Ukrainian nationalists.  
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As has been demonstrated in this study, Russians and Jews were 
among those arrested as Ukrainian “nationalists” and “terrorists.” Moreover, 
among them were faithful Marxists and Communists. Jerzy W. Borejsza noted 
that the discrepancy between words and deeds in the Soviet Union was 
striking,
 6
 and the regime provided no public explanations about the repression 
of these categories of people. In fact, all operations on eliminating the 
nationally conscious elites were conducted secretly.
7
 
The “acculturation into the colonial” and the preference for Ukrainian 
over Russian or Yiddish exhibited by the slov’iany of Russian and Jewish 
origin led them “straight to the basement of the NKVD.”
8
 For them, the use of 
the Ukrainian language seemed a path to liberation from the imperial 
oppressive practices and legacies, and this seemed to them not only fair from a 
humanistic perspective but also proper from the Marxist and Bolshevik point 
of view. Formerly oppressed but now emancipated and modern, a new 
Ukrainian culture would help de-colonize the Ukrainian people and lead them 
to a bright socialist future. Precisely this consideration inspired Ukrainian 
Russians and Ukrainian Jews to speak and write in Ukrainian which became 
problematic for the state. It dubbed this phenomenon a “nationalist deviation.” 
Petrovsky-Shtern has noted that “a Russian Jew had to maintain a low profile 
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but could survive. Ukrainian Jews were not blessed with this chance.”
9
 The 
visible slov’iany with ethnicities other than Ukrainian but with Ukrainian or 
mixed identities fell immediate victims to the repression by the secret police 
that methodically cleansed the nationally conscious intellectuals. The state had 
little interest in the cultural hybridization of “foreign” elements 
(Ukrainian+Jewish or Jewish+Ukrainian), or in Russian identity polluted with 
Ukrainian national sentiment in the republic. 
The early 1930s repressions in Budynok Slovo cultivated 
overwhelming fear among those who were still free. The temporary nature of 
their free existence generated deep pessimism among the slov’iany. 
Uncertainties about what the next day would bring shaped their lives, in which 
there was no room for creative art. “We were like rabbits mesmerized before 
the gaping mouth of a boa,” Hryhorii Kostiuk stated.
10
 Sadistically, the secret 
police invited the slov’iany to witness the arrests of their neighbors and 
friends. Vasyl’ Sokil had to be present when Andrii Paniv was arrested. Ivan 
Senchenko was poiniatyi during Iukhym Hedz’s arrest. Their home (Budynok 
Slovo/ Kharkiv/Ukraine) became a dangerous place, and many tried to escape. 
Some managed to do so and survived the thirties but then lived in fear for 
years. To some slov’iany the moment of recognition of terror and the feeling 
of déjà-vu came almost twenty years later, after the war, as it did to Leib 
Kvitko who was arrested in Kyiv in 1949. 
Importantly, the slov’iany’s behavior in prison was fostered by chronic 
stress attending their expectation of arrest. Their drive toward life and art was 
truncated, which ultimately increased the drive toward self-destruction. Erich 
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Fromm posited that “destructiveness [was] the outcome of unlived life.”
11
 In 
Khvyl’ovyi’s case, “unlived life” or rather life that went on against his 
principles and beliefs became unwanted, and this apparently led him to 
suicide. Life in fear of repression induced Semenko, Dykyi, Vukhnal’ and 
other slov’iany to resort to habitual use of alcohol. The isolation and 
marginalization of the writers as Ukrainian nationalists by the regime, and a 
profound feeling of despair and powerlessness to resist the center’s counter-
Ukrainization suppressed their passion (oderzhymist’ in Valentyn Moroz’s 
terms) for art and life, narrowing their space of escape and intensifying their 
feeling of insecurity and doom. By the early 1930s, the “energy of the national 
renaissance was depleted, indicating the beginning of a decline,” Moroz 
noted.
12
 The writers adopted the vigilant behavior and personality required by 
the political culture of the time, a mandatory stance that had to be exhibited 
through the press and their art. To avoid repression, the slov’iany followed the 
steps of the Shchupaks and Koriaks, denouncing their colleagues in the press 
and disguising their denunciations as literary criticism. While continuing to 
exist in the space of art, they lost their spontaneity and originality. Their 
thoughts and feelings ceased to be their own, and those new thoughts and 
feelings that emerged inspired verse or prose that glorified the leaders of the 
revolution, and even the leaders of the secret police. 
By the mid-thirties, the Ukrainian cultural landscape had become one 
dimensional and flat, a result of the destruction of national cultural patterns 
and traditions by the state. Symptomatically, under terror, the writers began to 
pen verse and prose for children (a relatively safe genre) and were engaged in 
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translation projects. Oles’ Donchenko, Volodymyr Dukyn, Ivan Senchenko, 
Oksana Ivanenko and Maik Iohansen now produced novels and fairy tales for 
children. The writers had been wandering through a linguistic maze, trying to 
find a “neutral” genre and language that could not be seen as suspicious by the 
party. They experienced spatial and cultural somnambulism and confusion. 
The language itself, however, ceased being neutral. Socialist in content, it still 
remained Ukrainian—not national but now nationalist in essence for the state, 
and thus incriminating, anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary.  
Katerina Clark noted that in the 1930s translations of world literature 
became a common trend not only in Russia but also in all Soviet republics. 
She posited that translations became “a celebration of ‘world literature,’” and 
were a sign of cosmopolitanism in Soviet literature in the 1930s. In Clark’s 
analysis, the avalanche of translations of world literature has been interpreted 
and explained as an original and natural phenomenon of the literary process 
rather than a consequence of repressive cultural tactics. She claimed that “the 
wave of translations from European literature in the Soviet 1930s might have 
led to a flowering and ultimately Soviet dominance.”
 13
 The current study of 
Budynok Slovo reveals something entirely different. Soviet control of culture 
in general, and literature in particular, an essential factor for the state’s 
domination, was designed to monitor the writers’ independent thought and 
their original creative work. Translation work did not lead to “Soviet 
dominance,” but rather “Soviet dominance” led to “the wave of translations” 
which became a means of survival for the writers because of the overarching 
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and omnipresent control of the literary process in the Soviet Union.
14
 
According to many accounts by writers who worked during this period, 
translations became the only possible literary activity in the context of terror 
and repression. As in Boris Pasternak’s case and a great many other cases, 
translations helped people physically survive in the 1930s when they could not 
publish any works of their own. The slightest deviation from the norms of 
socialist realism had been punished by party reprimands and ostracism in the 
press. Translations became the writers’ escape from the realities of being 
Soviet writers; it was safer to publish a European author in translation than to 
publish one’s own original work, where any aesthetic premise could be 
challenged by the party. For some, translations were a conscious principal 
choice of not conforming to socialist realism; for others, this activity became 
the only means of survival, as in the slov’iany’s case. 
Notably, the current study provides not only individual histories of 
many slov’iany that were previously unknown to historians but also discusses 
those of their tormentors—the most prominent and rank-and-file functionaries 
of the Soviet secret organs. Their histories and methods of work were unclear 
and vague before the early 1990s, and remain so in the West. This knowledge 
offers new ways of thinking about the writers’ dilemmas they encountered 
while in prison at the mercy of GPU/NKVD agents. The scrutiny of 
techniques employed by GPU/NKVD agents and their treatment of the 
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arrested helped illuminate the writers’ private dramas, moral turmoil, failures, 
victories and acts of heroism. Physical and mental torture transformed people 
into obedient automatons, a fact that explains the writers’ inner surrender and 
collaboration with the organs. Some prisoners tried to establish cordial 
relationships with their interrogators, hoping to disarm them of their cruelty, 
as did Ivan Kyrylenko (see Chapter Nine). Some were horrified from the 
moment they were arrested, like Hryhorii Epik (see Chapter Seven), and the 
fear of death and the prison’s practices paralyzed their will and ability to 
maintain dignity during and after preliminary investigation. Some, like 
Mykhailo Ialovyi (see Chapter Four), subliminally balanced between their 
hopes and fears before finally surrendering to their interrogators. Yet, because 
of their principles and stubbornness, there were a few who alienated 
themselves from the realities of the investigation room, and never complied 
with the rules of the game their investigators imposed on them. Among them 
were the writers Ivan Bahrianyi and Onanii Lebid’. The knowledge about 
these patterns of human behavior under torture has often been obtained 
obliquely, through individual histories and testimonies of their tormentors. 
Prison, interrogation rooms and investigative practices confronted the 
writers in a violent and barbaric way, and invited the majority to choose a faint 
prospect of life instead of certain death. Threats of retaliation against their 
relatives were serious and real, and as has been discussed in Chapter Seven, 
“prisonization” of the slov’iany’s minds and violence made them compliant 
and subversive to the interrogators. 
Using Fromm’s terminology, the imprisoned writers, losing their 
“primary bonds” with the building and their self-identification in this place, 
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were searching for “secondary bonds” with the system that persuaded them 
that nationalist conspiracies existed and even convinced them of their own 
participation in them (see Ialovyi’s case).
 15
 This search manifested itself in 
submission and complete surrender to the interrogator. They felt inferior, 
insignificant and confused, and they rationalized their gradual slip into 
nationalism and wrecking activities by “foreign” and “malicious” influences. 
Ialovyi verbally crucified himself for his ideological shortsightedness. 
Kyrylenko belittled himself, identifying himself as a worm, and begged the 
party to crush him if he was unworthy of its trust. Through intimidation and 
fear, the secret police demanded people’s absolute submission to the state, 
even before their deaths. The task of the interrogator was to de-humanize the 
accused to the point where their previous identity became vague and fuzzy, 
and eventually would be replaced by what Fromm called a “pseudo-identity” 
or a “pseudo self.”
16
 The slov’iany tried to overcome the panic linked to this 
inner transformation (see Dukyn’s and Kas’ianenko’s cases) and wrote long 
letters explaining themselves to their tormentors who seemed to them their 
only saviors under the circumstances. They understood that they could not 
negotiate with the state but they tried to negotiate with its middle men—
NKVD operatives and their supervisors. 
This study also demonstrates that places are not static but dynamic. 
Despite the rigidity of the Soviet system, its spaces (e.g. 
political/social/cultural), places (e.g. Budynok Slovo/the GPU/NKVD prison) 
and institutions (e.g. the Union of Writers/ the secret police) were 
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characterized by constant changes within them, where nothing was fixed or 
permanent.  
The general atmosphere of corruption and violence that reigned in the 
secret organs in the 1930s encouraged the sadistic personalities of those who 
worked there. Working in blood and executing people on New Year’s Eve, the 
GPU/NKVD agents seemed to take special pleasure from their sadistic 
actions. The Russian scholar Boris Lanin noted that “sadism routinely uses the 
fear of death for its pleasure.”
17
 Some argue that only people of certain 
personalities were hired to work in the secret police. Paraphrasing one chekist, 
“being a chekist is not an occupation; this is a permanent state of his or her 
soul.”
18
 Whatever the case might be, Soviet practices of terror encouraged and 
rewarded the chekists’ inhuman behaviors in interrogation rooms with 
memorable watches and certificates of excellence. They enjoyed their power, 
even though this power was extended only over their office or interrogation 
room. The spatial dimension of their power reduced to a single room and over 
one or two individuals at a time never disturbed them. They were addicted to 
power which was absolutely necessary for their psychological equilibrium in 
the atmosphere of common violence and fear.
19
 Their moral regression was 
inevitable and required. Ideological fuel and support for violence were derived 
from their supervisors who in turn looked up the hierarchical ladder for 
inspiration. The micro-environment in the NKVD headquarters in 
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Radnarkomivs’ka Street in Kharkiv encouraged violence on the part of NKVD 
associates, and structured their everyday behavioral patterns. The goal of 
“uncovering a nationalist conspiracy” was identified, and “nationalists” were 
severely beaten and tortured by their interrogators. As archival materials show, 
this group of people perceived themselves as the masters of a limited space 
and time which they appropriated; for them, the subjects of their experiments 
lived in the past and present without prospects to make it into the future. Some 
interrogators (Ivan Drushliak) exercised their power through brutal physical 
torture of the arrested; others (Pustovoitov) habitually applied mental abuse to 
their victims, demonstrating the “friendliness of the cannibal” that alternated 
with shouting and verbal humiliation.
20
 
This study provides evidence of how “nationalist conspiracies” were 
fabricated by the secret police, and shows the active involvement of the center 
in writing a conspiracy scenario in Ukraine. Importantly, criminal files of 
“Ukrainian nationalists” were fabricated for the insiders, not for public 
consumption. The scenario of massive nationalist conspiracy written by the 
police would not hold water or maintain narrative continuity had it been read 
by either a non-specialist or an independent lawyer or a foreign government or 
an international observer. However, the creators of these files composed texts 
that always found grateful appreciators. Using literary jargon, the majority of 
the texts in criminal files had been written “on commission,” and the 
interrogators’ patrons were generally pleased with the final appearance of the 
                                                          
20
 The expression “friendliness of the cannibal” is borrowed from Theodore W. Adorno. 
Quoted in Benjamin’s 27 February 1936 letter to Adorno in The Correspondence of Walter 
Benjamin, 1910-1940, eds. Gershom Scholem and Theodor W. Adorno and trans. Manfred R. 
Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1994), 523.   
 488 
 
files. The secret police, as it had been understood by them, held exclusive 
reading rights over these files once and forever.   
The space of politics brought perpetrators and victims closer to each 
other, eventually forcing them to share the same place, and within this space 
and place they became interchangeable and interchanged. Some writers 
became secret agents, and some members of the secret police became the 
accused and were ultimately repressed as well. State violence disabled the 
resistance of both groups, and they were physically eliminated. Tragically, 
both groups attempted to conform to the regime in their own ways, but they 
were not permitted to conform.  
As in a bad play, the outcome of the terror was rather predictable. The 
Great Terror also devoured its managers and perpetrators. Violence 
encouraged by the government and the secret police led to a crisis in both 
institutions. In 1937, despite Ezhov’s claims that the agency had been 
reorganized to pay more attention to surveillance methods rather than mass 
operations, surveillance work had diminished, and the unmatched terror was 
unleashed, eventually consuming its executors.
21
 After a conspiracy, imagined 
or real, that was uncovered in spring 1937 in the NKVD and the Red Army, 
the “whole Soviet Government hung by a thread,” as Ezhov’s deputy Mykhail 
Frinovskii explained.
22
 In essence, fear became a totalizing migrating 
phenomenon, which “traveled” from agency to agency, from institution to 
institution. In the face of the virtual demise of the Ukrainian secret police’s 
staff, its leadership tried to escape and to hide. Some committed suicide. In 
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July 1937 Balyts’kyi was arrested. During the night of 12-13 June 1938, 
anticipating inevitable liquidation, Henrikh Liushkov, the first head of the 
Ukrainian Secret Political Department (SPV) and head of the Far Eastern 
NKVD administration, escaped and surrendered to the Japanese. Aleksandr 
Uspenskii, Commissar of Internal Affairs in Ukraine, went into hiding on 14 
November 1938. 
23
 During 1937-38, those operatives and heads of the 
departments who were involved in “the Ukrainian operation” and the 
elimination of the slov’iany were arrested and executed as anti-Soviet 
conspirators.  
According to Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe, one of the goals 
of the Great Terror was to “identify scapegoats held responsible for the 
political and economic failings” of the state.
24
 Following his routine scheme of 
politics, Stalin blamed the party leadership and the secret police in Ukraine for 
excesses and anti-Soviet conspiracy, and executed those “responsible” for 
them. The entire composition of the highest echelons of power in Ukraine was 
tossed and reshuffled. Most were arrested and executed. Khrushchev’s 
leadership in Ukraine marked a new course of cultural development there—
russification accompanied by the physical elimination of the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia in prisons and labor camps. The majority of the slov’iany who 
were arrested in 1937-38 were sentenced to death. Criminal cases of those 
who had been sent to the Solovky earlier were reopened, and they were shot as 
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Ukrainian nationalists in Sandarmokh (Karelia).
25
 For many slov’iany, 
Sandarmokh became a place of liberation: the death they met there ended their 
suffering and the violence to which they had been subjected for a decade.
26
  
Katerina Clark depicted Moscow in the 1930s as the Soviet capital that 
“was considered advanced” culturally, and as “the place where culture was 
‘happening.’” She noted that “culture spread centripetally.”
27
 Which culture 
she refers to—Soviet, Russian, or non-Russian—is unclear. In reality, the 
imperial culture did not spread but was forcibly implanted in centrifugal 
fashion, devouring “colonial” talents, original ideas and discoveries. The 
“colonial” culture, including religious traditions and its carriers (“centrifugal 
forces” by Stalin’s definition), strove for cultural independence and was 
murdered by the state. Those few who survived the terror, impelled by “the 
centripetal forces,” moved to Moscow not by choice but by necessity to avoid 
the repression. Interestingly, in Clark’s narrative, the agency (the center) and 
its brutality in establishing cultural monopoly are de-emphasized, and the 
process of “centripetal spread of culture” is cast as a natural historical flow. 
Indeed, culture must have been “happening” in Moscow, because according to 
the center’s assimilation plans, other national cultures together with their 
proponents, were physically exterminated, as well as their artifacts—art, 
books, architecture and sculpture. 
Another scholar, Sheila Fitzpatrick, has written that “from the first half 
of the 1930s, the intelligentsia—Communist and non-party, technical and 
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cultural—became an unambiguously privileged group within the society,”
28
 
and that they could negotiate their position with party authorities and literary 
dignitaries. The campaign against Ukrainian nationalism and the destruction of 
Ukrainian culture demand different lenses for examining the lives of the 
Russian and Ukrainian intelligentsia, although there were some common 
features. The image of the privileged intelligentsia might be accurate for the 
RSFSR, but in 1933-38 not only was the Ukrainian intelligentsia not a 
privileged group, it was virtually destroyed. Ukrainization had been curtailed 
and all its supporters had been eliminated. Moreover, the repression that was 
conducted by the secret police and aimed at eliminating the critically-thinking 
Ukrainian intelligentsia and nationally conscious elite was so intense and rapid 
that there was simply no time for “negotiations.” Those few negotiations that 
occurred were related to literary conformism. They meant little in the context 
of the scale of state violence against the intellectuals who were swept away en 
masse. The biggest paradox of the newly created Soviet Ukrainian state was 
that there was no place for Ukrainian culture in it. The arrest of the most 
prominent Ukrainian intellectuals in a cultural microcosm such as Budynok 
Slovo indicates that this was the case. 
The history of this building demonstrates the impossibility of a natural 
cultural flow or international cultural exchange in the space of violence, or the 
possibility of a national renaissance. Moreover, it showed that in this space, 
morality and wickedness, creativity and destruction, the truth and deception 
began to co-exist, blending and amalgamating to the point of creating a 
composite: one big lie and social indifference, a feature and a norm of a 
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regimented society. Ukraine’s national revival became of little concern for the 
majority of its people, and its democratic revivalist initiatives were choked at 
the root.  
In the late twenties, the center rebuked the Ukrainian intelligentsia for 
its bourgeois lifestyle and material comfort. In the early thirties, when the 
community of Ukrainian intellectuals built a home for themselves, they were 
perceived by the center as a rather independent and private group of 
individuals. As recent studies have demonstrated, the Soviet regime exhibited 
ambivalence toward the private sphere of Soviet citizens, refusing “to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of spheres of the private and set about attempting 
to colonize or eliminate them,” and at the same promoting private space.
29
 
This study demonstrates that the center’s concerns emanated not from its 
perception of Ukrainian writers as an extremely private and wealthy 
(according to the standards of the 1930s) community but from the perception 
of danger the Ukrainian intelligentsia represented. The slov’iany wrote their 
own history and culture, and sought Ukrainian culture’s roots in the European 
cultural tradition. For a centralized state such as the Soviet Union, free spirit 
and independent thinking were much more dangerous social trends than 
excessive privacy or material welfare. In Moscow’s view, the freedom allowed 
by Ukrainization extended to thoughts about political separatism, a 
phenomenon that outgrew aspirations for cultural independence. 
Through party purges and repression, the state stigmatized Budynok 
Slovo as a “nest of nationalists,” and its autonomous social and intellectual 
space was denied to be absorbed into a larger space of politics and ideology. 
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Creative art was gradually transformed into the art of living and surviving 
under the terror, skills that not every artist could afford or wanted to learn. The 
state and the secret police fragmented the community of the slov’iany, and not 
surprisingly, the value of their social space and its original meaning were 
altered for people. This change was conditioned by the physical destruction of 
the community, and by people’s moral and intellectual transformations that 
were accompanied by newly developed behavioral trends. The residents 
became suspicious of each other, and social contacts among them were 
minimized. 
The evidence suggests that being a Ukrainian in Ukraine in the 1930s 
meant a probable persecution, but being a critically thinking individual, 
actively involved in Ukrainian social, cultural and political affairs, meant 
definite arrest, and almost always definite death. By the late thirties, in the 
building no stone was left unturned. Most residents were repressed, and there 
was no apartment in Budynok Slovo that had not been searched by the 
GPU/NKVD multiple times. Arrests in the building became so habitual and 
ritualistic that secret agents no longer treated the residents with visible disgust 
or hatred. The searches were often conducted in silence, and the operatives 
were emphatically indifferent to the inhabitants of the apartment.
30
 They were 
usually focused on the search procedure, and treated the arrested as an “empty 
space” (pustoe mesto), using Eugenia Ginzburg’s observation.
31
 The future 
                                                          
30
 To be sure, some agents still enjoyed humiliating and intimidating the arrested, as in Ivan 
Maistrenko’s case. Maistrenko who was arrested just before the Great Terror in December 
1936 remembered that NKVD agents, reading his correspondence with his wife who spoke 
and wrote in Russian, treated her with great respect, and chastised him for his use of 
Ukrainian, calling him a “nationalist.” See Ivan Maistrenko, Istoriia moho pokolinnia: 
Spohady uchasnyka revoliutsiinykh podii v Ukraini (Edmonton, Canada: Kanads’kyi Instytut 
Ukrains’kykh Studii, Al’berts’kyi Universytet, 1985), 203. 
31
 Eugenia Ginzburg, Journey into the Whirlwind, trans. Paul Stevenson and Max Hayward 
(New York: A Helen and Kurt Wolff Book Harcourt, Inc., 1995), 52. 
 494 
 
scenario of processing the individual was carried out de fideli, and the final 
result of the night event was obvious for everyone in Budynok Slovo: the 
arrested would never return home; their wives would likely be arrested; their 
possessions would be confiscated; and the apartment would be appropriated by 
the secret police.
32
 Stalin’s lists predetermined the fates of many slov’iany, 
and the Special Collegium, troikas and dvoikas passed their verdicts 
unanimously on the basis of Stalin’s decision. 
Early November 1937 marked the end of those slov’iany who had 
survived to that point. Today we know who signed the final verdicts of 
execution: the head of the NKVD troika in Leningrad oblast’ Leonid 
Zakovskii (Genrikh Shtubis), the second secretary of the VKP(b) committee in 
Leningrad oblast’ Piotr Smorodin and the prosecutor in Leningrad oblast’ 
Boris Pozern. After November 1937, Zakovskii was even promoted to 
positions in the central apparatus of the NKVD, and worked as an assistant to 
the People’s Commissar. Not surprisingly, he was arrested and shot as a 
counterrevolutionary on 29 August 1938, as were many of his colleagues, 
including the head of the Solovky prison Ivan Apeter and his assistant Piotr 
Raevskii.
33
 Smorodin and Pozern met the same violent death, and were 
executed on the same day—25 February 1939. 
The bodies of many of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, disfigured and 
mutilated, cannot be found or identified. The slov’iany, the “executed 
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renaissance,” have only symbolic graves, such as those of Kurbas in Kharkiv 
and of Epik in Kyiv. They were buried together with many thousands of 
people in the frozen soil of Karelia in pits dug by their fellow prisoners. 
Sandarmokh also became a burial place of the slov’iany’s ideas, novels, poems 
and theatre performances that have never been and will never be 
consummated. They are irrevocably lost, without having had the opportunity 
to be born. The slov’iany goals remain unattainable, and this loss is 
irredeemable. During the period of one decade, the terror tore a hole in the 
fabric of Ukrainian culture that has never been and may never be mended. 
Miron Petrovskii wrote: 
Not only the avant-garde artists were exterminated, their art was exterminated 
through banning from circulation, and thus their fermentative influence on the 
cultural development was interrupted…Subsequent generations were unable to 
inherit the findings of their predecessors as a legitimate tradition—they had to start 
from the beginning... the continuity [of cultural tradition] requires a non-interrupted 
flow…our cultural development began from the beginning, similar to how a reptile 
grows a new tail [after its damage].
34
 
 
The humanistic tradition may incorporate the failure of the slov’iany to reach 
their literary and political goals. Historically, the Ukrainians struggled for their 
self-identity for centuries, and the community of Budynok Slovo neither 
initiated this struggle, nor completed it. Once again it was suppressed by 
authorities. This struggle seems to be a permanent cyclical phenomenon, 
which might never be completed. After decades of Soviet repression, 
Ukrainian culture appeared to be rejuvenating during the years of 
independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, although it is again in 
jeopardy. Pitirim A. Sorokin argued: 
Only petty and relatively valueless cultural systems and congeries fail to revive (and 
there are exceptions even to this rule). Truly great cultural systems and supersystems 
are virtually indestructible. They may be enfeebled, suppressed, or temporarily 
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extinguished; but ultimately most of them reassert themselves and renew their 
development until they have achieved their creative mission. 
35
 
 
Perhaps such striving is the essence of humanism. As Mikhail Epstein noted, 
common sense resists the notion of “the last,” and “the completed.”
36
 What the 
humanistic tradition cannot accommodate is a cultural formula that employs 
violence to suppress goals and cultural aspirations, a formula that Lemkin 
called genocide—a destruction of nations and cultures.
37
 
In the systematic elimination of the intelligentsia, one can trace anti-
Ukrainian, anti-human, anti-aesthetic and anti-intellectual stances of the Soviet 
Communist regime and its faithful servants. The beautiful and subtle was 
doomed, and the crude and unsophisticated was encouraged and promoted. 
The former survived as an aberration in dormant, carefully concealed or 
distorted forms, while the latter victoriously paraded across the cultural 
landscape and ultimately dominated the popular culture. In her study about 
post-war repression in Yugoslavia, Jerca Vodusek Staric observed that the 
state exercised “the terror of subjugating the population to a forcibly installed 
level of ‘vulgarity’ imposed in everyday life…in behavior, family relations, 
literature, architecture and the educational system…which aspired not only to 
control the mind, but also to transform human nature.”
38
 Party leaders 
disguised their anti-aesthetics and vulgarity through dubious ideology and 
pseudo-revolutionary romanticism.    
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            In Budynok Slovo there were 66 apartments. Three of them were not 
residential and belonged to the cooperative’s administration, kerbud (the chief 
of the building) and the kindergarten. The arrests in 63 apartments of the 
building lasted relentlessly until the beginning of the Second World War. A 
decade of terror wiped out 59 people who lived or used to live in the House of 
Writers.
39
 Mykola Khvyl’ovyi and Ivan Mykytenko supposedly committed 
suicide in 1933 and 1937 respectively. The Jewish writers and former 
residents of the building Itsyk Fefer and Leib Kvitko were shot in 1952 
together with other members of the Jewish Anti-fascist Committee. Only 7 
former residents of Budynok Slovo miraculously survived the gulag, Halyna 
Orlivna, Ivan Bahrianyi, Hryhorii Kostiuk, Volodymyr Gzhyts’kyi, Ostap 
Vyshnia, Lidiia Vovchyk-Blakytna and Ivan Vyrhan. Vasyl’ Mysyk whose 
life was intertwined with the building and slov’iany also returned to Kharkiv 
after the war. 
The survivors developed a fear of the place that was associated with 
their torturous past, most never returned to Kharkiv and Budynok Slovo.
40
 
Some emigrated abroad; some relocated to Lviv and Kyiv. The slov’iany 
inhabited places indifferent to their past, places that had a healing effect on 
their souls and did not evoke bad memories. They believed that only a total 
spatial alienation could rejuvenate art in them, bringing them redemption in 
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Lisovyi, Vasyl’ Sedliar, Ivan Padalka, Mariia Padalka, Oles’ Iasnyi, Vira Savyts’ka,  Iurii 
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Volodymyr Koriak, Sofiia Koriak, Antin Dykyi, Anastasiia Dyka, Onoprii Turhan, Ivan 
Mykytenko, Ivan Kyrylenko, Hordii Kotsiuba and Volodymyr Dukyn.        
40
 Vasyl’ Mysyk was an exception.  
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their future. They hoped that the frontiers between the past and the future 
would be eventually erased, and they would be able to reflect on both through 
their art.
41
 A spatial notion such as the geographical distance between the 
place of their suffering and the place of future redemption was supposed to 
cure their psychological traumas. For the most part, this turned out to be an 
illusion. Their present returned them to their past, in turn reducing the 
imaginary spatial and associative distance between Kharkiv and the place of 
their new residence. Unable to forget or to critically perceive the past, they 
extended their suffering into the future—permanently, and without a chance 
for psychological recovery. As the Russian writer and dissident Andrei 
Amalrik has argued, the Soviet system disfigured people’s psyche; individuals 
who were born in the Soviet Union could not be considered quite normal in a 
psychological sense.
42
   
Three slov’iany passed away because of tuberculosis and a psychiatric 
collapse, and hence avoided certain repression: Leonid Chernov-
Maloshyichenko (d.1933), Ivan Dniprovs’kyi (d.1934) and Samiilo Raduhin-
Rashpa (d. 1942). Systematic arrests in Budynok Slovo distressed the 
psychological equilibrium of Samiilo Raduhin and Volodymyr Sosiura who 
found themselves in the Saburova Dacha, a psychiatric clinic near Kharkiv.
43
 
Perhaps, this factor saved them from inevitable arrest. Those who in the 1930s 
                                                          
41
 Gzhyts’kyi’s life after the camps and his creative work is instructive in this respect.  
42
 Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (New York: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1970). On popular acceptance of Stalinism and on popular “historical” cynicism, 
see Adam B. Ulam, “The Price of Sanity” in Stalinism: Its Impact on Russia and the World, 
ed. G.R.Urban (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), 106.  
43
 Dukyna, 540-41; Kostiuk, 1:302-03. 
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moved from Kharkiv to Kyiv and Moscow survived the terror, and were never 
repressed.
44
 
Larysa Krushel’nyts’ka aptly noted that Stalin’s repressions turned the 
graphical representation of the genealogical tree of most Ukrainian 
intellectuals’ families upside down. Many families were completely 
obliterated, others lost a few members, and many other families, even large 
families, were reduced to one or two members who survived the terror.
45
  
“Mapping” this place and time where the slov’iany lived is important 
because Budynok Slovo embodies not only individual histories of Ukrainian 
intellectuals and the cultural history of interwar Kharkiv but its walls preserve 
the memory of unmatched state violence that was disastrous for Ukrainian 
culture and Ukrainian citizenry. Alla Herburt-Iohansen, Maik Iohansen’s wife 
who survived the terror, once stated that stories told by history differ from 
what occurred in reality. The realities of Budynok Slovo were much more 
frightening and hopeless than has been imagined or told.
 46
 Hopefully, this 
study approaches an approximation of the realities, and it broadens the space 
of memory and knowledge about state violence and cultural disruption in 
Ukraine in the 1930s. 
 
                                                          
44
 The list of those who used to live in Budynok Slovo and who were never repressed included: 
Antin Shmyhel’s’kyi, Volodymyr Iurezans’kyi, Arkadii Liubchenko, Mykola Bazhan, Iurii 
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45
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